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Diplomatic and political entrepreneurs and brokers designing and managing euro-Mediterranean politics
The Franco-Spanish paradigm

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**DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS AND BROKERS
DESIGNING AND MANAGING EURO-MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS
THE FRANCO-SPANISH PARADIGM**

A Dissertation of

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I hereby declare that this PhD dissertation submitted is wholly the work of

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Any other contributors or sources have either been referenced in the prescribed manner or are listed in the acknowledgements together with the nature and scope of their contribution.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses how Spain as a rising power in the Mediterranean, has developed its diplomatic strategies and mechanisms to gain diplomatic influence, international recognition and power. On the other side, it also analyses how France as a competing and rival power reacted to those diplomatic offenses and to what extent they became collaborators or competitors.

Geopolitical interests, domestic politics, historical and contextual pre-conditions architected their diplomatic strategy. Political communication and lobbying strategies deployed by them as political entrepreneurs and brokers, were defined to construct a new socio-political imaginary and to gather political and public opinion' consensus in order to achieve planned aims and objectives.

This thesis focuses on the evaluation of the policies propelled by these political brokers and entrepreneurs. In order to propose a valid evaluation system the thesis has implemented a wide number of methodological tools that will allow the researcher to understand –and explain and demonstrate – complex scenarios and dynamics, avoiding generalizations and speculation in the process. In order to do so the researcher has adopted a long-term, multivariable –quantitative and qualitative analysis- that allows a better understanding of political, diplomatic and socio-economic trends, mechanisms and processes. The thesis avoids also a Eurocentric approach and has developed a symmetric discourse aiming at placing European and southern Mediterranean interests at the same level.

This thesis concludes demonstrating that Western leaders, political entrepreneurs and brokers, have been trying to find and support cooperative and collaborative regimes. In parallel, leaders from Southern Mediterranean countries have been playing that game in order to consolidate their leadership. Despite the number of Euro-Mediterranean initiatives, projects and mechanisms European partners did not show a commitment to choosing the right objectives and expectations for the challenges they faced. Therefore, at a managerial level, these policies have been ambiguous and scarcely productive.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AP	Alianza Popular (Spain)
ALN	Armée de Libération Nationale (Algeria)
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
BMENA	Broader Middle East and North Africa
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CDI	Christian Democrat International –Later- Centrist Democrat International
CDSP	Common Security and Defense Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign Policy and Security Policy
CSCM	Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean
CRUA	Comité Révolutionnaire d’Unité et d’Action (Algeria)
EC	European Commission
EAEC	European Atomic Energy Community
EAP	Economically Active Population
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EMFTA	Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
EMPA	Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ETA	Euskadi Ta’ Askatasuna
EU	European Union
FLN	Front de Liberation National
FRAP	Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriota
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCIM	Global Commission on International Migration
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GMP	Global Mediterranean Policy
IEE	Instituto Español de Emigración (Spanish Institute of Immigration)
IEMED	European Institute of the Mediterranean (Catalonia)
IPEMED	Institute de Prospective Économique du Monde Méditerranéen (France)

JDP	Justice and Development Party (Turkey)
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
MEG	Maghreb Europe Gas (Pipeline)
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MEPI	Middle East Partnership
OIC	Organization of Islamic Countries
ODA	Overseas Development Aid
PA	Palestinian Authority
PACE	Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
PP	Partido Popular
PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero Español
SMIC	Salaire Minimum Interprofessionel de Croissance (Minimum Interprofessional Growth Salary)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
UFM	Union for the Mediterranean
UN	United Nations
UNAOC	United Nations Alliance of Civilizations
UNCD	United Nations Conference on Disarmament
UNHDR	United Nations Human Development Report
USA	United States of America
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION, THEORETICAL APPROACHES AND METHODOLOGY.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Mediterranean space has been defined in many ways across history. It has been re-defined recently by Abulafia as the Great Sea.¹ Greatness suggests majesty, power and respect. But it also hints at conflict, ambitions and passions. Braudel, the most acclaimed “mediterraneanist” always acknowledged that he loved the region with passion.² Undoubtedly, the history of the Mediterranean is the history of dichotomies and contradictions, hopes and disillusion.

However, the objective of this research is not to define the Mediterranean space and its complexity/ies. This research does not consider the Mediterranean space as an entity. Nor will it be examined as a commercial area or a space of exchange. For the benefit of this thesis, and beyond its geographical and cultural dimensions, the Mediterranean is understood as a transactional good that has been manipulated, used, and traded, multi-directionally, for political, economic and diplomatic goals. The Mediterranean space, at least for the purposes of this thesis, is not a concept. Rather this dissertation focuses on how two neighbouring countries –Spain and France – have developed their national political and diplomatic interests and strategies in “marketing”, “selling” and “trading” with Mediterranean issues –the Mediterranean as a brand or a product- between mid-1980s until 2010.

Main Objective.

The main objective of this dissertation aims at understanding how both Spain and France have been conceptualizing, designing, implementing and managing policies and mechanisms to lead Euro-Mediterranean politics and to achieve greater diplomatic influence, regional power and strategic leadership within the EU and the southern Mediterranean rim.

Specific Objectives.

In order to address this main objective a number of specific objectives have been defined.

¹ Abulafia, D. (2011): *The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean*. Oxford University Press. However this definition was already used by the Jews.

² Braudel, F. (1996): *The Mediterranean and The Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*. University of California Press. Vol. 1. P. 17.

- To analyse the historical setting that frames Franco-Spanish relations towards the Mediterranean region prior to Spain's accession to the EEC (European Economic Community) in 1986.
- To assess how Spain has been developing a particular communication strategy and rhetoric in order to attract the attention of EU member states with the purpose of gaining diplomatic and political influence and relevance and how, in so doing, it has been possible to develop a communitarian approach towards the Mediterranean.
- To understand how stakeholders and parties have been acting as political entrepreneurs, brokers and opportunists in order to identify political windows that would allow them to pursue partisan or national interests according to a national agenda.
- To examine critically how the rhetoric, the political communication and the diplomatic efforts to design mechanisms and policies to regulate Euro-Mediterranean relations have been failing due to a lack of consistency and theoretical and pragmatic misconceptions. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership and especially migration-related issues will be discussed in in this context.
- To examine how and why Spain and France as political and diplomatic entrepreneurs and brokers have been managing symbols and deploying political and diplomatic rituals in order to pursue and achieve their political objectives across the Euro-Mediterranean region.
- To understand how political and diplomatic continuity or discontinuity may disrupt national or international strategic objectives and to examine the extent they can be the cause of failures or successful experiences within complex projects involving a very wide array of stakeholders and expectations.
- To critically assess the political, social and budgetary responsibility of governments and involved stakeholders both from the Southern Mediterranean rim and the EU in a number of failed experiences, communicational strategies, promises and objectives, and, to gain an understanding of how the evolution of the historic, political and economic cycle have shaped, and impacted on, the implementation of such mechanisms, policies and strategies over time.
- To examine the role that migration policies and dynamics from 1990 to 2010 have had in challenging the consistency of the EU policies, mechanisms and objectives and in widening the gap between Northern and Southern Mediterranean stakeholders.

Research Questions.

- Do political communication strategies define the success or failure of political entrepreneurs, brokers and institutions?
- Is there coherence and consistency in how political entrepreneurs, brokers and institutions define their communication strategies and how they behave in practice?
- Did migration related issues challenge the mechanisms and processes created, designed, implemented and institutionalized by political entrepreneurs, brokers and European institutions.
- Did these political entrepreneurs and brokers really take into consideration southern partners and the development of consistent and long-term cooperative policies?

1.1. Literature Review.

The scholarly debate on the Mediterranean as a concept is large and has been growing over the last decade. However “the Mediterranean”, as a concept, was considered by scholars in the early nineteenth century, as Chambers highlights.³ As a subject its changing nature is related to modern geographical, political and historical classifications and interpretations that have been mostly determined by a European approach. During the 1920s and 1930s authors like Monroe and Norwich explored the historical, cultural and political nature of this sea.⁴ But the Mediterranean as a subject for scholarship in the modern era was definitely launched by Braudel in 1949 when he published his classical “Mediterranean corpus”.⁵

In considering geographical, cultural, social, political, economic and organizational factors Braudel stressed that the Mediterranean is not a single sea, but many seas. This is in fact a very powerful idea because it removes the Mediterranean from a monolithic conceptualization. However, within this apparent dynamism, Braudel conceded more importance to the ecological, geographical and physical space rather than to human agency. The heritage of this school of thought was very strong evidenced in Horden and Purcell’s 2000 work on the nature of a corrupting sea.⁶

³ Chambers, I. (2008): *Mediterranean Crossings: The Politics of an Interrupted Modernity*. Duke University Press.

⁴ Norwich, J.J. (2007): *The Middle Sea: A History of the Mediterranean*. Doubleday. First edition, 1929; Monroe, E. (1938): *The Mediterranean in Politics*. Oxford University Press. First edition, 1938.

⁵ Braudel, F. (1996): *The Mediterranean: And the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philippe II*. University of California Press. Vols. 1 and 2.

⁶ Horden, P. and Purcell, N. (2000): *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History*. Blackwell Publishers.

Continuing with the interdisciplinary but historical methodology Abulafia has challenged the Braudelian perspective through a number of publications mostly since 1994.⁷ In 2003 Abulafia challenged Braudel and some other authors like Horden and Purcell because he considered that they were not successful in paying enough attention to human agency.⁸ This perspective and approach ended up with his book on the human history of the Mediterranean, where geography and the physical spaces are shaped, understood and managed by actors, not the other way around.⁹

Conceptually speaking, this represents a crucial contribution to the study of contemporary complex realities and spaces, such as the Mediterranean basin. This research represents the most suitable approach for international relations, politics or diplomacy related issues. On one hand it recognises the value of these Mediterranean “seas” as a scenario and on the other hand it acknowledges how human agency has defined, structured and managed these dynamic scenarios as trading goods for shoring up and underpinning the attainment of political objectives and diplomatic influence and leadership.

1.1.1. Franco-Spanish Rivalry.

With regards to Franco-Spanish relations, Laia Mestres has asked whether they are relations among friends, partners or allies.¹⁰ Relations between these neighbouring countries are rooted in the very beginning of imperial history. The Pyrenees as the barrier that naturally separates Spain from France is one of the most stable and oldest boundaries in Western Europe since the Roussillon was annexed to France in 1659-1660.¹¹ However, this “sleeping” boundary that could be seen as synonymous with peaceful coexistence does not directly translate into a lack of conflict, as Sahlins has pointed out.¹²

For instance, Rule has studied the Franco-Spanish rivalry between 1462 to 1700.¹³ Schroeder has analysed the rivalry between France and the Habsburgs, thus shedding light

⁷ Abulafia, D. (1994): *A Mediterranean Emporium: The Catalan Kingdom of Majorca*. Cambridge University Press.

⁸ Abulafia, D. (Ed.) (2003): *The Mediterranean in History*. Thames and Hudson, London.

⁹ Abulafia, D. (2011): *The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean*. Oxford University Press.

¹⁰ This definition was done by Juan Carlos I in 1999 during the first State visit of Jacques Chirac to Spain. Mestres I Camps, L. (2005): Veinte Años de Cooperación Entre España y Francia: Amigos, Socios o Aliados? *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*. N°75. Pp. 151-172.

¹¹ Stewart, D. (1965): *Assimilation and Acculturation in Seventeenth-Century Europe: Roussillon and France, 1659-1745*. Greenwood Publishing Group. P. 13.

¹² Sahlins, P. (1989): *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees*. University of California Press. Pp. 1-2.

¹³ Rule, C.J. (1999): “The Enduring Rivalry of France and Spain ca. 1462-1700” In Thompson, W.R. (Ed.): *Great Power Rivalries*. University of South Carolina. Pp. 31-59.

and understanding on the period of the Thirty Years War and the signing of the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1658.¹⁴ Folmer and Hoffman have also written about the Franco-Spanish rivalry but concentrated on North America over a period of 200 years.¹⁵

Continuing with this historical perspective, Soumille wrote about the Franco-Spanish rivalry in the Maghreb during, before and after the French revolution concentrating on the defence of the Catholics over that period.¹⁶ The same rivalry continued and increased after 1808 when France was defeated during the Peninsular War due to the intervention of the Britain, as Esdaile has studied.¹⁷ This episode had an enduring impact on Spanish-French relations and deepened future tensions. Due to geostrategic interests, North Africa has been a regular stage for Franco-Spanish disputes in more recent times. For instance, Ybarra Enríquez analysed Franco-Spanish rivalry during the decolonization of the Maghreb between 1951 and 1961.¹⁸ Franco-Spanish disputes and tensions concentrated over that period predominantly on Morocco. Both countries were claiming sovereignty or influence over a number of territories as Maghraoui has analysed.¹⁹

Aside from these episodes, but influenced by this long-standing rivalry, France was very reactive against Franco's regime between 1945 and 1975. Especially during 1946 France closed the border with Spain and, along with Britain and the US, signed off on the Tripartite Declaration.²⁰ One of the most relevant aspects that determined the lack of Franco-Spanish collaboration was the terrorist question since the 1940s.²¹ As an example of this lack of collaboration and rivalry, France did not collaborate with Spain in the fight against terrorism until 1989 when the Guardia Civil was allowed to act in France even though very few

¹⁴ Schroeder, P.W. (1999): "A Pointless Enduring Rivalry: France and the Habsburg Monarchy: 1715-1918". In Thompson, W.R. (Ed.): *Great Power Rivalries*. University of South Carolina. Pp. 60-85.

¹⁵ Folmer, H. (1953): *Franco-Spanish Rivalry in North America. 1524-1763*. A.H. Clark Co. California;

Hoffman, P. (1984): The Chicora Legend and Franco-Spanish Rivalry in La Florida. *The Florida Historical Quarterly*. Vol. 62. N°4. Pp. 419-438.

¹⁶ Soumille, P. (1991): Rivalites Franco-Spagnoles Avant et Pendant la Revolution Française. *Awraq*. Estudios Sobre el Mundo Árabe e Islámico Contemporáneo. N°12. Pp. 179-195.

¹⁷ Esdaile, C. (1988): War and Politics in Spain, 1808-1814. *The Historical Journal*. Vol. 31. Issue 2. Pp. 295-317; Esdaile, C. (2003): *The Peninsular War: A New History*. Palgrave Macmillan.

¹⁸ Ybarra Enríquez, N.C. (1998): *España y la Descolonización del Magreb: Rivalidad Hispano-Francesa en Marruecos 1951-1961*. UNED, Madrid.

¹⁹ Maghraoui, A. (2003): Ambiguities of Sovereignty: Morocco, The Hague and The Western Sahara Dispute. *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 8. Issue 1. P. 121.

²⁰ Güell, C. (2009): *Las Potencias Internacionales Ante la Dictadura Española, 1944-1955*. Aresta, Madrid. P. 108; Basora, A. (2009): "US-Spain Relations from the Perspective of 2009" In CIDOB: *International Yearbook 2009*. Bellaterra. P. 92.

²¹ Hualde Amunarriz, X. (2010): La Question Basque. Un Factor de Tensión entre Francia y la España Franquista, 1945-1975. *Revista de la Fundación Sancho el Sabio*. N°32. Pp. 95-116.

extraditions have occurred since 1984. This change was possible from 1988 when a socialist government closer to Spanish government came to power.²²

If rivalry has been a dominant theme of the literature, there have also been times and contexts when Spain and France have cooperated. Temple-Patterson's study of their joint plan to invade Britain in 1779 provides one such example.²³ Trade relations and competition explain this. As Nichols and Murray have shown, Britain was increasingly jeopardising Spain's monopoly in the Latin American and Caribbean region.²⁴

In considering the aforementioned Moroccan War of Independence, France and Spain collaborated in 1958 during the Operation Ecouvillon against the Armée de Liberation Nationale (ALN) in the Western Sahara.²⁵ The most intense collaboration between Spain and France was possible after 1989 when both countries started to work together against Euskadi ta' Askatasuna (ETA).²⁶ This cooperation improved relations between the two countries and allowed a more fluent communication especially, during Felipe Gonzalez's era of rule and Aznar's first term in office.

In considering this historical rivalry and the episodic cooperation, this past has shaped and conditioned, partially, contemporary Franco-Spanish relations and has been well studied by authors like González del Miño.²⁷ In fact, until Spain joined the EEC in 1986, the Pyrenees blocked the communication and political interaction between the two countries. Even in 1994 authors like González del Miño highlighted this lack of understanding, alliance and affinity despite the absence of war over the previous 180 years.²⁸

As shown above the historical rivalry between the two countries has been broadly studied. However, even though there is evidence of Franco-Spanish rivalry since the 1990s, this thesis aims at explaining how these long-standing rivalries have affected the Euro-

²² Morán Blanco, S. (1996): *La Cooperación Hispano-Francesa en la Lucha Contra ETA*. Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Doctoral dissertation. Pp. 414-416.

²³ Temple-Patterson, A. (1960): *The Other Armada: The Franco-Spanish Attempt to Invade Britain in 1779*. University of Manchester Press.

²⁴ Nichols, R.F. (1933): Trade Relations and the Establishment of the United States Consulates in Spanish America, 1779-1809. *The Hispanic American Historical Review*. Vol. 1. N°3.P. 289-313; Murray, D. (1980): *Odious Commerce: British, Spain and the Abolition of the Cuban Slave Trade*. Cambridge University Press. P. 8.

²⁵ Op. Cit. Maghraoui, A. (2003): P. 123. See also: Mohsen-Finan, K. (2002): The Western Sahara Dispute and UN Pressure. *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 7. Issue 2. Pp. 1-12.

²⁶ Bask independentist group created in 1959.

²⁷ González del Miño, P. (1988): Las Cumbres Hispano-Francesas: Nueva Diplomacia Entre Vecinos. *Cuadernos de la Escuela Diplomática*. N°1. Pp. 159-174; González del Miño, P. (1991): *La Heterogeneidad de las Relaciones Bilaterales Hispano-Francesas Durante el Cambio Político Español: 1969-1986: Sus Constantes y Sus Variables*. Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

²⁸ González del Miño, P. (1994): "Las Relaciones Bilaterales Hispano-Francesas" In Calduch, R. (Ed.): *La Política Española en el Siglo XX*. Ediciones de las Ciencias Sociales. Pp. 223-235.

Mediterranean process. In order to do that, it will be explained how, when and why France and Spain have been cooperating or competing for Euro-Mediterranean diplomatic and political influence and power. Therefore for the purposes of this dissertation, understanding the nature of the Franco-Spanish rivalry should be interpreted as a parallel aspect not as a central one. In considering this comment as it is possible to appreciate in the table of contents, the attention devoted to Spain and France is clearly inclined towards the former one. The reason of this is mostly related to the main and specific objectives specified above as well as to methodological related aspects as it is going to be commented below.

According to the main and specific objectives, the dissertation has taken into consideration specific case-studies that have been relevant to understand how political entrepreneurs, brokers or opportunists have understood the Mediterranean as a political window to get higher penetration and diplomatic weight within the EU. Even though Spain and France have clear interest in the Mediterranean their approaches have been different. On one hand, France represents a much stronger European stakeholder when it comes to its influence in the Mediterranean. Mostly in North Africa, where its industrial, trading and economic power is much more solid and structured than the Spanish one.²⁹

As it is going to be demonstrated in chapter 9, until the arrival of Sarkozy as French president, France's foreign policy was more focused on economic and industrial diplomacy. Before Sarkozy, France was not acting as a leading political entrepreneur or broker trying to sell the Mediterranean to gain diplomatic stature within the EU as Spain did. This factor explains why the thesis focuses more on Spain's actions. As the thesis focuses on explaining how political brokers and entrepreneurs set their political agenda based on national interests the relevant case-studies to understand this dynamics gravitate in favour of Spain.

As per the objectives of this dissertation, the strongest Franco-Spanish rivalry before the establishment of the Barcelona Process, was related to the French clear opposition to Spain's accession to the EEC. This is analysed in chapter 5. After 1985, Spain deployed its brokering and entrepreneurial strategy to sell the Mediterranean to Europe. France accompanied the process supporting these initiatives with more or less intensity as a European member while its attention was concentrated on economic and industrial issues. The second episode of clear rivalry that is analysed in this thesis is the French proposal to create the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). This is analysed in chapter 9. These are the

²⁹ Anon. (2013): France-Morocco Economic Relations. *France Diplomatie*. Available at: www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/morocco-285/france-and-morocco/economic-relations6307 (Retrieved 14 May 2014)

two more relevant case studies that better illustrate the rivalry between two countries acting as political entrepreneurs and brokers.

In considering Mediterranean politics, whereas Spain acted as a major entrepreneur and broker in launching the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) -1995 to 2005- and the Alliance of Civilizations –founded in 2005- France just led the first steps of the UfM – formed in 2008- and this episode evidenced a clear example of rivalry between the two countries.

1.1.2. Mediterranean Politics.

Representative scholarly work on Mediterranean politics is both very available and fragmented. For the purpose of this dissertation six main policies and mechanisms will be considered: The Mediterranean Global Policy, The 5+5 Dialogue, the Barcelona Process or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Alliance of Civilizations (AoC) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). Embedded within the chapters, the thesis will also analyse some other parallel Euro-Mediterranean initiatives such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), the Mediterranean Forum launched by Egypt in 1994, the Eurofor and Euromarfor and the MEDA programme.

With regard to the operational point of view of these six policies and mechanisms this part of literature review will conclude and coincide with three points. First, Gómez has stated that these policies have demonstrated the EU's ability and capacity "to embark upon strategic foreign policy behaviour but that the ability to consistently translate strategic objectives into effective action is not yet in evidence".³⁰ Second, as Monar has stressed, the EU's policy in the Mediterranean "suffers from the gap between its apparent potential to act and its actual performance".³¹ Third, as Schimmelfennig, Sasse and Gänzle have highlighted, EU policies and mechanisms in following union member's needs, ambitions and strategic interests through the different enlargements, face two kinds of entrapments: a rhetorical entrapment and a procedural entrapment.³² These three elements will form part of the analysis and argument of this thesis.

³⁰ Gómez, R. (2003): *Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Strategic Action in EU Policy?* Ashgate Publishing House

³¹ Monar, J. (1998): Institutional Constraints of the European Union's Mediterranean Policy. *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 3. N°2. P. 39.

³² Schimmelfennig, F. (2001): The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. *International Organization*. Vol. 55. N°1. P. 47; Gänzle, S. (2009): EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy: A Framework for Analysis. *Europe-Asia Studies*. Vol. 61.

1.1.2.1. EEC/EU Foreign Policy and the Global Mediterranean Policy.

The development of EU foreign policy corresponds to the EU institutional building process. Therefore the development of such a policy has corresponded and evolved according to the needs and strategic interests of member states. National needs, preferences and interests marked the way that EU foreign policy has evolved, as Bulmer and Moravcsik have studied.³³

This idea will be valuable to understanding the role as political entrepreneurs that certain countries, like Spain or France, have played in designing and lobbying for new proposals – i.e. the Euro-Mediterranean policy – to define and develop a more integrative EU foreign policy. This has made defining the contours of the EU foreign policy slow.

As Smith has highlighted, European co-operation with regards to both foreign policy and security was completed in its third decade.³⁴ In 1970 the European-Political Co-Operation (EPC), was created and it transitioned in 1991 to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) before the defence integration within the framework of the European Council of Cologne and Helsinki took place in 1999.³⁵

In considering the aforementioned facts, EU foreign policy towards the Mediterranean has followed its own dynamic. Bicchi has studied EU foreign policy towards the Mediterranean since 1957 to contemporary times.³⁶ Joffé has explained that the beginning of the Mediterranean policy started in 1956 with the intention of decreasing the economic dependence and implications of North African countries towards Europe after the French decolonization process.³⁷

However it is important to note that from 1957 to 1972 EU foreign policy was non-existent. Nevertheless European foreign policy towards the Mediterranean rapidly integrated the political and diplomatic agenda due to the geo-strategic interest of the Middle East. In 1970 the six original members of the union gathered in Munich to discuss the framework that constituted European Political Co-Operation.

N°10. P. 1716; Sasse, G. (2008): The European Neighbourhood Policy: Conditionality Revisited for the EU's Eastern Neighbours. *Europe-Asia Studies*. N°60. 2.

³³ Bulmer, S.J. (1983): Domestic Politics and European Community Policy Making. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. N°21. Pp. 349-363; Moravcsik, A. (1993): Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Inter-Governmentalist Approach. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. N°31. Pp. 19-56.

³⁴ Smith, M.E. (2000): Conforming to Europe: The Domestic Impact of EU Foreign Policy Co-Operation. *Journal of European Public Policy*. N°7. Vol. 4. P. 614.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Bicchi, F. (2007): *European Foreign Policy Making Towards the Mediterranean*. Palgrave Macmillan. London.

³⁷ Joffé, G. (1997): Europe and North Africa. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*. Vol. 10. N°2. P. 86.

As Monar and Nuttall have noted, the first topic to be discussed related to the Middle East.³⁸ Calabrese by quoting Western European officials reminds us that they have always asserted that European interests cannot be separated from the Mediterranean basin.³⁹ This was also valid for the US approach and geo-strategic interests towards the Mediterranean, as Pero has shown in the period 1968-1976.⁴⁰

As Tayfur has mentioned, the EEC's interest in developing a policy towards the Mediterranean was mostly motivated by the changing nature of security challenges.⁴¹ In fact two years after the constitution of the EPC, in 1972, it launched the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP). As Tsoulakis mentions, the implementation of the GMP coincided with major politico-economic events like the energy crisis and the empowerment of both OPEC and southern countries.⁴² With regards to the potential challenges the Euro-Mediterranean region had to face with regards to the EEC enlargement and the interactions with Southern Mediterranean countries Pomfret and Koliris have studied the economic implications and trade of the GMP.⁴³

1.1.2.2. The 5+5 Dialogue.

The availability of scholarly literature on the 5+5 Dialogue is limited and it is rarely examined as a stand-alone research topic. Most of the journal papers dealing with this issue embed it within issues related to the EMP and other policies and mechanisms. Joffé has explained that the 5+5 initiative was launched by President Francois Mitterrand at the beginning of the 1980s during a period when French politics was still very much focused on North Africa.⁴⁴

Barbé, Mestre I Camps and Soler I Lecha have studied how after French interest in the Mediterranean started to fade during the second half of the 1980s, Bettino Craxi, Prime

³⁸ Monar, J. (1998): Institutional Constraints of the European Union's Mediterranean Policy. *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 3. N°2. P. 39; Nuttall, S. (1997): "Two Decades of EPC Performance" In Regelsberger, P., De Schoutheete, P. and Wessels, W. (Eds.): *Foreign Policy of the European Union*. Lynne Rienner. P. 24.

³⁹ Calabrese, J. (1997): Beyond Barcelona: The Politics of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. *European Security*. Vol. 6. Issue. 4. Pp. 86-110.

⁴⁰ Pero, M. (2001): Kissinger e la Politica Estera Americana nel Mediterraneo: Il Caso Portoghese. *Studi Storici*. N°4. P.1.

⁴¹ Tayfur, F. (2000): Security and Co-Operation in the Mediterranean. Working Paper. University of Ankara. Available at: <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/FatihTayfur.pdf> (Retrieved 5 May 2013).

⁴² Tsoulakis, L. (1977): The EEC and the Mediterranean: Is "Global" Policy a Misnomer? *International Affairs*. Vol. 53. N°3. P. 422.

⁴³ Pomfret, R. (1981): The Impact of the EEC Enlargement on Non-Member Mediterranean Countries' Exports to the EEC. *The Economic Journal*. Vol. 1. N°363. Pp. 726-729; Koliris, P. (1984): Global Mediterranean Policy Implications in View of the New EEC Enlargement. *Journal of Agricultural Economics*. Vol. 35. Issue. 3. Pp. 319-329.

⁴⁴ Op. Cit. Joffé, G. (1997): P. 97.

Minister of Italy, looking to strengthen the socialist alliance with Spanish president Felipe González, re-launched the 5+5 dialogue.⁴⁵

1.1.2.3. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).

The launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, or Barcelona Process, from 1995 onward resulted in an increase of scholarly work related to Euro-Mediterranean issues. As Joffé has stated, the EMP represented the culmination of European political, diplomatic and economic attempts to design and implement a common policy towards the Mediterranean during and after the end of the Cold War.⁴⁶ Gomez and Barbé have studied the first stages of the partnership and how it was negotiated.⁴⁷

Joffe, Branch, Marquina, Brad, Liotta, Hahn, Montanari and Gillespie among others have studied the implications, limitations and challenges of the EMP since its inception in 1995 focusing on issues including politics, development, economics and trade.⁴⁸ Gillespie, has studied how the architecture and philosophy of the Barcelona Process was challenged by the events of September 11, 2001,⁴⁹ while authors like Suzan have examined the new security approach adopted by both the Barcelona Process and the EU to fight terrorism.⁵⁰

Another very important part of the literature has concentrated on analysing the role and influence of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership in dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁵¹ Assenburg has studied how the Middle East conflict can be defined as the main

⁴⁵ Barbé, E., Mestres I Camps, L. and Soler I Lecha, E. (2007): La Política Mediterránea de España: Entre el Proceso de Barcelona y la Política Europea de Vecindad. *Revista Cidob d'Afers Internacionals*. N°79-80. Pp. 35-51.

⁴⁶ Op. Cit. Joffé, G. (1997): P. 86.

⁴⁷ Op. Cit. Gomez, R. (2003):P. 8; Barbé, E. (1996): The Barcelona Conference: Launching Pad of a Process. *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 1. Issue 1. Pp. 25-42.

⁴⁸ Joffe, G. (Ed.) (1999): *Perspectives on Development: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*. Frank Cass, London; Brauch, H.G., Marquina, A., Brad, A. and Liotta, P. (Ed.) (2000): *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for the 21st Century*. Palgrave MacMillan; Gillespie, R. (Ed.) (1997): *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Political and Economic Perspectives*. Routledge; Hahn, M. (2009): *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: The Barcelona Process since 1995*. Diplomica Verlag; Montanari, M. (2007): The Barcelona Process and the Political Economy of Euro-Mediterranean Trade Integration. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. Vol. 45. Issue 5. Pp. 1011-1040.

⁴⁹ Gillespie, R. (2003): Reshaping the Agenda? The International Politics of the Barcelona Process in the Aftermath of September 11. *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 8. Issue 2-3. Pp. 22-36.

⁵⁰ Suzan, B. (2002): The Barcelona Process and the European Union Approach to Fighting Terrorism. *Brookings Institution*. Available at: <http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cusf/analysis/suzan.pdf> (Retrieved 21 May 2013).

⁵¹ Tovias, A. (2003): Israel and the Barcelona Process: The First Five Years. *Israel and Europe*. Pp. 37-51; Peters, J. (1998): The Arab Israeli Multilateral Peace Talks and the Barcelona Process: Competition or Convergence? *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*. Vol.33. Issue 4. Pp. 63-76; Alpher, J. (1998): The Political Role of the European Union in the Arab-Israel Peace Process: An Israeli Perspective. *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*. Vol. 33. Issue 4. Pp. 77-86.

obstacle that has challenged the entire Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) almost since its launch despite the initial optimism.⁵²

Nevertheless, the European Commission, along with some other scholars like Joffe and Vasconcelos, has been also making efforts to show the positive impacts of the Barcelona Process.⁵³ On the economic and trade side, Bensassi, Márquez Ramos and Martínez Zarzano, have concluded that within the Barcelona Process framework, Southern Mediterranean economies have benefited due to an increase of their exports into the EU.⁵⁴

Most of these works, however, provide a northern Mediterranean or European perspective and sometimes reflective criticism is lacking. Examples of initial criticism can be found in Marks who stated that global economic liberalization would promote greater instability in the south. He also argued that any potential success would not depend upon the EU's actions but upon how Southern Mediterranean countries would be able to address and deal with their own instability.⁵⁵

This issue has become the most important and relevant factor of contemporary Euro-Mediterranean politics. Authors like Khader, on the contrary, have been working to re-evaluate a southern point of view and have been criticising Euro-Mediterranean policies and mechanisms due to their lack of consistency, coherence and the attempt to verticalize Euro-Mediterranean relations.⁵⁶

Moreover, the Mediterranean has been also been a place of competition and strategic interest for a number of stakeholders and this has ended up with the design and implementation of a number of parallel initiatives and mechanisms that have contributed to making the panorama more confusing and the policies less efficient. In this sense, Ünven Noi has examined how the EMP has clashed with the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) initiative of the US.⁵⁷ The BMENA was launched in 2004 in Rabat after a meeting called the Forum for the Future. It was conceived by George W. Bush's administration to

⁵² Assenburg, M. (2003): The EU and the Middle East Conflict: Tackling the Main Obstacle to Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 8. Issue 2-3. Pp. 174-193.

⁵³ European Commission (2011): *Europe and the Mediterranean: Towards a Closer Partnership. An Overview of the Barcelona Process in 2002*. Dictus Publishing; Joffe, G. and Vanconcellos, A. (2000): *The Barcelona Process: Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community*. Frank Cass.

⁵⁴ Bensassi, S., Márquez Ramos, L. and Martínez Zarzano, I. (2012): Economic Integration and the two Margins of Trade: The Impact of the Barcelona Process on North African Countries. *Journal of African Economies*. 21(2) Pp. 228-268.

⁵⁵ Marks, J. (1996): High Hopes and Low Motives: The New Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative. *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 1. Issue 1. Pp. 1-24.

⁵⁶ Khader, B. (2001): *Le Partenariat Euro-Méditerranéen vu du Sud*. L'Harmattan, Paris; Khader, B. (2009): *L'Europe pour la Méditerranée. De Barcelone à Barcelone, 1995-2008*. L'Harmattan, Paris.

⁵⁷ Ünven Noi, A. (2011): *The Euromediterranean Partnership and the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: Competing or Complementary Projects?* University Press of America.

foster democracy in the Arab and non-Arab Muslim world through political and economic liberation following a neo-liberal approach.⁵⁸ However, as Dalacoura has pointed out, the objectives were heavily concentrated on economic issues rather than focusing the attention on political reforms or on activating and strengthening non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations.⁵⁹

1.1.2.4. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

As Del Sarto and Schumacher have highlighted, until 2004 the UMP has been the most important mechanism channelling the relations between the EU and Southern Mediterranean countries.⁶⁰ However, the international context between 1995 and 2005 challenged the EMP's philosophy and hypotheses. On one hand the Middle East peace talks did not evolve as the EMP would have desired. The aftermath of 9/11 altered the global scenario, the US promoted intervention in Iraq and the Madrid -2004- and London bombings -2005- contributed to deepening the tensions between the West and the Arab world.⁶¹ On top of that, as Smith has mentioned, during 2004 the EU was enlarged by 10 states, a move that resulted in new neighbours and new external borders that required new policies and mechanisms.⁶²

Within this context the ENP was proposed and launched in 2004. The European Commission's Benita Ferrero-Waldmer explained that the ENP was designed to allow each country to determine the level and the strength of collaboration with the EU that they desired.⁶³ This represents mainly the development of a bilateral policy between the EU and partner countries.⁶⁴ This policy was built upon Romano Prodi's new proposal in 2002 to bring up to speed the EU's foreign policy based on the idea of a "wider Europe" surrounded by a "circle of friends".⁶⁵ This project was described by Prodi as "sharing everything with the

⁵⁸ Sharp, J. M. (2005): The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: An Overview. *US Military*.

⁵⁹ Dalacoura, K. (2005): US Democracy Promotion in the Arab Middle East Since 11 September 2001: A Critique. *International Affairs*. Vol. 81. Issue 5. Pp. 963-979.

⁶⁰ Del Sarto, R., and Schumacher, T. (2005): From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with the Southern Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean? *European Foreign Affairs Review*. N°10. P.17.

⁶¹ Op. Cit. P. 18; Pace, M. (2005): Conclusion, Cultural Democracy in Euro-Mediterranean Relations. *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 10. N°3. P. 427.

⁶² Smith, K. (2005): The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy. *International Affairs*. Vol. 81. Issue 4. Pp. 757-773.

⁶³ Ferrero-Waldmer, B. (2007): European Neighbourhood Policy. *Baltic Rim Economies*. N°148. P. 11. Available at: http://www3.tse.fi/Fl/yksikot/erillislaitokset/pei/Documents/bre/expert_article148_62007.pdf (Retrieved 20 May 2013).

⁶⁴ European Commission (2013): European Neighbourhood Policy. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm (Retrieved 20 May 2013).

⁶⁵ Prodi, R. (2002): A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability. 6th ECSA World Conference. Brussels, 5-6 December. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02-619_en.htm (Retrieved 15 May 2013).

Union but institutions”.⁶⁶ Basically this meant developing a Common European Economic Space where bilateral relations with neighbouring countries would follow mostly economic and not political or institutional procedures.

As soon as it was launched some authors expressed their doubts and criticism over the ENP. Sasse considered that both conceptually and empirically the ENP was weak if the policy is measured against a rationalist conditionality model.⁶⁷ The lack of institutional commitment was one of the most relevant points to be criticised. Lavenex considered that the EU was seeking to expand the legal boundaries by restricting openings of the institutional boundaries.⁶⁸ Fostering economic reforms without considering political and institutional transformations is not realistic. Kelley wondered whether “the potential of ‘everything without institutions’ [would] motivate democratic and human rights reforms?”⁶⁹

This asymmetric relationship has been also noted by Smith, who stated that the ENP was requiring too much from neighbours whereas in return for a number of vague incentives.⁷⁰ Following this rationale, Gänzle noted that the ENP aimed at integrating third countries into “policy-taking” instead of “policy-making” processes.⁷¹ This perspective clashes with the initial hypothesis that the ENP tried to propose that the process would increase the sense of co-ownership.

In considering the Mediterranean sphere, the ENP was intended to strengthen the EMP not to substitute it. However as Natorski has stressed, with the adoption of the ENP, initiatives and objectives proposed by the EMP or the Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East would remain unclear.⁷² Youngs has pointed out that the ENP had to face a number of challenges: the new redistribution of funds among new member states; an increasing bilateralism that clashed with the EMP’s multilateral approach and objectives towards the Arab world; and the increasing claims from Arab countries to be considered according to their particular specificities. According to Johansson-Nogués this

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Sasse, G. (2008): The European Neighbourhood Policy: Conditionality Revisited for the EU’ Eastern Neighbours. *Europe-Asia Studies*. Vol. 60. Issue 2. Pp. 295-316.

⁶⁸ Lavenex, J. (2004): EU External Governance in “Wider Europe”. *Journal of European Public Policy*. Vol. 11. Issue 4. P.680.

⁶⁹ Kelley, J. (2006): New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. Vol. 44. N°1. Pp. 29-55.

⁷⁰ Smith, K. (2005): The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy. *International Affairs*. Vol. 81. Pp. 757.

⁷¹ Op. Cit. Gänzle, S. (2009): P. 1716.

⁷² Natorski, M. (2007): Explaining Spanish and Polish Approaches to the European Neighbourhood Policy. *European Political Economy Review*. N°7. P. 63.

bilateralism represented a step backwards because it increased the possibilities of developing asymmetric relations.⁷³

In addition, this new initiative entailed new political and diplomatic dynamics within the region and increased competition among states. As Bicchi and Natorski have noted, by acting like entrepreneurs EU member states attempted to find new ways to increase their influence and new leadership.⁷⁴ One of the most relevant problems of Southern Mediterranean countries is related to political and democratic reforms. The EMP was inefficient in proposing such changes. With regards to the ENP, as Emerson and Noutcheva have pointed out, the new mechanisms would prioritise economic issues over political reforms.⁷⁵ Therefore unsolved problems for the stability of the region and the promotion of democracy remain as Schimmelfennig and Scholtz have demonstrated.⁷⁶ These elements would undermine the entire argument, rationale and value of the ENP.⁷⁷

1.1.2.5. The Alliance of Civilizations (AoC).

Even though the AoC was adopted in 2007-2008, the scholarly debate on this topic basically coincides with the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the EMP and the proposal of the ENP (2004-2005). Naïr has stressed that “an” AoC would help to soften the increasing tensions between the West and the Arab world.⁷⁸ However this initiative immediately generated controversies, reactions and contributed to political polarization. Bardají and Kamen claimed that this political initiative was inaccurately designed and proposed from a political, budgetary and conceptual point of view.⁷⁹

⁷³ Johansson-Nogués, E. (2004): Profiles: A ‘Ring of Friends’? The Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy for the Mediterranean. *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 9. Issue 2. Pp. 240-247.

⁷⁴ Op. Cit. P. 65; Bicchi, F. (2002): Actors and Factors in European Foreign Policy Making: Insights from the Mediterranean Case. *EUI Working Paper N°47*. Pp. 4-5.

⁷⁵ Emerson, M., and Noutcheva, G. (2005): “From Barcelona Process to Neighbourhood Policy”. In Iemed (Ed.): *Iemed 2005 Yearbook*. Iemed, Barcelona. P. 96.

⁷⁶ Schimmelfennig, F., and Scholtz, H. (2008): EU Democracy in the The European Neighbourhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational Exchange. *European Union Politics*. Vol. 9. N°2. Pp. 187-215.

⁷⁷ Youngs, R. (2005): Ten Years of the Barcelona Process: A Model for Supporting Arab Reform? *Fride Working Paper*, 2. P. 4-5.

⁷⁸ Naïr, S. (2005): “Alianza de Civilizaciones y Diálogo para la Modernidad”. *El País*. 15 March. Available at: http://www.almendron.com/politica/pdf/2005/reflexion/reflexion_0591.pdf (Retrieved 15 May 2013).

⁷⁹ Bardají, R.L. (2005): La Alianza de las Civilizaciones. Elementos Para una Crítica. *Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos. GEES. FAES. Análisis N°77*. Available at: http://www.almendron.com/politica/pdf/2005/spain/spain_2217.pdf (Retrieved 1 May 2012); Kamen, H. (2004): “Qué Alianza? Qué Civilizaciones?” *El Mundo* 10 December. Available at: <http://viaforastore2004.blogspot.ch/2004/12/kamen-qu-alianza-qu-civilizaciones.html> (Retrieved 1 May 2012).

Conceptually speaking, Balci has defined the AoC as the clash/alliance dichotomy and as an initiative that was represented by a “reactionary identity”.⁸⁰ Vallespín, following a similar critical approach, examined the role future stakeholders would play within such a complex mechanism, recognising that this factor would determine the success or the failure of such an initiative.⁸¹

Despite the critics, authors like Petito, have considered that the AoC could contribute to defining the limits of a global political discourse that could contribute to the elaboration of an international political theory.⁸² Barreñada considered that the AoC has been one of Spain’s most innovative proposals due to its cultural and political impulse to fight against global security problems.⁸³ Cajal considered that the AoC was “a Spanish ethical initiative for a lasting world peace”.⁸⁴ Both authors consider the AoC to be a major success of the Spanish diplomacy. Celso has stressed that this policy and multilateral diplomatic effort ensured Spain’s strategy to define a national Post 3/11 antiterrorist policy.⁸⁵

1.1.2.6. The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).

The UfM was adopted by the EU in 2008 after Nicolas Sarkozy introduced the idea of a Mediterranean Union during a speech in Toulon in 2007. The scholarly literature on the UfM, its inception and its developments has followed the same trend as the other policies commented on earlier. Strong criticism mixed with positive reviews. Emerson has pointed out that Sarkozy’s initial proposal was poorly conceived and “awkwardly presented politically.”⁸⁶ Soler i Lecha has pointed out that the proposal of a Mediterranean Union was the initiative that revolutionised most Euro-Mediterranean politics since 2005.⁸⁷

However it also revolutionised European politics. As Balfour and Schmid have commented, Sarkozy’s proposal provoked strong opposition and criticism from Germany

⁸⁰ Balci, A. (2009): The Alliance of Civilizations: The Poverty of the Clash/Alliance Dichotomy? *Insight Turkey*. Vol. 11. N°3. Pp. 95-108.

⁸¹ Vallespín, F. (2005): Alianza de Civilizaciones. *Claves de Razón Práctica*. N°157. Pp. 4-8. Available at: <http://www.hugoperezidiart.com.ar/sigloXXI-cl2012/vallespin-1999.pdf> (Retrieved 1 May 2012).

⁸² Petito, F. (2007): The Global Political Discourse among Civilizations: Mohammed Khatami and Václav Havel. *Global Change, Peace and Security*. Vol. 19. Issue 2. Pp. 103-126.

⁸³ Barreñada, I. (2006): Alliance of Civilizations: Spanish Public Diplomacy and Cosmopolitan Proposal. *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 11. N°1. P.99.

⁸⁴ Cajal, M. (2009): The Alliance of Civilizations: A Spanish View. *Insight Turkey*. Vol. 11. N°3. Pp. 45-55.

⁸⁵ Celso, A. (2009): Spanish Post-3/11 Antiterror Policy: Zapatero’s Tyranny of Circumstances and the Dashing of Good Intentions. *Mediterranean Quarterly*. Vol. 20. N°2. Pp. 11-25.

⁸⁶ Emerson, M. (2008): Making Sense of Sarkozy’s Union for the Mediterranean. *CEPS Policy Brief*. N°155. P. 1.

⁸⁷ Soler i Lecha, E. (2008): “Spain and the Mediterranean: In Defence of the Barcelona Process.” In Barbé, E. (Ed.): *Spain in Europe 2004-2008*. Observatory of European Foreign Policy. N°4. P.1.

through Angela Merkel, because the initiative did not take into account the EU's existing communitarian efforts, policies and mechanisms to deal with Southern Mediterranean partners.⁸⁸ Balfour mentions that the concepts of "Mediterranean Union", "Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean" and the final "Union for the Mediterranean" have not been a semantic evolution. These definitions have been coined in order to be supported by all EU member states.⁸⁹ Gillespie has described and studied how tensions with European and non-European states challenged an initiative that aimed at placing France as leader, promoter and centre of a new Mediterranean political, diplomatic and economic reality.⁹⁰

With regards to Franco-Spanish relations and Spain's reactions to Sarkozy's initiatives, Soler i Lecha has noted that Spain, as the former political leader in the Mediterranean had to react in order to either minimise the impact of the French proposal against the existing EMP or, on the contrary, try to strength it.⁹¹ The main question however remains: Do these new mechanisms and policies overlap or complement existing initiatives? Authors like Aliboni, Joffé, Lannon, Mahjoub, Saaf, Vasconcelos or Ammor describe the final formula and design of the UfM as a continuation of the UMP, and argue that there is more room for initiatives that may contribute to strength Euro-Mediterranean relations.⁹²

⁸⁸ Balfour, R., and Schmid, D. (2008): Union for the Mediterranean, Disunity for the EU. *European Policy Centre*. Policy Brief. Available at: http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/235206674_Union%20for%20the%20Mediterranean.pdf (Retrieved 15 March 2012).

⁸⁹ Balfour, R. (2009): The Transformation of the Union for the Mediterranean. *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 14. N°1. Pp. 99-100.

⁹⁰ Gillespie, R. (2008): A "Union for the Mediterranean" ... or For the EU? *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 13. N°2. Pp. 277-286.

⁹¹ Op. Cit. Soler i Lecha. E. (2008): P. 5.

⁹² Ammor, F.M., and Aliboni, R. (2009): Under the Shadow of "Barcelona": From the EMP to the Union for the Mediterranean. *Euromesco*. Working Paper 77; Aliboni, R., Joffé, J., Lannon, E., Mahjoub, A., Saaf, A. and Vasconcelos, A (2008): *Union for the Mediterranean: Building on the Barcelona Acquis*. European Union Institute for Security Studies.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL APPROACHES

2.1.Theoretical Approaches.

Examining human, political or diplomatic agency in the Mediterranean implies the assessment of how humans, politicians or diplomats act, react, communicate, interact and plan. How they identify their political windows. How they define a certain strategy. How they lobby, bargain and try to gather political and public consensus. How they aspire to lead certain political and diplomatic processes and mechanisms.

Choosing a suitable theoretical approach should comply with the philosophical approach that frames the main and the specific objectives of the dissertation, as well as its methodological apparatus. It would be possible to classify theories of international relations into four different families. First, authors like Waltz, Copeland and Mearsheimer among others, have studied the variables that configure the distribution of power among states.⁹³ Within this category Deutsch, Ruggie or Rosencrance have devoted scholarly efforts to assess trade, financial flows as well as interstate communication.⁹⁴ Other authors like Keohane and Martin have studied the degree of institutionalization among different countries.⁹⁵

Second, as Walt has enumerated there is a group of theories that concentrate their attention on⁹⁶: The study of different types of regimes⁹⁷; the characteristics of bureaucratic and organizational politics, a group of theories that are relevant to this dissertation⁹⁸; the level

⁹³ Waltz, K.N. (1979): *Theory of International Politics*. Random House, New York; Mearsheimer, J.J. (1989): Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and the Future of Security Studies. *International Security*. Vol. 13. N°4. Pp. 54-89; Copeland, D. (2000): *The Origins of Major War*

⁹⁴ Deutsch, K. (1969): *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*. Greenwood, New York; Ruggie, J.G. (1983): "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change. In Krasner, S. (Ed.): *International Regimes*. Cornell University Press, Ythaca; Rosencrance, R. (1986): *The Raise of Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*. Basic Books, New York.

⁹⁵ Keohane, R.O. and Martin, L.L. (2003): "Institutional Theory as a Research Program" In Elman, C., and Elman, M.F. (Eds.): *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraisal in the Field*. MIT, Cambridge, USA.

⁹⁶ Walt, S.M. (2005): The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International Relations. *Annual Review of Political Science*. Vol. 8. Pp. 23-48.

⁹⁷ Fearon, J. (1994): Domestic Audience Costs and the Scalation of International Disputes. *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 88. N°5. P.92; Russett, B. (1995): *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*. Princeton University Press.

⁹⁸ Halperin, M. (1972): *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*. Brookings Institution.

of internal cohesion⁹⁹; as well as the analysis of ideas and doctrines, aspect that is central to this dissertation.¹⁰⁰

Third, authors like Jervis, Mercer or Byman and Pollack –among others- have concentrated their scholarly efforts in assessing both individual and group psychology.¹⁰¹ Within this group of theories and considering a systemic approach it would be important to mention decision theory. Applying this theory to international relations, it is possible to assess, criticize and explain the levels of rationality, coherence and achievement of objectives by studying the behaviour of groups, agents and individuals and how it shapes the decision making process.

This approach is also relevant to this dissertation because the author accepts the transformative and influencing capacity of political actors such as political brokers and entrepreneurs. Therefore, this approach overcomes “structural” perspectives –shared in contradictory ways- by neo-realists and scholars working on world-system theory. As Wendt, has mentioned, this two theories fail to recognize the “mutually constitutive nature of human agents and system structures”.¹⁰²

Fourth and finally, studies developed by Finnemore, Ruggie and Wendt, have been designed to better understand the interconnections between ideas, identities and socio-political discourse.¹⁰³

The aforementioned groups of theories use a wide array of methods that can be borrowed from different disciplines. However, there are theories that might present higher or lower degrees of applicability and are mostly descriptive. Realism and its variations, however, do represent the most applicable framework and its wide acceptance by policy-makers is out of discussion. Nevertheless in considering big families of theories such as idealism, realism, Marxism, functionalism and critical theories, there is a marked trend among scholars and theorists to consider these theories as uncommunicated compartments. This happens to the point that scholars and theorists tend to identify themselves –almost

⁹⁹ Levy, J. (1989): “Domestic Politics and War”. In Rotberg, R. and Rabb, T. (Eds.): *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*. Cambridge University Press.

¹⁰⁰ Goldstein, J. and Keohane, R.O. (Eds.)(1993): *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change*. Cornell University Press. Ythaca.

¹⁰¹ Jervis, R. (1976): *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics*. Princeton University Press; Mercer, J. (1996): *Reputation and International Politics*. W.W. Norton. New York; Byman, D.L. and Pollack, K.M. (2001): Let Us Now Praise Big Men. *International Security*. Vol. 25. N°24. Pp. 107-146;

¹⁰² Wendt, A.E. (1987): The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory. *International Organization*. Vol. 41. Issue 3. Pp. 335-370.

¹⁰³ Finnemore, M. (1996): *National Interests in International Society*. Cornell University Press. Ythaca; Ruggie, J.G. (1998): What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivism Challenge. *International Organizations*. N°52. Pp. 887-917; Wendt, A. (1999): *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

doctrinally- with their theoretical frameworks and therefore, interconnections or mixed approaches can be penalised by the “scholastic” –not scholarly- community.

For the purpose of this dissertation, the author has preferred not to follow a precise theoretical program but integrating theories and approaches that can better serve the purpose of the main objective, the specific objectives and the methodological design of this dissertation. The author has decided to use an interdisciplinary approach that helps to assess with a greater degree of precision complex situations and scenarios related with international affairs *per se*, but also with the aspects related to individual and collective behaviour as well as communication processes as a baseline paradigm. In this sense, the author has used a theoretical framework that may appear initially contradictory, especially when it will be proposed the combination of realism and constructivism.

This dissertation accepts that the realist approach is the most accurate one to understand state’s interests, strategies and decision making process. They are guided first of all by their own interest, the perpetuation of their influence as well as their security. Their interests with regards to foreign policy remain –or should remain stable-, while their alliances might be variable according to the context. However, as political entrepreneurs and brokers, their strategies as well as their decision making process and communicational strategies are more understandable using a complementary approach: constructivism. Constructivism helps to understand how ideas, myths and fears can mould the international system and how, for instance, public opinion can be shaped and manipulated to follow or support political postulates and strategies.

In considering the above mentioned comments, the philosophical backbone of this dissertation is represented by the discussion and the understanding of how on one hand, theory can explain the way practitioners –diplomats and political brokers, opportunists or entrepreneurs- understand their daily tasks and how and why they act. On the other hand, to use and capitalize these practices and experiences to contribute to both the elaboration of applicable theories that can better explain complex processes as well as generating the bases for improving decision making processes and evaluation frameworks. Therefore, the theoretical approach of dissertation aims to shed light and bridge the gap between theory and practice to better explain procedural aspects, decision making processes and agenda setting. Walt has stated that IR theorists have not been able to satisfy the demands of policy and decision makers.¹⁰⁴ A similar view has been defended by Jentleson and Wallace.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ Op. Cit. Walt, S.M. (2005): P. 24.

For the purposes of explaining and achieving the objectives defined in this thesis, the author has identified five main theoretical strands. They have been chosen due to their complementary nature and their convergence towards the main objective of this dissertation as well as with the intention of bridging the gap between theory and practice. They are: the bureaucratic politics model; political marketing; political entrepreneurship and political brokerage; political communication and symbolism management and; realist-constructivism.

Therefore, the theoretical building of this dissertation can be split into two bodies. The first is descriptive and the second one applied. Within the first one, the realist-constructivist approach represents the theoretical baseline that runs transversally across the dissertation. Although apparently contradictory, realist-constructivist together allows the researcher and the reader to understand the decision-making processes versus the communication strategies deployed by political entrepreneurs, brokers and opportunists. Realism is at the base of political entrepreneurs' objectives and strategies from a strategic and decisional point of view. However, in order to get the desired outcomes they have to orchestrate political communication campaigns and strategies to gather the consensus from active and representative stakeholders as well as the public opinion.

In order to underpin this initial theoretical approach the author has selected the bureaucratic political model, political marketing, political communication and symbolism management and political marketing. These frames act as complementary theoretical and methodological approaches that would allow to better understand how, by following realist objectives, political entrepreneurs construct the a new reality in order to get public consensus.

Second, political entrepreneurship and brokerage comply with the exigencies of finding a framework that can be applied to evaluating policies and to improving decision making processes. It also complements the precedent theories.

2.1.1. The Bureaucratic Politics Model.

Understanding decision-making processes in foreign policy has increasingly interested scholars since the 1960s. Since then three waves of scholarly work have dealt with it. The first of those developed by Neustadt who established the theoretical framework based on the observation that “presidential power is the power to persuade”.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ Wallace, W. (1996): Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and Practice in International Relations. *Review of International Studies*. N°22. Pp. 301-321; Jentleson, B.W. (2002): The Need for Praxis: Bridging Policy Relevance Back In. *International Security*. Vol. 26. N° 4. Pp. 169-183.

¹⁰⁶ Neudstadt, R. (1960): *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership*. Wiley, New York. P. 10.

Following this theoretical approach as Rosati mentions, some other authors like Huntington, Schilling, Hilsman were also developing their understanding of how governments define their negotiations with other stakeholders, as well as their decision-making processes.¹⁰⁷ At this level, they have highlighted the correlation between the decision-making process and the bargaining process.

During the second generation scholars led by Allison and Halperin concentrated on developing the initial proposals into a model of bureaucratic politics by systematizing the processes.¹⁰⁸ Allison “solidified the bargaining nature of governmental policy into a decision-making model”.¹⁰⁹ Both Allison and Halperin, by studying some US operations during the Vietnam war in 1968, proposed the model that was finally called “bureaucratic politics”.¹¹⁰

The third generation of scholarly work was again represented by Allison and Szanton.¹¹¹ Steinbruner advanced these studies by applying the cognitive psychology approach to the analysis of political decision-making processes.¹¹² Destler explained how organizational reform would be a valid framework to understand how governments define their foreign policy.¹¹³ Summarizing, these authors developed further the initial ideas and hypotheses of the authors of the first and second generations.

Theoretically speaking this model, applied to US foreign policy, was systematized by Rosati who structured it into four main propositions:

1. “For any single issue, the executive branch of the government is composed of numerous individuals and organizations, with various differences in goals and objectives”.¹¹⁴
2. “No preponderant individual or organization exists; the President, if involved, is merely one participant, although his influence may be the most powerful”.¹¹⁵
3. “The final decision is a ‘political resultant’ - the outcome of bargaining and compromise among the various participants”.¹¹⁶

¹⁰⁷ Rosati, J.A. (1981): *Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective*. *World Politics*. Vol. 33. N°2. P. 234-252; Huntington S. (1961): *The Common Defence*. Columbia University Press; Hilsman, R. (1967): *To Move a Nation*. Doubleday; Schilling, W.R., Hammond, P.Y. and Snyder, G.H. (Eds.) (1962): *Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets*. Columbia University Press.

¹⁰⁸ Allison, G. (1971): *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Boston, Little Brown; Halperin, M. (1974): *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*. Brookings, Washington.

¹⁰⁹ Op. Cit. Rosati, J.A. (1981): P. 234.

¹¹⁰ Allison, G., and Halperin, M. (1972): *Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications*. *World Politics*. N° 24. Pp. 40-79.

¹¹¹ Allison, G., and Szanton, P. (1976): *Remaking Foreign Policy*. Basic Books, New York.

¹¹² Steinbruner, J.D. (1974): *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision*. Princeton University Press.

¹¹³ Destler, I.M. (1972): *Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform*. Princeton University Press.

¹¹⁴ Op. Cit. Rosati P. (1981): P.236.

¹¹⁵ Op. Cit. P. 237.

4. “A considerable gap usually exists between the formulated decision and its implementation”.¹¹⁷

These four propositions do not fit with the profile presented and developed by countries like Spain or France with regards to their foreign policies and decision-making processes. Before explaining these concerns and lack of applicability for this dissertation, it should be noted that some other authors have questioned the applicability of this model in other contexts.

Despite the initial consensus shared by political scientists, sociologists and historians over the three aforementioned waves, since the 1970s the model has started to be criticized.¹¹⁸ Among all the criticism there are at least three that should be taken into consideration for the purposes of this dissertation. Pelmutter and Rosati have specified that the model failed to consider broader issues related to international affairs.¹¹⁹

Hollis, Smith, Permuter and Steiner have criticized the model as mostly presenting a mechanic nature without bearing in mind that the most relevant issue would have been to define the basis to understand the model as a dynamic process as Kaarbo has pointed out.¹²⁰ Finally, Caldwell and Wagner have indicated that the model is not replicable beyond the original specific US case.¹²¹ On top of these three elements, as Kaarbo mentions, the bureaucratic politics model places the president as the figure who is forced to bargain with his advisors and other institutional forces.¹²²

In considering the four aforementioned propositions defined by Rosati and bearing in mind mostly the Spanish and French case, the first two propositions do not apply. However the second and third might apply. Per proposition number 1, Spanish executive branches, especially during Felipe Gonzalez's, Aznar's or Zapatero's governments, were not divided into numerous individuals or organizations defending different goals and objects.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Op. Cit. P. 238.

¹¹⁸ Freedman, L. (1976): Politics and Foreign Policy Processes: A Critique of the Bureaucratic Politics Model. *International Affairs*. Vol. 52. N°3. Pp. 434-449; Art, R.J. (1973): Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique. *Political Sciences*. N°4. Pp. 467-490; Ball, D.J. (1974): The Blind Man and the Elephant: A Critique of Bureaucratic Politics Theory. *Australian Outlook*. Vol. 28. Issue 1. Pp. 71-92.

¹¹⁹ Perlmutter, A. (1974): The Presidential Political Center and Foreign Policy: A Critique of the Revisionist and Bureaucratic-Political Orientations. *World Politics*. Vol. 27. Pp. 87-106; Op. Cit. Rosati, J. (1981): P. 234-252.

¹²⁰ Hollis, M., and Smith, S. (1986): Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making. *British Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 16. Pp. 269-286; Op. Cit. Perlmutter, A. (1974): 87-92; Kaarbo, J. (1998): Power Politics in Foreign Policy: The Influence of Bureaucratic Minorities. *European Journal of International Relations*. Vol. 4. N°1. P.70.

¹²¹ Caldwell, D. (1977): Bureaucratic Foreign Policy Making. *American Behavioural Scientist*. Vol. 21. Pp. 87-110; Wagner, R.H. (1974): Dissolving the State: Three Recent Perspectives on International Relations. *International Organization*. Vol. 28. Pp. 435-466.

¹²² Op. Cit. Kaarbo, J. (1998): P. 70.

On the contrary, they were very much aligned in pursuit common foreign policy objectives. Per the second proposition, the president in the cases under examination in this thesis played a fundamental role in defining foreign policy strategies and holding together the political and diplomatic forces.

The third proposition, however, describes well the way countries like Spain have been defining their strategies to gain diplomatic stature and influence and can be considered as a “political resultant” due to the compromise among involved stakeholders. The fourth element applies completely. As it is going to be demonstrated in chapters 5, 7 and 8, this is a fundamental part of this thesis. Normally it is possible to appreciate gaps between formulated decisions and implementations. This fourth proposition will be valuable to apply to the final Political entrepreneurs model. These elements and considerations make the classic bureaucratic politics model a partially inappropriate approach for this dissertation.

Nevertheless, beyond the aforementioned criticism, some theoretical developments were inspired by this model and they can be applied in order to frame this thesis. Kaarbo has indicated that the bigger part of the existing research on the bureaucratic politics model has concentrated attention on the central importance of power. This is partially due to the fact that researchers are interested in understanding the dynamics of political decision making process, where decision makers, normally should be placed at the top of the organization.

However, putting aside this important part of the literature she has studied and introduced the role of bureaucratic minorities.¹²³ In her research she indicates that these apparently less important groups have an impact in defining foreign policy strategies.¹²⁴ In effect, her research covers a gap explaining the nature and effects of asymmetrical power relations.¹²⁵ These relations are important for understanding, for instance, how Spain was able to develop foreign policy strategies through its European diplomacy. Therefore, per asymmetric power relations, this author considers that, for example, Spanish diplomacy in Europe was a minority –vertical minority – that played a fundamental role in defining and defending Spain’s interests and strategies in Europe.¹²⁶

The limitations of the bureaucratic politics model has raised issues over its suitability for this dissertation. The strongest criticism against this model is that it does not provide a

¹²³ Op. Cit. Kaarbo, J. (1998): P. 67.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Kaarbo differentiates vertical and horizontal minorities. Whereas ‘horizontal minorities’ could be able of manipulating procedures to defend their interests and objectives, ‘vertical minorities’ would work more aligned with the objectives of the central power and would engage in “confidence-building strategies” to convince their superiors about decisions justifying their expertise. Op. Cit. Kaarbo, J. (1998): P. 87.

clear framework to understand how dynamic decision-making processes are structured and defined.

Given that the objective of this dissertation is to provide further understanding of the dynamics of decision-making processes in foreign policy the theoretical framework provided by political entrepreneurship is more suitable, though even this will need to be adapted and reformulated to better meet the purposes of this dissertation.

2.1.2. *Political Marketing.*

Political marketing is one of the elements that operate at the baseline of the process the bureaucratic politics model fails to address and can help provide an understanding and systematization of these operations. Over the last decade, a number of studies have increasingly tried to understand how to apply marketing to politics and political decision-making processes. Newman and Scammell are good examples of those who have been building on older examples like Kotler, Sidney, Tucker or Carman, all of whom proposed the universal application of marketing rules.¹²⁷

More recently, in 2008, Lees-Marshment has formulated a number of questions that are relevant to discussing these connections and to evaluate the practical and ethical impacts of such an approach: What does political marketing mean for political leadership? “Is not political marketing manipulative and only concerned with manufacturing images?” and “how can business concepts be applicable to an area traditionally seen as concerned with ideology and value?”¹²⁸

Beyond these questions, it would also be important to understand the mechanics of such political marketing and how political actors –termed here political entrepreneurs and brokers – design and have designed their strategies to “sell” political and diplomatic “products” aimed at gathering political consensus and politico-economic influence. Therefore, technically speaking, and in order to systematize the marketing, selling and implementation processes, the analysis of how language has been used will be very relevant to understanding the principles of this political marketing. For the purposes of achieving this objective, and anticipating what is going to be explained in the methodological section, , this

¹²⁷ Newman, B. I. (Ed.) (1991): *The Handbook of Political Marketing*. Sage; Scammell, M. (1999): Political Marketing: Lessons for Political Science. *Political Studies*. N°47: 4. Pp. 718-739; Kotler, P. and Sidney, J.L. (1969): Broadening the Concept of Marketing-Too Far. *Journal of Marketing*. N°33. 1. Pp. 10-15; Tucker, W.T. (1974): Future Directions in Marketing Theory. *Journal of Marketing*. N°38. 2. Pp. 30-35; Carman, J. (1973): On the Universality of Marketing. *Journal of Contemporary Business*. N°2. 4.

¹²⁸ Lees-Marshment, J. (2008): Political Marketing. *Journal of Political Marketing*. Vol. 2. N° 1. Pp.2-3.

thesis will apply the framework provided by Corpus Linguistics (CL) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).

2.1.3. *Political Entrepreneurship.*

The concept of political marketing can be more understandable, operationally speaking, by introducing the concept of a political entrepreneur. According to Christopoulos, political entrepreneurs are similar to economic entrepreneurs given that they share “intellectual ability, good knowledge of their domain, team building skills, reputation, extensive networks, strategic vision and tenacity”.¹²⁹ However, the differences, he argues, are related to the fact of “having a different incentive structure in attempting to control or exercise political power”.¹³⁰ The other important operational element that is common to political entrepreneurs is that they are network-dependents and this implies that their “ability for political action is network-contingent”.¹³¹

As stated by Van der Steen and Gronewegen the literature on policy entrepreneurship “is still in its infancy”.¹³² The practical and theoretical understanding has been studied by Kingdon who elaborated the Policy Streams Approach.¹³³ Kingdon explains policy design and formation as the product of the interaction between three streams: The problem stream, the policy stream and the politics stream.¹³⁴ The first element, the problem stream is related to public affairs requiring attention. As Guldbrandsson and Fossum have stressed “some conditions are not even defined as problems until there is something to do about it, i.e. there is a solution (a policy) available and recognized by the politicians”.¹³⁵

Second, the policy stream refers to proposals aimed at inciting changes. According to Guldbrandsson and Fossum, “before a problem can reach the decision agenda, decision makers must be given at least on alternative solution, worked out and ready to put in place”¹³⁶

¹²⁹ Christopoulos, D.C. (2006): Relational Attributes of Political Entrepreneurs: A Network Perspective. *Journal of European Public Policy*. N°13. Vol. 5. P. 757.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Van der Steen, M. and Groenewegen, J. (2008): Exploring Policy Entrepreneurship. Discussion Paper Series on the Coherence between Institutions and Technologies in Infrastructures. WP0801. École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne and Delft University of Technology. P. 5.

¹³³ Kingdon, J.W. (1995): *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*. Longman, London, 2nd Edition.

¹³⁴ Guldbrandsson, K. and Fossum, B. (2009): An Exploration of the Theoretical Concepts Policy Windows and Policy Entrepreneurs at the Swedish Public Health Arena. *Health Promotion International*. Vol. 24. N°4. Pp. 434-435.

¹³⁵ Op. Cit. P. 434.

¹³⁶ Op. cit. P. 435.

Third, the politics stream is related to political issues, changes of public opinion or administration amongst other factors.

Normally these three streams evolve independently and are not necessarily linked. However, when a given problem has been recognized, a partial or total solution for it has been defined and the political environment welcomes changes a policy window appears.¹³⁷ This process facilitates the understanding of public policymaking. As Kingdon has noted, this system can be conceptualized as a set of processes: First, setting an agenda; second, specifying alternatives for such agenda; third, an authoritative choosing process evaluating the existing alternatives and fourth, the implementation of the decision or the law.¹³⁸

Prior to all this Polsby has added a fundamental preparatory process that is important to assess in order to understand better the mechanisms and the possible failures or strengths of a given agenda setting, policy or political process: Policy initiation. It is defined as “the politics of inventing, winnowing and finding and gaining adherents for policy alternatives before they are made part of a ‘program’”.¹³⁹ Roberts and Kings have elaborated an interesting taxonomy that partially explains the characteristics of public entrepreneurs.¹⁴⁰

- Advocacy of new ideas and development of innovative proposals.
- Define and reframe existing problems.
- Search for political alternatives.
- Brokering the new ideas and proposals among a number of representative political or policy actors.
- Mobilizing public opinion through strategies of political communication and public speech.
- Helping to set the decision-making agenda.

With regards to the functional aspects of public entrepreneurs, Roberts and King have identified 4 central stages:

- Creation: An innovative idea is developed and starts to emerge.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Op. Cit. Kingdon, J.W. (1995): P. 35.

¹³⁹ Polsby, N. W. (1984): *Political Innovation in America: The Politics of Policy Initiation*. New Haven. Yale University Press. P.3.

¹⁴⁰ Roberts, N.C. and King, P. (1991): Policy Entrepreneurs: Their Activity Structure and Function in the Policy Process. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*. N°2. P.148. This taxonomy has been elaborated following: Kingdon, J.W. (1984): *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*. Little Brown, Boston; Op. Cit. Polby, N.W. (1984); Walker, J.L. (1981): “The Diffusion of Knowledge, Policy Communities and Agenda Setting: The Relationship of Knowledge and Power” in Tropman, J.E., Dluhy, M.J. and Lind, R. (Eds.): *New Strategic Perspective on Social Policy*. Pergamon Press. New York. Pp. 74-96. Cobb, R.W. and Elder, C.D. (1983): *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda Building*. Allyn and Bacon. Boston.

- Design: The innovative concept is perfected and is encapsulated into a formal statement or proposal.
- Implementation: The new concept or idea has been theoretically approved and is tested to constitute a new initiative or programme.
- Institutionalization: The idea becomes an established practice and is not any longer considered as something innovative.¹⁴¹

For the purposes of this dissertation it is important to note that these four functional and procedural stages developed by Roberts and King are going to be used as a framework to analyse, understand and explain the process that political entrepreneurs and brokers have used to design and implement Euro-Mediterranean politics. The virtue of this model is justified by the fact that it is measurable, replicable and empirically re-testable either in different socio-political and cultural contexts or in considering different issues and political problems. The last two propositions that can be applicable from the bureaucratic politics model developed by Rosati and the characteristics and features of the bureaucratic minorities studied by Kaarbo can be embedded to better describe the entire dynamic process.

Nevertheless, even though these four stages provide the most valid framework to achieve the objectives of this thesis, this model is not entirely satisfactory and it has to be further developed. The four stages –creation, design, implementation and institutionalization– are relevant to analyse how the process evolves since the inception to the institutionalization. However, it analyses a linear process and does not consider the possibility of understanding this process as a cycle.

For the purposes of this dissertation, it is central to understand the consequences of such policies and mechanisms beyond the linear description proposed by this framework. The framework can be completed by introducing a fifth variable: Evaluation. By integrating this factor, it will be possible to analyse an entire cycle. This final vision will be provided in the conclusions. Therefore this design will allow for a dynamic framework that will permit to study and explain these dynamic processes. In considering these elements, in the conclusions, this dissertation will propose the Political Entrepreneurship Cycle (PEC).

2.1.4. Political Brokers.

Traditionally, brokers are defined as middle-men mediating between buyers and sellers. This concept can be applied to policy and decision-making processes. However, the literature on

¹⁴¹ Op. Cit. Roberts, N. and King, P.J. (1991): P. 150.

political brokers is ample, diffused and not always clear. It started to develop during the 1950's. Pye studied the role of political brokers in non-Western societies.¹⁴² He defined political brokers as those “seeking first to differentiate special interests within the society so as to be better able to aggregate those interests as a propagandist basis. The political broker tries to satisfy the largest possible number of people by discovering how their particular interests can be brought together and adjusted to each other”.¹⁴³

According to this description political brokers provide “a common symbolism by aggregating the separate interests of people”.¹⁴⁴ From this point of view, symbolism management will represent one of the most relevant actions of both political brokers and entrepreneurs. These two definitions will be applied in this thesis for the purposes of explaining the role of political brokers as entrepreneurs.

Over the 1970s and the 1980s authors like Valenzuela, Barbaro, and Smith applied a very similar understanding of political brokers by focusing their analysis on local, regional and national politics.¹⁴⁵ In the 1980s Mann researched the role of brokers as entrepreneurs.¹⁴⁶ As it has been stated before, political entrepreneurs and brokers have to be differentiated, even though their roles can be interactive and can overlap operationally.

Since the 2000s a new wave of scholarly works on political brokers has been developing. Beyond the negative features –manipulation– offered by aforementioned works, Pielke wrote about the potential positive impact of “honest brokers”.¹⁴⁷ However, this positive approach is not shared by most authors focused on understanding how political brokers manipulate and manage common or scattered needs to get the desired consensus even trespassing moral and ethical limits in the process.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴² Pye, L.W. (1958 a): Administrators, Agitators and Brokers. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*. Vol. 22. N° 3. Pp. 342-348; Pye, L.W. (1958 b): The Non-Western Political Process. *The Journal of Politics*. Vol. 20. Issue 3. Pp. 468-486; Pye, L.W. (1988): *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimension of Authority*. Belknap Press.

¹⁴³ Op. Cit. Pye, L.W (1958 a): P. 346.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Valenzuela, A. (1977): *Political Brokers in Chile: Local Government in a Centralized Polity*. Duke University Press; Barbaro, F. (1972): Political Brokers. *Society*. Vol. 9. Issue 10. Pp. 42-54; Smith, J.G. (1972): *Political Brokers; People, Organisations, Money and Power*. National Journal Book.

¹⁴⁶ Mann, S. (1984): Brokers as Entrepreneurs in Pre-Socialist China. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. Vol. 26. Issue 4. Pp. 614-636.

¹⁴⁷ Pielke, R. (2007): *The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

¹⁴⁸ Carty, K.R. and Cross, W. (2010): *Political Parties and the Practice of Brokerage Politics*. The Oxford Handbook of Canadian Politics; Larreguy, H.A. (2013): Monitoring Political Brokers: Evidence from Clientelistic Networks in Mexico. EPSA Annual General Conference. MIT; Stokes, C.S., Dunning, T. and Nazareno, M. (2013): *Brokers, Voters and Clientelism: the Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

2.1.4.1. The Mediterranean as a Political Window for Political Entrepreneurs and Brokers.

Bicchi does not differentiate between the roles and characteristics of entrepreneurs and brokers. Therefore it should be necessary to disentangle this conceptual problem. She has suggested that looking at entrepreneurial states as brokers would help to understand these dynamics. In fact, as she has stressed, “once a policy window exists and a policy entrepreneur acts on it, the third factor that leads to development of European foreign policy making is the interaction among member states and EC/EU institutions”.

This argument is very pragmatic and explains well the role of the state as a broker. However, an initial critical point that may arise is related to the consistency and coherence of such speculative proposals beyond this pragmatism. In other words, to what extent the states acting as brokers – as the middle point between decision makers and “political buyers” – are conscious of an issue like political responsibility and the potential negative impacts and collateral damages of such policies? Which kind of reward would they expect from this transaction? What about the sustainability of such proposals that entail the mobilization of important financial resources and hopes? This thesis will address these questions in the course of subsequent chapters as there is a noticeable gap in the literature in terms of research dealing with foreign policy and bilateral relations from this perspective.

In considering these facts, this dissertation will focus on differentiating when a political actor should be denominated as a political entrepreneur or as a political broker –or both simultaneously. It will also explain how a political entrepreneur or broker is able to define a strategy to gather other’s interest to join proposals. In order to understand operationally this objective, the thesis will explain how political entrepreneurs or brokers design, adapt and modify their political speech to gain consensus by understanding changing contexts and scenarios. In accepting that there might be two or more political entrepreneurs or brokers competing for the same political window such as in this case, Spain and France, the thesis will discuss and assess the mechanisms and strategies used by both competitors for attracting consensus.

This point will help explain how alliances have been built and to what extent, beyond the fact of attracting consensus within the short and the medium term, political entrepreneurs or brokers considered the possible consequences and sustainability of their proposals within the medium and long term. Political entrepreneurs appear more far-sighted than political brokers who are more prone to concentrate their energies on the short term.

As Tsoukalis has mentioned, the EEC started to be interested in putting into effect the “Global Mediterranean Policy” (GMP) in response to some major politico-economic events that impacted significantly on EEC-Mediterranean relations.¹⁴⁹ For instance, the oil crisis of 1973 brought more relative power to the Arab oil-producing members of OPEC, in turn “provoking also a shift in the balance of power towards the south”.¹⁵⁰ The establishment of the Euro-Arab Dialogue from 1975 onward marked a very important milestone despite the initial hesitations among EEC members, oil producing countries and southern countries.¹⁵¹ However, as with the Barcelona Process two decades later the GMP was mostly limited to economic measures as it has been explained above.¹⁵²

This approach is useful in explaining how economic, market and strategic interests drove and have been driving Euro-Mediterranean relations and why the Mediterranean was, and is, considered as a political window or opportunity for political entrepreneurs and brokers. Per northern and southern Mediterranean relations the author understands mostly Portugal, France, Spain and Italy – and later Malta and Greece-. Whereas that for southern Mediterranean countries, the author is considering mostly the Maghreb - Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya- and to some extent also Egypt, even though this country represents the part of the Mashrek, the eastern part of the Arab world.

In analysing the 1970s, the EEC was already very interested in the Mediterranean due to both economic and trade objectives. By 1974, the 9.4 per cent of EEC exports went to Mediterranean countries.¹⁵³ The years 1975, 1976 and 1977 were very active in terms of the signing of trade agreements between the EEC and Mediterranean countries.¹⁵⁴ The focus on economics as well as the treatment of the 17 participating Mediterranean countries as a homogeneous bloc was a mistake.¹⁵⁵ Arguably, as will be addressed later in this thesis, this same mistake was repeated in the EMP from 1995 onward. Moreover, northern Mediterranean countries –such as Spain, Portugal, Italy, France- differed from Maghreb

¹⁴⁹ Tsoukalis, L. (1977): EEC and the Mediterranean: Is ‘Global’ Policy Misnomer? *Royal Institute of International Affairs*. Vol. 53. N°3. Pp.422-438.

¹⁵⁰ Op. Cit. P. 422.

¹⁵¹ Allen, D. (1977): The Euro-Arab Dialogue. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. Vol. 16. Issue 4. Pp. 323-342; Al Dajani, A.S. (1980): The PLO and the Euro-Arab Dialogue. *Journal of Palestine Studies*. Vol. 9. N°3. Pp. 81-98.

¹⁵² Op. Cit. Tsoukalis, L. (1977): P. 422.

¹⁵³ Op. Cit. Tsoukalis, L. (1977): P. 424.

¹⁵⁴ Putting aside the EEC-Turkish agreement of 1964, the concentration of agreements started in 1975 with Israel. In 1976 were signed trade agreements with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. In 1977, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. In Commission of the European Communities. (1978): List of Main EEC Agreements With Other Countries. Europe Information, Spokesperson Group and Directorate General for Information. 6/78. Pp. 3-4.

¹⁵⁵ Op. Cit. P. 423.

countries in political terms as according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, they were eligible for full membership with the EEC and “this has a definite influence on the attitudes and policies of both sides”.¹⁵⁶

This structural problem was not solved with the EMP and the same restrictions were present during the Barcelona Process and parallel and subsequent initiatives as explained previously. In considering Europe-Arab relations, the question of attitudes represents probably the most important element that may allow or block any attempt of implementing sustainable policies.

This statement is central to this thesis. In considering Euro-Mediterranean politics and in assessing how political entrepreneurs and brokers –and opportunists- have been designing policies and mechanisms to increase their diplomatic and political power, it is important to understand how asymmetric politico-economic relations operate. The relationship between southern European countries –Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and later Malta and Greece- and Maghreb countries are a clear example of asymmetry. In analysing how political entrepreneurs operate and in bearing in mind the four stages described above –creation, design, implementation and institutionalization –it is implicitly assumed that political entrepreneurs prioritise their self-interest and design policy proposals according to their objectives. However, the introduction of the evaluation of the PEC model will help us to understand the degree of consistency, coherence and political responsibility *vis-à-vis* Southern Mediterranean partners.

This evaluation component of the PEC model assesses to what extent attitudes deployed by dominant political partners, lobbies or political entrepreneurs have really considered the interests and needs of Maghreb partners –and to a certain point Mashrek partners like Egypt- or if, on the contrary, their needs have been used and manipulated to impose EU’s ambitions and objectives. The evaluation component therefore analyses the issue of political responsibility, coherence and consistency that is not implicit in the four stages that were presented in the original model by Roberts and King.

The issue of responsibility would establish the difference between political entrepreneurs, political brokers and opportunists. From this point of view, political entrepreneurs and brokers would be those who integrate in their proposals an ethical concern aimed at producing and generating win-win solutions. Whereas political opportunists are those who design policies and mechanisms aiming at fulfilling and accomplishing their own

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

objectives by manipulating and by speculating on others' needs. The theoretical differentiation of both concepts, are related to the principles that characterize industrial and financial capitalism and how the market power is understood and applied to a wide array of decision making processes as Chandler, Teece, Katz, Doucet, Stern or Neal, among others, have explained.¹⁵⁷

With regards to networks, coalitions and the implementation of new political projects and policies within the Mediterranean, Bicchi has pointed out that “the most effective policy entrepreneurship has come from a state member, state or from a coalition of actors guided by a member state”.¹⁵⁸ This concept is important for understanding the development and evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean political and diplomatic realm, as well as Franco-Spanish engagement and competition in the region.

2.1.5. Political Communication and Sensitive Issues.

This thesis concentrates its attention on how Spain and France have been leading the processes of developing the base of the current Euro-Mediterranean policies. The Euro-Mediterranean region raises certain challenges for policy makers. Political brokers or entrepreneurs have to evaluate and identify how these economic, social and cultural challenges may affect their proposals and therefore they have to adapt their communication strategies in order, first to identify the correct political window or opportunity, and second to convey the message aimed at gathering political consensus.

Within the Mediterranean sphere and especially considering EU-Maghreb relations, sensitive problems like migration flows, security, crime, religion and labour define already potential political windows or opportunities to be developed by political brokers and entrepreneurs. But these categories also carry risks of altering North-South relations due to misconceptions generated by entrepreneurs or brokers when they design their communication strategies.

Theoretically speaking, a political entrepreneur would act and communicate responsibly and would try to use these sensitive issues to promote positive changes and win-win solutions. Whereas political brokers –if they are not understood highlighting their

¹⁵⁷ Teece, D.J. (1993): The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism: Perspectives on Alfred Chandler's Scale and Scope. *Journal of Economic Literature*. Vol. 31. N°1. Pp. 199-225; Katz, M.B., Doucet, M.J. and Stern, M.J. (2002): *The Social Organization of Early Industrial Capitalism*. Harvard University Press; Neal, L. (1993): *The Rise of Financial Capitalism: International Capital Markets in the Age of Reason*. Cambridge University Press.

¹⁵⁸ Op. Cit. Bicchi, F. (2007): P.3.

potential positive virtues- would speculate with these sensitive issues in order to achieve short-term objectives that would entail unilateral benefits.

In considering these comments, research on the influence and impact of the mass media on shaping social processes and politics has increased over the years. As has been noted by Meyer, it is difficult to imagine another phenomenon shaping societies in such a profound, irreversible and intensive way.¹⁵⁹ It would be possible to classify these studies in three main ways.

The first involves the ways the public sphere has been impacted on and transformed by the evolution of the media and Internet and Communication Technologies (ICTs); this is how public communication has been affected by the influence of the media as Dahlgren and Sparks and Curran and Seaton had shown.¹⁶⁰ The second approach addresses the connections between the political sphere and the media. Here, the media is not just the interpretation of the political realm. The media can define a particular political image according to party or ideological interests.¹⁶¹

Other various studies regarding the impact of the media on shaping the political sphere constitute a third identifiable dimension. They contribute to understanding relations between media and politics. These studies by Stanton and Meyer, amongst others, cover a topic that can be described as media democracy.¹⁶²

Although it would be possible to find interconnections among these three approaches, and this author does not dismiss the claims in any, the main theoretical approach considered in this research is rooted in the second one – the relationship between the political sphere and the media. In short, it would be possible to consider political communication as a vector of the media impacting on public opinion and constructing consent without social or political responsibility.

Over recent years, studies on political communication and public opinion addressing sensitive issues such as migration, security, terrorism or environmental security have gained momentum. In the United States, for instance, Cook considers that the media might be

¹⁵⁹ Meyer, T. (2002): *Media Democracy: How the Media Colonize Politics*. Polity, Cambridge.

¹⁶⁰ Dahlgren, P. and Sparks, C. (Eds.) (1991): *Communication and Citizenship: Journalism and The Public Sphere in The New Media Age*. Routledge; Curran, J. and Seaton, J. (Eds.) (2003): *The Press, Broadcasting and New Media in Britain*. Routledge. 6th Edition.

¹⁶¹ Op. Cit. Dahlgren, P. and Sparks, C. (1991); Herman, E.S. and Chomsky, N. (1998): *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. New York, Pantheon; Graber, D.A., McQuail, D. and Norris, P. (2007): *The Politics of News: The News of Politics*. CQ Press; Graber, D.A. (2009): *Mass Media and American Politics*. CQ Press; Perse, E.M. (2001): *Media Effects and Society*. Taylor and Francis, USA.

¹⁶² Op. Cit. Meyer, T. (2002); Staton, C.D. (1994): Democracy's Quantum Leap. *Demos Quarterly*. N°3.

considered a political institution.¹⁶³ This basically means that the media could have the capacity to govern. Surely, these forms of governing, while being very efficient, go beyond the traditional ways of ruling. Adopting the same rationale, Graber, McQuail and Norris do not find deep differences between the politics of news and the news of politics.¹⁶⁴ At a pragmatic level politics and the media work together as agent and shadow.

Entman's work assesses how the media has played a fundamental role in the projection of power within the framework of American foreign policy.¹⁶⁵ Andersen studies the relationship between the media and war during the twentieth century.¹⁶⁶ Experts on the impact of the media on public opinion, like Iyengar and McGrady have set their sights on "protecting" the citizenry from these trends.¹⁶⁷ By accepting the connections between media and politics, it is possible to make the case that governing or acting as a political entrepreneur or broker might require creating images and illusions. As Bennet has concluded, news is the politics of illusion.¹⁶⁸

Very similar theoretical approaches can be found in Europe. For instance, Statham demonstrated that media communication and political communication have been a central argument in making the European Union's scope of legitimacy understandable.¹⁶⁹ Similar lines of research have been recently developed by Triandafylliou, Wodala and Krzyzanski.¹⁷⁰ They demonstrate the intimate connection between the role of the media and political communication and the construction of a European public sphere. In the Russian case, the media impact on changing social values was studied by Rosenholm, Nordenstreng and Trutina.¹⁷¹

¹⁶³ Cook, T.E. (2005): *Governing With the News: The News Media as a Political Institution*. University of Chicago Press.

¹⁶⁴ Op. Cit. Graber, D.A. (2009): P. 22.

¹⁶⁵ Entman, R.M. (2003): *Projection of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy*. University of Chicago Press.

¹⁶⁶ Andersen, R. (2006): *A Century of Media, a Century of War*. Peter Lang.

¹⁶⁷ Iyengar, S., and McGrady, J. (2006): *Media Politics: A Citizen's Guide*. W.W. Norton and Co.

¹⁶⁸ Bennet, L.W. (2008): *News: The Politics of Illusion*. Longman.

¹⁶⁹ Statham, P. (Ed.) (2010): *Political Communication, Media and Constitution Building in Europe. The Search for a Public Sphere*. Routledge.

¹⁷⁰ Triandafylliou, A., Wodala, A. and Krzyzanski, M. (Eds.) (2009): *The European Public Sphere and the Media: Europe in Crisis*. Palgrave MacMillan.

¹⁷¹ Rosenholm, A., Nordenstreng, K. and Trutina, E. (Ed.) (2010): *Russian Mass Media and Changing Values*. Routledge.

2.1.5.1. Welfare and Immigration Policies.

Western Europe is a case that deserves particular attention given that this dissertation focuses on this area. Southern European countries, such as Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Malta and Greece, have to deal with a number of problems relating to international migration flows from the southern Mediterranean. In the beginning of the 1990s, some like Siune and Treuttschler studied the existence of “media politics” in Western Europe.¹⁷² Recent studies on the same region conducted by Ellinas have demonstrated that far-right parties from these countries are using the media to spread extremist, nationalistic and racist discourses.¹⁷³

For any western country, individually speaking, as well as for the European Union as a whole, immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees are portrayed as a danger to the protection of the “national identity” and the welfare state system. This phenomenon has been studied by Huysmans. France, during the 2nd Empire (1852-1870), used the concept of *État-Providence* and Germany, during the 2nd Reich (1871), used the idea of *Wohlfahrtsstaat*, but the idea of the welfare state, a concept in its modern sense, that was coined during the World War II, most likely by William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury, has obtained a value which needs defending, and which was shaped at the same time as the European Union was established.

That is why the European Union has elevated the migratory question to that of security. This explains why the EU communitarized migration policies with the Amsterdam Treaty (AT) in 1997, even though, as Hammar has shown, massive scepticism prevails around the degree of Europeanization of those policies.¹⁷⁴

Thus, the idea of a welfare state is very much rooted in European culture—despite its regional variations—and any potential threat which might jeopardize its continuity constitutes a very profitable excuse, politically speaking, to gain consensus and to maintain a certain social cohesion and balance. Hence, beyond an economic approach, this researcher is very much inclined to do a cultural-symbolic discourse and interpretation of this problem. Weiner wrote that the unwillingness of states to open borders transcends economic considerations.¹⁷⁵ The rationale behind these political decisions are much more bound up with the fact that it “ensures” that an influx of migrants (economic migrants, refugees or asylum seekers) may

¹⁷² Siune, K. and Treuttschler, W. (Eds.) (1992): *Dynamics of Media Politics: Broadcast and Electronic Media in Western Europe*. Sage.

¹⁷³ Ellinas, A. (2010): *The Media and Far Right in Western Europe: Playing the Nationalistic Card*. Cambridge University Press.

¹⁷⁴ Hammar, T. (Ed.) (1995): *European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study*. Cambridge University Press.

¹⁷⁵ Weiner, M. (1993): Security, Stability and International Migration. *International Security*. Vol. 17. N°3. Pp. 91-126.

generate xenophobic sentiments and trigger conflicts between natives and migrants and, as a consequence, increase the appeal of right-wing political groups.

To what extent is this true? For instance, migratory policies in Spain have been much more damaging for immigrants during Zapatero's socialist government than during Aznar's conservative presidency. Thus, it is possible to repeat, that we face a socio-political realm where symbols and values are at stake and the subsequent political communication has been, and will remain, focused on managing these symbols and values through the generation of 'branded concepts', or widely accepted paradigms, such as the migration-security nexus.

2.1.5.2. Migration, Media and Public Opinion.

The case of migration highlights that current political communication is more strongly affected by the management of 'branded concepts' than in the past, and this might be related to the attempt to intentionally dislocate or change existing social norms and conventions as a way of gaining influence and dominance. The essence of this conflict resides in the will and necessity of artificially, though in a seemingly natural process, and paradoxically creating situations of imbalance –an unsettled cultural model –where precarious social balance has been achieved.

This alternation of balanced and imbalanced contexts justifies the very action of current politics, where priming "branded concepts" is just a strategy to survive and to project power as long as possible. By using this theoretical approach, this research will address the French and Spanish paradigms of political communication on the migration-security issue, which they used in order to gain international presence and project power. This approach is central because as it is going to be demonstrated in chapter 6, migration related issues have been the contextual elements that have challenged the consistency and coherence –and therefore the sustainability – of the policies, initiatives and mechanisms championed by both Spain and France.

The interests of Spain and France across the Mediterranean and chiefly, on its western side, are naturally determined by their geographical location. Due to this and the historical predisposition towards the constitution of empires, it is important to study their ways and strategies of projecting power by implementing and developing a number of formal and informal institutions. In doing so, as has been outlined above, this thesis analyses the evolution of their political dialectics over the last few decades, their political narratives, their public policies and their diplomatic actions and reactions by concentrating attention on those

transversal issues which have played, and which are playing, a decisive role in the region, such as international migration and security-related issues. It will be demonstrated in chapter 6 that by controlling and leading political communication on sensitive issues – migration and security – the perception of power, its projection and its materialization in terms of regional influence, has been decisive.

Media influence on public opinion regarding sensitive issues such as migration and security in the Euro-Mediterranean area has been studied with a focus on North Africa and central Europe.¹⁷⁶ Zapata and Lorite have concentrated their studies on the Spanish case.¹⁷⁷ Tailleux and Blion have concentrated their studies on France.¹⁷⁸ More generally, although still roughly addressing these issues, it would be interesting to underline the pioneering work done by King and Wood.¹⁷⁹ More recently, a collection of essays edited by Sabry continues this line of research.¹⁸⁰ It is also important to mention Mattelart's research on media, migration and transnationalism.¹⁸¹ All show that by accepting a bi-directional correlation between politics and media, we can carefully analyse ideas, values, myths, beliefs, images and stereotypes.

2.1.6. *Symbolism Management.*

A major task of this thesis is to assess the situation of political communication, public opinion, policy-making processes and political coherence within semi-democratic contexts. Normally, sets of values, beliefs and “absolute” truths are imposed from birth. That provokes an outcome: our mind-set is shaped first to believe. After that, we are encouraged to think. This dichotomy is applicable, afterwards, to socio-political behaviour. Firstly, those ideas,

¹⁷⁶ Ureta, I. (Ed.) (2010): *Media, Migration and Public Opinion: Myths, Prejudices and the Challenge of Attaining Mutual Understanding Between North Africa and Europe*. Peter Lang.

¹⁷⁷ Zapata, R. and Van Dijk, T.A. (2007): *Discursos Sobre la Inmigración en España. Los Medios de Comunicación, Los Parlamentos y Las Administraciones*. Bellaterra; Zapata, R. (2008): *Policies and Public Opinion Toward Immigrants. The Spanish Case. Ethnic and Racial Studies*. N°32. Pp. 1:20. Routledge; Lorite, N. (2002 a): *Comunicación, Inmigración y Dinamización Socio-Cultural en el Ámbito Local*. Migracom. Universidad de Barcelona; Lorite, N. (2002 b): *Tratamiento Informativo de la Inmigración en España*. Migracom. Universidad de Barcelona; Lorite, N. (2006): *Tratamiento Informativo de la Inmigración en España*. 2 Migracom. Universidad de Barcelona.

¹⁷⁸ Tailleux, J.P. (2002): *Many French Newspapers Have Been Shy on Immigration Questions When Related to Islam and Islamism. Bévues de Presse*; Blion, R. (2008): *Media and Migration Ambiguous Relationships for Complex Debates*. Radio 1812.

¹⁷⁹ King, R. and Wood, N. (Eds.) (2001): *Media and Migration. Constructions of Mobility and Difference*. Routledge.

¹⁸⁰ Sabry, T. (Ed.) (2004): *Media and Migration. Westminster Papers on Communication and Culture*. University of Westminster, London.

¹⁸¹ Mattelart, T. (2007): *Médias, Migrations et Cultures Transnationnelles*. Lavoisier.

values and sets of beliefs are imposed top-down and then societies are required to follow democratic and tolerant patterns. It would be possible to believe that this contradiction may be hidden, as Bauman has noted, behind our conflicts which are an open battle between the old and the new, between “we” and the “others” and between “our” universal truths and “their” dubious convictions.¹⁸² This is something that is definable as “symbolism management”.

Symbols can be seen as the genetic information of cultures. They define main cultural features and predispose certain collective and individual behaviours. Symbols are informational units that can be managed. Cultures aim at preserving those informational units and by doing so they tend to maintain an acknowledged and shared purity standard. Mutations can occur—they can even be modified artificially—but the main features remain.

“Symbolism management” acquires higher relevance when contexts or uncontrollable situations jeopardize a culture’s “purity standards”. This happens when their defining factors are contested or their authoritative dimensions are not respected. To sum up, within a conservative or progressive environment, symbols are manipulated for achieving consensus and for attaining outcomes. All reasons and points of view can be justified by the concept of ‘symbolism management’ and its role within different cultural environments.

The idea of culture that this thesis addresses follows Swidler’s research on the role of culture on social action. This makes it possible to understand better the hypothesis and specific objectives examined in this work.¹⁸³ This thesis does not assume that “culture shapes action by supplying ultimate ends or values toward which action is directed, thus making values the central causal element of culture”.¹⁸⁴ This vision would undermine Weberian and Parsonian’s traditional visions regarding the impact of culture on action.¹⁸⁵

The vision of culture Swidler offers is structured on three levels. Firstly, it proposes “an image of culture as a ‘tool-kit’ of symbols, stories, rituals and world-views which people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems”.¹⁸⁶ This idea is essential to understanding the aforementioned idea of “symbolism management”. This coincides with the second strand of the argument, in which Swidler states that in order to

¹⁸² Bauman, Z. (2001): *Community. Seeking Safety in an Insecure World*. Polity Press.

¹⁸³ Swidler, A. (1986): Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies. *American Sociological Review*. Vol. 51. N°2. Pp. 273-286.

¹⁸⁴ Op. Cit. P. 273.

¹⁸⁵ Parsons, T. (1934): *The Structure of Social Action*. Free Press. New York; Parsons, T. (1951): *The Social System*. Free Press. New York; Weber, M. (1958): *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Charles Scribner and Sons. New York.

¹⁸⁶ Op. Cit. Swidler, A. (1986): P. 274.

understand culture's causal effects it is necessary to focus on 'strategies of action', which are "persistent ways of ordering action through the time".¹⁸⁷ Thirdly, she does not observe culture's causal dimension and significance in defining ends of actions, but "in providing cultural components that are used to construct strategies of action".¹⁸⁸

What it is interesting in Swidler's approach are her two descriptive models of culture that are intrinsically related to the three steps stated earlier. The first one refers to the settled culture, the second one to the unsettled culture. The first model, for settled cultures, shows that strategies are guided by traditions and common sense. This model shows that, in the short-term, these strategies have weak direct control over action and refine and reinforce habits. In the long term, it provides resources for constructing strategies of action.¹⁸⁹ If one considers the unsettled model of culture, we see that strategies are guided by ideology. In the short term, strategies have strong control over action and teach new modes of action. In the long-term, new strategies of action are created.¹⁹⁰

It is important to note that when one considers the unsettled model of culture we describe contexts in which diverse ideological activisms compete to organize new paths of action and gain dominance. When describing these models, one should note that the common denominator of this dissertation's hypothesis, lies exactly on this point: The media and public discourse deployed by diplomatic brokers engaged in generating subsequent episodes of unsettled culture to impose certain realities and project power.

The idea of "symbolism management" is the very central force behind this "unsettling". What this dissertation aims to suggest is that an unsettled model of culture can be manufactured and, by manufacturing it, it is possible to gain dominance or engage in a fight for dominance. This research aims to demonstrate exactly this point by examining how France and Spain, as brokers, managed information regarding sensitive issues such as migration and security to gain international influence and stature—basically by creating models of unsettled culture.

2.1.7. Realist Constructivism.

Linked to the aforementioned points this thesis explores how states have been acting as political and diplomatic entrepreneurs and brokers –and opportunists- in order to achieve

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Op. Cit. Swindler, A. (1986): P. 282.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

greater diplomatic influence on the one hand and to address national interests on the other hand. In convincing other political and institutional stakeholders, political brokers and entrepreneurs have to start defining a particular communication strategy to convince and persuade them about the importance of their proposal. A successful communication strategy and rhetoric has to shape an existing common imaginary and construct a new one based on common values, needs and objectives. Beside this, they have to make sure that this communication strategy and speech remains linked to their permanent national interests and the defence of their objectives.

In considering Euro-Mediterranean politics, it is possible to identify that this approach follows a cyclical pattern. First countries –political entrepreneurs and brokers – like Spain and France have had to design and develop a communication strategy to shape and re-construct the common imaginary in order to gather consensus and after that implement and institutionalise the new policy. Second, once the EU has agreed to follow up with the proposal, and given that Euro-Mediterranean proposals entailed the participation of southern Mediterranean countries, the EU has had to convince European public opinion and southern Mediterranean countries of the pertinence of the new policy in order to adhere to the proposal.

As it is going to be demonstrated in successive chapters, political brokers and entrepreneurs as well the EU have very clear economic and security related objectives. However, at a rhetorical level, and to sell the proposal, it has been necessary to integrate more social and cultural elements to broaden appeal. This strategy permitted the construction of a new politico-diplomatic imaginary on one hand, and the pursuance and achievement of domestic interests and objectives on the other.

Theoretically speaking these strategies have to be explained by adopting a mixed approach. First, an approach based upon the prioritization of security related issues suggests a realist framework. Within the international system, the first priority of states is to survive as Waltz and the defensive realists suggest.¹⁹¹ However, in considering political entrepreneurs and brokers, they mostly aim at maximizing their relative power following an “offensive” realism.¹⁹² Not being great powers political entrepreneurs and brokers would pursue an

¹⁹¹ Waltz, K. N. (1979): *Theory of International Politics*. McGraw Hill, New York.

¹⁹² Mearsheimer, J. (1994): The False Promise of International Institutions. *International Security*. Vol. 19. N°3. Pp. 5-49; Mearsheimer, J. (2001): *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. Norton, New York.

expansionist policy of increasing diplomatic and political weight in an international context-
“when and where the benefits of doing so outweigh the cost”.¹⁹³

Nevertheless these approaches do not fully explain the process of how political entrepreneurs and brokers define their strategies. Therefore they are partially useful to understand how this process affects, or determines, foreign policy decision-making systems. In fact, as Waltz has stated, there is a difference between international politics and foreign policy.¹⁹⁴ That is why a more comprehensive and multidimensional theoretical approach is needed to explain these processes.

One answer can be offered by the post-realist approach.¹⁹⁵ As has been stated earlier, communication strategies and public speech are fundamental parts of the methods used both by political entrepreneurs and brokers. As well as realism, post-realism accepts both logic and facts. Hariman and Beer characterize post-realism as an approach that by adopting a “linguistic turn ...emphasizes narrative as an important means of persuasion. Post-realism relies on criticism and the formulation of alternatives. It involves deconstruction and reconstruction. Finally, post-realism combines strategy and ethics, power and prudence, cultural context and interpretation, and persuasion and psychology”.¹⁹⁶

These characteristics are relevant to explain and understand how political brokers and entrepreneurs behave, plan, lobby and execute. Therefore post-realism constitutes a good bridge between realism and other theoretical frameworks that focus their attention on socio-cultural and political processes like constructivism.

Realism, as Brown has argued, has dominated IR theories, but constructivism is increasingly developing as an oppositional theoretical framework.¹⁹⁷ Barkin states that constructivism has been considered as a theory opposing realism.¹⁹⁸ Rooted in the philosophical and sociological tradition, constructivism was applied to IR theory within the context of the end of the Cold War. Greenwood Onuf considered that states –and therefore political entrepreneurs and

¹⁹³ Taliaferro, J.W. (2000): Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited. *International Security*. Vol. 25. N°3. P. 128.

¹⁹⁴ Waltz, K. N. (1996): International Politics is not Foreign Policy. *Security Studies*. Vol. 6. N°1. P. 54.

¹⁹⁵ Beer, F.A. and Hariman, R. (1998): *Post-Realism: The Rhetoric Turn in International Relations*. Michigan State University.

¹⁹⁶ Beer, F.A. and Hariman, R. (1996): “Post Realism, Just War on the Gulf War Debate”. In Feldman, O. and De Landtsheer, O. (Eds.): *Politically Speaking: A Worldwide Examination of Language Used in the Public Sphere*. Praeger. P. 185.

¹⁹⁷ Brown, C. (2005): *Understanding International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan, 3rd Edition. P. 48.

¹⁹⁸ Barkin, J.S. (2003): Realist Constructivism. *International Studies Review*. N°5. P. 325.

brokers – act equally as individuals and live in a “world of our making”.¹⁹⁹ Therefore social, and political facts and power relations are constructed.

Wendt developed this discourse further in discussing the social construction of power politics, a central element of realism.²⁰⁰ These initial discussions were further developed and paved the way for a more consistent constructivist approach within IR theories. It was consolidated as a stronger critic of realism where it was stressed that according to the constructivist approach structure is constructed by social practice.²⁰¹

Following a similar theoretical framework, as Copeland has discussed, realism has been missing the “intersubjectively shared ideas that shape behaviour by constituting the identities and interests of actors”.²⁰² The application of this framework was not immediately adopted to explain how Europe has and is being constructed and integrated.²⁰³ The works of Delanty, Christiansen, Knud and Wiener, started to focus more on the social construction of Europe.²⁰⁴ For them, “crucial aspects of the integration process – polity formation through rules and norms, the transformation of identities, the role of ideas and the uses of language – are thereby opened up to systematic inquiry”.²⁰⁵

Considering Europe as a collective construction, language and discourse play a very important role in defining new values and new socio-cultural and political paradigms.²⁰⁶ Language, rhetoric, narratives and their evolution over time define communicational strategies of political entrepreneurs and brokers. They aim at re-shaping realities and collective perceptions in order to attain their political objectives. From this point of view, language and communication strategies are the vehicle to transmit new ideas and construct new collective imaginaries. This approach is not far away from radical constructivism. This framework insists on the relevance of language as one of the most important agents of social construction.²⁰⁷

¹⁹⁹ Greenwood Onuf, N. (1989): *World of Our Making*. University of South California Press.

²⁰⁰ Wendt, A. (1992): Anarchy is What States Make of It. *The Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organization*. Vol. 46. Issue 2. Pp. 391-425.

²⁰¹ Wendt, A. (1999): *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

²⁰² Copeland, D. (2000): The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism. *International Security*. Vol. 25. N°2. P.187.

²⁰³ Christiansen, T., Jorgensen, E. and Wiener, A. (1999): The Social Construction of Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy*. N° 6. Vol. 4. P.528.

²⁰⁴ Delanty, G. (1995): *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*. Palgrave Macmillan.

²⁰⁵ Christiansen, T., Knud, E.J. and Wiener, A. (1999): The Social Construction of Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy*. Vol. 6. Issue 4. P. 528.

²⁰⁶ Paasi, A. (2001): Europe as a Social Process and Discourse: Considerations of Place, Boundaries and Identities. *European Urban and Regional Studies*. Vol. 8. N°1. Pp. 7-28.

²⁰⁷ Glaseerfeld, E.U. (1984): “An Intro to Radical Constructivism”. In Watzlawick, P. (Ed.): *The Invented Reality: How do We Know What We Believe We Know*. W.W. Norton. Pp. 17-40.

Bearing in mind the characteristics of political brokers and entrepreneurs and aiming at better understanding and explaining how they behave and implement different strategies, it is evident that some theoretical aspects commented on above are useful.

Realism and constructivism might appear as contradictory theoretical frameworks, according to Jackson and Nexon.²⁰⁸ However, a combination of both approaches helps us to understand and explain how these political entrepreneurs and brokers behave. Some authors have aimed at combining these two theories, but Barkin was the first to successfully offer a consistent bridge between them.²⁰⁹ As he claims, constructivist epistemology and classical realist theory are compatible. He argues “not that constructivism is necessarily realist, but that constructivist research is as compatible with a realist worldview as with any other. Having a realist constructivism could prove useful in IR theory beyond clarifying methodological debates, including helping to specify the relationship between the study of power in international politics and the study of international relations as a social construction”.²¹⁰

In suggesting this, Barkin defines constructivism as a cluster of research methods and tools,²¹¹ “a set of assumptions about how to study world politics, rather than a set of assumptions about how politics work”.²¹² In these terms, this thesis considers a realist-constructivist approach.

2.2. Originality

This research attempts to fill the existing gap in the current literature and looks to use the linked theoretical approaches examined above, in order to provide an understanding of how Spain and France have been acting as political entrepreneurs or brokers in both designing and managing Euro-Mediterranean politics and diplomacy. The research will show how both France and Spain have taken advantage of historical, cultural, sociological, political and economic elements and have been deploying a certain political communication and diplomatic strategy that has been manipulated in order to gather political and diplomatic consensus on one hand, and in order to gain diplomatic influence both on the EU and on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region on the other hand.

²⁰⁸ Jackson, P.T., and Nexon, D.H. (2004): Bridging the Gap: Toward a Realist-Constructivist Dialogue. *International Studies Review*. N°6. P. 337.

²⁰⁹ Sterling-Folker, J. (2002): Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing or Re-reading. *International Studies Review*. Vol. 4. N°1. Pp. 73-97.

²¹⁰ Barkin, J.S. (2003): Realist Constructivism. *International Studies Review*. Vol. 5. Issue 3. P. 325.

²¹¹ Op. Cit. Jackson, P.T. and Nexon, D.H. (2004): P. 337.

²¹² Op. Cit. Barkin, J.S. (2003): P. 338.

The migration-security nexus will be integrated in order to understand how Spain and France's mechanisms and strategies have been rooted in mobilising sensitive issues that affect public opinion's reactions without taking into consideration the consequences of those policies and initiatives for southern Mediterranean countries. This factor has not been considered or integrated into previous research.

As such, this thesis will demonstrate why this element is essential to understanding these political processes, their weaknesses, inconsistencies and potential strengths.

This research also offers a long-term analysis that allows a better understanding of political, diplomatic and socio-economic trends, mechanisms and processes.

Methodologically speaking, and in terms of content, the research adds value to the literature due to the following:

- 1) Interviews with level French and Spanish actors who have shaped and developed these policies and mechanisms in their professional roles.
- 2) The application of innovative methodological tools such as Corpus Linguistics (CL) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to analyse how political entrepreneurs or brokers have been developing the political discourse and communication strategies in order to, on one hand, identify political opportunities/needs and on the other hand to see how they have been designing, managing and institutionalizing policies; how public opinion has been reacting to these communication strategies in order to understand the consistency and sustainability of these policies or proposals from a contextual point of view.
- 3) The application and combination of these methodological tools associated to the discussed theoretical framework offered by the literature on political entrepreneurs, allows for both a theoretical and methodological advancements. Theoretically speaking, in the conclusions, the dissertation proposes the Political Entrepreneur Cycle (PEC) which represents an effort to understand how the action of political entrepreneurs or brokers does not stop or end with the institutionalization of a policy, but with the evaluation, within the short, medium and long term, of such a policy on multiple levels.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

3.1. Methodology.

The methodology used for this dissertation complies with the exigencies of the required interdisciplinary approach. This research has taken a mixed approach, including both qualitative and quantitative methods. Most of the analysis presented in this dissertation is based upon a qualitative approach. However, quantitative analysis was also used when necessary in order to explain contextual, linguistic, demographic, economic and political trends.

3.1.1. Triangulation.

This thesis uses multiple methods of data collection and analysis.²¹³ It follows the concept of triangulation developed by Webb *et Al.* and Denzin among others. This builds on Campbell and Fiske's work also.²¹⁴ As Mathison notes "through triangulating we expect various data sources and methods to lead to a singular proposition about the phenomenon being studied."²¹⁵ As Denzin proposes, supported by King and Horrocks, there are four types of triangulation:²¹⁶

- Data triangulation: Refers to the variety of data used for a single study.
- Methodological triangulation: Uses a wide array of methods to address the same problem. It includes the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods.
- Investigator triangulation: It compares data collected by other researchers and it allows one to compare how 'outsiders' and 'insiders' of the studied research problem are related to it.
- Theory triangulation: Uses a range of theoretical models and approaches to better understand and proof the validity of gathered data.

²¹³ Mays, N., and Pope, C. (2000): Qualitative Research in Healthcare: Assessing Quality in Qualitative Research. *British Medical Journal*. 320, 7226. Pp. 50-52.

²¹⁴ Denzin, N.K. (1978): *The Research Act: A theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods*. McGraw Hill. New York; Webb, E.J. et. Al. (1966): *Unobstrusive Measures*. Rand McNally, Chicago; Campbell, D.T., and Fiske, D.W. (1959): Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multitrait-multimethod matrix. *Psychological Bulletin*. Vol. 56. N°2. Pp. 81-105.

²¹⁵ Mathison, S. (1988): Why Triangulate? *Educational Researcher*. March. P.13.

²¹⁶ King, N. and Horrocks, C. (2010): *Interviews in Qualitative*. Sage. P. 164.

As King, Horrocks and Mathison have shown, there exists a debate on the pros and cons of using triangulation.²¹⁷ Patton defends triangulation in order to avoid certain risks related to the use of individualized methods.²¹⁸ Even though, using triangulation as Mays and Pope have stressed, does not guarantee that the data gathered by using different methods can be easily integrated in order to show a unified outcome or result.²¹⁹ Nevertheless, as Patton has written the strength of triangulation derives from its suitability to discern “when and why there are differences”.²²⁰

In these terms, triangulation is a valuable technique to proof correlations, consistencies and inconsistencies related to this research’s main and specific objectives. Methodologically speaking this research has been structured into three correlated and transversal layers. The first layer corresponds to the analysis of secondary sources. The second layer corresponds to the use of interviews. The third layer assesses primary sources. Triangulation has been used within each layer and across all three layers in order to better test and proof the initial hypotheses and approaches suggested in the initial sections.

3.1.2. *Corpus Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis.*

Given that this dissertation aims at analysing how political entrepreneurs and brokers have been designing and managing Euro-Mediterranean politics, it is important to give special attention to the use of language and the rhetorical strategies these stakeholders have been following to achieve their objectives. This approach is fundamental to understanding, the processes, dynamics and mechanisms of policy design and management, and on the other hand, how these processes and mechanisms can be evaluated through 1) the evolution of the socio-economic context and 2) the reaction of the public opinion to them.

In order to analyse how political and diplomatic entrepreneurs or brokers conceptualize, plan, define and implement their proposals and projects, content analysis is a crucial research method. Content analysis is defined by Holsten as “any technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying special characteristics of

²¹⁷ Ibid; Op Cit. Mathison, S. (1988): P.13.

²¹⁸ Patton, M.Q. (1990): *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*. Sage, Newbury Park. 2nd Edition. P. 330-331.

²¹⁹ Mays, N., and Pope, C. (2000): Qualitative Research in Healthcare: Assessing Quality in Quality Research. *British Medical Journal*. 330 (7226). Pp. 50-52.

²²⁰ Op. Cit. Patton, M.Q. (1990): P. 331.

messages”.²²¹ In terms of political or diplomatic projects, agenda setting and general or specific interventions, it is important for the researcher to assess three components: the message and the formulation of the message, the sender and the intended audience.

That said, and in order to achieve positive outcomes, it is important to know the targeted audience and understand how to reach and motivate it in order to gather the desired consensus. As Kolbe and Burnett note, content analysis is “an observational research method that is used to systematically evaluate the symbolic content of all forms of recorded communications”.²²² For this research, it is vital that one can assess, through content analysis, the way symbols are communicated and portrayed to defend the necessity of implementing a common Euro-Mediterranean policy, as well as the way one should deal with the threats and probable dangers related to EU-MENA (Middle East and North Africa) relations in order to achieve increased diplomatic stature and influence.

The way that diplomats and politicians have framed Euro-Mediterranean affairs is linked to their management style.. As Semetko and Valkenburg have stressed, alongside content analysis and agenda-setting research, framing analysis “shares (...) a focus on the relationships between public policy issues in the news and the public perceptions of these issues”.²²³

In choosing the most appropriate methodology to study these objectives the author has been guided by two principles: innovation and pertinence. Innovation here is understood as the identification of a methodological gap in the existing scholarly literature. Pertinence is understood as the most suitable and efficient methodological tool or approach to achieve the objectives formulated before.

None of the aforementioned works summarized in the literature review have devoted attention to the linguistic component and therefore, the explanation of the processes and mechanisms of policy-making and evaluation are neither complete nor satisfactory. The mechanisms and strategies to design and manage Euro-Mediterranean politics have been mostly based upon a linguistic construction aimed at 1) gathering political consensus to support potential initiatives and 2) to determine and condition the support, directly or indirectly, of the public opinion in order to justify these policies.

²²¹ Holsti, R. O. (1968): *Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis*. Northwestern University Press. Chicago. P. 68.

²²² Kolbe, H. R. and Burnett, M.S. (1991): Content Analysis Research: An Examination of Application with Directives for Improving Reliability and Objectivity. *Journal of Consumer Research*. Vol. 18. N°2. P.243.

²²³ Semetko, H.A. and Valkenburg, P.M. (2000): Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News. *International Communication Association*. P. 93.

These two elements come together and explain the theoretical approach selected for this thesis. A realist approach is used linguistically to justify the pertinence of certain policies. Whereas a more socio-constructivist approach has to be defined as well to gather consensus, to manipulate public opinion in order to achieve non-mutable national or international –individual or clusters- interests and objectives.

In order to analyse these strategies, apparently contradictory theoretical frameworks and practices and, on the other hand, propose a complementary methodology which will work jointly with the following tools and methods, the author has decided to use corpus linguistics (CL) and critical discourse analysis (CDA). This methodological framework will be essential to characterize, differentiate and define the strategies and behaviours deployed by political entrepreneurs and brokers. It will also help us to understand 1) the mechanisms of agenda setting 2) the long-term analysis of political communication strategies on sensitive issues, 3) the behaviour of public opinion according to different contexts and, 4) the policy-evaluation process necessary to understand the PEC.

3.1.2.1. Corpus Linguistics.

CL is a recently developed discipline that attracts increasing attention among linguists.²²⁴ As Biber, Conrad and Reppen mention, studies of language have been classified into two areas: studies of structure and studies of use.²²⁵ CL emphasises language use and therefore it is possible to investigate the ways speakers, writers or in this case, politicians and diplomats, have been exploiting “the resources of their language”.²²⁶

For the purposes of this thesis and in order to understand and analyse how political entrepreneurs and brokers define their communication and political strategies within the short, medium and long term it is important to discover patterns of use within these timeframes. However, the discovery and analysis of these patterns of use have to be consistent, otherwise the results will be merely intuitions or anecdotal, and therefore, neither methodologically correct nor useful. MacEnery and Wilson highlight that a corpus is in

²²⁴ Aarts, J. and Keijs, W. (Eds)(1990): *Theory and Practice in Corpus Linguistics*. Rodopi; McEnery, T. and Hardie, A. (2012): *Corpus Linguistics*. Cambridge University Press; Breyer, Y.A. (2011): *Corpora in Language Teaching and Learning. Potential, Evaluation, Challenges*. Peter Lang; Renouf, A. and Kehoe (Eds.) (2009): *Corpus Linguistics: Refinements and Reassessments*. Rodopi; Hoey, M., Mahlberg, M., Stubbs, M. and Teubert, W. (2007): *Text, Discourse and Corpora. Theory and Analysis*. Continuum.

²²⁵ Biber, D., Conrad, S. and Reppen, R. (1998): *Corpus Linguistics: Investigating Language and Use*. Cambridge University Press. P. 3.

²²⁶ Ibid.

principle “any collection of more than one text”.²²⁷ However, and this is relevant to our understanding of the dynamics of CL, Butler has mentioned that a corpus differs completely from any collection of texts or an archive because they are not necessarily ordered.²²⁸

Nevertheless, as Biber, Conrad and Reppen remind us, it is important to “analyse a large amount of language collected from many speakers to make sure that we are not basing conclusions on a few speakers’ idiosyncrasies.”²²⁹ Unlike nowadays, until recently and due to the absence of adequate software to analyse large series of data, this methodological problem, and therefore proper analysis was impossible to elaborate on..²³⁰

Tognini-Bonelli indicates that CL helps explore theories and hypotheses and according to the results it is possible to validate, refute or refine them.²³¹ Baker mentions that “large corpora allow researchers to find evidence of rare or unusual cases of language, as well as shedding light on very frequent phenomena”.²³² The application of this approach and methodology is then particularly useful in the fields of political science and international relations, given that CL allows the implementation of a methodology that permits the use of a precise quantitative-qualitative tool to proof right or wrong certain assumptions that otherwise would be difficult to demonstrate.

Given that nowadays many of the available documents are published on the internet, Kilgarrif and Grefenstette have coined the concept of Web as a corpus.²³³ Even though for this dissertation this concept does not fit, the totality of corpus analysed have been downloaded from databases published in internet. This methodology has been already studied and tested by Mautner who described the uses of web-based corpora in critical discourse analysis.²³⁴

²²⁷ MacEnery, T. and Wilson, A. (2001): *Corpus Linguistics: An Introduction*. University of Edinburg, 2nd Edition. P.29.

²²⁸ Butler, C.S. (2004): Corpus Studies and Functional Linguistics Theories. *Functions of Language*. N°11. Issue 2. P. 151.

²²⁹ Op. Cit. Biber, D., Conrad, S. and Reppen, R. (1998): P. 3.

²³⁰ Stubbs, M. (2007): “On Texts, Corpora and Models of Language”. In Op. Cit. Mahlberg, M. et al. (2007): P. 127.

²³¹ Tognini-Bonelli, E. (2001): *Corpus Linguistics at Work*. John Benjamins. P. 5.

²³² Baker, P. (2010): “Corpus Methods in Linguistics” In Litosseliti, L (Ed.): *Research Methods in Linguistics*. Continuum. P. 94.

²³³ Kilgarrif, A. and Grefenstette, G. (2003): Introduction to the Special Issue on Web as a Corpus. *Computational Linguistics*. Vol. 29. Issue. 3. Available at: <http://www.kilgarriff.co.uk/Publications/2003-KilGrefenstette-WACIntro.pdf> (Retrieved, 13 July 2013)

²³⁴ Mautner, G. (2005): Time to Get Wired: Using Web-Based Corpora in Critical Discourse Analysis. *Discourse and Society*. N°16. Issue, 6. Pp. 809-828.

3.1.2.2. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).

CDA has been widely used to study and understand the connections between discourse, power and society. As Khan and Ghazali have highlighted, one of the most relevant characteristics of CDA “is that it is more about what happens in society rather than what should or could have happened”.²³⁵ In that sense it is important to note the important socio-political dimension CDA entails. Fairclough, Mulderrig and Wodak have stressed that CDA is “a problem-oriented interdisciplinary research movement, subsuming a variety of approaches, each with different theoretical models, research methods and agenda. What unites them is a shared interest in the semiotic dimensions of power, injustice, abuse and political-economic or cultural change in society”.²³⁶

The fact of accepting that CDA is a problem-oriented interdisciplinary approach welcoming and integrating different theoretical models and research methods, represents an important advantage for the purposes of this dissertation, interested as it is in assessing how political entrepreneurs or brokers have dealt with issues such as power, injustice or political opportunism versus social benefit of socio-political sustainability.

Therefore, practically speaking this approach reinforces the importance of collecting data from the real rather than the fictional world. This characteristic makes this method very appropriate to study and understand the connections, within the short, medium and long run, between society, political structures and the struggles for change, because one of the most accessible kinds of data available is political speeches and statements.²³⁷

Nevertheless, CDA has been traditionally used and approached by analysing either single texts or a small number of texts as a way of examining the usage of specific classes of words. But discourse is not just texts or classes of text, it is also ways of thinking about something. Therefore, and considering the objectives of this dissertation, this approach explains the communication strategies political entrepreneurs and brokers have used to establish a new social thinking on sensitive issues in order to achieve the pre-established political objectives.

²³⁵ Khan, H. and Ghazali, K. (2011): “Critical Discourse Analysis” In Azirah, H., Khemlani, D. and McLellan, J. (Eds.): *Text, Discourse and Society: Functional and Pragmatic Approaches to Language in Use*. Peter Lang. P. 164.

²³⁶ Fairclough, N., Mulderrig, J. and Wodak, R. (2011): “Critical Discourse Analysis” In Van Dijk, T. (Ed.): *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction*. Sage. 2nd Edition. P. 357-378.

²³⁷ Other important references to understand the scope and application of CDA: Op. Van Dijk, T. (Ed.) (2011): *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction*. Sage, 2nd Edition; Locke, T. (2004): *Critical Discourse Analysis*. Continuum; Wodak, R. (2004): “Critical Discourse Analysis” In Seale, C., Gobo, G., Gubrium, J.F. and Silverman, D. (Eds.): *Qualitative Research Practice*. Sage. Pp. 185-202.

3.1.2.3. CL and CDA as Complementary Approaches.

Since the mid-1990s some authors have attempted to integrate these complementary approaches,²³⁸ and this has expressed itself in the growth of scholarly works on the area in the last decade.²³⁹ Most have focused on methodological issues. However, one of the first studies combining CL and CDA published in 2005 did deal with politics by providing an analysis of the discourses of refugees and asylum seekers in the UK press.²⁴⁰

Nevertheless, even though the aforementioned studies have been trying to harmonize both methodologies, the usage of them has been unbalanced and they have been privileging CL over CDA or *vice-versa*. Despite this trend it is important to harmonize the use of both in order to get more satisfactory results. Charles *et al.* mention that CDA “prioritizes whole texts and their cultural context, identifying patterns that extend across sentences and paragraphs” whereas “CL tends to use techniques that decontextualize individual texts and focuses on recurrent patternings of small-scale items such as words and phrases”.²⁴¹

For the purpose of this dissertation the contextualization of public speech is fundamental. Otherwise it would be impossible to demonstrate how political entrepreneurs and brokers have been designing, defining, lobbying, changing and implementing their communication strategies over time by reading socio-economic and political needs and opportunities. Therefore, the combination of CL and CDA will be used simultaneously and overlap as a tool or methodology, rather than a theoretical framework, to better explain the main objective of this dissertation.²⁴²

²³⁸ Hardt-Mautner, G. (1995): Only Connect: Critical Discourse Analysis and Corpus Linguistics. Technical Paper, N°6. University of Lancaster. Available at: <http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/ucrel/tech-papers.html> (Retrieved, 13 July 2013).

²³⁹ Koller, V. (2004): *Metaphor and Gender in Business Media Discourse. A Critical Cognitive Study*. Palgrave Macmillan; Baker, P. (2006): *Using Corpora in Discourse Analysis*. Continuum. London; O'Halloran, K. (2007): Critical Discourse Analysis and the Corpus-Informed Interpretation of Metaphor at the Register Level. *Applied Linguistics*. N°28. Issue, 1. Pp. 1-24; Orpin, D. (2005): Corpus Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis: Examining the Ideology of Sleaze. *International Journal of Corpus Linguistics*. N°10. Issue, 1. Pp. 37-61.

²⁴⁰ Baker, P. and MacEnery, T. (2005): A Corpus-Based Approach to Discourses of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in UN and Newspaper Texts. *Journal of Language and Politics*. N°4. Issue 2. Pp. 197-226; a posterior work based on this methodology and approach, Baker, P., Gabrielatos, C., Khovravinik, M., Krzyzanowski, M. and Wodak, R. (2008): A Useful Methodological Synergy? Combining Critical Discourse Analysis and Corpus Linguistics to Examine Discourses of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the UK Press. *Discourse and Society*. N°19. Pp. 273-305.

²⁴¹ Charles, M., Pecorar, D. and Hunston, S. (2009): “Introduction: Exploring the Interface between Corpus Linguistics and Discourse Analysis” in Charles, M., Pecorar, D. and Hunston, S. (Eds.): *Academic Writing. At the Interface of Corpus and Discourse*. Continuum. P. 1.

²⁴² The consideration of CL as a methodology and not as a theoretical frame is supported by authors like MacEnery, T., Xiao, R. and Yukio Tono, Y. (2006): *Corpus-Based Language Studies. An Advanced Resource Book*. Routledge; Flowerdw, L. (2012): “Corpus-Based Discourse Analysis”. In Gee, J.P. and Handford, M. (Eds.): *The Routledge Handbook of Discourse Analysis*. Routledge. Pp. 174-187.

3.1.2.4. *Software and Samples.*

In order to apply the methodological principles explained above the selected samples are fundamental in order to be consistent and achieve this thesis's objectives. Technically speaking two main software solutions are used for this kind of qualitative/quantitative analysis: *Nvivo* and *AntConc*. Both solutions offer basically the same functions, however the author has selected *AntConc* because it is more user-friendly and more intuitive.

Technically speaking both software solutions also entail certain limitations with regards to web-based corpora and how they can be adapted to be used. Pdf files have to be converted into Txt. format in order to make them readable and analysable. However, scanned documents converted into Pdf documents cannot be used with these programmes and it would be necessary to transcribe them. This problem was encountered when the author was creating the data base of relevant corpora. These limitations will be addressed subsequently.

In the previous section it was mentioned that a corpus has to be ordered and has to be consistent in order to proceed with its analysis. Technically speaking, ordering materials to create a corpus entails a very strict codification. Coding pieces of texts to create a consistent corpora is fundamental. In using software solutions if the texts are not coded accordingly it is difficult to analyse the results chronologically.

For the purposes of this dissertation, after selecting the type of documents to be converted into a corpus, the codification was mainly elaborated chronologically because one of the main purposes of this research is to show how public speech and communication strategies have been changing over time.

The main corpora and analysed documents include:

- The conclusions of the presidency, Council of Europe: The author has selected this corpus because it developed over a long period of time. The data is available online from 1975 to 2013. However, the Pdf files convertible into Txt formats were only available from 1992 onward. Nevertheless, 1992 represents an important landmark as the serious diplomatic talks towards the creation and the institutionalization of the Barcelona Process were developed from that time. Therefore the corpus analysed covers the period 1992-2013. This timeframe allows 1) analysis of how the Council of Europe has been prioritizing its political interests, 2) assessment of how member states have been communicating them 3) an understanding of how changing political agendas can be contextualized and

adapted according to challenging politic, economic and social contexts and, 4) an evaluation of the progression, accomplishment or failure of proposed policies and mechanisms.

- Eurobarometer, European Commission: One of the most relevant issues is how European public opinion has been interpreting and reacting to the public speech and proposed policies and mechanisms. The available, consistent and aggregated data for the EU starts from 1999. The period considered for this dissertation covers 1999 to 2013. Nevertheless, the variation of national reports is important and the data for some concerned Mediterranean countries start in 1999 whereas some other countries such as Malta start in 2004.
- Interviews and political speeches: CL and CDA has been also applied to a miscellanea of political speeches and interviews conducted by the author in order to understand how and why policymakers have been deploying their communication strategies.

3.2. Primary Sources and Secondary Works.

Primary sources used for this dissertation correspond basically to sets of statistical data needed to understand socio-economic, political and diplomatic behaviour. In that sense the Eurobarometer produced by the European Commission was very relevant to the analysis of the EU's public opinion with regards to sensitive issues like migration, security, terrorism, unemployment and crime. This thesis has also used material provided by national statistical services to understand the connection between economics, demographics and development. The European Commission archive, partially available online, was also valuable as were some original documents provided by a number of the interviewees.

With regards to secondary works – it has been necessary to identify the most relevant scholarship in order to develop a theoretical background and to provide a political and historical setting; to identify gaps or barely assessed elements in the existing literature; to identify how scholars and politicians have defended or criticised policies and sensitive concepts; to assess agreements or disagreements on policies and outcomes.

3.2.1. Interviews.

Twenty face to face interviews were conducted by this author between March 2010 and November 2012 for this dissertation. The author has interviewed key actors in order to further address issues and elements that have not been properly assessed by other means. Currently, the number of studies using interviews or directly interacting with elites are quite rare as Ostrander has mentioned.²⁴³ As Clark notes, one of the most relevant reasons for an interest in elites is due to the fact that scholars should analyse the behaviour of those decision makers “more closely and unlike other methods interviews have a strong emphasis on intimacy between the researcher and interviewee”.²⁴⁴

Nevertheless, getting access to these elites represents a number of initial obstacles. Methodologically speaking, as Mikecz says, “interviewing elites represents unique methodological problems when compared with non-elite interviews”.²⁴⁵

Included amongst these initial challenges and problems are:

- Identifying those actors who played an important role in designing the current Euro-Mediterranean political and socio-economic scenario.
- Gaining access to key politicians and diplomatic representatives that had an active role in the 1980s and 1990s but that were already retired when this research was conducted.
- Once those potential interviewees were identified all logistic aspects had to be defined and prepared following an accurate and precise calendar because the author had to travel several times to Madrid, Barcelona, Paris, Brussels, Rabat and Geneva.

Gaining access to political elites is difficult and success depends “a great deal on serendipity, social networks as well as particular circumstances” as McDowell points out.²⁴⁶ As Mikecz stresses, the three relevant aspects that have to be perfectly integrated and fixed in designing and defining interviews with elites are gaining access, acquiring trust and establishing rapport.²⁴⁷

²⁴³ Ostrander, S. (1995): “Surely you are not in this just to be helpful; Access, Rapport and Interviews in Three Studies of Elites”. In Hertz, B., and Imber, J.B. (Eds.): *Studying Elites Using Qualitative Methods*. Thousand Oaks, SAGE. P. 133.

²⁴⁴ Clark, G.L. (1998): Stylized Facts and Close Dialogue: Methodology in Economic Geography. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*. Vol. 88. N°1. Pp. 73-87.

²⁴⁵ Mikecz, R. (2012): Interviewing Elites: Addressing Methodological Issues. *Qualitative Inquiry*. Vol. 18. N°6. P. 482.

²⁴⁶ McDowell, L. (1998): Elites in the City of London: Some Methodological Considerations. *Environment and Planning*. A. 30. Pp. 2133-2146, quoted by Harvey, W.S. (2010): Methodological Approaches for Interviewing Elites. *Geographic Compass*. Vol. 4. N°3. P. 196.

²⁴⁷ Op. Cit. Mikecz, R. (2012): P. 482.

Of these three factors, gaining access is the most crucial and pressing element that may lead to a successful research interacting with elites as Shenton and Hayter have highlighted.²⁴⁸ The strategy for gaining access to these elites was staggered and started from the periphery going slowly to the centre. The first objective was gaining access to the contacts of influential political journalists and political spokespersons. This initial phase was concluded successfully by contacting, one of the most influential Spanish political journalists as well as Javier Solana's former spokesperson, Cristina Gallach. They facilitated a dense network of contacts that were decisive for this research.

The second part of the strategy consisted of contacting the apparently most accessible personalities that could provide access to higher levels. Once representatives of this second circle were interviewed they were asked to facilitate further contacts at a higher level. Operatively and logistically speaking the author encountered a number of problems:

- The geographical dispersion of interviewees between Switzerland, France, Belgium, Spain and Morocco.
- The follow up with potential interviewees. Sometimes after agreeing to be interviewed many were not available immediately or needed long notice due to travels and other commitments.
- In the cases where the interviewee showed immediate availability the author had to organise very quick international trips.

The literature related to interviewing as a data collection technique in political science is wide ranging. Pridham, Ball, Lillecker, Peabody *et Al.*, and Harvey and McEvoy have applied this research method to interview politicians and elites alike.²⁴⁹ Methodologically speaking, there are three major strands to interviews: Standardized or structured; unstandardized or informal and; semi standardized or semi-structured.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁸ Shenton, A., and Hayter, S. (2004): Strategies for Gaining Access to Organizations and Informants in Qualitative Studies. *Education for Information*. N°22. Pp. 223-231.

²⁴⁹ Ball, S. (1994): "Political Interviews and the Politics of Interviewing" in Walford, G. (Ed.): *Researching the Powerful in Education*. University College London Press; Lilleker, D.G. (2003): Interviewing the Political Elite: Navigating a Potential Minefield. *Politics*. N°23. Vol. 3. Pp. 207-214; Pridham, G. (1987): "Interviewing Party-Political Elites in Italy" In Moyser, G. and Wagstaffe, M. (Eds.): *Research Methods for Elite Studies*. Allen and Unwin. London; Harvey, W.S. (2010): Methodological Approaches for Interviewing Elites. *Geography Compass*. N°4/3. Pp. 193-205; Peabody, R.L. *et Al.* (1990): Interviewing Political Elites. *Political Science and Politics*. Vol. 23. N°23. Pp. 451-455; McEvoy, J. (2006): Elite Interviewing in a Divided Society: Lessons from Northern Ireland. *Politics*. Vol. 26. N°3. Pp. 184-191.

²⁵⁰ Babbie, E.R. (2012): *The Practice of Social Research*. Cengage Learning; Babbie, E. R. (1990): *Survey Research Methods*. Wadsworth Publishing. Belmont.

The chosen interview design used for this research was semi-structured. As Drever points out, in using semi-structured interviews, the researcher “sets up a general structure by deciding in advance the ground to be covered and the main questions to be asked. The detailed structure is left to be worked out during the interview, and the person being interviewed has a fair degree of freedom in what to talk about, how much to say and how to express it”.²⁵¹

Semi-structured interviews are also suitable for small-scale research like this with a small number of respondents (n=20).²⁵² Also as Barribal and While have highlighted, semi-structured interviews are relevant for this type of study because they help to explore perceptions and opinions of interviewees when they are asked about complex and sensitive issues.²⁵³

As Brink has stressed, in studies where the use of semi-structured interviews is important, the research process has to be at the same time valid and reliable in order to attain credibility.²⁵⁴ In that sense, the interview preparation with elites is fundamental. This research followed the method set out by Goldstein and Lilleker who have stressed the importance of explaining the whole project to the potential interviewee, pointing out which points or aspects would be expected from him or her in advance.²⁵⁵ Within the semi-structured interview, the “funnel” method highlighted by Pridham, starting with general questions and continuing with more challenging ones, was appropriate in order to establish trust and a comfortable communication flow.²⁵⁶

In adopting the semi-structured interview methodology, the interaction between interviewer and interviewee was a dialogical process as Bakhtin has defined it. This builds on Berg’s dramaturgical model.²⁵⁷ In order to foster mutual engagement and develop a more stimulating communicational exchange, the dramaturgical model is a combination of what Douglas has defined as “creative interviewing” and what Holstein and Gubrium have

²⁵¹ Drever, E. (1995): *Using Semi-Structured Interviews in Small Scale Research: A Teacher’s Guide*. Scottish Council for Research in Education. Edinburgh. P. 13.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Barribal, L.K., and While, A. (1994): Collecting Data Using a Semi-Structured Interview: A Discussion Paper. *Journal of Advanced Nursing*. N°19. P. 330.

²⁵⁴ Brink, P.J. (1989): Issues in Reliability and Validity. In Morse, J.M. (Ed.): *Qualitative Nursing Research: A Contemporary Dialogue*.

²⁵⁵ Goldstein, K. (2002): Getting in the Door: Sampling and Completing Interviews. *Political Science and Politics*. Vol. 35. N°4. Pp. 669-672; Op. Cit. Lilleker, D.G.

²⁵⁶ Op. Cit. Pridham, G.

²⁵⁷ Berg, B.L. (2001): *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*. Pearson Publishing, Boston. P. 68.

conceptualized as “active interviewing”.²⁵⁸ In pursuing the main issues of discussion pre-defined during the design phase, the interviews took the form of dialogue. This allowed for the development of an exchange of information and knowledge production alike. This methodology has allowed both discussion and reflection about policies, contexts, situations and feelings.

3.2.1.1. Recording and Transcribing.

As Peabody *et. Al.* have explained, there are three main methods to record an interview: Relying on the memory; taking thorough notes during the interview and; using a tape recorder after asking for permission making sure that those sections where the interviewee requires to be off the record, are completely deleted.²⁵⁹ This researcher opted for using a mixed approach.

Almost all listed interviews were recorded with a simple recording device from the beginning to the end of the conversations. Some interviewees preferred not being recorded. All the conversations had a maximum duration of 60 minutes. Fogg and Wightman have studied the use of speech recognition technology both for recording and transcribing.²⁶⁰

However, in order to avoid any technological problem, this researcher opted for a solid analogic recorder that has been used for over 100 interviews in the past without presenting problems. Transcribing the interviews may present some problems as has been stated by Wellard and McKenna.²⁶¹ All the interviews have been accurately transcribed, word by word. All the interviewees accepted to be recorded without hesitation. The permission for being recorded was asked in the introductory contact mail explaining the scope and the objectives of the interview. Aside from the recording, the researcher also took notes, highlighting crucial passages.

Each transcription was also elaborated after the interviews in order to keep in mind contextual, conceptual, situational and relational elements. Those intangible elements are crucial for a correct understanding that may be jeopardised by delaying the transcription for several days or weeks. All the interviews are presented in an annex at the end of the dissertation. They are transcribed in the original language. Only those passages that are

²⁵⁸ Douglas, J.D. (1984): *Creative Interviewing*. Sage; Holstein, J.A., and Gubrium, J.F. (1995): *The Active Interviewing*. Thousands Oaks, Sage.

²⁵⁹ Op. Cit. Peabody, R.L. et. Al. (2011): P. 453.

²⁶⁰ Fogg, T, and Wightman, C.W. (2000): Improving Transcription of Quality Research Interviews with Speech Recognition Technology. Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of *The American Educational Research Association*. New Orleans.

²⁶¹ Wellard, S. and McKenna, L.G. (2000): Turning Tapes into Text: Issues Surrounding the Transcription of Interviews. *Contemporary Nurse*. Vol. 11. N°2-3. Pp. 180-186.

relevant for the research and that have been integrated within the main text have been translated into English. This has been done to preserve accurately both meaning and contextualization without adding or eliminating extra elements. These quotes have not been integrated in the text, and are stand alone. The reason behind this strategy is because the language and the concepts used by these elites is important to understand better their judgement, opinion and feelings. Techniques of content analysis have also been used to understand and explain their messages.

3.3. Description of Thesis.

Chapter 4 analyses, after some necessary historical considerations, the socio-political and economic performance of Spain and France since the end of WWII. Chronologically speaking, this chapter will be developed up to the year 1985 when Spain was ratified as a member of the European Economic Community (EEC). In so doing, this chapter examines how France and Spain engaged up until this new beginning in their bilateral and multilateral relations.

Chapter 5 analyses French responses to Spanish EEC membership. It asks whether France believed that Spain deserved entry on the terms it received and whether France felt that Spain's ambitions inside the EEC would be dangerous for the French objective of political leadership in the region? Such fears were well founded as President Felipe Gonzalez was a key element in pushing Spain towards a new political and diplomatic dimension.

This international resurgence of Spain will be analysed by focusing on the period between 1985 and 1995. This was a decade of profound change in international politics. The bipolar balance collapsed, the consensus increasingly revolved around the acceptance of liberal democratic theories and migratory movements started to reach very high levels, similar to the rates experienced between the last two decades of the nineteenth century and World War I.

This chapter analyses the mechanisms and the strategies Spain followed during, what at that time was defined as, "the great gallop". This was the period when Felipe Gonzalez invested huge efforts in diplomatic lobbying in order to gain political and diplomatic stature by identifying a number of political windows and opportunities.

Chapter 6 analyses, by using a long-term comparative approach, the major role that migration related issues have played in influencing EU-Maghreb relations and in terms of stability in the Euro-Mediterranean region. France and Spain, due to their geographical positions and regional standing played a key role in this debate. The Euro-Mediterranean

region progressively began to gain relevance in this context and, obviously, national and international interests oriented their sights on the Mediterranean basin.

Chapter 7 examines the Aznar period between 1996 and 2004. This presidency coincided with and drove forward attempts to develop and consolidate the Barcelona Process. Aznar's government was very conscious of the role Spain needed to play in the international arena. An obsession with projecting international power reached its peak when Aznar endorsed Washington's Iraq policy in 2002-03, along with the United Kingdom and a handful of other countries.

While González's government developed good relations with Maghreb countries, especially Morocco, Spanish international politics changed dramatically with Aznar. He had no interest in strengthening links with this area and, because of some of his policies, the possibilities of interacting positively with the southern Mediterranean were seriously hampered. Parallel to this, migration-related issues gathered momentum and topped the government's domestic political agenda as migration increasingly came to be viewed in terms of criminality, terrorism and unemployment.

Chapter 8 analyses José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's presidency from 2004 to 2012, and examines its implications and impact on Euro-Mediterranean politics. The chapter assesses how and why Zapatero wanted and needed to transform Spain's foreign policy in order to place Spain once more at the centre of the EU decision-making process. This chapter answers one key question: To what extent was Zapatero able to return Spain as a key interlocutor between the West and the Arab world? How was this political strategy defined? To what extent did the "dialogue of civilizations" initiative serve Spanish ambitions and objectives? How consistent was Zapatero's foreign policy within Spanish foreign policy over the medium and long term past? How did France react to these policies?

Chapter 9 examines these issues during the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy in France between 2007 and 2012. For obvious reasons, this chapter starts before the presidential elections of 2007. Already in 2005 during the mandate of Dominique de Villepin as France's prime minister, Sarkozy, acting as Minister of Interior, exerted a zero tolerance policy to repress riots among second-generation immigrants in urban areas.

Many representatives from left-wing parties believed that Sarkozy destroyed his chances in the presidential elections as a result of this crackdown. They were wrong. The chapter analyses this reality and also examines Sarkozy's sponsorship of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), in particular its implications both for European – mostly in terms of the rivalry with Spain – and non-European stakeholders.

Throughout this thesis takes into consideration the most relevant variables that are important to understand how political entrepreneurs or brokers, depending on each particular case, have been creating, designing, implementing and institutionalising their political strategies and mechanism in order to gather international support and achieve greater diplomatic influence. The dissertation concludes that rhetorically speaking it would be possible to consider, within the short term, that all studied governments behaved and justified their political communication strategies following the characteristics of political entrepreneurs and brokers. However, in considering the medium and long run, almost of them have been acting as political opportunists speculating on international threats and existing myths, globally speaking, in order to better defend national interests.

SECTION 2

ANALYSIS

CHAPTER 4

UNDERSTANDING FRANCO-SPANISH RELATIONS

The Historical Manufacture of Symbols and Myths

Analysing Franco-Spanish competition, cooperation or relations from a Braudelian perspective would first imply explaining how and when these countries started to share a space where common interests came under political, diplomatic and economic dispute. This chapter aims at providing the historical background that allows a better understanding of the subsequent chapters. It will assess the historical competition between Spain and France; the features of their colonial and post-colonial processes, focusing mainly on the Maghreb; their socio-economic and political developments in order to understand France's superiority towards Spain; and their international projections and relations from 1970s onwards. These points will facilitate a better understanding of Franco-Spanish relations and their connections, competition and cooperation within the European space as well as within their interaction mostly with Maghreb countries.

The reader may appreciate an imbalance related to the periods that this chapter is taking into consideration with regards to Spain's and France's interests and experiences in North Africa. Both France's and Spain's key developments in the Maghreb have not been following the same speed and rhythm. For the purposes of this dissertation the researcher has concentrated its attention on those key periods that marked the future of Spain's and France's involvement in the Maghreb. First, the Spanish struggles with Morocco. Second and considering France, its post WWII period because on one hand, since 1946 France tried to retain fiercely its colonies after the humiliation of the war, by deploying an idea of new France, and on the other hand the post-colonial processes and the war with Algeria that originated a new period in approaching Franco-Maghreb relations.

4.1.France and Spain: Sharing Spaces, Competing for the future.

It is necessary to stress that both Spain and France were both neighbours and empires. This is important to note because it shapes mentalities and cultures, feeds myths and symbolism, and sets long-lasting prejudices. Their imperial ambitions coincided and occurred during a period in which the world started to change and when globalization acquired its first identifiable

manifestations. These, according to Ferrer were an increase in work productivity and a new global world order.²⁶²

These two conditions coincided with the beginning of the early modern age. As such, it is possible to say that this was the moment in which embryonic nation-states started to define their positions and to show their expansive ambitions.

During this period-from 1492 onwards-, it is possible to observe that these first waves of globalization –the mobility of ideas and people –started to shape international relations. Within this framework, it is possible to assume that globalization can be understood as a product of imperialist models of international government and an extended bureaucracy as Eisendstadt has stressed.²⁶³ During this period, especially during the first three quarters of the sixteenth century, Spain with apparent ease effortlessly expanded its influence beyond the ocean through a process of territorial expansion.²⁶⁴ This territorial expansion expanded from the Philippines to Latin America.

The Spanish talent was, according to Ortega y Gasset, a talent of imperative character. It was neither a theoretical knowledge nor a rich fantasy. It was also not a contagious and deeply religious emotion.²⁶⁵ Continuing with the Gassetian point of view, Spaniards combined -until the second decade of Phillip II's reign-1560s- the two main elements of the art of commanding: persuasiveness and force.²⁶⁶

Until this time, Spain was able to maintain a certain level of order and unity. Its status as the main architect of the Counter Reformation probably gave the country enough “moral” authority to justify its existence and its influential role.²⁶⁷ This order and unity may have been the main elements that permitted Spain to extend its boundaries.²⁶⁸ Hence, Spain jumped from the darkness of the early middle age to the bright lights of the early modern age.

²⁶² Ferrer, A. (1996): *Historia de la Globalización. II*. Fondo de Cultura Económica, Buenos Aires.

²⁶³ Eisenstadt, S.N. (1972): “Social Institutions” in Sill. D. (Ed.): *International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*. MacMillan. New York. Pp. 409-429.

²⁶⁴ Momsem, T. (2006): *The History of Rome*. Indy Publishing. 3rd Edition.

²⁶⁵ Ortega y Gasset, J. (1917): *La España Invertebrada*. *Diario El Sol*. Madrid.

²⁶⁶ Ibid. Philip II reigned from 1556 to 1598.

²⁶⁷ Menéndez Pelayo wrote “*Spain, evangelist of half world, Spain, hammer of heretics, the light of Trento, sword of Rome, the birthplace of Saint Ignatius, this is our greatness and our unity...we have not other*”.

²⁶⁸ This point of view was exposed by Ferdinand II of Aragon in the Florentine ambassador Francisco Guicciardini's *Relazione di Spagna*, 1514.

Having said this, as Lynch²⁶⁹ has noted, Spanish history is the history of great missed opportunities²⁷⁰; a view emphasised by Cánovas del Castillo in his *History of the Spanish Decadence*.²⁷¹

This tendency continued until 1808.²⁷² The Peace of Westphalia in 1648, marking the end of the Thirty's Year War, created the first modern diplomatic congress and inaugurated a new international order, which lasted until traditional empires collapsed after WWII. This order was based on the principles of national sovereignty as Philpott has underlined.²⁷³

Just eleven years after the Peace of Westphalia, Spain and France declared the end of hostilities with the signing of the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659. The price of these political manoeuvres was high for Spain and very beneficial for France,²⁷⁴ which subsequently became the undisputed hegemonic power in Europe.

French pre-eminence in European affairs has particular importance because it came during a period in which international relations started to redefine world politics as Ruggie has shown. This had a decisive impact in the constitution of the new political order after WWII.²⁷⁵ In considering the above historical currents, one can make the case that France led changes in two fundamental moments of modern and contemporary history.

Conversely, Spain's influence in international politics started to wane during the nineteenth century. During this period Spain fell behind other European countries in a number of key areas including demographics, industrial development, the financial system and the process of decolonization. The Spanish industrial revolution started one century after it had begun in many parts of Europe. As Tortella has shown, Spain experienced very limited

²⁶⁹ It is also advisable to read two works written by John Lynch on Spanish history after the death of Phillip II. Lynch, J (1992): *The Spanish World in Crisis and Change. 1598-1700*. Oxford University Press and Lynch, J (1989): *Bourbon Spain*. Oxford University Press.

²⁷⁰ Interestingly Luis Francisco Martínez Montes, quoting José Ortega y Gasset, said that 'Spaniards are like the Chinese of the Western world, since both nations have gone through many ups and downs but have always managed to bounce back'. Martínez, L.F. (2009): "Spain and China in the Age of Globalization". Available at: www.theglobalist.com/storyid.aspx?StoryId=7813 (Retrieved 1 June 2009)

²⁷¹ Cánovas del Castillo, A. (1854): *Historia de la Decadencia de España, Desde el Advenimiento de Felipe III al Trono Hasta la Muerte de Carlos II*. Ruiz, Madrid.

²⁷² Date of the Spanish war for the independence against the pretensions of Napoleon to crown Joseph Bonaparte as king of Spain instead of Ferdinand VII of Spain

²⁷³ Philpott, D. (2001): *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*. Princeton University Press.

²⁷⁴ It would be interesting to remark here that this treaty was entitled as a "Definitive Treaty of Peace and Commerce". Thus, international relations, regional stability and projection of power were strictly bound up with an economic dominance where privileged situations of commerce were a main issue.

²⁷⁵ Ruggie, J.G. (1998): *Construction of the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*. Routledge, London.

growth during the nineteenth century, as the population fell in number²⁷⁶ and modern infrastructure such as trains tracks lagged behind major powers in Europe.²⁷⁷

4.2.Spain and North Africa: Flirting Tragically with Morocco.

The ties of France and Spain to the Mediterranean and North Africa have been noted and explained by a considerable number of authors. Braudel's work is perhaps the most influential and widely read.²⁷⁸ Hegel, despite standing accused of eurocentrism, was convinced that, for historic reasons, North Africa and Southern Europe should be part of the same geopolitical, cultural and economic area.²⁷⁹

In 1906, in response to discussions at the conference of Algeciras, the Morocco's ruler granted colonial control over a good part of the country to France and Spain.²⁸⁰ Nonetheless, the Spanish presence in Morocco was much more in the role as a sub-protectorate under French control.

Further French dominance of North Africa crystallized in 1912 with the Treaty of Fez. Thanks to the Franco-Spanish Treaty -27 November 1912-, France conceded to Spain a conflictive and poor territory-Rif region- in the North of Morocco. Despite the lack of economic, strategic or political interest represented by this area, Spain, spurred on by frustrations and delusions of grandeur, started a misguided occupation and ensuing war.²⁸¹ In 1913, Spain created the Protectorate of Tetuan, and that provoked immediate reactions from the local population against the Spanish occupation since then.²⁸² However the Moroccan-Spanish conflict did not escalated immediately because Spain stop occupying more territories during the period of the WWI. Otherwise, this would have originated parallel conflicts between Spain and other European powers.²⁸³

²⁷⁶ Tortella, G. (1975): *Los Orígenes del Capitalismo Español*. Tecnos, Madrid.

²⁷⁷ Wais, F. (1974): *Historia de los Ferrocarriles Españoles*. Editora Nacional, Madrid.

²⁷⁸ Braudel, F. (1995): *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean in the Age of Phillip II*. University of California Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles.

²⁷⁹ As Hegel mentions: "Now we come upon the lands of Morocco, Fez, Algeria, Tunis, Tripoli. It can be said that this region does not belong properly to Africa but to Spain, with which forms a geographical basin. The polymath of Pradt claims on these grounds that Spain is part of Africa" Quoted by Dussel, E (1994): Eurocentrism and Modernity. *The Postmodernist Debate in Latin America*. Vol. 3. Pp. 65-70. Duke University Press. Here, Dussel is using Hegel, G.W.F (1955): *Sämtliche Werke Sistem Der Philosophier Ertdet Terl*. Hoffmeister Hamburg. Lectures. P.213. This Hegelian vision is also formulated Hegel, G.W.F (2001): *The Philosophy of History*. Batoche Books. Kitchener. Ontario, Canada. P.110.

²⁸⁰ González Alcantud, J.A. and Martín Corrales, E. (Eds.) (2007): *La Conferencia de Algeciras en 1906: Un Banquete Colonial*. Bellaterra, Barcelona.

²⁸¹ Romero, F. (1999): *Spain 1914-1918: Between War and Revolution*. Routledge. London

²⁸² Aziza, M. (2003): *La Sociedad Rifeña frente al Protectorado Español en Marruecos*. Bellaterra, Barcelona.

²⁸³ Ayache, G. (1981): *Les Origines de la Guerre du Rif*. Publications de la Sorbonne.

Internally speaking, the 1917 economic crisis was devastating for Spain and it was soon followed by the post-war crisis of 1919-1923. According to Carr, from 1898 to 1923 Spain experienced a period of degeneration and disintegration.²⁸⁴ During the same period, 1919-1923, the Spanish situation in Morocco was disastrous for its foreign policy. From 1919 to 1920 a number of operations aiming at stabilizing the area politically and socially shed some light to think about a successful pacification. However, in July 1921 the Spanish troops were annihilated by the local Moroccan –Berber- forces leaded by Abd El-Krim, during the battle –disaster as Spanish historians prefer to define it- of Annual.²⁸⁵ Ortega y Gasset accurately portrayed Spain's image after the Battle of Annual as incompetent and weak.²⁸⁶ The consequences of this incompetency provoked that from 1921 to 1926 Abd El-Krim and his troops created and managed the Republic of the Rif.²⁸⁷ Spain at that time passed from being a constitutional regime to a dictatorship after General Primo de Rivera toppled the previous democratic system in 1923.

As Desmond has mentioned, “across the Straits, the problem of the protectorate had become more embarrassing than ever”.²⁸⁸ The Moroccan issue topped both national and international agendas in Spain, to the point, that the new dictator, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, in 1924, one year after acceding to power, transferred his headquarters to Tetuan.²⁸⁹ It was actually General Primo de Rivera, who was behind the preparation of the disembarkation at the Alhucema bay in 1925. This successful –amphibious- operation was a Franco-Spanish joint initiative after the attack of Abd El-Krim to a zone of the French protectorate.²⁹⁰ This military collaboration pacified the Rif in 1926 and by 1927 Abd El-Krim was finally defeated.

The war against Morocco was one of the major causes of strong political and social problems in Spain and resulted, between 1917 and 1923 in 23 complete and 30 partial governmental crises. This national and military strategy ultimately culminated in the Spanish Civil War.²⁹¹ In fact, the Spanish Civil war that started in 1936, ensuing the uprising of the

²⁸⁴ Carr, R. (2007): *Historia de España*. Península, Madrid.

²⁸⁵ Leguineche, M. (1996): *Annual 1921, El Desastre de España en el Rif*. Ediciones Alfaguara, Madrid.

²⁸⁶ Op. Cit. Ortega y Gasset, J. (1917): P.5.

²⁸⁷ Pennell, C.R. (1986): *A Country with a Government and a Flag: The Rif War in Morocco, 1921-1926*. Middle East and North African Studies Press.

²⁸⁸ Desmond, R.T. (1927): Dictatorship in Spain. *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 5. Nº2 P. 279.

²⁸⁹ Op. Cit. P. 278.

²⁹⁰ Fleming, S.E. and Fleming, A.K. (1977): Primo de Rivera and Spain's Moroccan Problem, 1923-1927. *Journal of Contemporary History*. Vol. 12. Nº1. Pp. 85-99.

²⁹¹ Balfour, S. (2004): Civil Military Relations in the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco: The Road to the Spanish Civil War 1912-1936. *Armed Forces and Society*. Vol.30. Nº2. Pp. 203-226. It is important to mention that the problems between Spain and Morocco continued until 1956 when Morocco achieved its independence.

troops under the command of Francisco Franco Bahamonde. As Balfour has mentioned, the Spanish military troops deployed in Morocco adopted a particular nature and code of conduct with regards to Spanish politics. They became a “politically interventionist caste” able to overthrow the existing and legal republic.²⁹²

This misguided war had historical consequences of relevance to this study. Many in Spain thought that by losing a presence in North Africa, specifically in Morocco, the country would be very vulnerable on the geo-strategic level. Cánovas del Castillo, a moderate, shared the Hegelian vision regarding the links between North Africa and Spain by stating that the Spanish southern borders were situated in the Atlas mountains. From this angle, North Africa played an important geographical and symbolic role in the Spanish socio-political imaginary. Even worse, it was widely believed that Spain’s credibility as an international power was linked to a strong status in the Maghreb. As Romanones put it, “Morocco was for Spain the last opportunity for maintaining its position in the European concert”.²⁹³

France, for obvious reasons, was very aware of this and successfully prevented Spain maintaining a strong position in the region: France’s dominance was symbolised by the dominance of the French over the Spanish language in the region. With the exceptions of Tangier and Larache, French became the prevailing language across whole Maghreb.

4.3.Post-Civil War Aftermath: Spanish Socio-Economic, Political

Underdevelopment and International Isolation.

Morocco would continue to be very important for Spanish politics. With limited resources, energy and ability General Franco deployed his military offensive to gain power and rule for the next forty years from Morocco. Certainly the context of the WWII somehow favoured some successful events within the short term due to the fact that both France and Spain at the end left Morocco in 1956 right after its independence. For instance, when France was defeated in 1940 by Germany, Franco aiming at occupying French territories in Morocco took over Tangier without the consent or support of Italy or Germany. This action shows Franco’s interest in the region.²⁹⁴ The answer of France during this occupation was the

²⁹² Op. Cit. P. 203.

²⁹³ Cited by Carr, R. (1982): *Spain, 1808-1975*. Oxford University Press. 2nd Edition. P.518; It is also important to see the Picasso report that assessed the responsibilities of Spain in its intervention in Morocco during July 1921. Picasso, J. (1976): *Expediente Picasso*. Frente de Afirmación Hispanista. Mexico.

²⁹⁴ Goda, N.J.W. (2008): Franco’s Bid for Empire: Spain, Germany, and the Western Mediterranean World in World War II. *Mediterranean Historical Review*. Vol. 13. Issue 2. Pp. 168-194.

silence.²⁹⁵ The occupation of Tangier lasted until 1945. Despite these attempts and after a bloody civil war Spain entered into a dark period where international politics were completely ignored and where the country lost any kind of international presence and respect while France started to recover its preeminent position within the international arena.²⁹⁶ However, despite this episode, during the 1950s it was possible to witness some collaboration between Spain and France. As a matter of fact during 1957 France and Spain had talks to cooperate against a potential insurrection in the Sahara, Ifni or Mauritania.²⁹⁷ None of these collaborations happened and Spain continued to lose presence and influence in the region. In 1969 Morocco recovered Ifni and in 1975 the Spanish presence in Morocco – putting aside Ceuta and Melilla- vanished completely. This time, and against the Spanish interests, neo-elected French president Valéry Giscard D'Estaing supported the Green March in order to return the Spanish Sahara to Morocco. On one hand, Giscard did not have any appreciation for Spain as it is going to be demonstrated in the next chapter and on the other hand France maintained its economic interests in Morocco.²⁹⁸

In considering this framework, immediately after the Civil War, Franco's priorities were to consolidate his control over the country despite the economic, political and social cost. During the 1940s, Spain's productivity never once matched pre-war levels.²⁹⁹ Externally, Spain was also completely isolated during the first decade of dictatorship.

During the transitional decade of the 1950s, there was economic growth due to some foreign direct investments and the import of those capital goods that were indispensable for infrastructure construction, specifically, and most notably, the development of the electric sector, which was the industrial sector which supported Spanish economic and industrial growth from the 1950s onward.³⁰⁰ During this period, industrial production doubled and employment increased. Living standards in urban areas started to improve dramatically and

²⁹⁵ Paz, M.A. (1995): La Propaganda Francesa en España, 1940-1944. *Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez*. Vol. 31. Issue 31-3. P.226.

²⁹⁶ For more insights about Spanish civil war and implications with foreign affairs and policies see: Preston, P. (2007): *The Spanish Civil War: Reaction, Revolution and Revenge*. W.W. Northon and Co.; Hugh, T. (2001): *The Spanish Civil War*. Modern Library; Arostegui, J. (1996): *La Guerra Civil 1936-1939: La Ruptura Democrática*. Temas de Hoy. Madrid; Godicheau, F. (2006): *La Guerre d'Espagne: De la Démocratie à la Dictature*. Gallimard.

²⁹⁷ Pérez García, G. (2006): El Diario Le Monde y La Intervención Francesa en el Sahara Occidental. *Ámbitos*. N°15. P. 436.

²⁹⁸ Op. Cit. P. 438.

²⁹⁹ González, M.J. (1979): *La Economía Española del Franquismo. 1940-1970: Dirigismo, Mercado y Planificación*. Tecnos, Madrid.

³⁰⁰ Antolín, F. (1988): Electricidad y Crecimiento Económico: Los Inicios de la Electricidad en España. *Revista de Historia Industrial*. N°3; Sudriá, C. (1997): La Restricción Energética al Desarrollo Económico de España. *Papeles de Economía Española*. N°73; Ureta, I. (2003): *Hidroeléctrica Española y el Desarrollo de la Industria Eléctrica Española 1907-1977*. Universidad de Deusto. PhD dissertation.

the rural drift began to seriously hit peripheral regions.³⁰¹ In just one decade, from 1951 to 1962, the peasant population shrunk by 13.21 per cent.³⁰²

At the same time, Spanish demographic growth amounted to 1.2 per cent per annum and labour demand increased as well. By the end of the 1950s, Spanish industry was unable to absorb more labour and could not accommodate the incessant waves of peasants arriving to industrial regions such as the Basque Country or Catalonia. In order to solve this Spain established an assisted migration system under the auspices of the Spanish Institute for Emigration.³⁰³

From that point in time onwards, Spain became a net export of labour meeting the demand of economies like those of France and Switzerland needed labour and the Spanish surplus was channelled into these systems by way of regulated migration. From an economic perspective, as Zelinsky-based econometric models³⁰⁴ demonstrate, these migratory flows used had a direct consequence for economic growth in recipient countries.³⁰⁵

According to official figures provided by the Spanish Institute for Emigration (IEE, 2009), between 1959 and 1973, 1.066,440 Spaniards migrated to European countries. That figure represents roughly 71 per cent of total immigrants in the entire period.³⁰⁶ Although Spain had previously witnessed some periods of emigration, this was the first time that the country had opted for a circular migration system as a matter of policy.³⁰⁷ Agreements between the IEE and some European countries –primarily France, Switzerland and Germany and secondarily The Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom-, enabled Spanish immigrants to gain one-year work permits.³⁰⁸

However, the IEE was unable to entirely control these migration flows. Many migrated irregularly and some estimate that 1.500,000 is a more realistic figure for the total number of migrants over the period under discussion.³⁰⁹

³⁰¹ Pereira, D. et Al. (Eds.)(2004): *Las Zonas Rurales: Un Diagnóstico Desde la Perspectiva de las Desigualdades Territoriales y los Cambios Sociales y Económicos*. Fundación Fondesa, Madrid.

³⁰² Matés Barco, J.M. (2007): La Economía Durante el Franquismo: La Década de la Transición. 1950-1959. In González Enciso, A., and Matés Barco, J.M. (Eds.): *Historia Económica de España*. Ariel. Pp.707-744.

³⁰³ Instituto Nacional de Emigración (IEE) which was operative from 1956 to 1985.

³⁰⁴ Zelinsky, W. (1971): The Hypothesis of Mobility Transition. *The Geographical Review*. LX1. Pp. 219-249.

³⁰⁵ Martin, P.L., and Taylor, J.E. (1996): “The Anatomy of a Migration Hump” In Taylor, P.L. (Ed.): *Development Strategy, Employment and Migration: Insights from Models*. OECD Development Centre. Paris. Pp. 43-62.

³⁰⁶ This doesn't consider those Spanish emigrants who went to Latin America or the United States of America.

³⁰⁷ This system was imposed by destination countries in order to limit immigrants' long permanence and settlement.

³⁰⁸ Fernández Asperilla, A. (1998): La Emigración como Exportación de Mano de Obra: El Fenómeno Migratorio a Europa Durante el Franquismo. *Historia Social*. N°30. Pp. 63-81.

³⁰⁹ Babiano, J., and Fernández A. (2002): *El Fenómeno de la Irregularidad en la Emigración Española de los Años 60*. Fundación 1 de Mayo. P.51.

France was the preferred country for Spanish migrants during that period. In France alone, by 1968 103,892 Spanish immigrants out of a total of 607,000 arrived through the IEE.³¹⁰ Proximity and socio-economic conditions explain this. Spanish migration to France has been richly documented by Rubio, Parra Luna, Babiano and Fernández.³¹¹ At that time, France was experiencing very strong economic growth but the population did not increase at the same rate. The French National Office of Immigration decided to allow 1.450,000 immigrants from Mediterranean countries –Spain, Italy as well as from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia-.

Young people and families benefited from these generous immigration policies. A residence permit was awarded to those who held a work contract and, after 5 years of residence in the country, French citizenship might be granted. Successive waves of migrants over the 1960s and the 1970s represented 3 per cent of the active French population and 1.35 per cent of the total population.

In this context the French indigenous population developed a sense of superiority towards those countries dependant on migration for economic stability and these feelings continued over subsequent decades. Similar manifestations of contemporary immigrants' cultural associations were diffused among Spanish communities. For instance, Spanish communities in Switzerland experienced episodes of civil disorder, called the *Spanische Agitation*.³¹²

This reality underlines the point that during this period Spain was very much viewed as a developing country by the international community. Overcoming this view was not easy and the process to change perceptions took several decades until Spain, a destination country for migrants, with massive flows from Latin America, North Africa and Eastern European countries. When this happened, ironically, Spanish's perceptions and policies regarding immigrants echoed those held by destination countries such as France or Switzerland three decades earlier.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ Babiano, J., and Fernández A. (1998): *El Asociacionismo Como Estrategia Cultural: Los Emigrantes Españoles en Francia. 1956-1974*. Fundación 1 de Mayo. Madrid; Rubio, J. (1974): *La Emigración Española a Francia*. Madrid; Parra Luna, F. (1981): *La Emigración Española en Francia. 1962-1977*. Instituto Español de Emigración, IEE, Madrid.

³¹² Farré, S. (2001): *Spanische Agitation: Emigración Española y Antifranquismo en Suiza*. Fundación 1 de Mayo. Madrid; See also Sanz, C. (2004): *Clandestinos Ilegales, Espontáneos. La Emigración Ilegal de Españoles a Alemania en el Contexto de las Relaciones Hispano-Alemanas. 1960-1973*. Comisión Española de Relaciones Internacionales. Madrid.

4.4. France in the post- WWII era.

Immediately after the end of WWII, France started to consider how to project power in Europe and the rest of the world. The Marshall Plan began to lay the first bricks of economic rebirth as did its membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

Going beyond some revisionist approaches regarding the impact of the Marshall Plan in Europe³¹³ it is possible to agree with Milward who has argued that France came out on top of US plans for a reconstructed Europe through the allocation of aid.³¹⁴ Arguably a miscalculation given that post-war Europe emerged as a protectionist regional block under French leadership.

Charles de Gaulle, who presided a provisional government, established the Fourth Republic –from 1948 to 1958–as a symbol that represented the beginning of a new era and a period where the accumulation of governmental experience allowed to arrive to a more dynamic and efficient fifth republic.³¹⁵ Nevertheless, at the same time, the decolonization processes in Vietnam and Algeria was a bitter experience for the colonizers, but opened new opportunities in those countries.³¹⁶

After France's severe humiliation in 1940 at the hands of Germany, the power of the metropolis lost credibility in their colonies and its political authority crumbled. Tunisia, Indochina and Algeria all experienced this.³¹⁷ Although the concept of 'empire' was substituted by the idea of French Union in 1946, Paris fiercely attempted to retain its colonies by imposing a dramatic decolonization process.

The reactive approach to colonies was contradicted by a very proactive approach to Europe. Since Robert Schuman's discourse in 1950, France become one of the engines of the newly formed EEC with Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Germany and Belgium.

³¹³ Borchard, K., and Buchheim, C. (1991): "The Marshall Plan and Key Economic Sectors: A Microeconomic Perspective". In Maier, C., and Bischof, G. (Eds.): *Marshall Plan and Germany*. Oxford, Berg; De Long, J., and Eichengreen, B. (1993): "The Marshall Plan: History's Most Successful Structural Adjustment Programme" in Dornbusch, D. et al (Ed.): *Post-war Economic Reconstruction and Lessons for the East Today*. Cambridge, MIT Press. Pp. 189-230.

³¹⁴ Milward, A. (1984): *The Reconstruction of Western Europe: 1945-1951*. London. Methuen.

³¹⁵ Huber, J.D. and Martinez-Gallardo, C. (2004): Cabinet Instability and the Accumulation of Experience: The French Fourth and Fifth Republics in Comparative Perspective. *British Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 34. Issue 1. Pp. 27-48.

³¹⁶ Schalk, D.L. (1991): *War and the Ivory Tower: Algeria and Vietnam*. University of Nebraska Press.

³¹⁷ Prochaska, D. (1990): *Making Algeria French: Colonisation in Bone, 1870-1920*. Cambridge University Press; Ageron, C.R. (1991): *Modern Algeria. A History from 1930 to Present*. Hurst and Co.; Chafer, T. (2002): *The End of The Empire in French West Africa: France's Successful Decolonization?* Berg, Oxford.

Reflecting on Schuman's declaration -9 May 1950-, France played a decisive role in creating the first steps towards a united Europe.³¹⁸ Using both CL and Discourse Analysis it is possible to clearly see how France was portrayed as a power destined to lead this politico-economic and socio-cultural project. On one hand, the word "France" was repeated 5 times out of 955 words tokens -0.52 per cent-. This ranks "France" at the 27th position of most frequently repeated words –the ensuing word is "Germany". The declaration does not mention other countries, however the word "Europe" ranked at place 16th with 8 hits and "Member" at place 23rd with 6 hits. The contextualization of the word "France" within the text is as follows:

Table 1. Schuman Discourse 1950

"In taking upon herself for more than 20 years the role of champion of a united Europe, France has always had as her essential aim the service of peace"
"The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries"
"The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible"
"By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose decisions will bind France , Germany and other member countries, this proposal will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace"
"The Authority's decisions will be enforceable in France , Germany and other member countries"

Source: EU Documents.

The word "France" is strategically placed within the text. It is used there where a clear decision making process or a leading situation is required. It is clear that this process should be guided and agreed mostly by France and Germany whereas the description of other countries as "member countries" gives a very ambiguous definition of power sharing. This declaration, inspired by Jean Monnet, had a very clear aim - to create a bilateral economic union between France and Germany in order to produce and to manage jointly coal and steel production. By cooperating in the production of coal and steel, they hoped to reduce the possibilities of a new European war.

By controlling this production under the excuse of an economic reason, France was acting "not only on hope, but also on fear. European integration was not only reconciliation, but also an exorcism of Germany".³¹⁹

³¹⁸ For the whole Schuman's declaration see: http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/index_en.htm (Retrieved 17 November 2011)

³¹⁹ Wesseling, H.L. (2002): France, Germany and Europe. *European Review*. Vol. 10. N°3. P.302.

This fear and distrust was constantly present and preceded WWII going back to the defeat of France during the war of 1870 and the subsequent foundation of the German Empire one year later.³²⁰ Since 1898, Franco-German relationships were the reflex of an inverted mirror, where envy, antipathy and fear were main driving factors in creating a myth which would become part of future national heritages in both nations as Nolan has written.³²¹ Such feelings have continued up to the present time. In 1999, Philippe Delmas wrote a book on the next war with Germany.³²²

As Cole has pointed out, France, after WWII, was one of the most rural economies of the western nations.³²³ A quarter of the population worked in agriculture. Despite this and the challenges of decolonization, inflation, strikes, and governmental instability France led Europe. This was more to do with external factors. Germany had been defeated, Italy did not have the capacity and the United Kingdom lacked the political will.

The European Coal and Steel Commission (ECSC) was ratified by the Paris Treaty in 1951.³²⁴ This treaty was the first agreement in following the principles of supra-nationalism. After this first step, this community would embrace the participation of other partners to create a federation where capitals, people and merchandise would circulate freely.³²⁵

The Schuman Plan pursued, first of all, an economic union rather than a purely political joint initiative. Realistically speaking, given the complexity and the cultural and social differences in the region, it is difficult to imagine another kind of union besides the economic one. Thus, as will be assessed subsequently, as soon as particular or nationally specific problems arise, episodes of evident fracture also appear. Migratory issues are among these causes of rupture and discontinuity in the European political programme. This is going to be explained and justified in chapter 6.

Between 1945 and 1973, France experienced the strongest economic expansion in its history. These three decades were defined by Fourastié as the *Trente Glorieuses*.³²⁶ This

³²⁰ Some of these books are: Delaisi, F. (1911): *La Force Allemande et la Guerre Qui Vient*. Nemrich; Legendre, M. (1913): *La Guerre Prochaine et la Mission de la France*. Marcel Riviere; Danrit, C. (1889): *La Guerre de Demain*. Rossignol, Paris.

³²¹ Nolan, M.E. (2005): *The Inverted Mirror: Mythologizing the Enemy in France and Germany. 1898-1914*. Berghan Books. New York.

³²² Delmas, P. (1999): *De la Prochaine Guerre Avec l'Allemagne*. Odile Jacob. See the latest tensions between France and Germany in 2010 as a result of the economic slowdown.

³²³ Cole, A. (1998): *French Politics and Society*. Hertforshire, Prentice Hall. P.210.

³²⁴ Weil, G.L. (1967): The Merger of the Institutions of the European Communities. *The American Journal of International Law*. Vol. 61. N°1. Pp. 57-65.

³²⁵ One of the first steps to achieve that objective was when the European Communities signed on 8 April 1965 the "Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities". Op. Cit. Weil, G.L. (1967): P. 57.

³²⁶ Fourastié, J. (1979): *Les Trente Glorieuses, ou, La Révolution Invisible de 1946 à 1975*. Fayard, Paris.

sustained growth was very unique in economic history because, within this period of time, the French economy grew at an average annual rate of 5.9 per cent.

Foreign labour was not irrelevant to this progress. Vitally, Algerians played an important role in boosting the French economy, as they met the demand for cheap labour in the period between 1947 and 1962,³²⁷ considered the second stage of male Algerian labour migration to France.³²⁸

4.5. De Gaulle's Narrative and the Construction of a New Idea of France.

Without de Gaulle's leadership, events may have evolved very differently. De Gaulle's political communication was greatly influenced by a sense of historic predestination. As Gordon points out, his discourses were the founding narrative of the post-war French republic.³²⁹ He realized that only through evocative rhetoric could the country achieve international respect and the place it in the world its history demanded. This was evident from the beginning of his career, when as the youngest general, on June 18 1940 he proclaimed: "Quoi qu'il arrive, la flamme de la résistance française ne doit pas s' éteindre et ne s' éteindra pas".³³⁰ Just one day earlier, Marshal Pétain had said that France would surrender. This defiant call to arms was the beginning of a public discourse dedicated to constructing France as a leading country, even, as Lacouture has described it, a "Europe Tricolore".³³¹

De Gaulle was obsessed with the construction of a united France where the energies of all French citizens were focused on making the country a leading player. As his discourse of Bayeux on 16 June 1946, demonstrates, the role of the state was to forge a "new" France.³³² This quasi-mystical attempt to unite the country required all citizens to put their energies into service for the country. In fact, using CL and Discourse Analysis it is possible to see that the word "nous/we" is ranked 17th being repeated 27 times out of 978 words types.

The idea of "togetherness" was also very evident in the discourse pronounced in

³²⁷ Stora, B. (1992): *Ils Renaient d'Algerie: L'Immigration Algérienne en France 1912-1992*. Fayard, Paris; Silverstein, A. (2004): *Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race and Nation*. Bloomington, Indiana; Macmaster, N. (1997): *Colonial Migrants and Racism. Algerians in France. 1900-1962*. Palgrave Macmillan.

³²⁸ Sayad, A. (1999): *La Double Absence: Des Illusions de l'Émigré aux Souffrances de l'Immigré*. Seuil.

³²⁹ Gordon, P.H. (1993): *A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy*. Princeton University Press.

³³⁰ De Gaulle, C. (1940): Appel à la Résistance. Available at: <http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org/pages/l-homme/accueil/discours/pendant-la-guerre-1940-1946/appele-du-18-juin-1940.php> (Retrieved 5 May 2011)

³³¹ Lacouture, J. (1965): *De Gaulle*. La Seuil, Paris.

³³² Available at: www.charles-de-gaulle.org/pages/espace-pedagogique/le-point-sur/les-textes-a-conaitre/discourse-de-bayeux-16-juin-1946.php (Retrieved 14 May 2011).

Strasbourg almost one year after on the 7 April 1947.³³³ This aspect of “togetherness” is very evident in his discourse by quantifying the content. The word “nous/we” appears ranked in the 6th position. It was repeated 67 times out of 1.042 words types -6.42 per cent-. Following this trend, De Gaulle used as well 30 times the word “notre/our” –ranked 17th–.

Another interesting aspect of this discourse is that De Gaulle uses very often the verb “est/is”. This verb is ranked in the 16th position being mentioned with a frequency of 31 times. However De Gaulle uses “is” to show a clear image of present and how within this contexts all French citizens and himself–nous/we- are embarked in the same project: a real project not an imaginary or an abstract one. It is also possible to appreciate that this idea of common project is even more important than the word “France”. Without this civic gluing element the concept of France would not exist and a “new” France would not be possible.

All the patriotic and nationalistic appeals to grandeur, in the service of a united nation, were reinforced and accompanied by some of the most advanced public policies of the epoch. The most notable domestic examples include the decision of the government of the Fourth Republic to create social security in 1945 and the SMIC (Guaranteed Minimum Wage) in 1950.³³⁴ These measures ensured a higher degree of social cohesion, appropriation and identification to the idea of a “new” France.

The De Gaullian discourse was “designed” to build up a nation that had lost its self-identity and pride at the beginning of WWII. French successes from the end of WWII until 1973 can be explained by a number of factors: the lack of other leading players in a profoundly damaged post-war Europe; the existence of a bipolar international order where the US and the USSR tried to control the new international sphere; the conviction of the French leader who was obsessed with the idea of France’s historic responsibility and greatness; the successful strategy of taking advantage of the Marshall Plan without being controlled by the US; a favourable economic cycle; a public narrative where citizens were situated in the centre of a vertically –by De Gaulle- steered action and project³³⁵; and the support of a country which believed in their own capacity to achieve a glorious future.

By the 1960s, France was already playing a consistently significant role in the international system. The projection of French power was being assertively demonstrated.

³³³ Available at: www.charles-de-gaulle.org/pages/l-homme/dossiers-thematiques/1946-1958-contre-la-ive-republique/le-rassemblement-du-peuple-francais/documents/discours-du-general-de-gaulle-a-strasbourg--7-avril-1947.php (Retrieved 14 May 2011).

³³⁴ Bazen, S. and Martin, J.P. (1991): L’Incidence du Salaire Minimum sur les Gains et L’Emploi en France. *Revue Economique de l’OCDE*. N°16. Spring, P. 226.

³³⁵ Here are used here the principles contained in Touraine’s sociology of action. See for instance: Touraine, A. (1981): *The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements*. Cambridge University Press.

This was particularly the case when France vetoed the British attempt to join the EEC first in 1963. In 1967, France again said that it would veto Britain's application, threatening in the process the end of the Community if the other five founding members opposed the French stance. This demonstration of power was effective until the end of the *Trente Glorieuses*. Only when De Gaulle left power in April 1969, the veto was lifted and after negotiations, on the 1 January 1973, the United Kingdom became a full member of the EEC.

De Gaulle believed in his role as the champion of the principles of France, a country, created "in the name not just of the French citizen, but of all mankind".³³⁶ Through his political discourse, on both a local/national and international and global level, De Gaulle developed a narrative that was able to mobilize what Machiavelli called *Virtù Civile*, or Civic Virtue.³³⁷

This civic virtue simultaneously expresses trust and cooperation in the citizenry towards accomplishing a common objective. This is what Putnam called social capital.³³⁸ Probably the most essential driving element when it comes to collective socio-political and cultural projects. It brings up a question, raised by Connors, as to the roles of ethos, pathos and logos played in the de Gaullian narrative?³³⁹

The articulation of this social capital through his public discourse used a number of phenomena which had crucial importance, such as trust, credibility, virtue, emotions, feelings and passions.³⁴⁰ Words and expressions like "mission", "responsibility", "humanizing power", "interest of mankind" certainly do not deal with logos.

As Gottweis stresses, any communication combines three constitutive elements: ethos, pathos, logos.³⁴¹ Therefore, the speaker decides the proportion of those ingredients depending on the objectives. Following Caron, it is possible to differentiate a number of argumentative

³³⁶ Hearthfield, J. (2006): *The Death of the Subject Explained*. Books Surge Publishing. Chapter 6 available at: <http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/defeat-french-humanism.htm> (Retrieved 5 May 2011). De Gaulle's extracts of his discourses may include paragraphs like: France must fulfil her mission as a world power. We are everywhere in the world. There is not corner of the earth, where, at any given time, men do not look to us and ask what France has to say. It is a great responsibility to be France, the humanizing power par excellence" in 1958 or "Our action is aimed at reaching goal ...that because they are French are in the interest of mankind" in 1967. Available at: <http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org/pages/l-homme/dossiers-thematiques/1958-1970-la-ve-republique.php> (Retrieved 6 May 2011)

³³⁷ Skinner, Q. (2002): Machiavelli on Virtù and the Maintenance of Liberty. *Visions of Politics*. N°2. Pp. 160-185; Pettit, P. (1997): *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government*. Oxford Clarendon Press; Viroli, M. (2002): *Republicanism*. Hill and Wang. New York.

³³⁸ Putnam, R. (1993): *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton University Press.

³³⁹ Connors, R.S. (1979): The Differences Between Speech and Writing: Ethos, Pathos and Logos. *College Cognition and Communication*. Vol. 30. N°3. Pp. 285-290.

³⁴⁰ Gottweis, H. (2007): "Rhetoric in Policy Making: Between Logos, Ethos and Pathos" in Fisher, F., Miller, G.J., and Sidney, M.S. (Eds.): *Handbook of Public Analysis: Theory, Politics and Methods*. Taylor and Francis. Pp. 237-250.

³⁴¹ Op. Cit. P.237.

performativity or argumentative orientation models.³⁴² De Gaulle, in order to articulate his idea of a “new” France, employed the ethno-centric performance where the speaker is supposed to adopt the role of an authority.

This model was, however, affected by a very emotional and quasi-mythical discourse. This is the case not only in the beginning, but later also. By developing an ethno-centric discursive performance, De Gaulle was able to convince the masses since ethos functions with trust, respect, honesty, credibility, authority and benevolence. After first using this discursive approach, pathos –which operates through empathy, sympathy and sensibilities – did the rest.

One episode perfectly demonstrates the importance of political communication and its links with emotions, myths, prejudices, frustrations and illusions. It is also the episode that connects France directly to the Mediterranean context –the decolonization process. This integrates and exemplifies all these elements and it is important to reflect on it in order to better address the hypothesis of this manuscript and understand the future events with which France has had to manage and cope.

4.6.France and the Algerian Question

As stated previously, the moral and spiritual reconstruction of France was accompanied by great changes in the productive and service sectors of the economy. A highly ruralized country started to witness modernization that permitted increased productivity. The conditions of the peasants improved, notably due to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) introduced by the EEC in 1962.³⁴³ French industry was concentrated, internationalized and modernized to make it more competitive once the EEC internal market totally opened and GATT entered into force in 1948.

But this growth was not free of costs. It was accompanied by parallel social challenges. Notably, migration has always been intertwined with economic growth. Between 1945 and 1973, the material reconstruction of this ideal France was made possible, in part, by immigrants.³⁴⁴ Subsequently, during economic recession on a global scale following the oil

³⁴² Caron, J. (1983): *Les Régulations du Discours. Psycholinguistique et Pragmatique du Langue*. PUF, Paris.

³⁴³ Ackrill, R. (2000): *The Common Agricultural Policy*. Sheffield Academic Press; Runge, C.F. and Von Witzke, H. (1987): Institutional Change in the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*. Vol. 69. N°2. Pp. 213-222.

³⁴⁴ Ogden, P.E. (1995): “Labour Migration to France”. In Cohen, R. (Ed.): *The Cambridge Survey of World Migration*. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 189-296; Richard, J.L., and Tripier, M. (1999): “Les Travailleurs

crisis of 1973, immigration was officially suspended and restrictive policies introduced. The majority of these migrants came from the Maghreb, especially from Algeria. They were easily summoned because of the colonial links between France and Algeria, but this migration provoked deep socio-political and economic problems.

For France, after its humiliation during WWII and the decline of its international stature, retaining Algeria was a question of imperial pride.³⁴⁵ It is possible to argue that the French-Algerian conflict during the era of decolonization and between 1954 and 1962 was unnecessary. It did, however, belong to a process of identity reconstruction and the French population was not convinced of the merits of abandoning its North African colony. As late as 1958, a poll demonstrated that 52 per cent of the French population wanted integration whereas just 41 per cent agreed with Algerian independence.³⁴⁶

These concerns were much more troublesome for the French elite than for the masses. They did not easily accept the fact of losing Algeria, which was something symbolic and related to losing the historic imperial ethos. This is relevant when it comes to EU foreign formation where elites are much more concerned than the masses in creating new systems of control to exert influence by stabilizing EU-MENA relations for EU's benefit and interest.

Though France did not have a strong economic interest in Algeria, as Smith recognizes, there was a "common perception" inside the political elite regarding colonial issues.³⁴⁷ That is why both the Algerian war and the decolonization process were so damaging for both societies. Emotional attachments with the past were combined with a pervasive Jacobean tradition of citizenship very much related to those inspirational discourses of de Gaulle where France was called to an international mission of disseminating its highest values: its civilization.

As Sorum has stressed, the "Jacobean nationalism differed for other forms of nationalism in the intensity of its missionary zeal".³⁴⁸ French intellectuals were not immune to this socio-politic convulsion. A few months after the war began Claude Bourdett published an article in *L'Observateur* entitled "Y-a-t-il une Gestapo Algérienne".³⁴⁹ In this article, he explained and denounced the methods used by the French army against Algerian insurgents.

Immigrés en France, des Trente Glorieuses à la Crise". In Dewitte, P. (Ed.): *Immigration et Integration: L'Etat des Savoirs*. La Découverte. Pp. 173-184.

³⁴⁵ Sorum, P. (1977): *Intellectuals and the Decolonization in France*. Chapel Hill, Ithaca.

³⁴⁶ Bernstein, S. (1993): *The Republic of De Gaulle, 1958-1969*. Cambridge University Press.

³⁴⁷ Smith, B. (1978): *The French Stake in Algeria*. Cornell University Press.

³⁴⁸ Op. Cit. Sorum, P. (1977): P.23.

³⁴⁹ Bourdet, C. (1955): "Y-a-t-il une Gestapo Algérienne". *L'Observateur*. 13 January. Available at <http://jacques.morel67.pagesperso-orange.fr/ccfo/crimcol/node12.html> (Retrieved 1 May 2011)

At that time, words such as Gestapo or Nazi were not used lightly. French public opinion reacted to that because they could not accept such a comparison. Some other leading intellectuals such as Sartre, Beauvoir and Camus also expressed highly critical views.³⁵⁰

It is possible to argue that the political system of the Fourth Republic did not help in properly managing this situation. In twelve years from 1946 to 1958, 22 different governments were in place. That explains both the fragility of the political system and the difficulties inherent in developing a coherent colonial policy regarding Algeria and, to a lesser extent, Indochina. The international image of France started to rapidly decline and on 4 June 1958, during an allocution in Algiers, De Gaulle, who was clearly conscious about this delicate context and the possible aftermaths, declared that from that time onward he considered French and Algerian population as the same one and the same category of citizens with the same rights and obligations.³⁵¹ He personified the discourse by saying “Yes, myself, De Gaulle (...) open the doors to reconciliation”. He finished by saying that in that very night he understood how beautiful, grand and generous was France.³⁵²

By focusing on expressions such as “yes, myself, de Gaulle, to them, I open the doors of the reconciliation”, it is possible to observe, yet again, the extent that he was completely convinced of his role as the saviour of France.³⁵³ His role and style, even today, are considered quasi-mythical.³⁵⁴ However, this declaration of intention did not achieve the results he expected. It neither resolved the Algerian conflict nor improved the French image in the international sphere.

In 1959, the UN discussed Algeria and British Commonwealth countries aligned against France.³⁵⁵ De Gaulle realized that the crisis in Algeria was damaging France’s image across the world and generating strong criticism at home by opinion-makers. On 5 October 1958, France became a semi-presidential republic and de Gaulle shifted to more of an executive role with his authority totally legitimized.

The Algerian resistance against the French regime was organised around the Front the

³⁵⁰ See Simone de Beauvoir’s letters. Especially interesting the letter of the 18 March 1956. Sartre’s article evidences his harshest criticisms against French colonial attitudes: La conquête s’est faite par la violence; la surexploitation et l’oppression exigent le maintien de la violence, dont la présence de l’armée (...) Dans les faits eux-mêmes, dans les institutions, dans la nature des échanges et de la production, le racisme est ensuite. Sartre, J.P. (1956): “Le Colonialism est un Système”. *Temps Modernes*. March ; See also, Sartre, J.P. (1955): “L’Algerie n’est pas la France”. *Temps Modernes*. May.

³⁵¹ Kupchan, C.A. (1994): *The Vulnerability of Empire*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

³⁵² To study in deep this period and de Gaullian political narrative results interesting to take into consideration Gaulle, de. C (1970): *Discours et Messages*. Volume III: Avec le Renouveau 1958-1962. Paris, Plon.

³⁵³ Fenby, J. (2010): *Charles de Gaulle and the France He Saved*. Simon and Schuster.

³⁵⁴ Hazareensingh, S. (2010): *Le Mythe Gaullien*. Gallimard, Paris.

³⁵⁵ Although, some months before, on 13 December 1958, the UN rejected Algeria’s right to independence.

Liberation Nationale (FLN) in November 1954 under the auspices of the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (CRUA).³⁵⁶ Its armed section during the war was the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN). By 1956 mostly all the Algerian nationalistic factions gathered and joined the FLN. That socio-political and military momentum was decisive to make more efficient their struggles for the independence. The war situation worsened over the years to come and by 1960, civil riots in Algiers -the revolt of the barricades- underscored just how complex and visceral the Algerian conflict was.³⁵⁷ The same year, Melun's talks with the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) failed.³⁵⁸

On 19 December 1960, the United Nations recognized Algeria's right to independence and military and diplomatic action intensified. Through complicated negotiations, on 18 March, the cease-fire opened the door to the signing of the Evian accords and the long awaited end of the war.³⁵⁹ On 1 July 1961, Algerians voted overwhelmingly in favour of independence. Two days later the French government ratified the decision. Despite these outcomes, conflicts and social consequences did not stop. The Pieds Noirs – Nearly 900.000 French, European and Jewish residents had to flee from Algeria in 1962 after the declaration of independence- left a post-colonial legacy that served as a constant reminder to France of the complexity of managing “immigration” over decades to come.³⁶⁰

This historical perspective is important for the subsequent analysis of the dynamics between Spain and France from the 1970s onward, especially when Spain's application for EEC membership came to the fore. The next chapter explores, first, Spanish ambitions to join the EEC as well as French reactions in the context of the historical, cultural, political and economic developments that had gone before. Second, it explains the political and diplomatic processes that pushed Spain to become a political entrepreneur.

³⁵⁶ Harbi, M. (1998): *1954, La Guerre Commence en Algérie*. Editions Complexe. 3rd Edition. P. 5; Meynier, G. (2000): *Histoire Intérieure du FLN, 1954-1962*. Lavoisier.

³⁵⁷ Started on 24 January 1960.

³⁵⁸ From 25 to 29 of June 1960. Cairns, J.C. (1961): Algerian Progress: Towards Reality and Negotiation. *International Journal*. Vol.16. N°2. Pp.158-168.

³⁵⁹ Evian Accords is a journalistic name. The official title was General Statement of the two Delegations on 18 March 1962. Legally speaking it is not possible to define that document as an accord because Algeria at the moment was not an independent state.

³⁶⁰ It is relevant to note that they were not welcomed in France and they suffered discriminatory treatment since their arrival. Jordi, J.J. (1962): *De L'Exode à L'Exil. Rapatriés et Pieds-Noirs en France*. L'Harmattan, Paris.

CHAPTER 5

SPAIN AND THE GREAT GALLOP: STRATEGIES OF A POLITICAL ENTREPRENEUR

This chapter will explain how Spain transitioned -from the 1960s to mid-1980s- from a role of proto-entrepreneur to a role of political entrepreneur or broker. Spain's struggles and challenges to access the EEC were important. Strong European countries like France, Italy or Belgium among others, deployed intense political and communication campaigns to abort Spain's attempts to join the union. To what extent was France's dubious conviction regarding Spanish entry to the EEC justifiable? Did France think that Spain constituted a menace for French ambitions within European politics? Would Spain be able to maintain a durable socio-economic and political profile over the decades to come? Which were the main difficulties and obstacles Spain must overcome in order to converge with its European partners? Given its socio-political, economic and institutional backlog and considering that Spain would attain international stature, what price must Spain pay to reach its goals? Finally, how could Spain manage old myths, prejudices and open wounds and set up a credible and consistent agenda for the years to come?

5.1. Spain's European Ambitions and the French Response.

Spanish ambitions to enter the EEC date back to practically to establishment of the European Community as Spain started to have more contact with Europe. The same day as the signing of the Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC, 25 March, the first group of Spanish migrant workers departed to Belgium.³⁶¹ The diplomatic offensive to gain EEC status started in the early 1960s at the time of the Economic Stabilization Plan, which followed a period when the Spanish economy started to emerge from the endemic crisis. Still a dictatorship, at this time EEC entry was not possible. Due to this reason, all member states staunchly opposed Spanish ambitions to become part of the EEC. As it is going to be explained later, France was the most reluctant and less supporting country to Spanish ambitions. This attitude was a political constant almost until 1985 when Spain accessed to the EEC.

By 1960, the Spanish government had initiated early diplomatic attempts to court the EEC. On the 9 December 1960, Spain's ambassador to Brussels, Count of Casa Miranda,

³⁶¹ Oñate, J. (Ed.) (2005): *Portugal y España. Veinte Años de Integración en Europa 1985-2005*. Asociación de Periodistas Europeos. Muñoz Vergara Ediciones, Madrid.

presented his credentials to the president of the Commission of the EEC, Walter Hallstein. This act represented a declaration of intent. Two years later, on the 9 January 1962, Spain applied to become a member of the EEC in a letter addressed to the president of the EEC, Maurice Couve de Murville.

The original version of the letter was written by Fernando María Castiella, the Spanish minister of foreign affairs in Spanish rather than French, the diplomatic language of the time. The opening paragraph of the letter shows immediately the Spanish objective:³⁶²

“I have the pleasure of requesting, in the name of my Government, the opening of negotiations aiming at examining the possible engagement of my country with the EEC in the way most suitable to reciprocal interests.”

Subsequently, the Spanish minister justified his country’s candidacy by enumerating a number of relevant elements ranging from historic and economic to the political.³⁶³ He stated that Spain was a country with strong European vocation. A characteristic that has been demonstrated over the history and therefore, by joining the EEC, Spain could demonstrate its commitment towards the construction of Europe.

Paragraph four underlines one of the most important elements behind the French negative reaction against the Spanish request for accession to the EEC: The issue of agriculture. Even though this issue will be addressed subsequently, it is important to note here that the early mention of this issue highlighted major Spanish concerns regarding future negotiations:³⁶⁴

On the 7 March 1962, Couve de Murville acknowledged receipt of the letter, without indicating any kind of interest or encouragement regarding the Spanish proposal.³⁶⁵ Italy’s *Corriere della Sera* soon after published an article warning that Spain’s application to become a fully-fledged member of the EEC caused surprise, pleasure and perplexity in Brussels because member states did not expect such proposal.³⁶⁶ For one, Belgium’s highly regarded foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak, a long-time critic of the Spanish dictatorship was appalled.³⁶⁷ He was also president-in-office of the EEC. Also in 1962, the *Courrier*

³⁶² Historic Archives. Council of the European Union. Brussels. Archival EEC and EAEC, CM2/1970-851. Dossier relative to the signing of the commercial agreement between Spain and the EEC.

³⁶³ Ibid.

³⁶⁴ Ibid.

³⁶⁵ Historic Archives. Council of the European Union. Brussels. Archival EEC and EAEC, CM2/1970-851. Dossier relative to the signing of the commercial agreement between Spain and the EEC.

³⁶⁶ Ibid. O.V. in Italian.

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

Socialiste Européen was also commenting on Spain's proposal, defining it as something intolerable that might endanger the future and defence of democratic values because it was a fascist regime and "le fascism est un crime".³⁶⁸

After these episodes, in 1964 a second letter in French, Count of Casa Miranda, conveyed a message to the EEC emphasizing the fact that Spain had already started to liberalise its economy.³⁶⁹ Nevertheless, this argument ignored the dictatorship factor and therefore left the EEC unmoved. Pure economic reasoning was not enough to convince a reluctant EEC.³⁷⁰

After four months, Spaak, responded the request. His answer underlined the fact that the EEC might be willing to open contact with the Spanish government in order to analyse the economic problems that were affecting the Spanish economy.³⁷¹ A somewhat deflating response for the Spanish considering that part of the objective had been to showcase the progress that Spain had made economically in preceding years.

Despite this general lack of appreciation, the Swiss press expressed their concerns with regards to these blockages coming mostly from France, Belgium and Italy, saying that in recognising this hesitation, the European integration should be considered a long-term process where the regimes might vanish and the people would remain.³⁷²

Over 1965, Spain carried on with its purposes of integration. Following a very similar rhetoric and political argumentation as the one exposed above, the Embassy of Spain to Paris elaborated a document justifying and explaining again the reasons why Spain should access the EEC. It was highlighted the new Europeanist fashion of Spain's foreign policy since Castiella took over the Spain's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1957. Within this letter it is important to stress how Spain started to show its ambitions to lead, somehow, international politics despite the international ostracism. The Spanish diplomacy mentioned their proposal to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (UNCD) to organize a World conference for non-nuclear countries in order to contribute to the alleviation of the problems the world

³⁶⁸ Wilhelmus Burger, J.A. (1962): "Démocratie et Désintégration: L'Espagne Membre de la CEE?" *Courrier Socialiste Européen*. 2 April 1962.

³⁶⁹ Historic Archives. Council of the European Union. Brussels. Archival EEC and EAEC, CM2/1970-851. Dossier relative to the signing of the commercial agreement between Spain and the EEC.

³⁷⁰ Ibid.

³⁷¹ Historic Archives. Council of the European Union. Brussels. Archival EEC and EAEC, CM2/1970-851. Dossier relative to the signing of the commercial agreement between Spain and the EEC. Letter sent by P.H. Spaak to Castiella on 2 June 1964.

³⁷² Silve, R. (1964): Les Régimes Passent, Les Peuples Restent. *Journal de Genève*. 10 May 1964.

was facing at that time.³⁷³ The document also mentioned that for the European project it would be important to have a partner with very good relations with Latin American republics and the Arab World.³⁷⁴ As it is going to be shown later, these two vectors –Latin America and the Arab World- were the two geographical and cultural elements that Spain would continue selling to the EU over the decades to come, in order to get more diplomatic stature and international weight. The democratic and civilising rhetoric deployed by these proto political entrepreneurs to convince the European public opinion focused on: The Spain-USA agreements signed in 1953 and renewed in 1963 as something that was defined “by the World press as true alliance”; The role of Spain would play in order to “contribute to the defence of a free World” and following its universal vocation devoted “to the defence of Occident”.³⁷⁵

5.2. Trying to Build a New Image.

Over the next number of Spain looked to project an image of political, social and economic rebirth and cohesion. In July 1969, Franco in preparation for the inevitable Spanish democratic transition named Juan Carlos of Bourbon, Prince of Spain. The international community greeted this, as well as other, move towards transition with suspicion. The Community did, however, sign a preferential trade agreement with Spain in the context of the accession of three northern European countries in 1973 –Denmark, United Kingdom and Ireland. This was followed by the signing of an additional protocol to that agreement.³⁷⁶

Just one month before Franco’s death in 1975, EEC foreign ministers, along with Pope Paul VI, Olaf Palme of Sweden and the Mexican president Luis Echevarría, condemned the lack of respect for human rights displayed in the execution of one ETA (Euskadi ta’ Askatasuna; Bask Country and Freedom) member, Angel Otaegui, and three FRAP (Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriota; Revolutionary Front Anti-Fascist and Patriot) members, José Luis Sánchez, Ramón García and Humberto Baena.³⁷⁷

³⁷³ Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1965): Information Note Drafted by the Spanish Embassy to Paris on the New Europeanist Direction of Spanish Foreign Policy since the Arrival of Fernando Maria Castiella at the Spanish Foreign Ministry. P.5. Available at: www.cvce.eu/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/en/87c372a8-360d-4846-876e-d9d64705a918/30935d10-9431-42d9-a29c-3b23d72cc6f5/Resources#f6ec5a99-dba6-415c-bf58-f3cded9cf18d_en&overlay (Retrieved 1 June 2012).

³⁷⁴ Op. Cit. P. 9.

³⁷⁵ Ibid. Pp.9-10.

³⁷⁶ Op. Cit. Oñate, J. (Ed.) (2005): P. 12.

³⁷⁷ See Press and Information Office of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany (1977): *Texts Relating to the European Political Co-Operation*. PIOGFRG. Bonn. P. 113; See also Jauregui, F. (1985): Las Presiones Internacionales no Pudieron Frenar los Cinco Fusilamientos del 27 de Septiembre de 1975. *Periódico El País*. 27/09/1985. Available at: http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/FRANCO/_FRANCISCO/ESPANA/FRAP/ETA/FRANQUISMO/presio

Following Franco's death Spain faced a crossroads as the military, reactionary supporters of Franco, reformers and democrats all wondered what the future held. Juan Carlos I, was crowned on the 22 November 1975, just one day after Franco's death. The new King, had been chosen by Franco and during his coronation he paid tribute to the late leader.³⁷⁸ Despite the view of some authors such as Share,³⁷⁹ Franco's legacy would remain, as McDonough, Barnes and Pina have shown, more polarizing than does the democratic system over coming decades and would prevail jeopardise the effective implementation of the democratic system.³⁸⁰

In 1976 the Council of Europe via resolution 640 (1976) 1, guaranteed the support to the Spanish process of democratic transition on the grounds that Spain accept a multi-party system.³⁸¹

On 5 December 1976, the 27th Congress of the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español; Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) was celebrated in Madrid. At that time the PSOE was not still recognised as a legal political organization. Two years before, in 1974, while still in exile, the PSOE at its 26th Congress, elected Felipe González as Secretary-General.³⁸²

Two years on, and celebrating the first meeting in Spain after the dictatorship, González and his party now had the support of the main European socialist politicians such as Willy Brandt and Olof Palme. González proposed a new political direction more in line with social democracy and away from traditional socialism and Marxism that characterized the past of the party. Within a year, the PSOE was already the official opposition force with the 29.2 per cent of popular support.

The transition period to democracy was very vibrant. On 26 July 1977 Spanish president Adolfo Suárez wrote three different letters to the EEC applying to become a member of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community), the EAEC (European Atomic Energy Community) and the EEC.³⁸³ On the same day, probably as a political gesture to block Spanish intentions, the French government sent a memorandum to the EEC claiming

nes/internacionales/pudieron/frenar/fusilamientos/27/septiembre/1975/elpepiesp/19850927elpepinac_8/Tes?print=1 (Retrieved 25 January 2011).

³⁷⁸ Discourse available at: (Retrieved 25 January 2011)

³⁷⁹ Share, D. (1986): The Franquist Regime and the Dilemma of Succession. *The Review of Politics*. Vol. 46. Issue 48. Pp.546-575.

³⁸⁰ McDonough, P., Barnes, S.H., and Pina, A. (1986): The Growth of Democratic Legitimacy in Spain. *The American Political Science Review*. Vol. 80. N°3. P.753.

³⁸¹ Council of Europe. Resolution 640 (1976) 1. 28th Assembly. 21st and 22nd of September 1976. Brussels.

³⁸² Díez Cárcamo, A. (2006): El PSOE. De Suresnes a la Democracia: 1974-1982. *Revista Clio*. N°32. P.1.

³⁸³ Central Historic Archives. Council of Europe. Adhesion of Spain. 07.15 1 (46):7. Dossiers 1-12. Box 1. Original letter written in Spanish.

urgent revisions of the Community regulations and policies regarding agricultural production.³⁸⁴

Spain was not mentioned directly in the memorandum. But it was clear that France's fears regarding the entry of countries with the potential to be economic competitors. But the moderate tone of this letter was not shared by all. In very emotional language, the French communist party published an article in *L'Humanité* criticising and opposing stridently the EEC decision to start negotiations for the accession of Spain, Portugal and Greece.³⁸⁵

On 28 July 1977 the Spanish minister of foreign affairs, Marcelino Oreja, submitted the official Spanish candidacy to the EEC. The responses were not immediate. The French preoccupation remained agriculture.³⁸⁶ As *La Libre Belgique* noted in December 1978 Spain was no longer simply a holiday destination. By some indicators (in this case those published by the OSCE) the tenth most industrialised country in the world.³⁸⁷

The EEC responded officially to the Spanish request on 29 November 1978.³⁸⁸ The document was detailed and subdivided into six main categories: Industry, agriculture, fisheries, social issues, regional aspects and external relations. Point 53 expressed clearly the 'scale and complexity of the problems arising from Spain's accession'.³⁸⁹ By the time negotiations began in early 1979, senior European officials from president of the Council, Jean François-Poncet³⁹⁰ and Roy Jenkins, the president of the European Commission expressed satisfaction but emphasised the need for the move to democracy to continue.³⁹¹

5.3. French Reactions.

As explained briefly above, France opposed Spanish accession to the EEC more than almost any other European party as far back as the 1960s. Fears of Spain making the economic situation worse in terms of continent-wide downturn as well as a concerns over an imbalance caused by an Iberian entry was summed to the fear that the membership could trigger a flood

³⁸⁴ See French Government (1976): *Mémoire sur la Réforme des Règlements Communautaires Concernant les Productions Agricoles Méditerranéennes*. *La Politique Étrangère de la France*. 3rd Quarter. 26 July 1976.

³⁸⁵ Lajoine, A. (1977): *Empêcher le Mauvais Coup*. *L'Humanité*. 30 July 1977.

³⁸⁶ Kergorlay, H. (1977): *Espagne: Demande d'adhésion à la C.E.E.* *Le Figaro*. 20th of July.

³⁸⁷ See Anon. (1978): *La Longue Marche du Douzième Etat Membre de la CEE*. *La Libre de Belgique*. 21st of December. N. 335. P.D1.

³⁸⁸ Opinion on the Spain's Application for Membership. Bulletin of the European Community. September 1978. N. Supplement 9/1978. P.14-21. Brussels.

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

³⁹⁰ See Poncet, J.F. (1979): *Statement of the Ministerial Opening Session Regarding the Negotiations for Spain to its adhesion to the EEC*. Brussels. 5th of February. French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

³⁹¹ See Anon. (1979): *La Longue Marche de L'Espagne*. *30 Jours D'Europe*. March. N. 248. P.16.

of migrant labour. In late July 1977, the French Communist Party expressed its most harsh opposition to the accession of Spain (as well as Greece and Portugal).³⁹²

This echoed somewhat the official French view. On 31 August 1977, Spanish president Adolfo Suarez visited the French Élysée Palace. His host, the French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing –known for his lack of sympathies towards Spain–, was clear that his country would not sacrifice its position in Mediterranean agriculture.³⁹³ One month later, on 20 September 1977, Jean Taittinger, French secretary of state for foreign affairs, made a similar point at a meeting of the EEC Council of Ministers.³⁹⁴

As mentioned above, Portugal and Greece were also negotiating their accession to the EEC at the time but the Spanish issue was much more a preoccupation of France and the rest of the member states. It was, as *The Guardian*, noted “the biggest competitive threat to the Mediterranean farmers of Italy and the South of France”.³⁹⁵ It was also the biggest country to be considered for membership since the UK in 1973, though unlike the UK it was a net recipient not provider of funds. France in her approach towards the Spanish potential accession was mixing political, economic and emotional concerns alike. As it has been mentioned in the precedent chapter, a long shared history plagued mostly by conflict and rivalry generated an aversion that used politico-economic excuses to defend national interests.

The Spanish reaction to European questions was one of concern. Between the 6 and 7 November 1979 a meeting in Madrid was convened in which the nine Spanish ambassadors to EEC countries discussed the issue. It was chaired by Foreign Minister Marcelino Oreja and President Adolfo Suarez.³⁹⁶ The goal of the meeting was to assess the political and economic relationship between Spain and the EEC countries. One month later Marcelino Oreja conceded an interview in *La Libre Belgique* that the meeting confirmed the fear that Spain had a number of difficulties to overcome across Europe.³⁹⁷

During the first part of 1980 France took over the EEC Council Presidency and due to the French Communist's Party opposition against the Spanish accession there was some concern that this might be a setback for Spanish hopes. But overall, Oreja was of the opinion

³⁹² Souske, A. (1977): “Marché Commun: La Question Espagnole”. *L'Express*. 8 August 1977.

³⁹³ Anon. (1977): Communiqué de l'Élysée à l'issue de la Visite à Paris du Premier Ministre Espagnol Adolfo Suarez. *La Politique Étrangère de la France*. 3rd Semester. P.49.

³⁹⁴ Taittinger, J. (1977): Intervention 20 September 1977. *La Politique Étrangère de la France*. 3rd Quarter. P.66-67.

³⁹⁵ Palmer, J. (1978): “Getting Ready for EEC”. *The Guardian*. 14 November.

³⁹⁶ At this meeting Marcelino Oreja was confirmed as the top Spanish diplomat. Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo who was in charge of the enlargement negotiations was not present in the summit.

³⁹⁷ Anon. (1979): L'Espagne face à l'Europe, à l'OTAN et au Monde. 21 December. N.355. P.D1.

that the general political will in the EEC supported Spanish entry as the “preconditions” put forward by the French opposition “seem to us unacceptable and do not, of course, reflect a truly European view of Community integration.”³⁹⁸

5.4. Amateur Government Paving the Road for the Next Steps.

Following Franco’s death institution and state building, communication systems, civil society, and external engagement had to be constructed from scratch. As one of the most authoritative political journalists in Spain, Fernando Jauregui, put it “It was clearly an epoch of impressive activity. It was a moment of hectic activity where everybody had to learn”.³⁹⁹

This first period of accommodation lasted exactly two years after Franco’s death from November 1975 to June 1977, the time of the first constituent elections. Notable as the first time Spaniards voted for the first new parliament after 40 years of dictatorship. Despite its democratic credentials, the first government was institutionally very weak. As Jauregui put it, “That govern was mainly based on interpersonal relations. I remember when Suarez won the elections, there was a journalist –Pedro Calvo Hernando- who greeted the new President saying, *Bastard!* to which Suarez replied, *Pedro, I remind you that now I am the new President.*”⁴⁰⁰

In 1982, the socialist Felipe González won the elections and replaced Suárez. His government set a new standard for the way post-transition Spain was governed and there was a new focus on projecting external power. The role played by González in this was vital. As Jauregui explained in an interview with this author,

“Adolfo Suarez abroad represented a kind of the Spanish Evo Morales. Someone coming from Franco’s ranks. Someone who did not speak foreign languages. Someone who never left Spain in his life. González was a guy coming from the Socialist International, substituting the mythical Yopis. González was legitimized by the history of socialism.”⁴⁰¹

For instance González looked to strengthen relations with Latin America, Spain's most natural partner. His foreign minister, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, was a socialist who was successful in improving the Spanish image in Europe that, as Jauregui recalled, was still distrusted and looked down on across Europe.⁴⁰²

³⁹⁸ Ibid.

³⁹⁹ Personal interview to Fernando Jauregui. Madrid. 6 July 2010.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁰¹ Cited interview with Fernando Jauregui.

⁴⁰² Ibid.

This government had to deal with a very heavy past and with scarce political training and experience. This past was dragged by new enthusiastic politicians. As Jauregui said during the personal interview, when he was travelling across with the president Suarez “we were despised people. Spain was a model for Latin America, but regarding Europe we were very badly considered.”⁴⁰³

However the negotiations to access the EEC were still very long, excessively long. West Germany was the key supporter for entry inside the EEC. In an interview with this author, Carlos Westendorp -who was a senior negotiator for Spanish accession to the EEC and Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1995-1996-, recognised that: “The Germans were our main allies. Germany said that it was not possible that a Spanish soldier would defend us in the NATO whereas we deny the entrance of Spain to the EEC.”⁴⁰⁴ As Westendorp acknowledged during the personal interview, after all the efforts, it was the referendum for the NATO the element that unblocked all the process of accession.⁴⁰⁵

The negotiations were finalised and signed in June 1985. At that time Spain had a voice, but no vote until full accession on 1 January 1986. The era of, as González put it the “Great Gallopade”, was here. Spain could now define its identity, its role and its strategy in Europe and beyond. After achieving these complicated outcomes, Spain was ready to become a political entrepreneur or broker and therefore, it was vital to design a political and diplomatic strategy to gather greater European consensus –especially from the strongest member states like Germany- and pursue its ambitions: The baseline of this political and diplomatic strategy was the Latin America and the Mediterranean, the two traditional historical cards Spain could play.

5.5. A Political Entrepreneur Looking for a Strategy.

From 1985 onward Spain deployed an important political and diplomatic strategy to gain influence in European politics in order to become a middle power. However, it is necessary to examine the extent that Spain was a political entrepreneur and to ask how Spain developed its entrepreneurial plan in the pursuit of its interests. Another relevant question is whether or not Spain encountered opposition from other southern Mediterranean countries – potential competitors or partners- such as France or Italy and how northern European countries viewed these developments.

⁴⁰³ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁴ Personal interview with Carlos Westendorp. Madrid 30 January 2011.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid.

Richard Gillespie has written that “Spain has undoubtedly played a major role in persuading Europe that the problems of North Africa are European, and not merely southern European problems”.⁴⁰⁶ Similarly, Soler i Lecha has pointed out that the Europeanization of Spain’s foreign policy was the clear consequence of the attempt to transfer its problems to the EU.⁴⁰⁷ However, Soler i Lecha does agree with Gillespie that Spain looked to use the EU –in particular its economic and financial resources – in the service of its foreign policy needs, at the same time, making consistent diplomatic efforts to become the interpreter and the spokesperson of European’s interests in the Southern Mediterranean.⁴⁰⁸

Derisbourg goes further. The “key of its influence” he has argued “has been [Spain’s] ability to marry national interests with those of other partners, notably France, and to exchange policy support with major northern EU member states, especially Germany-”.⁴⁰⁹

As Gillespie has pointed out, Spain’s prominence provoked within the short term, “occasional rivalry” with France, a traditional Mediterranean power. However this has been contested by some actors interviewed for this research as will be demonstrated later in chapters 5, 7, 8 and 9.

Nevertheless, this possible rivalry within the medium and long term transformed this competitive behaviour into a more cooperative attitude in order to work together to persuade Europe about the need of developing a consistent Mediterranean policy.⁴¹⁰

The leading role of Spain in developing a new Euro-Mediterranean policy in the context of Europe’s evolving realist-security approach cannot be debated. In this Spain was able, as Bicchi incisively notes, to identify a “Mediterranean political window”. This began to be an issue of increasing interest in the earliest post-dictatorship period at a national level between 1982 and 1984, when Spain re-launched bilateral relations with southern Mediterranean countries. However, this was a foreign policy strategy that was inherited from the “internationalist” approach Spain tried to sell to Europe from 1957 onward as it has been mentioned above. Despite this political heritage that was mostly focusing on a national scale,

⁴⁰⁶ Gillespie, R. (1995): Northern European Perceptions on the Barcelona Process. *Afers Internacionals*. Nº37. P. 68.

⁴⁰⁷ Soler I Lecha, E. (2008): España y el Mediterráneo. En *Defensa del Proceso de Barcelona*. Monografía del *Observatorio de Política Exterior Europea*. Nº14.

⁴⁰⁸ This view is also shared by Torreblanca who described the process of Europeanization of the Spain’s foreign policy. See Torreblanca, J.I. (2001): “La Europeización de la Política Exterior Española” en Closa, C. (Ed.): *La Europeización del Sistema Político Español*. Istmo. Contributing to the knowledge of Spain’s foreign policy from a historical point of view see Pereira, J.C. (Ed.) (2009): *La Política Exterior de España, 1800-2003*. Ariel, Barcelona. 2nd Edition.

⁴⁰⁹ Derisbourg, J.P. (1997): The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Since Barcelona. *Mediterranean Politics*. 2:1. P. 1.

⁴¹⁰ Gillespie, R. (1997): Spanish Protagonismo and the Euro-Med Partnership Initiative. *Mediterranean Politics*. 2:1. Pp. 33-48.

Spain's activism shifted from the national sphere to the international arena between 1989 and 1992.⁴¹¹

5.6. The Spanish “Gallopade”: Looking for International Recognizance.

Spain's accession to the EEC ended decades of isolation, though the country was still considered an underdeveloped country.⁴¹² Now Spain had the opportunity to demonstrate its potential to the rest of Europe, especially those countries that expressed scepticism that the new member would have an important role to play in the Community. The Spanish (and Portuguese) entry into the EEC in 1986 came at a moment of Euro-optimism.

As has been pointed out by Westendorp, “Spain and Portugal promoted a new dynamic ... where Spain was always in the vanguard [of Europe]” and were they brought with them special relations with Latin America, North Africa and the Southern Mediterranean”.⁴¹³ As Ambassador Navarro, -who currently is the Spanish Ambassador to Morocco, he has worked on European issues occupying top positions in Brussels since 1985 and he was named Secretary of State to the European Union in 2004- has explained over his interview for this research, Latin America did not exist for the EEC until Spanish entry. There was only one EEC outpost on the continent, in Santiago, Chile, that was moved to Caracas, Venezuela after 1973. Even by 1986 the EEC invested the same resources in Togo as it did in the whole Latin America, which had non-preferential status.⁴¹⁴ The potential contribution of Spain to the EEC was very clear: building up relations with Latin America. The role of Felipe González in leading this new political agenda, as well as in promoting Spain's new Mediterranean policy –and Latin America-, is widely accepted.⁴¹⁵

González was central to Spain's growing standing inside Europe and inspired the new diplomatic team –a team that enjoy both ability and agency to propose policies- Spain sent to Brussels. Eneko Landaburu, former director general of foreign affairs of the European Commission noted in an interview for this thesis that by 1986 many Europeans were saying,

⁴¹¹ Bicchi, F. (2007): *European Foreign Policy Making Toward the Mediterranean*. Palgrave Macmillan. P. 131.

⁴¹² Personal interview with Ambassador Alberto Navarro. Rabat, 1 July 2011.

⁴¹³ Cited interview with Carlos Westendorp.

⁴¹⁴ Cited interview, Ambassador Alberto Navarro.

⁴¹⁵ Kausch, K. (2010): El Declive de la Política de España en el Mediterráneo. *FRIDE*. Policy Brief. Nº26. Pp. 1-2; Del Arenal, C. (2011): *Política Exterior de España y Relaciones con América Latina. Iberoamericanidad, Europeización y Atlantismo en la Política Exterior Española*. Fundación Carolina, Madrid; Viñas, A. (1999): “Breaking the Shackles from the Past: Spanish Foreign Policy from Franco to Felipe González” In Balbour, S. and Preston, P. (Eds.): *Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century*. Routledge, New York; Powell, C. (2000): “Cambio de Régimen y Política Exterior: España, 1975-1989” In Tussell, J., Avilés, J. and Pardo, R. (Eds.): *La Política Exterior de España en el Siglo XX*. Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, UNED, Madrid. Pp. 413-453.

“Look at these Spaniards! They are doing really well!”⁴¹⁶ Landaburu continued that González always told him that “We are not going there to beg, we are going there to work with the others, to build Europe.”⁴¹⁷

González sent his most talented and trusted officials to Brussels: Abel Matutes, Anna Terrón, José Borrell, José María Gil Robles, Pedro Solbes, Loyola de Palacios or Javier Solana, among others.⁴¹⁸ People who left an important mark in Europe. They were tasked with building up Spanish influence. As Ambassador Landaburu recalled that González ‘insisted’ that Spain received the post of Direction General of Regional Policy, a key role in the development of the common market and the social and economic cohesion. González insisted very much to get the Direction General of Regional Policy. His close relationship with Commission President Jacques Delors aided in this task.⁴¹⁹

5.7. The Mediterranean Card.

Carlos Westendorp has acknowledged that the Mediterranean was always a priority for Spain as it was believed very much that the region could contribute to the increase in Spain’s relevance.”⁴²⁰ Andreu Claret, Executive Director of the *Anna Lindh Foundation* –The Mediterranean platform integrating 43 states and embedded within the Euromed (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership)-has explained during a personal interview for this research, that the vision of Felipe Gonzalez’s and his senior officials towards the Mediterranean was decisive for the evolving European approach to the region and was responsible for the attempt of the Community to “transform risks in opportunities”.⁴²¹

In other words, the importance that Spain attached to the Mediterranean was soon adopted by Europe primarily due to the “entrepreneurial” activity of the Spanish government. The actual Spanish role, in terms of the influence of regional politicians in this process, has not previously been addressed properly in the scholarly literature. On the list of Spanish politicians occupying relevant roles in the European Commission over the last two decades and a half, is interesting to note that many of them are from Catalonia. This is not a

⁴¹⁶ Anon. (2009): “Landaburu, El Poderoso Afable”. *El Mundo*. 13 May 2009. Available at: http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2009/03/01/union_europea/1235927278.html (Retrieved 15February 2012)

⁴¹⁷ Personal interview with Ambassador Eneko Landaburu. EU Ambassador to Morocco and former Director General of Foreign Affairs, European Commission. Rabat, 2 July 2011.

⁴¹⁸ Cited interview with Ambassador Alberto Navarro.

⁴¹⁹ Cited interview with Ambassador Eneko Landaburu.

⁴²⁰ Cited interview with Carlos Westendorp.

⁴²¹ Personal interview with Andreu Claret, director general of the Anna Lindh Foundation. Barcelona, 26 October 2011.

coincidence. Catalonia as a regional power within Spain played a very important role in pushing for developing intensively Euro-Mediterranean policies. A fact was later recognised in the launch of the Barcelona Process.

The former president of Catalonia, Jordi Pujol can be probably considered among the main political entrepreneurs of the Spain's Mediterranean political and diplomatic initiatives and policies. Andreu Claret has stated that it was Pujol's intervention that enabled Gonzalez to situate Spain at the centre of Europe's Mediterranean agenda.⁴²² During an interview for this thesis Pujol –former president of the Catalanian government between explained that the commitment of the Government of Catalonia (*La Generalitat*) towards the Mediterranean was, due to historical, geographical, economic and political factors. Pujol reminded that Catalonia was the only region in Spain that belonged to the Carolingian empire and on top of that its permanent trade relations with the Mediterranean over the centuries have shaped this European and Mediterranean identity. Pujol continued, “Hence, as Catalans and *Generalitat*” he explained, “we firstly disseminated this message throughout European institutions and then lobbied the Spanish government to work for that.”⁴²³

From 1987 onward, Pujol's objective was to make the Mediterranean an issue of importance for Europe's least inclined nations. He was a key figure in organising conferences in places like Stockholm that promoted the idea that the Mediterranean constituted “potentially, a Euro-region”.⁴²⁴ The conference was held at the Grand Hôtel, Stockholm the 5 November 1987. After an historical introduction about the importance of the Mediterranean over the centuries, Pujol developed the central point of his conference by saying: “The Mediterranean is not losing positions any longer, on the contrary, is recovered. It is not a passive area anymore. Today is a region full of initiative and creativity. It is an area that progresses, a lot.”⁴²⁵

González, who was also convinced about the necessity of selling the Mediterranean to Europe found a very important and creative ally in Catalonia that combined to offer two complementary Europeanisms⁴²⁶ –the Spanish and the Catalan. Evidence of the entrepreneurial action on this issues is seen in Pujol's explanation that “The Mediterranean

⁴²² Cited interview with Andreu Claret.

⁴²³ Personal interview with Jordi Pujol. Barcelona, 25 January 2012.

⁴²⁴ See, Pujol, J. (2006): *Idees I Records*. Galaxia Guttenberg. P. 30.

⁴²⁵ Ibid.

⁴²⁶ According to Jaúregui: “González made all the differences. He was who dressed Spain of internationalism.” Cited interview with Fernando Jaúregui.

policy of Felipe González, I think, it was his idea, however, what is true is that I went many times to speak with him to stress the fact that Spain should have a Mediterranean policy”.⁴²⁷

It is important to stress that Spain was not alone in this Mediterranean venture. Countries such as France, Morocco, Portugal and Algeria also demonstrated a commitment to this issue.⁴²⁸ Italy ably supported Spanish initiatives.⁴²⁹ As has been acknowledged by Claret the relationship between Spanish foreign minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos and his Italian counterpart Gianni De Michelis was very close during the presidency of Giulio Andreotti between July 1989 and June 1992.⁴³⁰

It was in these years that the first benefits of the earlier Spanish efforts to take a lead on Euro-Mediterranean policy, started to be seen.⁴³¹ By this time the importance of the Mediterranean was being promoted by deploying a realist public discourse in the immediate post-Cold War era. New dangers and threats had to be publicised in order to attract international attention.⁴³² The Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) was convened in this context. Philosophically this was inspired by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which opened in Helsinki on the 3 July 1973.

But its immediate roots can be traced back to the efforts of De Michelis in 1989⁴³³ and the success of Spain in conceptualizing it in response to the weaknesses inherent in both the existing European Mediterranean Policy and the Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP) that had been developed by Abel Matutes during 1989-1990 as it has been explained in the introduction.⁴³⁴ Mediterranean politics so far –the existing political mechanisms and structures- as well as the European action towards Southern Mediterranean countries concentrated their attention mostly on trade related issues. The end of the 1980s with a new global international dynamics demanded a different political, economic, communicational and diplomatic approach, whether elements such as the understanding among cultures should be the key factor underpinning sustainable Euro-MENA relations.

⁴²⁷ Cited interview with Jordi Pujol.

⁴²⁸ Op. Cit. Gillespie, R. (1997): P. 34.

⁴²⁹ Cited interview with Andreu Claret. Carlos Westendorp coincides with the same view.

⁴³⁰ Interview cited with Andreu Claret.

⁴³¹ Op. Cit. Gillespie, R. (1997): P. 34.

⁴³² As has been stated by Calleya, “The growth of regional arrangements since the end of the Cold War is partly due to the fact that great powers and regional powers welcome the opportunity to participate in collective security and cooperative frameworks in which the costs of foreign policy actions are shared among several actors”. In Calleya, S. (2003): *The Euro-Med Partnership and Sub-Regionalism: A Case of Region Building?* IPRI 4, Working Paper. Berkeley. Available at: http://ies.berkeley.edu/pubs/workingpapers/PRI-4-Euro-Med_Partnership.pdf (Retrieved 8 March 2012)

⁴³³ Op. Cit. Gillespie, R. (1997): P. 34.

⁴³⁴ Ibid.

In considering this initial period pre-Barcelona Process, Italy's diplomatic energy on this front lasted until 1992, when De Michelis concluded his time as a minister.⁴³⁵ Until the end of the 1980s and at this stage, the continuous formulation of policies towards the Mediterranean based on a "security-cooperative" formula to be applied in the Southern Mediterranean has been assessed by Calleja as a "premature remedy for a region which now neither as a bridge nor it is a divide (...) It is simply a vacuum".⁴³⁶

Spain intended to fill this vacuum with an innovative discourse and a new political and diplomatic breath. There were four central elements to this vacuum filling 1) the European attitude towards the Mediterranean, 2) the need to develop a consistent communicative strategy that could justify further political actions, 3) the capacity to articulate the specific politic objectives within the short, medium and long term and 4) a consistent political discourse on bilateral and multilateral levels with regards to the implementation of policies.

In these terms the three pillars of Euro-Mediterranean relations from the time of the CSCM were: political-security, economic and socio-cultural.⁴³⁷ These would subsequently form the basis of the three baskets of the Barcelona Process.

In this sense Felipe González had the intuition, identified the political window, lobbied with the strongest country, Germany, by deepening his friendship with Helmut Kohl and strengthening strategically his links with Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission at the time. Abel Matutes, -a member of the European Commission since 1986 and Spain's minister of foreign affairs between 1996 and 2000 during the government of José María Aznar- played a vital role in building ties to Delors. As Matutes explained during an interview for this thesis:

"The Mediterranean issue was very clear to Felipe González since the first day. I had the occasion of sharing all his ideas, and after my first mandate I asked him to help to me to convince Delors to give me the responsibility over the Mediterranean, Latin America, Asia and the relations North-South. He helped me with efficacy and honesty. At that time, we had the occasion of specifying a lot the contents of the policy that I wanted to develop in the Mediterranean and the role of González was crucial".⁴³⁸

⁴³⁵ Holmes, J.W. (1996): Italy: In the Mediterranean but of it? *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol.1. Issue 2. Pp. 176-192.

⁴³⁶ Calleja, J. (1992): Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean. *International Journal of World Peace*. Vol. IX. Nº1. March. P. 17.

⁴³⁷ Op. Cit. Gillespie. R. (1997): P. 34.

⁴³⁸ Personal interview with Abel Matutes. Madrid, 12 March 2012.

In this context the reactions of other regional powers like France should not be forgotten. France opposed strongly Spanish entry into the EEC. It distrusted and opposed Spanish attempts to take the lead on a new Mediterranean policy, once it was inside the Community. However, there were subtleties to this dynamic. The CSCM was an ambitious Spanish diplomatic attempt to assert itself in the Mediterranean. It was, as noted above, a premature attempt that failed due to a number of factors: regional realities such as the ongoing failure to find Arab-Israeli peace and the ongoing tensions in the Persian Gulf; the opposition of some key partners such as the US, the UK and The Netherlands; Germany's reluctance to engage with the Mediterranean in a period of immense change in Eastern Europe and on its borders.⁴³⁹ For its part, France at that time France was developing a more modest diplomatic plan to cope with challenges and opportunities in the Western Mediterranean. With this in mind, France expressed, what Valle Simón and Holmes have described as a “non-negative” attitude towards the CSCM.⁴⁴⁰

5.8. The French Attitude

It was in the Western Mediterranean that both Spain and France had their most significant investment in the region. Jordi Pujol has gone so far as to argue that Spain should have limited its focus to this area and it is arguable that the failure to do so had dramatic and negative long term impacts on the failure of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. As Pujol put in:

“I always said that Spain should not get involved in the whole Mediterranean, only in the Western Mediterranean, from Malta to here. From Malta to here we are someone, from Malta towards the East we are nobody. Neither Italy nor France, even France is a nobody, that is for the north-Americans”.⁴⁴¹

One conclusion from this is that this explains France's lack of interest in stamping its authority on Europe's Mediterranean policy from 1989 onwards. But in truth, as Pujol noted in an interview for this thesis, though France distanced itself from a desire to take a lead in the Mediterranean at the end of the Cold War it did work behind the scenes to take any opportunity to extend and consolidate its power base in the region. For example, following

⁴³⁹ Op.Cit. P. 35.

⁴⁴⁰ Valle, B. (1995): Introduction. In CERI, *Conferencia Euro-Mediterránea*. Madrid; Op. Cit. Holmes, J.W. (1996): Pp. 176-192.

⁴⁴¹ Cited interview with Jordi Pujol.

the fall of the Berlin Wall, France pressed hard to take over the Mediterranean –Sixth Fleet-Command from the US.⁴⁴²

It is in these terms that one should examine the French push in the Western Mediterranean at this time. President Mitterrand first proposed the idea of the 5+5 group in the early 1980s. This idea was re-launched by presidents Bettino Craxi and Felipe González during the second half of the 1980s involving five countries from the South-Western Mediterranean and five from the North-Western Mediterranean.⁴⁴³ The 5+5 group meeting was held in Rome in 1990. Nevertheless, contextual political elements such as the Gulf War – from August 1990 to February 1991- and the Lockerbie affair –from 1988 to 1992 and onward- impeded its smooth development and the dialogue among parts has been blocked due to these disputes. On one hand the First Gulf War generated new tensions between the Arab world and Western stakeholders in creating the basis of mutual distrust for future diplomatic developments. Following this aspect, Telhami has studied how the Arab public opinion reacted to this military intervention and therefore how this event conditioned future initiatives.⁴⁴⁴

On the other hand, the Lockerbie affair stopped the political and economic inclusion of Libya in times of strong economic crisis –and further political dialogue- due to the economic embargo issued in March 1992 by the Security Council of the UN –resolution 748- in response to the Libyan attack to a Pan Am flight in 1988.⁴⁴⁵ After this event Libya was defined as a terrorist state. As Mortimer has stressed, this politic and diplomatic issue not only affected Libyan-Western relations, but the stability of the entire Maghreb and existing partnerships like the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) established in 1992.⁴⁴⁶

Disputes between Maghreb countries such as Algeria and Morocco, as well as rivalries between France and Spain for the leadership of this initiative also limited its

⁴⁴² Ibid.

⁴⁴³ Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya on the southern rim. Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Malta on the northern shore. Initially and until 1991, the group was called 4+5 Group. In 1991 Malta joined the initiative. To learn more see: Schumacher, T. (2004): Riding on The Wings of Change: The Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. *The International Spectator*. 38(2). Pp. 89-103; Ureta, I. (2010): "Migration, Development and Policy Coherence in the Mediterranean". In Ureta, I. and Lutterbeck, D. (Eds.): *Migration, Development and Diplomacy: Perspectives From the Southern Mediterranean*. Africa World Press. Pp. 169-190.

⁴⁴⁴ Telhami, S. (1993): Arab Public Opinion and the Gulf War. *Political Sciences Quarterly*. Vol. 108. N° 3. Pp. 437-452. On the aftermaths of the Gulf War from a Western point of view see: Halliday, F. (1991): The Gulf War and its Aftermath: First Reflections. *International Affairs*. Vol. 67. N°2. Pp. 223-234.

⁴⁴⁵ Sánchez Mateos, E. (2005): Libya's Return to the International Scene. *Mediterranean Politics*. Special Issue. Conceptualizing Cultural and Social Dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean Area: A European Perspective. Vol. 10. Issue 3. Pp. 439-445;

⁴⁴⁶ Mortimer, R. (1993): Regionalism and Geopolitics in the Maghrib. *Middle East Report*. N°184. Special Number on New Orders: The Middle East in a Realigned World. P.17.

effectiveness and survival.⁴⁴⁷ In an interview for this thesis Ambassador Eneko Landaburu – EU Ambassador to Morocco and former Director General for External Relations of the EU, from 2003 to 2009 among other positions- responded to a question on this issue in the following terms: “Tensions between France and Spain and Italy existed because France wanted more focus on the Western Mediterranean, and Spain and Italy [wanted] a broader approach”.⁴⁴⁸

With regards to the apparent disinterest of France for leading the Mediterranean policy during the late 1980s and 1990s, it is possible to say, again in the spirit of that political pragmatism, that Mitterrand, especially between 1988 and 1995, was very much interested in blocking the potential German domination over France. Mitterrand was a leading driver of the Treaty on European Union in 1991, which contributed to establish a central European banking system along with a unified foreign policy and a shared currency partly at least to constrain German power. With this as a French priority the Mediterranean inevitably took second place⁴⁴⁹

5.9.Spain: Achieving Objectives.

Spain’s first attempts to promote a Mediterranean policy served as tests that confirmed that “political windows” can be opened and developed once the leading “political entrepreneur” enjoys the support of the largest number of partners or the economically strongest partners. These first attempts also saw Spain beginning to market the Mediterranean to Europe. The Madrid Conference on the Arab-Israeli peace process that commenced on 30 October 1991 acknowledged the potential role of Spain in Mediterranean politics, even though as has been noted by Gillespie, the Spanish role was reduced to that of mere organizer.⁴⁵⁰ Even leaving the side the symbolism of the Madrid venue had an important psychological importance, it is also true that Spain was more than a mere organizer at Madrid. Spain had earned the trust of

⁴⁴⁷ Anon. Dialogue 5+5 Western Mediterranean. *European Institute for Research on Euro-Arab Cooperation*. Brussels. Available at: <http://www.medeas.be/en/themes/euro-mediterranean-cooperation/dialogue-55-western-mediterranean/> (Retrieved 11 March 2012)

⁴⁴⁸ Cited interview with Eneko Landaburu. See also Khader, B. (1995): *Europa y el Mediterráneo*. Icaria. Barcelona. P. 60.

⁴⁴⁹ Baun, M.J. (1995): The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics: Germany and France and European Integration. *Political Science Quarterly*. Vol. 110. Nº4. Pp. 605-624; Moravcsik, A. (1998): *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Cornell University Press; Sandholtz, W. (1993): Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht. *International Organization*. Nº47. Pp. 1-39. Cambridge University Press.

⁴⁵⁰ Op. Cit. Gillespie, R. (1997): P. 33.

Washington to organize, host and oversee this complex and historic meeting. As Carlos Westendorp recalls:

“The fact is that when [James] Baker –when George Bush was still president- asked Paco Fernández Ordóñez, Spain’s minister of foreign affairs between 1985 to 1992, to organize a conference in Madrid we were in Seville. I saw Paco holding the phone and with a very worried face he tells me: ‘*It was Baker, he is asking me to organize the conference in Madrid on Middle Eastern issues because he trusts us.*’ And Paco Fernández Ordóñez who had a very strong sense of goal, accepted immediately and this was important. It brought more credibility with the US and with the world, because, first of all, it was not easy at all to convince Israelis and Syrians to come”⁴⁵¹

The role of Spain under Felipe González as a legitimate and influential interlocutor between the West and the Middle East started to be recognised. This resonates in the current era. Prior to the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011, González was asked to act as a negotiator with the Qaddafi’s regime.⁴⁵² One reason the Libyan leader trusted González because in 1986 he had refused the US to use the Spanish airspace to attack Qaddafi.⁴⁵³

Along with rising credibility in the early 1990s came another even more important development – German support for Spanish plans to develop its Mediterranean policy. As Westendorp points out, first of all Spain was rewarded by Germany for “being a loyal partner in Europe”.⁴⁵⁴ In particular, Germany was grateful for Spanish support over the re-unification of Germany.⁴⁵⁵

5.10. Spain Sells the Mediterranean: A Threatening Political Discourse.

By 1992 the political discourse regarding Euro-Maghreb relations started to be more present in the EC’s agenda. This can be explained in significant part by the Spanish interest in attracting Community’s attention to its southern border. As both Spanish Euro Commissioner Abel Matutes and Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, stated in 1992: “The Maghreb is truly a time bomb. The Community cannot remain indifferent”.⁴⁵⁶

⁴⁵¹ Cited interview with Carlos Westendorp.

⁴⁵² Chicote, J. (2012): *Socialistas de Élite. Felipe y los Felipistas: De Suresnes al Club del Millón de Euros*. La Esfera, Madrid.

⁴⁵³ Marticorena, A. (2012): Felipe González, El Último Líder en Quien Confío Gadafi. Available at: <http://es.noticias.yahoo.com/blogs/episodios-nacionales/felipe-gonzález-el-último-líder-en-quien-confió-212329450.html> (Retrieved 11 March 2012)

⁴⁵⁴ Cited interview with Carlos Westendorp.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁶ Anon. (1992): “La CE decide iniciar una nueva era de relaciones con el Maghreb”. *La Vanguardia*. Tuesday 3 March. P. 7.

These statements were delivered during the European Council meeting in Lisbon, 26-27 June 1992. By using this emotional language, Spain was consciously trying to attract attention to the issue amongst its partners in Europe. All the more so when this was combined with diplomatic efforts to reduce the importance of the problems of Eastern Europe compared to those in North Africa, which was truly a “vulnerable frontier.”⁴⁵⁷

The question that this raises is the extent that Spain had enough symbolic power to drive home this message inside the Community? At that time, as has been suggested by Fontela, the EC was facing a choice between two hypothetical scenarios of action –variable geometry or co-development. The concept of variable geometry was considered at the Lisbon meeting. It refers to a method that promotes differentiated integration. This concept accepts that there exist sets of irreconcilable elements among partners that make permanent separation inevitable.⁴⁵⁸ The more idealistic concept for a way forward is co-development. This idea postulates the view that relationships among partners are designed to overcome differences in order to create win-win solutions.

The main problem regarding the Maghreb is that in that area there are two contradictory streams: Westernization and Islamization. The former looks to steer Maghreb economies towards the open markets democratic values and respect for fundamental human rights. Fontela has argued that in these terms the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) created on 7 February 1992 was a sign of westernization because they tried to follow the example of Western economic and trade integration.⁴⁵⁹ Others have disagreed with this assessment due to the fact that given that Maghreb economies are not complementary this integration would have opened the doors to both more regional competitiveness and economic and industrial efficiency and to the possible solutions of regional disputes and conflicts.⁴⁶⁰

Arguably, since the 1960s of all the initiatives regarding EEC-EU relations with southern Mediterranean countries, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) –or Barcelona

⁴⁵⁷ This area was pretty much forgotten. Probably western media started to be more interested in the region when the FIS (Front Islamique de Salut) won Algerian municipal elections on 1990 with a 54.2 per cent.

⁴⁵⁸ Fontela, E.M. (1995): El Marco de las Nuevas Relaciones Europa-Maghreb. *Revista Española de Economía Agraria*. N°172. P. 12. Authors like Grant indicates that countries like France and the Netherlands never were interested in the European enlargement and that coming back to the practical idea of variable geometry would save core European economies. See Grant, C (2005): Variable Geometry. *Prospect Magazine*. Centre for European Reform. Available at : http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/grant_prospect_july05.html (Retrieved 6 December 2010)

⁴⁵⁹ Op. Cit. Fontela, E.M. (1995): P. 13.

⁴⁶⁰ Aghrout, A., and Sutton, K. (1990): Regional Economic Union in the Maghreb. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. 28(1). P. 115; Finaish, M. and Bell, E. (1995): Strategy of Integration, Future Changes. *Middle East Executive Reports*. December; Mortimer, B.A. (1999): “The Maghreb Union: Myth and Reality” In Zoubir, Y.H. (Ed.): *North Africa in Transition: State, Society and Economy Transformation in the 1990s*. University Press of Florida.


Process- has been the most significant in terms of looking to increase co-operation among EU-MENA partners. Over this period of time, it is also true that four generations of commercial and trade agreements were signed between the EEC and southern Mediterranean countries since 1969 to 1996.⁴⁶¹ Over this period, France was the strongest country projecting power in North Africa and due to this, it was reasonable to understand that also France was actively engaged in supporting Spanish or Italian proposals aiming at launching and establishing the EMP.

In order to see how the efforts mostly from Spain and Italy –and to a lesser extent France- impacted Europe's foreign policies and political plans in order to focus more on the Southern frontier, it is important to assess the texts emanated from the meetings of the European councils. In using the CL approach, it would have been desired to have access to the data since 1985. However the materials ready to be used start in 1993. Therefore the conclusions of the presidency of the European Council that are going to be used for this purpose start in 1993. The texts that have been analyzed belong to the councils of: Copenhagen and Brussels –1993-, Corfu and Essen – 1994-, Cannes and Madrid (extraordinary) 1995.

The variables that are going to be used in order to understand how the penetration of certain concepts into the European public speech and political agenda have been evolving from 1993 to 1995 with the establishment of the Barcelona Process are the next ones: Mediterranean, migration, security, Arab/Muslim, Terrorism and Racism. The graphic number 1 shows this evolution.

⁴⁶¹ First bilateral agreement EEC with Morocco-Algeria and Tunisia was signed in 1969. The second generation of agreements signed in 1976 took place by 1978 inside the Global Mediterranean Policy which lasted until 1991. The third wave of agreements within this Policy developed between 1981 and 1986. Within the new Renovated Mediterranean Policy, 1992-1996, agreements of fourth generation were developed.

Graphic (1) European Councils, Conclusions of the Presidency.



Source: European Commission. Elaborated by the author.

As the graphic number 1 shows, the concept “Mediterranean” was not present until 1994 in the European Council celebrated in Corfu. Until then it is possible to say that the “entrepreneurial” activities developed by countries such as Spain or Italy were trying to lobby and to convince European stakeholders about the necessity of designing and developing a comprehensive Mediterranean policy. From then onward, this European interest towards the Mediterranean was publicly acknowledged, and therefore it is possible to appreciate the consistent growth as the Council was approaching the date of establishment of the Barcelona Process in 1995.

The drop between Cannes 1995 and Madrid 1995 is due to the fact that the council celebrated in Madrid was an extraordinary one, and therefore also the amount of pages of the document is shorter. Beyond this technical aspect, it is also interesting to note how the concept “Security” has been the constantly present –and before- since 1993 as European security at large is obviously the most relevant concern. Nevertheless, it is also interesting to see how since the concept Mediterranean started to be present in the political agenda, security related issues increased as well.

This correlation underpins the EU’s hypothesis, affirmed during a personal interview with Abel Matutes–the aforementioned dilemma between the co-operation and variable geometry- that ensured that more co-operation and investment in Southern Mediterranean

countries would reduce the incentives to migrate and therefore, by improving the general socio-economic conditions Europe would be safer.⁴⁶²

Apart from the EU's political rhetoric that has been tried to sell the EMP as a win-win situation by deploying a liberal discourse, the real intentions behind the partnership is fully rooted in a neo-realist approach where the defense of European interests are fundamental as it is going to be demonstrated in chapters 7,8 and 9. In observing this hypothesis it is possible to appreciate the differences between political entrepreneurs, political "brokers", and opportunists. Whereas, political entrepreneurs and brokers would define their strategies following a real and non-speculative win-win scenario, political opportunists would identify opportunities and design their *modus operandi* following unilateral benefits by speculating about their real intentions.

Completing this picture is also possible to appreciate how the variables "Racism", "Migration" and "Terrorism" increased also from 1995. This represents a growing political interest on these three variables considering the new environment of globalization which entails also transnational risks and uncertainties. These initial elements will constitute the most relevant political and diplomatic concerns and challenges the EU will have to face and deal with, especially from 11 September 2001 onward.

The use of the CL approach offers valuable insights to understand discover hidden aspects of the public speech that are important to better evaluate the outcomes of political proposals and initiatives. In considering the aforementioned corpora and in analyzing the list of most repeated words –out of 5.164 word types-, it is possible to see that within the top-15 results there are two verbs: Be (ranked 12 with 768 repetitions) and Will (ranked 15 with 630 repetitions). In searching for the concordance between these two verbs most of times the formula "will be" was used 174 times. These next verb represented in the world list is "is" ranked 21 with 431 hits. These elements clearly show that the usage of this political language is projected towards the future and it is mostly characterized by a declaration of intentions and political will and not necessarily driven by a clear sense of accomplishment. Assessing these political communication strategies and resources are relevant to understand whether these political initiatives and projects are mostly based on a "productive" –political entrepreneurs and brokers- approach or on a "speculative" one –political opportunists-.

Therefore, France, Italy and Spain were the main countries advocating a change of politics in the Euro-Mediterranean region. As it has been shown above, it was evident in 1994

⁴⁶² Cited interview with Abel Matutes.

during the Corfu and Essen European Council Summits.⁴⁶³ As the Bulletin of the European Community N°6/1994 summed up decisions made at the Council of Corfu that had been backed by Spain, France and Italy:

“In the field of external relations, the European Council confirmed its commitment to the development of existing links with the Mediterranean countries and to the peace process in the Middle East and stressed the importance of the European Agreements with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (...) The European Council confirms the importance it attaches to the close links already existing with its Mediterranean partners and its wish to develop them still further so that the Mediterranean area may become an area of cooperation guaranteeing peace, security, stability and well-being”.⁴⁶⁴

Here is possible to see the initial fruits of this diplomatic offensive to re-direct the EU's political efforts southwards. The same document noted that the importance of constructing the Algeria-Morocco-EU gas pipeline as a priority. Considering the importance of energy resources for the future of Europe, the Maghreb-Europe Gas pipeline (MEG) was originally proposed in 1963 by a consortium of French companies even though more structured proposals were developed during the 1970s following Spanish, Italian and Algerian interests.⁴⁶⁵ Whereas the *Transmed* project began in 1983 to provide gas to Italy thanks to ENI the Italian “strong and politically mobilized company”.⁴⁶⁶ Spain was not able to achieve its objectives for the creation of a national project until 1990s because both the government and its national gas company *Enagas* were not influential and strong enough.⁴⁶⁷ The fact of highlighting the priority of developing the MEG –lately named Pedro Duran Farell pipeline- in this document reveals the positive outcomes achieved by Spain as a raising political actor from 1985 to 1995. The construction of the MEG began in 1996.

At Essen in December 1994 – Jacques Delors' last council as president of the Commission, - the Mediterranean issue was again raised as a priority.⁴⁶⁸ “Ensuing the lasting peace and stability of the European continent and neighboring regions” necessitated, the

⁴⁶³ Lesser, I.O., Larrabee, F.S., Green, J. and Zanini, M. (1998): *NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Policy Issues and Dilemmas*. Rand.

⁴⁶⁴ European Union (1994): Bulletin of the European Commission. Council of Corfu. N°6/1994. P.1 and 12. Available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1444/01/corfu_june_1994.pdf (Retrieved 21 November 2010).

⁴⁶⁵ Hayes, M. (2006): “The Transmed and Maghreb Projects: Gas to Europe from North-Africa” In Victor, D.G., Jaffee, A.M. and Hayes, M.H. (Eds.): *Natural Gas and Geopolitics. From 1970 to 2040*. Cambridge University Press. P. 49.

⁴⁶⁶ Op. Cit. P. 51.

⁴⁶⁷ Prieto, A.P. and Hall, C.A. (2013): *Spain's Photovoltaic Revolution. The Energy Return on Investment*. Springer. P. 15.

⁴⁶⁸ European Union (1994): Bulletin of the European Commission. Council of Essen. N°12/1994. Available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1447/01/Essen_Dec_1994.pdf (Retrieved 21 November 2010)

council meeting argued, “preparing for the future accession of the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe and developing *in parallel* the special relationship of the Union to *its other* neighbors particularly the Mediterranean countries”.⁴⁶⁹

The emphasis on “parallel” and “other” in this statement reflects the still secondary interest in Southern Europe. The ongoing dominant view that eastern and central Europe was a natural part of the European project unlike those states in the Mediterranean who may never be fully incorporated into Europe, like Morocco. However in evaluating the consistency and coherency of potential win-win policies and diplomatic projects this heterogeneous aggregation should happen, otherwise, any integration project that does not consider this dimension is doomed to fail.

In an interview on Spanish television in 1984, King Hassan II of Morocco was asked to explain his recent declaration that “Morocco was at least, as European as Greece and (...) should be fully-fledged member of the EEC.”⁴⁷⁰

For King Hassan II it appeared that membership of the EEC was primarily a matter of political will. According to him the entire Maghreb was entitled to become associated to the EEC because that region, without any doubt, “is the base of the Mediterranean. It is the hinge between Europe and Africa toward the South of the Sahara. I believe that Europe should not let this occasion escape. But in any case, this proposal should not surprise to anyone. At an institutional level, at a constitutional level, at a geographical level is not an eyesore the fact of asking about being a fully-fledged member of the European Union”.⁴⁷¹

In the same interview, when asked about the role of Spain and whether Spanish accession was troubling to Morocco, Hassan II replied:

“First of all. Spain is a neighbor country. If its accession to the EEC is useful I wish that this accession should been done as soon as possible. Because it is a neighbor country, and a friend. But, if Spain shares the same feelings as Morocco at a bilateral level, I believe that Spain will do everything to avoid its accession affecting Morocco. I believe that this is a bilateral problem and not only a European problem”⁴⁷²

⁴⁶⁹ Op. Cit. P. 8.

⁴⁷⁰ Available at <http://www.rtve.es/mediateca/videos/20091001/informe-semanal-entrevista-hassan/601716.shtml> (Retrieved 19 October 2010)

⁴⁷¹ Available at : <http://www.rtve.es/mediateca/videos/20091001/informe-semanal-entrevista-hassan/601716.shtml> (Retrieved 25 November 2010)

⁴⁷² Ibid.

Spain's strategy to achieve greater diplomatic influence by playing the North African card was successful and overcame the resistances from Northern European countries that were more interested due to geo-strategic reasons in Eastern European countries. The establishment of the EMP or Barcelona Process was the material proof of such success. However, is it possible to consider Spain a political entrepreneur, a political broker or an opportunist? Despite Spain's interests in Morocco, it is possible to say that Spain was not really interested in defending the "mutual interests" expressed above by Hassan II. Spain had an instrumental interest in selling southern Mediterranean problems as European problems as Gillespie has suggested.

The next chapter will assess and shed light on the role Spain played as a political broker. In order to prove that it is important to analyze the most important and relevant issue that has challenged the consistency and coherence of the policies issued in the Mediterranean: the migratory issue. From the rhetorical point of view, Spain and aligned stakeholders used a very realistic approach –the propagandistic strategy –when they wanted to sell the Mediterranean. Subsequently, a liberal approach was developed as the Barcelona started to come to fruition. The migratory issue will demonstrate the dialectical and practical disconnections and lack of consistency between the period when the Mediterranean and Mediterranean problems started to be sold as a "diplomatic good" for attracting consensus and funds on one hand, and the focus on it marked the moment when the EU started to develop a more integrative, integrated and liberal, Euro-Mediterranean approach.

CHAPTER 6

MIGRATION, SECURITY AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN REGION

Challenging Political Entrepreneurs and Brokers

Migratory movements are essential to understand history and the way societies, political structures, economic relations and cultural patterns have been challenged and modified. It is possible to say that migration and mobility itself, represents the most representative and single socio-political, economic and cultural phenomena modifying and challenging contexts. Therefore, understanding its transforming power is crucial to explain: How politicians, political entrepreneurs and brokers deal with it; how it does affect political communication strategies; how public opinion reacts, digests and accommodates political messages and information; as well as understanding the role of migration political management in exacerbating or moderating existing conflicts or cultural cleavages.

There is strong scholarly evidence supporting the fundamental role of migration and mobility in setting and impacting agenda setting. As it has been explained in chapter 2 where it has been discussed political communication and sensitive issues –mostly immigration-political entrepreneurs and brokers- have found in immigration the most profitable opportunity to gather public opinion's consensus.

In considering the American case, Brown studied how the voting behavior was conditioned by the ways politicians successfully used immigration as a central message of their campaigns.⁴⁷³ Pojmann assessed the linkages between migration and political activism in Europe highlighting the fact that immigration generates intense debates at every level of society and that “the media, policy makers, and politicians have entered into a discourse that examines immigration from seemingly every possible angle.”⁴⁷⁴

Richmond studied the consequences of post-industrialism, globalization forces and international migration in boosting racial conflicts and reviving ethnic nationalism.⁴⁷⁵ Betz and Swank have acknowledged that globalization processes and forces contribute to the

⁴⁷³ Brown, T.A. (1988): *Migration and Politics: The Impact of Population Mobility on American Voting Behaviour*. University of North Carolina Press.

⁴⁷⁴ Pojmann, W. (Ed.) (2008): *Migration and Activism in Europe since 1945*. Palgrave Macmillan.

⁴⁷⁵ Richmond, A.H. (1994): *Global Apartheid: Refugees, Racism and the New World Order*. Oxford University Press.

electoral success of new far-right movements across Western Europe.⁴⁷⁶ This vision has been also shared by Castles and Davidson in acknowledging that globalization represents one of the most challenging forces in questioning the meaning and the boundaries of citizenship and participation. That is why immigration related issues represent a strong opportunity window for political entrepreneurs aiming at gathering public consensus by manipulating sensitive issues.⁴⁷⁷

The interest in discussing migratory related issues as an opportunity structure approach for politicians –including political entrepreneurs and brokers- was studied by Koopmans and Statham.⁴⁷⁸ Following a similar approach, Arzheimer and Carter have also confirmed that migration related issues represent a central part of political opportunity structures leaded by right-wing extremist parties –political entrepreneurs-.⁴⁷⁹ This view has been confirmed for Western European countries by authors like Lubbers, Gjsbert and Scheepers, while they studied voting behavior and political strategies developed by extreme right-wing parties in Europe.⁴⁸⁰

Summarizing the common grounds share by these scholars, Knigge stressed that increasing levels of immigration associated with raising levels of public dissatisfaction with existing political contexts and regimes, significantly facilitate right-wing extremism.⁴⁸¹ These studies validate this hypothesis by testing it from 1984 to 1993 and from 2002 onward.

The success of right-wind political parties in identifying political opportunities is related with their capacity of managing collective fears. In line with the aforementioned authors, Huysmans considers that immigration related issues represent the most representative element paying back huge dividends to political entrepreneurs.

⁴⁷⁶ Swank, D. and Betz, H.G. (2003): Globalization, the Welfare State and Right Wing Populism in Western Europe. *Socio-Economic Review*. Vol. 1. N°2. P. 215.

⁴⁷⁷ Castles, S. and Davidson, P. (2000): *Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging*. Routledge, London.

⁴⁷⁸ Koopmans, R. and Statham, P. (2000): "Migration and Ethnic Relations as a Field of Political Contention: An Opportunity Structure Approach" in Koopmans, R. and Statham, P. (Eds.): *Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics: Comparative European Perspectives*. Oxford University Press.

⁴⁷⁹ Arzheimer, K. and Carter, E. (2006): Political Opportunity Structures and Right Wing Extremist Party Success. *European Journal of Political Research*. Vol. 45. Issue 3. Pp. 419-443.

⁴⁸⁰ Lubbers, M., Gjsberts, M. and Scheepers, P. (2002): Extreme Right-Wing Voting in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*. Vol. 41. Issue 3. Pp. 345-378.

⁴⁸¹ Knigge, P. (1998): The Ecological Correlates of Right-Wing Extremism in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*. Vol. 34. Issue 2. Pp. 249-279.

Immigration being manipulated by political entrepreneurs and brokers, especially from far-wing factions, defines the contours of “existential politics” by “administering inclusion and exclusion”.⁴⁸²

Mudde coincides with this thesis and brings it further by considering that immigration has been a catalyst for most of contemporary extreme right parties.⁴⁸³ He has even defined this theory as the “single-issue party thesis”.⁴⁸⁴ The author of this dissertation shares this point of view considering that migration related issues are key to understand the limitations, inconsistencies and probably the failure of policies and mechanism used to promote a new strategy for the Mediterranean. This is due to the fact that primordially, those policies and mechanisms are communicational strategies that may allow or block Euro-Mediterranean dialogue and understanding. Migration related issues are very sensitive and within Euro-Mediterranean dialogue a wrong communicational strategy may lead to blocking more technical mechanisms and prevent the success of complex political and diplomatic interactions.

Euro-Mediterranean policies and mechanisms had to deal with a fundamental contradiction. On one hand, the EU wanted to develop mechanisms to enhance trade relations and improve living standards in North African countries considering that this hypothesis would have contributed to limit and control immigration flows. In fact, as it is going to be demonstrated below, the only specific date that was contained in the documents of the EMP was 2010, moment where the FTA between the EU and North Africa would have entered into force. On the other hand EU immigration policies became increasingly restrictive from 2002

This approach shows the mercantilist standpoint promoted by the EU, whereas rhetorically speaking, the EU’s discourse was addressing the importance of fostering the Mediterranean dialogue. Being politically coherent, for the success of every economic integration process, it is necessary to consider free movement of people as well. This contradiction represents the major failure point of the EMP as it is going to be demonstrated in this chapter.

In considering the traditional trade theory developed by Heckscher-Ohlin, both free trade and free migration are equivalent measures and elements of economic integration.⁴⁸⁵

⁴⁸² Huysmans, J. (2008): *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*. Routledge, London. Pp. 45-54.

⁴⁸³ Mudde, C. (1999): The Single-Issue Party Thesis: Extreme Right Parties and the Immigration Issue. *West European Politics*. Vol. 22. Issue 3. Pp. 182-197.

⁴⁸⁴ Op. Cit. P. 182.

⁴⁸⁵ Leamer, E.E. (1995): The Heckscher-Ohlin Model in Theory and Practice. *Princeton Studies in International Finance*. N°77.

However as Wellisch and Walz have demonstrated, this theory does not correspond to the choices of industrialized countries that prefer free trade over free migration.⁴⁸⁶ In line with this evidence, Schiff has demonstrated that free trade is preferred to free movement, because the latter generates attachments “with those with whom they share social capital, including norms, language, customs, values and culture”.⁴⁸⁷ Bearing in mind Euro-Mediterranean politics, these approaches are even more evident and significant as the divide between North Africa and the EU is the deepest in the world in terms of income, industrial development and institutional sophistication. On top of that immigration rates -as it is going to be demonstrated throughout this chapter- have been the most crucial aspect defining EU-Maghreb relations.

As de Haas recognizes, “persistent and increasing migration from and through North Africa has put relations with European countries under considerable stress. In particular the EU has attempted to ‘externalize’ its restrictive immigration policies through putting Maghreb states under pressure to adopt restrictive immigration laws and regulations and to intensify –joint- border controls”.⁴⁸⁸

This artificial and intentional construction of a “buffer zone” in North Africa belongs to the EU’s policy of entering into association agreements with Maghreb countries with the intention of creating a free trade area by 2010. These mechanisms were driven by a belief in the hypothesis –following a neo-liberal approach- that an open economy would not only reduce incentives for migration but also foster democracy, democratic peace as well as sustainable socio-economic changes in those countries.

However, it is arguable that this hypothesis is incorrect and did not take into account other factors such as the communication processes between more and less industrialized countries, policy coherence and consistency, and a real understanding of persistent socio-economic challenges. According to the Zelinsky’s model, also known as “migration hump”, the improvement of socio-economic conditions would stimulate more migration within the short and medium term.⁴⁸⁹

The initial diplomatic and communicational strategies to set up the objectives of an Euro-Mediterranean dialogue coincided, as shown previously chapter five, with increasing

⁴⁸⁶ Wellisch, D. and Walz, U. (1998): Why do Rich Countries Prefer Free Trade Over Free Migration? The Role of the Modern Welfare State. *European Economic Review*. Vol. 42. Issue 8. Pp. 1595-1612.

⁴⁸⁷ Schiff, M. (2002): Love thy Neighbor: Trade, Migration and Social Capital. *European Journal of Political Economy*. Vol. 18. Issue 1. P. 87.

⁴⁸⁸ De Haas, H. (2007): Between Courting and Controlling: The Moroccan State and ‘It’s’ Emigrants. *Centre on Migration, Policy and Society*. University of Oxford. P. 4.

⁴⁸⁹ De Haas, H. (2008): Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective. *IMI*. N°9. University of Oxford. P.3.

migration flows on one hand and, on the other hand, with the development of the EU in a context of international globalization. This mixed phenomenon raised both directly and indirectly discussions on the traditional concept of nation-state and its sovereignty.⁴⁹⁰ As Balibar, Wallerstein and Sassen have highlighted, these challenging scenarios based on discussing core issues like citizenship and nationality have forced political agendas to respond to these changing contexts in a never-ending process of reconstructing inter-state relations.⁴⁹¹

As it has been demonstrated in the preceding chapter, the initial diplomatic movements to develop Euro-Mediterranean comprehensive policies were based on a threatening communication strategy influenced by thinking on the risks that a less industrialized region like the North-African would represent for Europe. Subsequently, the theoretical justification of such policies shifted orientation and win-win situations – rhetorically speaking- were structured and designed in order to achieve a better understanding between European and Arab neighbors.

The success of these policies and rhetoric argumentations, therefore, were linked to three main theoretical and operational aspects: the understanding of long-standing problematic issues -such as socio-economic underdevelopment, security, post-colonialism, human mobility and more industrialized-less industrialized labor dynamics; the consistency of such policies and the degree of commitment of key decision makers and stakeholders; the course of parallel and complicated political situations like the Arab-Israeli conflict, the aftermaths of the 9/11 and the global economic crisis.

The 1990s were years of political and socio-cultural experimentation within the realm posed by the post-cold war scenario. These experimentations were framed and challenged by migration, security, and socio-economic development related issues. All them increasingly challenged Euro-Mediterranean relations, policies, diplomatic mechanisms and communicational processes. As it is going to be demonstrated in chapters 7, 8 and 9, these issues topped EU's political agenda as well as European public concerns. It was also the

⁴⁹⁰ Martiniello, M. (1995): "European Citizenship, European Identity and Migrants: Towards the Post-National State?" In Miles R., and Thrändhart, D. (Eds.): *Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion*. Pinter, London. Pp. 37-52; Silverman, M. (1992): *Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism and Citizenship in Modern France*. Routledge, London; Glick-Schiller, N. (1998): *Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity and Nationalism Reconsidered*. New York Academy of Sciences; Geddes, A. (2003): *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe*. Sage.

⁴⁹¹ Balibar, E., and Wallerstein, I.M. (1991): *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*. Verso, London; Sassen, S. (1996): *Losing Control: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*. Columbia University Press, New York.

decade when Euro-Mediterranean politics were broadly defined and implemented following the theoretical and practical avenues defined by the Barcelona Process also called EMP.

This chapter aims at assessing two interrelated aspects. First the most representative elements that have had to address these challenges and how they have been challenging Euro-Mediterranean politics and diplomatic action within the short, medium and long term. Second, how the EU's initial hypotheses and objectives have clashed and thus contradicted both with the development of such elements and with the particular interests of certain nations that have shifted and changed their policies and priorities due to economic, social and political difficulties. The second objective is going to be demonstrated by analyzing European public speech and its influence is shaping European public opinion. This objective will also address and show how the EU's rhetoric in favor of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue has clashed and has being challenged by national right-wing parties that have pushed EU member states' public opinion towards more intolerant stances during the 1990's and more intensively from 2002 onward due to immigration related issues.⁴⁹²

6.1. General Migratory Trends.

The percentage of international migrants as part of global population rose from 2.2 percent in 1970 to 2.9 percent in 2005.⁴⁹³ However, over the same period, the concentration of international migration in OECD countries rose from 4.5 percent to 8.3 percent.⁴⁹⁴ Net migration from outside OECD to OECD countries from 1956 to 1976 amounted to 790,000 per year; 1.24 million per year from 1977 to 1990 and 2.73 million per year from 1990 to 2005.⁴⁹⁵

According to UN and International Organization of Migration (IOM) estimates, the number of international migrants moved shifted from 150 million in 2000 to 214 million in 2012.⁴⁹⁶ These figures raise two fundamental questions that must be answered in order to understand possible manipulations, and inconsistencies with existing policies and generally

⁴⁹² Oesch, D. (2008): Explaining Worker's Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe. Evidence from: Austria, Belgium, France, Norway and Switzerland. *International Political Science Review*. Vol. 29. N°3. Pp. 349-373; Lucassen, G. and Lubbers, M. (2012): Who Fears What? Explaining Far-Right-Wing Preference in Europe by Distinguishing Perceived Cultural and Economic Ethnic Threats. *Comparative Political Studies*. Vol. 45. N°5. Pp. 547-574.

⁴⁹³ Martin, J.P. (2008): Migration and the Global Economy. OECD. P 1-3. Available at: <http://www.oecd.org/migration/internationalmigrationpoliciesanddata/40196342.pdf> (Retrieved 1 March 2010)

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁶ UN. (2008): Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision. *United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs*. Available at: <http://esa.un.org/migration/index.asp?panel=1> (Retrieved 1 March 2011); IOM. (2010): *World Migration Report 2010*. International Organization for Migration, Geneva.

accepted assumptions: Are politicians and the media over-stating this problem? Does irregular migration really threaten the state's sovereignty and security, or are these worries hugely exaggerated?⁴⁹⁷ Along with these two initial questions, one should also ask how this phenomenon affects the Euro-Mediterranean region?

6.1.1. Migration in the Mediterranean.

The Mediterranean, as a central pivot for Europe, North Africa and the Middle East constitutes one of the most dynamic regions in the entire world in relation to labor migration flows.⁴⁹⁸ This dynamism is particularly evident in the Maghreb region. North African countries, mainly Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria have become some of the most active exporters of labor to Europe as De Haas and Skeldon have shown.⁴⁹⁹

Spanish and French colonization and decolonization philosophy differs in the case of North Africa from other types, such as British decolonization. Whereas the Anglo-Saxon model established the British Commonwealth, Mediterranean decolonization models in North Africa were violent and damaging to all parties. This explains why both France and Spain were reluctant to allow "former" dependent countries to become sovereign states.⁵⁰⁰

The French presence in North Africa especially in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria since the mid-nineteenth century laid the first bricks of the constant interconnection among these countries. Algeria was the country that suffered this linkage more than the others as Naylor has studied.⁵⁰¹ The Algerian French protectorate was established in 1830 and incorporated into the French state. The Moroccan French protectorate started in 1881 and the Tunisian in 1912. During the first half of the twentieth century the French labor market had high demand during WWI and WWII as Muus and Bidwell have analyzed.⁵⁰²

⁴⁹⁷ Koser, K. (2005): Irregular Migration, State Security and Human Security. *Global Commission on International Migration*. P. 22.

⁴⁹⁸ Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2005): *Migration in the Middle East and the Mediterranean*. A Regional Study Prepared for the Global Commission on International Migration. Panteion University, Greece.

⁴⁹⁹ Haas, H. de (2007): The Myth of Invasion. Irregular Migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union. *International Migration Institute and James Martin 21st Century School*. University of Oxford; Skeldon, R. (1997): *Migration and Development*. Prentice Hall.

⁵⁰⁰ Perkins, H. (2004): *History of Modern Tunisia*. Cambridge University Press; Strang, D. (1990): From Dependency to Sovereignty: An Event History Analysis of Decolonization 1870-1987. *American Sociological Review*. 55. Pp. 848-860; Wansbrough, J. (1968): The Decolonization of North African History. *The Journal of African History*. Vol. 9. Issue 4. October. Pp. 643-650.

⁵⁰¹ Naylor, P.C. (2000): *France and Algeria: A History of Decolonization and Transformation*. University Press of Florida.

⁵⁰² Muus, P. (1995): *L'Emigration Marocaine Vers L'Europe. Changement et Continuité*. Université Mohammed V Press. Rabat; Bidwell, R. (1973): *Morocco Under Colonial Rule: French Administration of Rural Areas 1912-1956*. Frank Cass, London.

After WWII migration from the Maghreb to France continued until 1968 as noted in chapter four. Following the country's move to independence in 1962, Algerians were allowed to move freely between France and Algeria.⁵⁰³ This helped France to sustain and shore up its economic and industrial boom until 1973. During the Algerian war between 1954 and 1962, Moroccans workers filled the gap left by Algerians.⁵⁰⁴

Broadly speaking during the first decade of post-colonialism between 1962 and 1973, Maghreb countries participated in the Euro-Mediterranean migration.⁵⁰⁵ This notably occurred in Belgium, The Netherlands and the German Democratic Republic (GDR),⁵⁰⁶ were "guest workers", -also known as "*gastarbeiter*"-⁵⁰⁷ agreements were introduced.

Despite the formal channels in which this circular economic migration occurred, especially during the first years of the 1960s, irregular migration accompanied the regular process. This system was designed to promote and encourage circular migration but the majority of migrants were entitled with permanent residence permits through legalization campaigns in 1975 in The Netherlands and Belgium and in 1981-1982 in France.⁵⁰⁸ That is why it is difficult to estimate the exact number of migrants who moved over this decade.

The 1973 oil crisis and the global economic downturn that followed impacted severely on migration into industrial Europe, a main victim of the rapid rise in the oil price during the mid-1970s. Since then, European migration policies have been linked to the economic cycle, and thus unavoidably to the national and international macroeconomic situation.⁵⁰⁹

⁵⁰³ Collyer, M. (2003): Explaining Change in Established Migration Systems: The Movement of Algerians to France and the UK. *Sussex Migration Working Paper*. N°16. University of Sussex.

⁵⁰⁴ Haas, H de. (2005b) Morocco: From emigration country to Africa's migration passage to Europe. Country profile Morocco. Migration Information Source. Available at: <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=339> (Retrieved 1 May 2011)

⁵⁰⁵ Haas, H de. (2005a): International Migration, Remittances and Development Myths and Facts. *Third World Quarterly*. Issue 26. N°8. P. 1270.

⁵⁰⁶ Morocco signed recruitment agreements with France in 1963, the GDR in 1963, Belgium in 1964 and the Netherlands in 1969. Tunisia did the same with France in 1963, GDR in 1965, Belgium in 1969 and the Netherlands in 1970. Trans-Maghreb migration was also developed in these years. Tunisia signed agreement with neighbour Libya in 1971. See Baduel, P.R. (1980): *Societe et Emigration Temporaire au Netzaoua. Tunisie*. CNRS, Paris.

⁵⁰⁷ Traditionally the system of 'guest workers' should be considered under the representation of circular migration. Foreign workers are summoned for a pre-arranged period of time. After that time immigrant workers should leave the country compulsory.

⁵⁰⁸ Op. Cit. Muus, P. (1995): P. 199.

⁵⁰⁹ The 1973 oil crisis produced quite a different effect in Arab countries because that event triggered off massive labor incorporation. It is true also, that for the North American case, before the Crash of 1929, the Immigration Act of 1924, which went into force in 1928 applied strong restrictions to new immigrants from almost all countries. Hence, here is possible to see how migration policies are very much affected by the economic cycle. See Papademetriou, D. G. and Terrazas, A. (2009): *Immigrants and the Current Economic Crisis: Research Evidence, Policy Challenges and Implications*. Migration Policy Institute. Washington D.C.

The subsequent period of economic and industrial stagnation generated an increasing structural unemployment leading to a reduction of the demand of the traditional immigrant labor. As De Haas points out, large number North African immigrants stayed permanently as visa restrictions pushed immigrants to remain in receiving countries.⁵¹⁰

This cause-effect approach might be at the root of the failure to manage migration, and are also (as subsequent chapters will address), potentially, at least in part, the reason for the common linkage of migration with other issues such as security, terrorism, criminality or unemployment.

The effects of the raising of oil prices provoked varied responses in the Maghreb. As an oil producer, Algeria was able to take advantage of the new situation for resetting relations with France.⁵¹¹ The government of Houari Boumédiène –in office between 1965 to 1976- suspended immigration agreements with France because he considered emigration and those policies as “a form of post-colonial dependence”.⁵¹²

On the other hand, as De Haas also argues that other North African countries suffered much more intensively from the 1973 oil crisis. Moroccan immigration in Europe grew steadily since 1972 due to family reunification, family formation, new labor migration and undocumented migration. According to official figures, the number of Moroccan immigrants rose from 300,000 in 1972 to nearly 2.7 million by 2005. France was the top recipient with 1 million Moroccans, followed by Spain, 500,000, Italy, 350.000, Belgium, 350,000, The Netherlands 325,000 and Germany, 108.000.⁵¹³ The same trend can be witnessed for the Tunisian population. According to Gammoudi the Tunisian population abroad doubled between 1977 and 1992 and between 1987 and 2007.⁵¹⁴ By 2007 France was the main destination for both Tunisian and Algerian migrants with 54.5 percent of Tunisians in Europe living in France. At the same time the number of Algerians residents in France was estimated 1.5 million.⁵¹⁵

⁵¹⁰ Op. Cit. De Haas, H. (2005a): P. 1270.

⁵¹¹ Op. Cit. Collyer, M. (2003): P. 3.

⁵¹² Fargues, P. (2004): Arab migration to Europe: trends and policies. *International Migration Review* N° 38. P. 1349.

⁵¹³ de Haas, H. (2009) : The Moroccan Emigrant Population. Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung. Available at : http://www.bpb.de/themen/K0W40E,0,The_Moroccan_Emigrant_Population.html (Retrieved 22 November 2010)

⁵¹⁴ Gammoudi, T. (2006): *L'Impact de L'Emigration sur la Région de Départ : Cas de l'Oasis Continentale de Fatnasse*. Master Dissertation. Université du 7 Novembre. Carthage. Tunisia; Zekri, A. (2010): “Migration and Development: Socio-Economic Impacts of Emigration in Tunisia” In Ureta, I., and Lutterbeck, I. (Eds.): *Migration, Development and Diplomacy: Perspectives from the Southern Mediterranean*. Africa World Press. Pp. 2-9.

⁵¹⁵ Godard, B. and Taussig, S. (2007): *Les Musulmans en France: Courants, Institutions, Communautés*. Pluriel.

France's colonial past and current economic power explain this but so does its cultural links. Spain, on the other hand, was not such an attractive prospect for much of the same period due to decades of economic stagnation, political dictatorship and institutional and democratic under-development. From the early 1980s onward as Spain moved from being a sending to a receiving country from migrants this all changed.


Seventy percent of the immigrants coming from the Maghreb came to Spain between 1980 and 1990 as González Yanci and López García and Berriane have shown.⁵¹⁶ Moroccans and Algerians migrated to Spain more than Tunisians. This new wave of immigrants from the Maghreb was defined by one of the most notable Spanish experts on migration as “the return of the Moors”.⁵¹⁷

These trends have been replicated all over the Mediterranean. The graphics below show the evolution of the migrant population in Europe and in the Mediterranean area, for 4 countries: Spain, France, Italy and Malta. This first graph show how international migration evolved between 1990 and 2010. The Spanish case has been the most dramatic given its growth from 2000 onwards, whereas France has been experiencing a very discreet rise although until 2004 it still led regarding the number of international migrants as a percentage of the population. With the exception of France, the country with largest labor migration, the inflexion point for the other Mediterranean countries began between 2000 and 2005. As it is possible to appreciate in the graphic number 2, between 2005-2005 Spain overcame France with regards to the international migrants as a percentage of the national population.

⁵¹⁶ López García, B and Berriane, M. (Eds.)(2004): *Atlas de la Inmigración Marroquí en España*. Taller de Estudios Internacionales Mediterráneos. Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración. Madrid; Yanci González, M.P. (1995): Algunas Consideraciones Sobre la Inmigración de Maghrebíes en España y su Incierto Futuro. *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma*. Serie VI. Geografía. T.8. Pp. 167-192.

⁵¹⁷ Lopez García, B. (1993): *Inmigración Maghrebí en España: El Retorno de los Moriscos*. Editorial Mapfre. Madrid.


Graph. (2) International Migrants as a Percentage of the Population



Source: UN. Elaborated by the author.

In the following graphic number 3, one can observe the annual change of the migrant stock in Southern European countries. Clearly, Spain has experienced again a very sharp growth between 2000 and 2005, whereas in Italy and Malta this growth has been much more reduced. The French case is almost irrelevant due to the fact of its long tradition attracting labor over the *treinte glorieuses*.

Graph (3) Annual Rate of Change of the Migrant Stock % in Spain, Italy, France and Malta.




Source: UN. Elaborated by the author.

Going beyond the Mediterranean rim, the following two graphics focus on Europe. They show that the most important period in terms of migrants' inflow was between 2000


and 2005. From 1990 to 2010 the percentage of migrants as a percentage of the population in Europe grew from 7 percent to 10 percent. These two following graphics number 4 and 5 evidence the notable differences between the Mediterranean Europe and northern European countries as the aggregated values are much lower than the others displayed before. Therefore, these differential trends justify the fact that southern European countries like Spain, France and Italy have been acting as political entrepreneurs and brokers. They have been naturally raising awareness of these increasing flows and the potential risks they would entail for the entire European security.

Graph (4) Annual Rate of Change of the Migrant Stock % in Europe



Source: UN. Elaborated by the author.

Graph (5) International Migrants as a Percentage of the Population in Europe.



Source: UN. Elaborated by the author.

6.2. Gambling on the Needs and Problems of Southern Mediterranean Countries.

The EU was created and developed to increase the economic power of member states and this economic interest established the ground for future political and diplomatic initiatives.

Understanding this is fundamental to understanding how Euro-Mediterranean politics have evolved from 1995 onward.

The decade following the end of the Cold War was characterized by a certain optimism that was translated into a common European agreement upon a number of issues of common interest.⁵¹⁸ The definition of a new World Order aside the opportunities to develop creative political, economic and diplomatic mechanisms to occupy privileged positions within this new scenario were very apparent. As Calleya has stressed, “the growth of regional arrangements since the end of the Cold War is partly due to the fact that great powers and regional powers welcomed the opportunity to participate in collective security and cooperative frameworks in which the costs of foreign policy actions are shared among several actors.”⁵¹⁹

This wave of agreements was characterized by a rhetoric that used expressions like “north-south dialogue”, “win-win solutions”, “socio-economic development” or “increasing mutual security”. These concepts were diplomatic mantras to sell new strategies to create new balances and new mechanisms intended to consolidate control of southern Mediterranean countries including the Maghreb and the Mashrek. Through the CL approach this is going to be demonstrated in analyzing EU’s public speech.

Within this period the following were created: the 5+5 Initiative, the Council of the Mediterranean launched by the Maltese government, the Mediterranean Forum initiated by the Egyptian government, the Italian-Spanish proposal to flesh out the CSCM, the AMU and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona Process) led by the EU in 1995.⁵²⁰

The Barcelona Process was intended to breathe new life into the Euro-Mediterranean relationship by increasing the collaborative aspect of the relationship, boosting democratic promotion, upholding human rights, safeguarding regional security and developing economic partnerships. Regional initiatives and multilateralism were also encouraged in an attempt to

⁵¹⁸ Schumacher, T. (2004a): “Riding the Wings of Change”: The Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. *The International Spectator*. Issue 39. Vol. 2. Pp.89-103; Rudolph, C. (2003): Security and the Political Economy of International Migration. *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 97. N°4.November. P.603.

⁵¹⁹ Calleya, S. (2004): *Evaluating Euro-Mediterranean Relations*. Routledge. P.2; To assess to what extent regional powers designed and oriented their diplomatic and political efforts to re-control peripheral areas see also Schumacher, T. (2004b): Survival of the Fittest: The First Five Years of Euro-Mediterranean Economic Relations. *EUI Working Papers*. European University Institute. Florence.

⁵²⁰ Op. Cit. Ureta, I. (2010): P.175.

overcome, and put aside, the traditional bilateralism that had characterized the region up to that point.⁵²¹

At a communicational level, the political discourse surrounding this was optimistic, committed and proactive. However, some pessimistic voices were raised. Authors like Khader, have been criticising Euro-Mediterranean policies and mechanisms due to their lack of consistency, coherence and the attempt to verticalize Euro-Mediterranean relations.⁵²² Youngs criticized the lack of vision and the limitations to prioritize strategies and actions.⁵²³

In fact, as it has been also mentioned in the precedent chapter, it was evident the deployment of a double discourse from the EU since the first attempts of gathering communitarian consensus on one hand and the post-1995 political and diplomatic developments on the other hand. Probably this communicational dichotomy was the seed of the future failure. This contradictory and inconsistent public discourse has contributed to enhance and reinforce an existing feeling of fear and mistrust within the entire Mediterranean region.⁵²⁴ This will be demonstrated by analyzing European public discourse with regards to migration relations issues.

The details of the Barcelona Process in the three areas of politics and security; economic and financial issues and social, cultural and human aspects have been widely examined.⁵²⁵ However, in the context of a communicative strategy on the Mediterranean, the security aspect was fundamental to gathering communitarian consensus. As Rudolph mentions, this security-focused on discourse found much support amongst states whose priority was developing free trade.⁵²⁶

⁵²¹ Ibid.

⁵²² Khader, B. (2001): *Le Partenariat Euro-Méditerranéen vu du Sud*. L'Harmattan, Paris; Khader, B. (2009): *L'Europe pour la Méditerranée. De Barcelone à Barcelone, 1995-2008*. L'Harmattan, Paris.

⁵²³ Youngs, R. (1999): The Barcelona Process after the UK Presidency: The Need for Prioritization. *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 4. Issue 1. Pp. 1-24.

⁵²⁴ Malmvig, H. (2006): Caught Between Cooperation and Democratization: The Barcelona Process and the EU's Double Discursive Approach. *Journal of International Relations and Development*. Vol. 9. N°4. Pp.343.

⁵²⁵ For the official description see : The Barcelona Process. Available at:

http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/barcelona_en.htm (Retrieved 12 May 2011); the literature about the issue is abundant. Among other see Vasconcelos, A. (Ed.) (2000): *The Barcelona Process: Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community*. Routledge; Edis, R. (1998): Does the Barcelona Process Matter? *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 3. Issue 3. Pp.93-105; Gillespie, R. (1997): Northern European Perceptions of the Barcelona Process. *Revista CIDOB*. Pp. 65-75.

⁵²⁶ Rudolph, C. (2003): Security and the Political Economy of International Migration. *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 97. N°4. P. 603; On this issue see also Rosencrance, R.N. (1986): *Rise of the Trading State*. Basic Books, New York.

6.3. Trying to Manage Migration: The Fundamental Gap.

None of the three baskets in the Barcelona process considered the migratory issue despite its centrality to the stability of the entire region. From 1995 to 1999 the European situation with regards to migration issues changed dramatically. From 1999 to 2004, and especially from the time of the al-Qaeda attacks on the US in September 2001 (the 9/11 attacks) migration and security were indefectibly associated. As the former Spanish secretary of state Anna Terron mentioned prior to the European Council of Tampere in 1999 there was no common immigration policy for Europe and Spain played a very important role in developing the importance of this issue in response to an acceleration of migratory flows from the Southern Mediterranean.⁵²⁷

In fact, over this period Spain played a fundamental role in leading the EU on developing its migratory policies. Terrón mentioned during an interview for this thesis, Spain was able to identify this trend because “we came from this migratory experience and I think that we realized quicker than the rest of the EU that there was an intense migratory problem coming. Everything was very visible and on top of that the consciousness of Spanish people to migration issues started to awake at that time”.⁵²⁸

The preparation of the Council of Tampere served precisely to create the mechanisms and the concept of a unified European migratory policy. During the Council of Tampere meeting, four intertwined factors were revealed as critical for the future sustainability of the Euro-Mediterranean region as a project: first, a common EU asylum and migration policy; second, a genuine European area of justice; third, a union-wide fight against crime; and fourth, stronger external action.⁵²⁹ These measures stressed the importance of managing, in a coordinated way, both existing and future migratory flows, especially points 22, 23 and 24.⁵³⁰ Point 23, highlighted the European commitment in fighting against illegal migration. That encouraged the development and implementation of a communitarian legislation to sanction serious crimes.⁵³¹ Point 24, stressed the importance of Euro-Mediterranean

⁵²⁷ Personal Interview with Anna Terron. Former Secretary of State. Spain. Madrid, 30 June 2011.

⁵²⁸ Cited interview with Anna Terron.

⁵²⁹ Anon. (1999): Presidency Conclusions: Tampere European Council. 15-16 October 1999. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm (Retrieved 5 February 2010)

⁵³⁰ Mainly point 22 highlights that: “the European Council stresses the need for more efficient management of migration flow at all their stages. It calls for the development, in close co-operation with countries of origin and transit, of information campaigns on the actual possibilities for legal immigration, and for the prevention of all forms of trafficking in human beings.” Ibid.

⁵³¹ Ibid.

cooperation in managing and controlling migration flows, an issue that reveals European worries and desires to increase domestic security.⁵³²

From this point onwards it was possible to detect migration related issues shifting from the domain of low politics to the sphere of high politics. This approach acquired political justification and social acceptance after the 9/11 attacks. Subsequently, the migration-security nexus was institutionalized. As Thieux puts it the idea of multilateralism in the “idealistic” public discourse, reverted to the earlier model of the dangers of bilateral proximity.⁵³³ As Anna Terron explained in her interview for this thesis:

“In considering both the sphere of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) policies and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) realm, we lived since many years ago, I would say, from mid-1990s, with a very strong tension between the fear and the need of closing and managing the Euro-Mediterranean space and migratory flows with other criteria more linked to foreign policy, cooperation and development.”⁵³⁴

Following Tampere, the migratory issue continued to rise in importance within the EU political space jeopardizing the possibilities of developing a consistent and holistic Euro-Mediterranean approach. In 2003, and in parallel to the Barcelona Process, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was launched. This created expectations and also uncertainties.⁵³⁵

The internal consistency of this Mediterranean project had much to do with the consistency of the interaction between previous policies and mechanisms set in the region. On the other hand, the Hague Program (2004-2009) was an EU attempt to strengthen freedom, security and justice. It gave continuity to the points that were previously established during the European Council in Tampere. It described a master plan divided into 10 main points. Four of those 10 points were related to migration issues.⁵³⁶ This underlined the centrality of migratory related issues within the European political debate. Adding to this, on 3 October 2005, FRONTEX (the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Border of the Member States of the EU) became operational.

⁵³² Ibid.

⁵³³ Thieux, L. (2005): *The Democratic Deficit: A Pending Objective for the Barcelona Process*. Peace Research Centre. Madrid.

⁵³⁴ Cited interview with Anna Terron.

⁵³⁵ Emerson, M., and Noutcheva, G. (2005): From the Barcelona Process to Neighbourhood Policy: Assessment and Open Issues. *CEPS Working Documents*. N°220. 1. March.

⁵³⁶ EU (2005): The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union. *Official Journal of the European Union*. C53/1. Pp.5-7. Available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2005:053:0001:0014:EN:PDF> (Retrieved 12 December 2011)

FRONTEX aimed at providing an “integral global response” against the roots, dynamics and consequences posed by illegal migration within the Mediterranean.⁵³⁷

As Neal and Lutterbeck have argued, these mechanisms defined the pathway to the securitization of migration management policies.⁵³⁸ As a consequence, this more pragmatic and security-related approach provoked mistrust and misunderstanding among the EU’s Mediterranean partners.

From this point only the necessary social, cultural and intercultural communication reforms were secondary objectives or even excuses to exert control and boost cooperation with Southern Mediterranean regimes on the issues of migration and illegal immigration control, the war against terrorism and drug and human trafficking.⁵³⁹

Between 1995 and 2005, the economic gap between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbors had widened and this caused virtually uncontrollable migratory movements.⁵⁴⁰ So much so, in fact that it was now possible to argue that migration related issues represented an indicator of the ineffectiveness of multilateral political projects dealing with unbalanced economies sharing a very proximate and conflicted geographical space.

6.4. Migration and the Economic Cycle: Triggering National Fears, Evidencing Multilateral Deficiencies.

The extent that multilateral projects like those launched by the EU in relation to the Mediterranean are endangered by possible economic slowdowns is an important question. Solimano argues that “international migration is like a barometer of economic and societal conditions in home countries with respect to the rest of the world”.⁵⁴¹ There is some historical evidence that corroborate this link between migration and variations in the economic cycle. The global economic crisis that began in 2008 can be compared with the two other major crises of the twentieth Century in 1907-1908 and 1929-1935. Those crises were preceded by

⁵³⁷ Carrera, S. (2007): The EU Border Management Strategy: Frontex and the Challenges of Irregular Immigration in the Canary Islands. *CEPS Working Document*. N°261.

⁵³⁸ Neal, A.W. (2009): Securitization and Risk at the EU Border. The Origins of Frontex. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. Vol.47. Issue 2. Pp. 333-356; Lutterbeck, D. (2006): Policing Migration in the Mediterranean. *Mediterranean Politics*. 11(1). Pp. 59-82.

⁵³⁹ As per organizations dealing with cultural issues it would be necessary to speak about the Anna Lindh Foundation, created in 2005 to foster dialogue between cultures. In 2004 was created Euromed, a non-governmental platform created by the civil society to put together NGOs working in the Mediterranean area.

⁵⁴⁰ Op. Cit. Ureta, I. (2010): P.179.

⁵⁴¹ Solimano, A. (2003): *Development Cycles, Political Regimes and International Agents: Argentina in the 20th Century*. CEPAL, United Nations. P.7.

a sustained and optimistic period of buoyancy in terms of credit growth and low risk premiums; by periods of speculation driven by a fictitious feeling of financial euphoria.

By considering the two earlier crises, it is certainly possible to observe that both resulted in socio-political and economic policies aimed at closing societies, stoking nationalist fires, and rejecting earlier internationalist engagement. Of course, those political and social measures affected directly big numbers of migrants.

As Khalid Koser has pointed out, the same occurred systematically in response to other, more limited economic crises such as the Oil Crisis, 1973, the Asian financial crisis between 1997/1999, the Russian crisis of 1998 and the Latin American Crisis between 1998 and 2000.⁵⁴²

However, in contradiction to what occurred in the two previous global crises, the current crisis did not impact on international migration in the predicted way. As Koser has pointed out, the last global economic slowdown “did not last long enough to disrupt migration plans that were already prepared before it began; the underlying forces that drive contemporary migration are not only economic, and in any case are so powerful that they are relatively immune to economic cycles and policy interventions.”⁵⁴³

Another example that would underpin these suggestions and that stresses the fact that international migration cannot be simply stopped or punished is related to the changing of routes followed by migrants. In the period between January and September 2010, FRONTEX reported a notable reduction in illegal migration on the Central Mediterranean Route. In Italy it was down 65 percent and in Malta, 98 percent. The Western Mediterranean Route saw a reduction in Spain of 20 percent. The Western Africa Route saw a reduction in the Canary Islands by 99 percent and the Central Eastern European Route saw a reduction of 24 percent in the Western Balkans.

However, over the same period, irregular migration increased by 369 percent on the Eastern Mediterranean Route along the Greek-Turkey land border.⁵⁴⁴ Preventive measures on other routes had pushed migrants to find more accessible entry points.⁵⁴⁵ This is a common

⁵⁴² Koser, K. (2009): *The Impact of Financial Crises on International Migration: Lessons Learned*. International Organization for Migration, Geneva. P.6.

⁵⁴³ Koser, K. (2010): *Why Didn't the Global Economic and Financial Crisis Have More of an Impact on International Migration*. GCSP, Geneva. Paper n°6. P.1.

⁵⁴⁴ FRONTEX, *Current Situation at the External Borders of the EU (Jan-Sept)* Available at: http://www.frontex.europa.eu/situation_at_the_external_border/art18.html (Retrieved 4 December 2010)

⁵⁴⁵ This phenomenon is very similar to the coca production industry. The existence of a consistent international demand provokes that when policies are blocking or restricting coca production in Colombia, Peruvian or Bolivian productions increase almost automatically. See Lutterbeck, D. (2006): *Policing Migration in the Mediterranean*. *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol.11. N°1. Pp.59-82.

occurrence, but the fact that it happened in this specific way does challenge, partially at least, the hypothesis that links migration to the economic cycle. The reason is that Greece during 2010 was experiencing the worst economic and financial crisis within the euro-zone and was hardly a destination of choice for would-be economic migrants. Of course, Greece may well have appealed to many of these migrants as a transit destination, but it is less clear how much time they would have to wait before feeling able to attempt to move to other European country.

6.5. Migration and Public Opinion: National Politics Challenging International Projects.

Migration is seen and used by political forces and political entrepreneurs, across the political spectrum.⁵⁴⁶ In more industrialized countries, public opinion overwhelmingly subscribes to the idea that migration is triggered by extreme poverty. This can cause feelings of compassion and sympathy for migrants when immigration is very present in the public's everyday consciousness. However, such feelings diminish as soon as "visible migrants" become noticeable. The difference between "visible" and "invisible" migrants is related to phenotypic and cultural issues. The fear being that these people escaping from their homelands will take local jobs and will jeopardize the welfare system and cultural identity. While such views are linked to long time notions of the nation state, as Castles and Miller have studied,⁵⁴⁷ they do not, as Castells says, belong to the 'reality' of a globalized environment.⁵⁴⁸

During a EUROMESCO meeting in Sharm-el-Sheikh in 2007, Egyptian ambassador Gamal Bayoumi criticized European stakeholders because they were trying to develop an economic dialogue, favorable to EU interests, whereas at the same time, the EU was punishing migration from the Maghreb. This argument is the seed that more intensively pollutes Euro-Mediterranean relations.⁵⁴⁹

⁵⁴⁶ Castles, S., and Miller, J.M. (2003): *The Age of Migration*. Palgrave MacMillan. 3rd Edition; Ureta, I. (2009): *The Blurry Line: Economic Performance, Migration Policies and Public Opinion in the Euro-Mediterranean Area*. Working paper presented at the *BRISMES Annual Meeting*. University of Manchester; Santamaria, E. (2002): *Immigración y Barbarie. La Construcción Social y Política del Inmigrante Como Amenaza*. UAB. Vol.66. P.36.

⁵⁴⁷ Op. Cit. Castles, S., and Miller, J.M. (2003): P.18.

⁵⁴⁸ Castells, M. (1997): *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture: The Power of Identity*. Oxford Blackwell. 2nd Edition. P.15.

⁵⁴⁹ Personal notes taken during the preparatory annual session of EuroMEsco, 2008. Sharm-el-Sheikh. The same approach was also detected during the interview with Andreu Bassols who when he was representing the

European governments and political parties have been deploying intense and increasing anti-immigration campaigns. As it is going to be demonstrated in chapters 8 and 9, anti-immigrant and anti-Islam behavior and political campaigns intensified from 2006 onwards. In the Netherlands after Pim Fortuyn's assassination –anti-immigrant and nationalist politician- Geert Wilders identified a political window to become a political broker and opportunist establishing the *Party for Freedom*, focusing its attention on anti-migrant and anti-Islam discourses.⁵⁵⁰ For instance Spain in 2007 launched ads in Africa in order to discourage emigrants.⁵⁵¹

In Switzerland, SVP (*Schweizerische Volkspartei*) headed by Christoph Blocher and first political force since 1999, deployed intense anti-immigrant political campaigns since 2007. The proposed referendums failed –to expulse foreigners committing crime, against free circulation and against the promotion of democratic naturalizations- however SVP inseminated a strong anti-immigrant sentiment within the country.⁵⁵² Following a similar trend, during 2009 Italian extreme right-wing party *Lega Nord* started to prepare a video game aiming at sinking boats. The Spanish version was also prepared by a PP member in Catalonia.⁵⁵³ These attitudes and political behavior were propelled by the rampant global financial crisis that was declared in 2008.

Most of this political discourse and xenophobic attitudes has been targeting Islam and Muslim citizens. As it has been demonstrated by Pew Global Attitude Project in 2008, negative views against Muslim communities and groups increased between 2004 and 2008. These negative perceptions increased from 37 percent to 52 percent in Spain; 46 to 50 percent in Germany; 30 to 46 percent in Poland; 29 to 38 percent in France and; 18 to 23 percent in the UK.⁵⁵⁴

In 2003 Jacques Chirac launched a law approved by the parliament in 2004 banning the display of the Muslim veil, large Christian crosses and Jewish Kippa.⁵⁵⁵ This trend started

interests of the EU in Sri-Lanka, the minister of foreign affairs told him that the most abundant export product Sri-Lanka had was migrants. Cited interview with Andreu Bassols.

⁵⁵⁰ Vossen, K. (2010): Populism in the Netherlands after Fortuyn: Rita Verdonk and Geert Wilders Compared. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*. Vol. 11. Issue, 1. Pp. 22-38.

⁵⁵¹ Anon. (2007): "Spain Begins Anti-Immigration Ads". *BBC News*. 20 September. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7004139.stm> (Retrieved 1 August 2012)

⁵⁵² Ureta, I. and Profanter, A. (2011): "Public Discourse and the Raising of Islamophobia" In Op. Cit. Ureta, I. (Ed.) (2010): P. 252.

⁵⁵³ Anon. (2009): "La Liga Norte de Italia Juega a Hundir Pateras en Facebook". *El País*. 21 August. Available at: http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2009/08/21/actualidad/1250805611_850215.html (Retrieved 1 August 2012)

⁵⁵⁴ Op. Cit. Ureta, I. and Profanter, A. (2011): P. 242.

⁵⁵⁵ Gemie, S. (2004): Stasi's Republic: The School and the "Veil". December 2003-March 2004. *Modern Contemporary France*. Vol. 12. Issue 3. Pp. 387-397.

to consolidate from 2005 onward. In September 2005 Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published the caricatures of Prophet Mohammad provoking intense debates on the limits of freedom of expression.⁵⁵⁶ After this event reactions from the Muslim world ensued and what is more important, linked to the aspect of political responsibility, these reactions were easily predictable.⁵⁵⁷ So it is possible to assume that political entrepreneurs and brokers make out of differences and social turmoil a substantial political benefit. Similar political strategies playing the “Islam” card were played in Europe from then onward. As mentioned earlier Swiss SVP after developing an anti-immigrant political campaign focused on an anti-minaret campaign. This happened in 2009 and this time the referendum was successful.⁵⁵⁸ In 2010 Austrian far-right wing party *Freiheitlichen Partei Österreich* (FPÖ) launched a video game named “Mosche Baba” –Bye bye Mosque- which main objective was the elimination of mosques.⁵⁵⁹

However, despite the aforementioned examples, it is true that opinions about either positive or negative impacts of migration are normally assumptions that are not visually demonstrated. For the purpose of identifying the most relevant risks endangering Euro-Mediterranean relations the author designed for this dissertation a multivariable quantitative analysis to show how European public opinion reacted towards migration related issues over a period of almost 10 years. The hypothesis assumed that negative concepts such as terrorism, criminality, unemployment, security/securitization, are intentionally attached by political entrepreneurs to migration issues in order to influence public opinion.

In terms of methodology data from Eurobarometer (EB) studies that monitor EU public opinion were used for the period between 1999 and 2011. 36 European reports and 52 national reports –EB standards- from Spain, France, Italy and Malta were also used due to their geographical exposure to southern Mediterranean migration and their role in lobbying, designing and managing Euro-Mediterranean policies. From 2002 to 2009 the author has considered the two Eurobarometers published every year –that’s why the years are double-, whereas from 2010 the Eurobarometer is only published once a year.

⁵⁵⁶ Sturges, P. (2006): Limits to Freedom of Expression? Considerations Arising from the Danish Cartoons Affair. *IFLA Journal*. Vol. 32. N°3. Pp. 181-188.

⁵⁵⁷ Hervik, P. (2006): The Predictable Responses to the Danish Cartoons. *Global Media Communication*. Vol. 1. N°42. Pp. 225-232.

⁵⁵⁸ Stussi, M. (2008): Banning of Minarets: Addressing the Validity of Controversial Swiss Popular Initiative. *Religion and Human Rights*. Vol. 3. N°2. Pp. 135-153.


⁵⁵⁹ Anon. (2010): “Moschee Baba”: Justiz Lässt Minaret-Spiel Sperren”. *Die Presse*. 3 September. Available at: http://diepresse.com/home/politik/steiermarkwahl/592068/Moschee-baba_Justiz-laesst-MinarettSpiel-sperren (Retrieved 1 August 2012)

Five variables were considered: Migration, employment, security, crime and terrorism. These show potential correlations, convergences and manipulations linking public speech, political strategies and public opinion. In order to quantify these correlations the author took account of how many times these concepts appeared in those reports in order to estimate the importance they had for public opinion.

In the Spanish case over the studied period until the second half of 2008, Spanish public opinion was reacting to specific political communication strategies and parties aiming at profiting from this sensitive issue. The graph number 6 shows that rising concerns on migration issues coincided with a peak in illegal immigration in 2006.⁵⁶⁰

Within the following two years the situation did not improve notably due to the consequences of the economic crisis and more restrictive policies introduced by the Zapatero's government.⁵⁶¹ Since 2008 within the context framed by the global economic crisis, migration and employment were the two most important concerns for Spanish public opinion. This demonstrates that political public speech and public opinion identified migration related issues and immigrants as one of the dangers and threats against native workers.

Graph (6) Spain, Public Opinion.⁵⁶²



Source: Eurobarometer. Elaborated by the author.

⁵⁶⁰ Cited interview with Anna Terron.

⁵⁶¹ Lario Bastida, M. (2008): Crónica Crítica del Debate Sobre las Políticas Migratorias en España en 2008. *Discurso y Sociedad*. Vol.2 N°4. Pp.769-798.

⁵⁶² Double years equal two Eurobarometers per year.

The Italian case shows slight variations, although some patterns remain similar. That confirms the general European trend on migration related issues. On one hand migration issues threefold by 2003 and until 2007 the importance of migration related issues decreased. This happened during the pre-global crisis period. However from 2007 to 2008 migration related issues topped the concerns of Italian public opinion primarily due to the political communication strategies of Italian conservative parties like the *Lega Nord* who used migration fears to gain political consensus prior to the parliamentary elections of April 2008.⁵⁶³

Even before this, since 2001, increasing levels of migration were being linked to rising crime rates.⁵⁶⁴ In particular, the arrival of masses of illegal migrants from North Africa to Lampedusa contributed to creating the image of an “invasion”, a word that has been widely used on populist political campaigns and mostly deployed by the *Lega Nord* and its leader Umberto Bossi.

From 2008 to 2009 illegal migrants at Lampedusa fell from 34,000 to 6,588 irregular immigrants.⁵⁶⁵ But in 2011 the influx of illegal immigrants to Lampedusa skyrocketed as a consequence of the Libyan war, which led Italy to challenge the EU and raise the viability of the entire Schengen structure as will be discussed later.⁵⁶⁶ This evolution is demonstrated in the graph number 7.


⁵⁶³ Guerra, S., and Massetti, E. (2008): The Italian Parliamentary Election of April 2008. *EPERN*. Election briefing N°41. University of Sussex.

⁵⁶⁴ Diamanti, I., and Bordignon, F. (2001): Sicurezza e Opinione Pubblica in Italia. *Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia*. N°1. P.115.

⁵⁶⁵ Available at: <http://www.daw-blog.com/2009/05/28/lampedusa-e-tornata-lampedusa/> (Retrieved 20 March 2013). This trend was confirmed by the author during a personal meeting with Roberto Maroni during the NATO Parliamentary Assembly celebrated in Rome 2009.

⁵⁶⁶ Koser, K. (2011): Responding to Migration from Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Lessons Learned from Libya. *Global Health Security*. 2011/2. P.2.

Graph (7) Italy. Public Opinion.



Source: Eurobarometer. Elaborated by the author.

The French case is similar though its migration history is different. France had a much more long standing tradition as a host country than Spain, Italy or Malta. However, despite this tradition, as Tränhardt has studied, political campaigns using migration to stir up xenophobia were already in use by political parties the end of the Cold War.⁵⁶⁷ As the graphic number 8 shows, like the Spanish and the Italian cases, 2003-2004 was a key period for rising fears over migration being used by politicians. It is important to note that in 2005 the riots on the outskirts of Paris in highly populated migrant areas, in the words of Kott and Duprez, posed a potential open challenge to the French Republican model of citizenship.⁵⁶⁸

At that time Nicolas Sarkozy was minister of interior and initiated a “zero tolerance” policy.⁵⁶⁹ This coincided also with the French ban of headscarves in primary and secondary schools in a country where the 10 percent of the population is Muslim. From this time onward the political and social debate has been very polarized and has challenged the relationship between liberal values and religious freedom in a secular country.⁵⁷⁰

At the same time populist anti-immigration rhetoric was also deployed by French politicians like Jean Marie Le Pen, leader of far-right *National Front*.⁵⁷¹

⁵⁶⁷ Tränhardt, D. (1995): The Political Uses of Xenophobia in England, France and Germany. *Party Politics*. N°1. Pp. 323-345.


⁵⁶⁸ Kott, H., and Duprez, D. (2009): The 2005 Riots in France: The International Impact of Domestic Violence. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. Vol. 35. Issue 1. Pp. 47.

⁵⁶⁹ Balibar, E. (2007): Uprisings in the Banlieues. *Constellations*. Vol. 14. N°1. Pp.133; Schneider, C.L. (2008): Police Power and Race Riots in Paris. *Politics and Society*. Vol. 36. N°1. P.133.

⁵⁷⁰ Joppke, C. (2009): *Veil, Mirror of Identity*. Polity Press, London.

⁵⁷¹ Betz, H.G., and Johnson, C. (2004): Against the Current Stemming the Tide: The Nostalgic Ideology of the Contemporary Radical Populist Right. *Journal of Political Ideas*. Vol. 9. Issue 3. P.311.

Graph. (8) France. Public Opinion.




Source: Eurobarometer. Elaborated by the author.

The Maltese case is also relevant due to a number of factors. On one hand the country's geographical situation placed the island very close to the North African shore. Linked to that the Malta accession to the EU in 2004 made the country much more attractive for those migrants looking to reach the EU. As Lutterbeck had shown in 2002, this "small frontier island" had already started to be viewed as a destination for seaborne illegal immigration.⁵⁷² As the graph below, number 9, highlights, migration has remained the second most important concern after employment for Maltese public opinion over the period under review. As Sammut has shown, the institutional influence of the media has played a major role in sustaining concerns on this issue.⁵⁷³

⁵⁷² Lutterbeck, D. (2009): Small Frontier Island : Malta and the Challenge of Irregular Immigration. *Mediterranean Quarterly*. Vol. 20. N°1. Pp.119.

⁵⁷³ Sammut, C. (2010): "Producing Immigration News in Receiving Countries: Beyond Journalists' Professional Ideology and Cultural Explanations" in Ureta, I. (Ed.): *Media, Migration and Public Opinion. Myths Prejudices and the Challenge of Attaining Mutual Understanding between Europe and North Africa*. Peter Lang, Bern. Pp. 215-238.


Graph (9) Malta. Public Opinion.



Source: Eurobarometer. Elaborated by the author.

The following graph number 10 shows that on the one hand French public opinion has reacted differently to immigration issues due to its long-standing tradition as a receiving country. However in comparing Italy, Spain and Malta it is possible to appreciate a particular correlation, leaving aside the 2008 Italian elections. This convergence is due to the fact that both Italy and Malta share the same geographical space and therefore they have to deal on equal basis against illegal migration coming from North-Africa.


Graph (10) Compared migration, Spain, Italy, France and Malta



Source: Eurobarometer. Elaborated by the author.

The following graphic number 11 represents the clearest picture showing how European public opinion has been shaped by political entrepreneurs and brokers in associating factors such as migration, crime, terrorism and security. The data confirms the hypothesis presented above that employment behaves independently and can be understood as an independent variable. This variable remains the most relevant for the public opinion and does not varies easily even over periods of good economic prospects. However, in considering the other four variables –migration, crime, security and terrorism- there is almost a linear convergence among them especially between the years 2007 and 2009. Political parties or brokers were very capable of acting irresponsibly in deploying political communications intended to make these convergences possible. As a consequence, European public opinion assimilated those images and claims and this generated a very particular social image, which in turn fuelled a hostile politico-cultural environment that has affected the entire Euro-Mediterranean building project.


Graph (11) Aggregated European Union.



Source: Eurobarometer. Elaborated by the author.

The following graph number 12 shows a different perspective of the precedent one by highlighting how the trend lines –migration, security, crime and terrorism- tend to converge between 2007 and 2009.

Graph (12): Trend lines. Europe.



Source: Eurobarometer. Elaborated by the author.

Ivarsflaten has studied right-wing populist strategies to gain political support in seven western European countries by 2002, a time when migration issues started to top European concerns. He demonstrated that “no populist right party performed well in elections around 2002 without mobilizing grievances over immigration. (...) only the appeal on the immigration issue unites all successful populist right parties”.⁵⁷⁴

Over the following period this trend intensified as it has been also mentioned earlier. For instance in the 2009 European Parliamentary elections the EU swung to the right due to these increasing concerns. As Van Spanje, this was in part explained by a contagion effect among parties keen to be seen as holding an anti-immigration position that they believed to be popular with voters. As Van Spanje stresses, this contagion effect is not restricted to far-right wing parties but involve the entire political system “without entering governments.”⁵⁷⁵

In reality European political parties of all almost all ideological persuasions have been very active in identifying a profitable electoral opportunity in taking a stand against migration in general and against Muslim migration in particular.⁵⁷⁶ This general political trend that has

⁵⁷⁴ Ivarsflaten, E. (2002): What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-Examining Grievance Mobilization Models in 7 Successful Cases. *Comparative Political Studies*. Vol. 31. N°1. P. 3.

⁵⁷⁵ Van Spanje, J. (2010): Anti-Immigration Parties and their Impact on Other Parties' Immigration Stances in Contemporary Western Europe. *Party Politics*. Vol. 26. N°5. P.563.

⁵⁷⁶ Op. Cit. Ureta, I. (Ed.) (2011): 246.

been focusing on national politics had an international impact weakening international mechanisms and policies aiming at increasing Euro-Mediterranean dialogue and cooperation. This is central to understand how Euro-Mediterranean politics at large, have been undermined by political movements and local policies.

Given all this, the migration issue is the key and most representative variable to understand when examining the extent that EU multilateral projects or programs aimed at increasing Euro-Mediterranean dialogue and mutual relations suffer at the feet of national political interests.

Without a mutually agreed and positive common migration policy neither free trade nor economic development projects are viable in the long term. The following chapters will examine the Mediterranean ambitions and projects of Aznar, Zapatero and Sarkozy in the context of this reality.

CHAPTER 7

LIGHTS AND SHADOWS

The Assertion of Spanish Leadership in the International Arena during the Aznar Era, 1996-2004

Assessing José María Aznar's foreign policy in general, and in regard to the Mediterranean in particular, requires reflection on the origins and ethos of the Partido Popular (PP).⁵⁷⁷ The PP was re-founded in 1989 out of the original Alianza Popular (AP), which was itself created in 1976 by a constellation of former Franquist ministers and headed by former minister of Information and Tourism (1962-1969) and vice-president (1975-1976) Manuel Fraga Iribarne. As such, it can be defined as a federation of 7 proto-parties intent on developing a conservative or right wing political discourse in the context of the country's democratic transition. This required as a priority a re-constitution of Spanish identity. This meant that during the 1980's foreign policy did not top the AP's political agenda. Instead, the emphasis was on the domestic realm where politics was dominated by the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE).⁵⁷⁸

As stated previously in chapter 5, due to its socialist character the PSOE was very much influenced by the international dimension as socialism and internationalism can often be, and in this case were, two sides of the same coin. On the other hand, the PP which was re-founded as a unique party in 1989 to contest and counterbalance the majority of the PSOE, inherited the same philosophical approaches of AP with regards to engagement in the domestic and foreign spheres. The PSOE had engagement in the international arena in its blood. The AP and PP were the products of an introspective domestic and nationalistic political approach. As Jiménez Redondo has pointed out, the hegemony of the PSOE over three legislatures and the lack of a real political choice until the early 1990s limited the possibility of a valid and alternative foreign policy.⁵⁷⁹

⁵⁷⁷ For a complete historical review of the *Partido Popular* see, Baon, R. (2001): *Historia del Partido Popular*. Ibersaf. Editores.

⁵⁷⁸ Spanish Socialist Party.

⁵⁷⁹ Jiménez Redondo, J.C. (2006): *De Suárez a Zapatero: La Política Exterior de la España Democrática*. Dílex. Madrid.

7.1. Discussing the Paternity of Spain's Foreign Policy.

It is possible to argue that the PP did not accept explicitly the PSOE's dominance of Spain's foreign policy after the transitional period between 1975 and 1978. As noted by Fernández⁵⁸⁰, the PP regularly argued that the foundations of Spain's foreign policy was not conceived by the PSOE but by the previous Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD).⁵⁸¹ This was the very clear message published in the PP's government programme of 1993. The section devoted to foreign policy started with this statement: "The greatest merit of the foreign policy of socialist governments have made was the adoption of approaches that were not originally theirs."⁵⁸² This same point was made in 1996 during the PP's successful electoral campaign.⁵⁸³

It is interesting to note, however, that in 1993 and through its government programme the PP revealed some key aspects of its foreign policy. It was mainly focused on Spain's relationship with NATO.⁵⁸⁴

After that, came Latin America, the Maghreb and Equatorial Guinea.⁵⁸⁵ Though the first –Latin America – was classified as the priority, the Maghreb was also important as it was defined as an 'area of conflict [with] extraordinary potential'. The goal was to establish 'preferential agreements' with the region both through bilateral engagement and through the EEC.⁵⁸⁶ Bearing in mind this strategy of 'preferential agreements' it is possible to appreciate the mercantilist and business-driven approach deployed by the PP's leaders.

This approach to foreign affairs corresponded with that of the PSOE. However, Aznar in 1992 also argued that the Maghreb raised the problems of "massive emigration,

⁵⁸⁰ Fernández Molina, I. (2007): El Partido Popular y la Política de España Hacia el Magreb. *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*. La política Árabe y Mediterránea en España. Nº. 79-80. Pp. 53-71.

⁵⁸¹ Under the presidency of Adolfo Suárez, the UCD governed from 1977 to 1982. To learn more about the UCD see, Huneens, C. and Nohlen, D. (1985): *La UCD y la Transición a la Democracia en España*. Editorial Siglo XXI; Hopkin, J. (1999): *Party Formation and Democratic Transition in Spain: The Creation and Collapse of the Union of Democratic Centre*. Palgrave Macmillan.

⁵⁸² Partido Popular (1993): *Ahora, Programa de Gobierno Para Todos*. Partido Popular. P. 114. Available at: http://www.pp.es/file_upload/recursos/pdf/20090915092057_349537285.pdf (Retrieved 25 February 2012) P. 114.

⁵⁸³ Op. Cit. Fernández Molina, I. (2007): P.55.

⁵⁸⁴ Op. Cit. Partido Popular (1993): P.115.

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid. The PP also mentioned that Spain would support the celebration of the Referendum in Western Sahara in accordance of United Nations resolutions. Spain will also support the holding of a Conference Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean.

economic and commercial dependence and unavoidable security concerns”.⁵⁸⁷ At that time and since 1989 –after being the president of the Regional Government of Castile and León from 1987 to 1989- José María Aznar was already the PP’s leader and therefore he headed up the political opposition against the PSOE until he won the elections in 1996.⁵⁸⁸

These arguments were reinforced by the rise of the so-called “Islamic decade” between 1980 and 1990 following the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF) in municipal elections in Algeria in 1990.⁵⁸⁹ In response, some alarmist and arguably extreme comments emanated from analysts affiliated to the PP. For instance, Rafael L. Bardají, who since 1989 had headed up international affairs at the Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos (GEES)⁵⁹⁰ –he was also the former Executive Advisor of the Spain’s Ministry of Defence during the PP governments, from 1994 to 2004- wrote that since the end of the Cold War, the threats from Southern Mediterranean countries included nuclear proliferation, social instability due to a unstoppable demographic growth, underdevelopment and religious fundamentalism.⁵⁹¹

This argument, coming as it did following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, led to a new strategy intended to identify new political windows by political entrepreneurs -or opportunists- willing to play a leading role in international politics. However, by using a more moderate language and a more proactive and comprehensive approach, the architect of the new Renovated Mediterranean Policy, Abel Matutes attempted to promote an increase in living standards and the overall development in the South that transcended the alarmist discourse and potential threats. From 1988-89 onwards, Matutes had attempted to propose and to implement the Renovated Mediterranean Policy. It was adopted by the European Union in 1990 precisely to avoid and to correct the inefficiencies of the old Mediterranean policy and it culminated in the work of Manuel Marin and the launch the in the course Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995.⁵⁹²

⁵⁸⁷ Aznar, J.M. (1992): “Principales Problemas Que Afectan al Sur de Europa: Política de Seguridad y Cooperación en el Mediterráneo”. In Trillo Figueroa, J. et al.: *El Fundamentalismo Islámico*. Fundación Cánovas del Castillo. Madrid. Pp. 89-100.

⁵⁸⁸ Magone, J.M. (2009): *Contemporary Spanish Politics*. Routledge. London. 2nd Edition. P. 21-23.

⁵⁸⁹ Volpi, F. (2003): *Islam and Democracy: The Failure of Dialogue in Algeria*. Pluto Press; Zoubir, H.Y. (1996): Algerian Islamits’ Conception of Democracy. *Arab Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 18.

⁵⁹⁰ Group of Strategic Studies.

⁵⁹¹ Bardají, R.L. (1992): *España En El Nuevo Entorno Estratégico*. Incipe, Madrid.

⁵⁹² Prat I Coll, J. (2004): La Institucionalización del Espacio Euro-Mediterráneo. *Revista Valenciana d’Estudis Autonòmics*. Nº. 45/46. Pp. 127-137. Available at: http://www.pre.gva.es/argos/fileadmin/argos/datos/RVEA/libro_45_46/127-45_46.pdf (Retrieved 4 March 2012)

In this regard, Matutes commented in the course of an interview for this thesis that intercultural dialogue was considered as important as aid, as this allowed Spain to present itself as a valid interlocutor with the Southern Mediterranean countries and the Middle East: “In speaking about the EU’s Mediterranean Policy, I was in charge of redesigning, or designing to be more precise, the new Mediterranean Policy. On one hand it looked to improve financial protocols and support. On the other hand, it tried to help not only on financial level, but also to help them to create more wealth in their countries. I mean, develop more their potential. In order to do so, it was crucial to involve them in trade and provide them with commercial opportunities”⁵⁹³

This declaration is certainly aligned with one of the two hypothesis explained in the precedent chapter of co-operating with southern Mediterranean countries *versus* developing asymmetric relations. However, as it has been demonstrated, within the long term this liberal public speech was a rhetoric resource that was useful to launch the basis of the EMP. Beyond this rhetoric baseline, existing strong geo-strategic and politico-economic interests prevailed and Northern Mediterranean countries focused on neo-realist approach where the strengthening of European security played the most fundamental role.

In any case this co-operative and comprehensive ‘selling strategy’ played out well in the short and medium term. It was important to attract also the interest of Southern Mediterranean countries. Therefore, the new emphasis on Euro-Mediterranean political dialogue represented a fundamental element. Since 1986 onward, Spain’s influence over Morocco increased notably despite the traditional political frictions such as Western Sahara open dispute, the question of Ceuta and Melilla or drug trafficking related issues among others.⁵⁹⁴

Considering an economic point of view, Morocco over the 1980’s was also more communicative both with Spain and Europe thanks to the establishment of an economic reform. Along with this economic reform and the Spanish increasing role as influential – neighbouring- stakeholder, there were signed bilateral agreements such as; the Framework Agreement on Economic and Financial Cooperation -1988-; the Agreement on the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments -1989-; the Treaty of Friendship, Good

⁵⁹³ Cited interview with Abel Matutes.

⁵⁹⁴ Ferrer-Gallardo, X. (2008): The Spanish-Moroccan Border Complex: Processes of Geopolitical, Functional and Symbolic Rebordering. *Political Geography*. Vol. 27. Issue 3. Pp. 301-321.

Neighbourhood and Cooperation -1991-; and in 1996, just after the launch of the EMP, the Agreement on Economic and Financial Cooperation.⁵⁹⁵

However, as it has been discussed before, these agreements and political will to increase bilateral co-operation –and the liberal and inclusive rhetoric strategy used during the “selling process” of the EMP- had to face the challenges imposed by the migratory issue, where it is possible to appreciate that economic integration processes and mechanisms cannot be implemented sustainably if further socio-political integration is not ensued as White has studied.⁵⁹⁶

Nevertheless, highlighting the relevance and influence Spain exerted over Morocco over this process - and beyond bilateral episodes of understanding and misunderstanding- some Spanish politicians like Felipe González or Abel Matutes continued being influential even when they were not anymore part of the Spanish government. Matutes thinks that the dialogue that he had with Mohamed VI of Morocco during 2010-2011 played an important role in the evolution of the country’s new constitution.⁵⁹⁷ Matutes goes further and considers that this new constitution represented a clear benefit for Morocco and allowed the country to solve, or at least tackle, some of key problems that during the Arab Spring of 2011 destabilised both Egypt and Tunisia. This idea is shared by Dalacoura.⁵⁹⁸

In considering these facts, Matutes can be considered the key figure in developing the PSOE’s foreign policy with regards to the Euro-Mediterranean policy as well as the PP’s foreign policy from 1996 onwards. That is why, in considering these elements during the early 1990s, it is practically impossible to find a difference between the PSOE’s and the PP’s views in the foreign policy sphere.

Leaving aside the paternity of Spain’s foreign policy in the first years of the democratic era, the new PP, after being in the opposition for 7 years, won the elections in 1996 with a very tight margin. This victory followed the launch of the Barcelona Process. Prior to that, between 1982 and May 1996, under Felipe González Spain had looked to become a political entrepreneur in foreign policy but on a relatively modest level. An

⁵⁹⁵ Jordan Gandulf, J.M. (1997): Spanish Moroccan Economic Relations. *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 2. Issue, 1. P. 50.

⁵⁹⁶ White, G.W. (2007): Sovereignty and International Labour Migration: The ‘Security Mentality’ in Spanish-Moroccan Relations as an Assertion of Sovereignty. *Review of International Political Economy*. Vol. 14. Issue, 4. Pp. 690-718.

⁵⁹⁷ Interview cited with Abel Matutes. The new Moroccan constitution was approved by the referendum celebrated on the 1 June 2011 in order to substitute the previous Constitution 1996. A reduction of the King’s powers summed to more civil and political representation constituted the key elements to block raising protests.

⁵⁹⁸ Dalacoura, K. (2011): The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political Change and Geopolitical Implications. *International Affairs*. Vol. 88. Issue, 1. Pp. 65-66.

approach that was fitting for a “newcomer” who was required to demonstrate its value and political seriousness by northern European partners like Germany.

This modesty was expressed in a very telling and pragmatic phrase coined by Francisco Fernandez Ordoñez, Spanish foreign minister in the crucial years between 1985 and 1992: “In European politics, our position is defined very clearly: we have to take the fifth”.⁵⁹⁹ Was this the key of the Spain’s success in Europe between 1985 and 1995? Certainly, from 1982 to 1996 Spain successfully led on Euro-Mediterranean policy. In this sense Spain was the main political entrepreneur in selling the idea of the Mediterranean. This idea crystallized with the Barcelona Process, a political platform that raised doubts about its future almost since its inception due to the complex problems and ongoing conflicts present in the Mediterranean.⁶⁰⁰ The loss of momentum was a matter of fact and it became even more evident –and damaging for the future of the EMP- when Aznar, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks developed a foreign policy that prioritised relation with Washington, over the interests of the EU and the Mediterranean.

7.2. The baseline of Spain’s New Foreign Policy.

Prior to its 1996 election victory the PP lacked of a clear profile in international affairs as stated above.⁶⁰¹ Balfour states that the PP government followed a policy of continuity in relation to foreign policy.⁶⁰² They had no proper training in international affairs. However, as Valencia points out, there were cases where they had relevant experience. There was a major focus on economic related issues linked to the area of political economy aimed at reinforcing economic diplomacy.⁶⁰³

Nevertheless, this was not fully evident during the early stages of the first PP government. From an operational point of view, the nomination of Miguel Ángel Moratinos

⁵⁹⁹ Abian, A. (2010): “Hablar los quintos”. *La Vanguardia*. 20 June. Available at: <http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20100620/53949261273/hablar-los-quintos.html> (Retrieved 10 February 2012)

⁶⁰⁰ Edis, R. (1998): Does the Barcelona Process Matter? *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 3. Issue, 3. Pp. 93-105.

⁶⁰¹ For a more detailed review of the *Partido Popular*’s action on the Maghreb see, Fernández Molina, I. (2007): *El Partido Popular y la Política de España Hacia el Maghreb*. *Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals*. Nº. 79-80. Pp. 53-71.

⁶⁰² Balfour, S. (2005): “The Reinvention of Spanish Conservatism: The Popular Party Since 1989”. In Balfour, S. (Ed.): *The Politics of Contemporary Spain*. Routledge, London. Pp. 146-168.

⁶⁰³ Valencia, M. M. (2000): “España y la Diplomacia Económica”. In VV.AA.: *España, Un Actor Destacado En El Ámbito Internacional*. FAES, Madrid. P. 303-331. See also Fernández Molina, I. (2009): “Los Partidos Políticos y la Política Exterior Española Hacia el Maghreb. Los Casos del PSOE y del PP.” In Hernando de Larramendi, M.H. and Mañe, A. (Eds.): *La Política Exterior Española Hacia el Magreb*. Real Instituto Elcano. Ariel. P. 45.

(PSOE) as the EU's representative for the Arab-Israeli peace process from 1996 to 2003, placed Spain in a strong position to play a role in that key foreign policy issues.⁶⁰⁴ It is evident that the EU focused its attention on Moratinos, due to his regional knowledge and contribution to the development of PSOE's foreign policy towards the Mediterranean.⁶⁰⁵

This mandate confirmed Spain's role in lobbying and working for a comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean policy. As Aoun stresses, over the 1990's the EU has not played an influential role in managing the recurrent crises presented by the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁶⁰⁶ However as Alpher has mentioned, Moratinos, already during the first year of his activity filled "the vacuum created by the stalemate in the process and the reduced activity of US mediator Deniss Ross".⁶⁰⁷ On the other hand, Moratinos' nomination coincided as well with Jacques Chirac's announcement of the new French foreign policy towards the Arab World aiming at "reversing France's marginalization as a political player" in the region in order to become more influential.⁶⁰⁸

Beyond these initial considerations, it is important, however, to describe, how, at a philosophical level the new government faced the challenge of developing Spain's foreign policy. As Aznar's personal advisor, Alberto Carnero has stated during a personal interview for this thesis:

"If I should explain the PP's foreign policy I would start by explaining the idea of Spain that had the President. Aznar said, *we have the ambition of making out of Spain one of the best democracies in the world*. I would frame this phrase to describe both his foreign and domestic policies. I am politician and diplomat and after many years I would say that those dimensions should not be differentiated. And I quote again the President when he says that *there is no best foreign policy separate from a domestic policy*".⁶⁰⁹

This same idea is defended by Abel Matutes who, in speaking to this author, stated that both Felipe González and José María Aznar shared this outlook:

⁶⁰⁴ Guillespie, R. (2000): *Spain and the Mediterranean. Developing a European Policy Towards the South*. Palgrave Macmillan. P. 157.

⁶⁰⁵ Among his numerous posts, Moratinos was Spain's Director General of Foreign Policy for the Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East from 1993, and from 1996 Spanish Ambassador to Israel.

⁶⁰⁶ Aoun, E. (2003): European Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Dispute: Much Ado About Nothing? *European Foreign Affairs Review*. N°8. P. 289.

⁶⁰⁷ Alpher, J. (1998): The Political Role of the European Union in the Arab-Israel Peace Process: An Israeli Perspective. *The International Spectator*. Pp.80-81.

⁶⁰⁸ Wood, C. (1998): Chirac's 'New Arab Policy' and Middle East Challenges: The Arab-Israeli Conflict, Iraq and Iran. *Middle East Journal*. Vol. 52. N°4. P.563.

⁶⁰⁹ Personal interview with Alberto Carnero. Madrid, 10 January 2012. To "speak the fifth" consisted in allowing to express themselves first to Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy.

“In foreign policy this is very clear. This was said always by Felipe and Aznar and I believe that generally speaking they practiced that. It is a state policy, of permanent interests that need being constant and permanent. If you go from one band to another by making a party policy you cannot achieve anything and at the end of the day that is the end of your foreign policy”.⁶¹⁰

This political framework and conceptualization expresses the main lines of Aznar’s visions for Spain’s foreign policy. This argument can be used to justify the PP’s lack of international projection in historic terms. That said, Aznar’s visions of international affairs were founded upon two principles. First, the consolidation of Spain as a respected medium sized power.⁶¹¹ Second, the intertwining of his foreign and domestic policies, because as it was expressed above, for Aznar the best foreign policy had to be and had to concur with a strong domestic policy, where permanent interests should not change.

7.3.Aznar and the Mediterranean: The First Step.

These two principles are a good starting point for analysing Aznar’s foreign policy. First, there were a number of continuities in Spain’s “foreign” policy during Aznar -Europe, Latin America, United States and the Mediterranean.⁶¹²

Focusing on the Mediterranean, the 1996 PP electoral programme followed the spirit of the Barcelona declaration and was more liberal and cooperative compared to the outlook between 1988 and 1992 that defined the relationship in terms of potential threats. This new electoral programme focused instead on economic prosperity and stability; a new immigration policy adapted to the exigencies of the Schengen agreement –despite the challenges posed by an increasing migration flow-⁶¹³; the promotion of human rights and fundamental liberties and the processes of political reform; attention to rising Islamic fundamentalism and the resolution of the Western Sahara conflict.⁶¹⁴ In all of these areas one constant consideration was migration.

⁶¹⁰ Cited Interview with Abel Matutes.

⁶¹¹ Aznar in 1996 said that “there has been a wide agreement that has allowed us to adjust the foreign policy to our capacities as a medium power”. Quoted by Op. Cit. Fernández Molina, I. (2007): Pp. 57.

⁶¹² Cited interview with Alberto Carnero.

⁶¹³ The Schengen Agreement was originally signed in 1985 by France, Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in order to gradually achieve a European borderless area –Schengen Area-. This outcome was achieved in 1995. Despite the necessity to adequate the Spanish Migration Law to the exigencies imposed by the Schengen Agreement, Spain has been struggling with increasing migration flows due to its role as a gateway to the Schengen area. Gil Bazo, M. (1998): The Role of Spain as a Gateway to the Schengen Area: Changes in the Asylum Law and their Implications for Human Rights. *International Journal of Refugee Law*. Oxford University Press. Vol. 10. Nº1/2. P. 214.

⁶¹⁴ Partido Popular (1996): Programa Electoral: Con la Nueva Mayoría. *Partido Popular*. Available at: http://www.pp.es/file_upload/recursos/pdf/20090915093224_127951152.pdf (Retrieved 12 March 2012)

There was a strong economic and realist approach behind this agenda. Like Barcelona, it was conceived in terms of a belief that the liberalization of the economy would accelerate regional development, reduce migration and mitigate potential risks derived from deep socio-economic cleavages, thus improving regional security.

As discussed in chapter 5 this hypothesis proved wrong and represented the biggest obstacle to developing Euro-Mediterranean relations. However, initially and theoretically speaking, the acceptance of this hypothesis by policy makers was a driving force as Matutes explains:

“It is true that the financial protocols could have been larger, that the trade could have been more intense, and that a more integrative policy may have been wanted, of course, but beyond that, this ideas represented a big advancement, because those countries had a much lower life standard in the past”⁶¹⁵.

In these terms, Aznar, from the start of his government, was very interested in developing bilateral relations between Spain and Morocco. That explains why Aznar decided to visit Rabat on his first official visit on 27 May 1996 following his 3 March 1996 election victory. He had a meeting with King Hassan II and first Minister Abdellatif Filali.⁶¹⁶ They discussed, among other issues, illegal immigration, fishing agreements, drugs trafficking, the Western Sahara question and the sovereignty of Ceuta and Melilla.

As Andreu Claret explained during an interview for this thesis:

“During the first mandate, Aznar governs in coalition, and that pact made possible a more moderate foreign policy. I spoke a lot with him (Aznar) on Mediterranean issues. When he was elected President he did what had to be done - visit Morocco. The first official trip has to be to Morocco. He saw immediately that the Mediterranean was very important. When politicians go to the Council each one speaks about what he or she has. So, Aznar, since the beginning sold and promoted the Mediterranean policy.”⁶¹⁷

In terms of strengthening collaboration and improving bilateral political relations with the Maghreb, the PP government concentrated its attention on three countries. The first was Morocco where the relations were consolidated with Mohammed VI after his accession to the

⁶¹⁵ Cited Interview with Abel Matutes.

⁶¹⁶ Anon. (1996): “Aznar Quiere Impulsar las Relaciones con Marruecos en su Primer Viaje Oficial”. *El País*. 7 May. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1996/05/27/portada/833148003_850215.html (Retrieved 15 March 2012)

⁶¹⁷ Cited interview with Andreu Claret.

throne in 1999.⁶¹⁸ As the level of internal violence in Algeria started to diminish at the end of 1990s, Spain started also to look for increasing contacts.⁶¹⁹ Third, as soon as Libya started to be integrated by the international community, Aznar's government showed full political support for the process, support that was openly noticeable from September 2003 onwards. In fact, Aznar was the first western leader to visit Qadaffi once the UN ended the sanctions against Libya on 12 September 2003. Five days later, on 17 September 2003, Aznar visited Tripoli together with 28 Spanish entrepreneurs and businessmen.⁶²⁰ The making up of this delegation alone highlights the business focus of the Aznar government, especially during its second term.⁶²¹

Despite the recognition of the strategic importance of the Maghreb and the Mediterranean during Aznar's first term, scholars like Núñez Villaverde considered Spanish leadership on the Euro-Mediterranean level decreasing or even entering into a "hibernation period" following the Barcelona Process.⁶²² Certainly the PP was unable to maintain the same diplomatic rhythm as the Gonzalez's governments developed, because due to its political philosophy and practice the PSOE had a much greater internationalist approach whereas the PP historically speaking has been more rooted into domestic politics.

In order to analyse and to understand if the aforementioned "hibernation" of Euro-Mediterranean related issues and diplomatic activity is correct, it is important to analyse EU's political priorities. The CL approach is again used to examine the conclusions of the presidency of the Council of Europe. The studied period correspond to the first four years of Aznar's government, 1996-2000. The same method and the same variables used in the case

⁶¹⁸ Cembrero, I. (2006): *Vecinos Alejados. Los Secretos de la Crisis entre España y Marruecos*. Galaxia Gutenberg. Pp. 13-14.

⁶¹⁹ A good review of the latest years of violence in Algeria has been written by Stora, B. (2001): *Algeria 1830-2000. A Short History*. Cornell University Press. Pp. 213-230. See also, Bustos, R. (2003): *Economic Liberalization and Political Change in Algeria, Theory and Practice. 1988-1992 and 1994-1999. Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 8. Issue 1. Pp. 1-26.

⁶²⁰ Cembrero, I. (2011): Aznar, Ese Buen Amigo. *El País*. 27 February 2011. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/2011/02/27/domingo/1298782356_850215.html (Retrieved 12 January 2012)

⁶²¹ A good example of that can be the case of the companies *Abengoa* and *AES*. Through their filial company *Instalaciones Inabensa*, in 2003, two contracts were won for 300 million to build the required infrastructure to deliver electricity in Libya. In Anon. (2011): *El Conflicto en Libia Encarece el Crudo Pero No Afecta El Suministro Mundial*. *El País*. 21st of March 2011. Available at:


http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2011/03/21/actualidad/1300696383_850215.html#despiece1 (Retrieved 12 January 2012). See also Feliú, L. (2005): *España y el Magreb Durante el Segundo Mandato del Partido Popular. Un Período Excepcional. FRIDE*. Working Paper. N°9; Remiro Brotóns, A. (2004): "Espagne: Les

Années Aznar" in Moderne, F. and Bon, P. (Eds.): *La Politique Étrangère. La Documentation Française*. Paris.

⁶²² Núñez Villaverde, J.A. (2001): "The Mediterranean: A Firm Priority of Spanish Foreign Policy?" In Gillespie, R. and Youngs, R. (Eds.): *The European and International Challenges*. Frank Cass, London. Pp. 129-147.

exposed in the precedent chapter have been considered for consistency. This evolution is demonstrated in graphic number 13.

Graph (13) European Councils, Conclusions of the Presidency.



Source: European Council. Elaborated by the Author.

Quantitatively speaking and focusing on Mediterranean issues the 1996-2000 period is very different to the 1993-1995. The graphic above, number 13, shows that from 1996 to 2000 –Lisbon council- the vibrant atmosphere experienced before the launch of the Barcelona process decreased notably. Per the variables migration, Arab/Muslim, Terrorism or Racism, they have also curved. However, within this apparent lack of activity in 1997, during the Amsterdam Council, three important Mediterranean ideas/projects were raised: the establishment of a common Euro-Mediterranean area of peace, prosperity and stability; the project of creating a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area; the positive attitude towards the signing of a Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement with the PLO.⁶²³

These three elements represent by themselves the three most relevant objectives and obstacles any EU's Euro-Mediterranean project has to face: without economic and politic stability in Southern –Maghreb- Mediterranean countries, security for EU members is very limited; the economic interests based on the creation of a Mediterranean Free Trade Area were decisive for EU's politico, economic and geo-strategic objectives; any Euro-

⁶²³ European Council (1997): Conclusions of the Presidency. Amsterdam. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/032a0006.htm (Retrieved 10 June 2013)

Mediterranean project –its success or failure- will be determined by the evolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and how Western stakeholders mediate and deal with it.

Over the examined years these three elements have constituted the permanent baseline of the European foreign policy towards the Mediterranean. Migration flows have been also a contextual variable that have determined the evolution of the EMP as well as its consistency and coherence within the long term. Already in the council celebrated in Vienna in 1998, it was discussed the necessity of developing a European migration strategy.⁶²⁴ In this council it was also approved the creation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.⁶²⁵ As it is possible to see in the graphic, the variable security is the most relevant one, and all the policies and projects proposed by the European Council are designed to increase European security in order to control and reduce actual or potential threats.

The Cologne council of 1999 represented a peak with regards to security issues. During this council it was mentioned the evolution of the tasks assigned to Moratinos as the special envoy to the Middle East. But most importantly it was intensively discussed the need of developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy following the agreements of the Council celebrated in Vienna.⁶²⁶ Following the same trend, the Council celebrated in Helsinki in 1999 highlighted the importance of developing a common strategy for the Mediterranean, Eastern Europe and Western Balkans.⁶²⁷

Bearing in mind Mediterranean issues is possible to confirm that 1996-1999 was in fact a period of low-middle intensity, where the accent was focused on discussing and implementing the mechanisms to create a common European security and defence policy. It is also possible to say that despite the interest of Northern European countries to support the European expansion towards the East, Mediterranean issues remained more important in the European agenda. In considering all the councils celebrated between 1996 and 2000 the variable Mediterranean was mentioned 101 times whereas Eastern-Europe was mentioned 35 times.

Nevertheless this period of relative “hibernation” should be better defined as a period of “realisation”. The 1996-2000 window represented the medium term where politicians and diplomats realised the real problems and difficulties to achieve the pre-defined –certainly

⁶²⁴ European Council (1998): Conclusions of the Presidency. Vienna. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/wie1_en.htm (Retrieved 10 June 2013)

⁶²⁵ Ibid.

⁶²⁶ European Council (1999): Conclusions of the Presidency. Cologne. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/ko11_en.htm (Retrieved 1 June 2013)

⁶²⁷ European Council (1999): Conclusions of the Presidency. Helsinki. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm (Retrieved 1 June 2013)

ambiguous- objectives described by the declaration of Barcelona. This “realisation” somehow paralysed the initial optimism deployed in 1995.

As the graphic 13 shows, 2000 represented a clear landmark with regards to Euro-Mediterranean issues. During the celebration of the Council of Santa María, it was expressed that the problems in the Middle East determine the entire Mediterranean project and therefore it would be necessary to adopt a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability.⁶²⁸ After five years, the European Council stressed that “the EU will together with its Mediterranean partners undertake a comprehensive review of the Barcelona Process with the aim of reinvigorating the process and making it more action-oriented and results-driven”.⁶²⁹

This important statement reveals that so far the EMP was not producing results beyond the political will expressed over the EMP’s conferences and therefore, not relevant outcomes had been achieved. During this conference it was also stressed the EU will in strengthening political and security related dialogue with Mediterranean partners, increasing co-operation with the AMU in order to stimulate south-south trade, as well as collaborating with Southern Mediterranean countries on the management of migration flows.⁶³⁰ These three elements reveal again the interest of the EU in security and trade. The 2000’s deepened these trends and challenges as it is going to be explained in the next epigraphs.

7.4. Aznar’s New Foreign Policy: Changing Methodology.

Aznar’s victory in the March 2000 elections by an overwhelming majority allowed him to govern the country without relying on the support of nationalist groups.⁶³¹ In his second start he began to adopt a more presidential approach to foreign policy which required Spain taking a stand on key international issues and no longer remaining silent or deferring to larger EU partners. Therefore, as Woodworth has mentioned Aznar thought that those who were not aligned with him were against democracy.⁶³² This attitude was defined by Cebrián as “Democratic fundamentalism” and he interprets it as a “disease which the Spanish right suffers in an extreme form”.⁶³³ However, as the personal political advisor of Aznar –Alberto Carnero- says:

⁶²⁸ European Council (2000): Conclusions of the Presidency. Santa María. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei1_en.htm (Retrieved 1 June 2013)

⁶²⁹ Op. Cit. Point 11.

⁶³⁰ Op. Cit. Points 12-13.

⁶³¹ Op. Cit. Fernández Molina, I. (2009): P. 46.

⁶³² Woodworth, P. (2004): Spain Changes Course: Aznar’s Legacy, Zapatero Prospects. *World Policy Journal*. Vol. 21. Nº2. P. 8.

⁶³³ Cebrián, J.L. (2011): *El Fundamentalismo Democrático*. Santillana Ediciones Generales, Madrid.

“The position of Spain was very comfortable, in the middle, trying to not disturb anyone. Aznar wanted to change this aspect very consciously. And to change that it was necessary to change the foreign policy.... I think that if one analyses those years, clearly, the political objective that provoked the change as that Aznar developed a foreign policy that had an impact on the domestic sphere. (...) Having said that, this denoted this ambition of becoming one of the best democracies in the world. Having an idea of Europe. Moving forward. To follow with the policies of the past. But with a different intensity and with ambition”.⁶³⁴

This necessitated Aznar to design a more active and engaged public discourse that strategically speaking was aligned to the dominant western power, the US, even at the expense of the position of the EU. These presidential ambitions led to the creation of the Consejo de Política Exterior (Council of Foreign Policy, CPE). As Fernández Molina points out, the CPE was devoted to advising the president.⁶³⁵ Within this context, a new and fundamental change of status was experienced, designed and implemented through the Plan Estratégico de Acción Exterior (Strategic Plan of Foreign Action, PEAЕ).⁶³⁶ This was the instrument that changed Spain’s foreign policy. The PEAЕ was directed by Josep Piqué, foreign minister between 2000 and 2002. It was conceived as the tool for Spain to use to gain political influence, international stature and global prestige.

Most of the interviewees –putting aside political inclinations or personal problems with Aznar- for this thesis are in agreement that that Aznar’s ambitions and the foreign policy approaches in which they were embodied and expressed damaged greatly the Euro-Mediterranean policy developed by González. As Jordi Pujol put it:

“First, I don’t know how he did it (Aznar), but he ruined totally relations with Morocco, both during the first and the second term. Second, he was not interested in Europe. He was interested in Europe for the cohesion funds. He doesn’t feel sympathy, neither for France nor for Germany. For France feels great antipathy. He despises Italy and then, he focuses on the United States and the United Kingdom because they go together and the Atlantic. Hence, the policy initiated by Felipe González was interrupted.”⁶³⁷

As stated previously, implementing his ambitious policy required a regional and philosophical shift embodied in Aznar’s Atlanticist policy. Aznar’s political advisor, Alberto Carnero, during a personal interview for this thesis, justified this Atlantic policy on the

⁶³⁴ Op. Cit. Fernández Molina, I. (2009): P. 46. Cited interview with Alberto Carnero.

⁶³⁵ Op. Cit. Fernández Molina, I. (2009): Pp. 46-47.

⁶³⁶ Jiménez Redondo, J.C. (2006): *De Suárez a Zapatero: La Política Exterior de la España Democrática*. Dilex. Madrid.

⁶³⁷ Cited interview with Jordi Pujol.

grounds that the Aznar government was very much conscious of the importance of the Mediterranean and that this was a motivation for deeper collaboration with the US during the late 1990s:

“The first time that Spain and Aznar supported to the US was with Bill Clinton, when Saddam Hussein expelled UN observers. That was the first time, but what I would like to say is that, since the first moment, there was a very clear vision of making Spain a privileged partner of the US. And this strategy came from the transition, from the 1953 agreements⁶³⁸, ratified with all the turbulences that we already know. (...) That was very important, also for the Mediterranean, because at the end of the day, if there exists a Mediterranean power, it is the US.”⁶³⁹

Why the US is undoubtedly the major power in the eastern Mediterranean this is somewhat less obvious in the western part of the region where Washington’s capacity to influence the region by drawing on commercial, cultural, economic interests and a legitimate moral authority were less developed than in Israel and the Arab world. It is arguable that Aznar miscalculated on this point when engaging the US for the interests of projecting Spanish influence in North Africa.

One can even argue that Aznar’s approach to foreign policy, especially during his second term, was a significant contribution to the failure of the Barcelona Process as Spain lost the previously acquired credibility as a main negotiator and as a recognised interlocutor between western countries and the Arab world. It is also possible to argue that this Atlantic shift contributed to increase miscommunication and misunderstanding between European and Arab stakeholders. However, as it is going to be demonstrated later in this chapter, beyond any criticism against Aznar’s detachment from the Europe, the EU developed a very similar political agenda and public speech.

⁶³⁸ The US-Spain relations however during the first Franquism were tense and complicated, see Fernández, D. (2006): *El Antiamericanismo en la España del Primer Franquismo, 1939-1953*. *Ayer*. Nº 62. Pp. 257-282. Later on, in 1950, the US recommended to the UN to end the diplomatic isolation of Spain. Geo-strategic reasons were behind these diplomatic intentions. Three years later, in 1953, bilateral agreements between the US and Spain were signed. Thanks to those agreements US military bases were settled down in Spain. In change, Spain received economic aid from Spain. These events have been covered for instance by: Liedtke, B (1998): *Embracing a Dictatorship: US Relations with Spain, 1945-1953*. St. Martin’s Press; Escudé, C. (2011): *¿Cuánto Valen Estas Bases? El Tira y Afloja Entre Estados Unidos y España, 1951-1953*. Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea. Universidad Complutense de Madrid; Calvo, O. (2001): *Bienvenido Mr. Marshall! La Ayuda Económica Americana y la Economía Española en la Década de 1950*. *Revista de Historia Económica*. Nº19. Pp. 253-275.

⁶³⁹ Cited interview with Antonio Carnero.

7.5. Mutating Axels: The Atlantic-Mediterranean Approach.

Good relations between Spain and the US did not happen as a direct consequence of the 9/11. The first official visit George W. Bush paid to Europe was to Spain in July 2001. One reason for this choice of destination was the US interest in increasing the NATO presence in Spain as well as boosting economic ties and consolidating their cooperation on Latin America.⁶⁴⁰ During this visit Bush declared that it was important to work together in order to “prevent or solve regional conflicts, to eliminate barriers to free trade, to extend Europe’s zone of peace and stability (...) to meet new challenges to our security”.⁶⁴¹ Bush decided to go first to Spain because as Carnero, during an interview for this thesis, has ruminated on this point:

“Spain was a growing country. Spain enjoyed prestige, a dynamic economy, assumed more responsibilities with regards to some international questions. It started to participate to the NATO’s structural budget in 1997 and bit by bit, it was evident the ...US started to see Spain as a privileged ally.”⁶⁴²

Having said that, the Mediterranean element would become a crucial factor in the bilateral relationship just few months later, after 9/11. Aznar became something of a link to the region. One of the key activities in this context was the Foro Formentor (Formentor, Majorca, Spain). It represented a parallel initiative to the Barcelona Process. The Forum Formentor is very important in understanding Aznar’s vision of the Mediterranean and his view of the role Spain should play within this political and diplomatic environment, otherwise it would have not been necessary to create alternative platforms to an existing process. It also illuminates the “Mediterranean-Atlantic shift”, whereby Spain used its standing in the Mediterranean and the leverage that brought in the security sphere to make itself more attractive to the US.

It seems plausible that this Forum - especially after the 9/11- served strategically to re-launch Spain’s political influence not only in Europe, but on a global scale. In other words,

⁶⁴⁰ The visit was planned during the first months of 2001. A press statement was released by the White House in April 2001. The US government stated that “Spain is an important NATO ally and economic partner working with the United States to strengthen stability, security and prosperity in Europe and beyond.” See <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/04/20010419-6.html> (Retrieved 1 February 2012). *The Guardian* published an article where US would help Spain to spy on ETA by using the Echelon programme. That would also explain the enthusiastic reception of Aznar to Bush during his first visit to Spain. See: Tremlett, G. (2001): “US Offers to Spy on ETA for Spain”. *The Guardian*. 15 June 2001. Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/jun/15/spain.usa> (Retrieved 1 February 2012)

⁶⁴¹ Anon. (2001): “Bush Warns Europe of New Threats”. *CNN*. 12 June 2001. Available at: <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/06/12/bush.visit.03/> (Retrieved 1 February 2012)

⁶⁴² Cited interview with Alberto Carnero.

the Mediterranean was once more the political opportunity for Spain to show its relevance and crucial role as political stakeholder and entrepreneur.

The Formentor Forum, was funded by Foundation Repsol YPF, the Spanish largest oil and gas multinational company. It started in 1999 and ended in 2006.⁶⁴³ Those who attended over its six years life included Tayip Erdogan, Hosni Mubarak, Simon Peres, Driss Yetú, Jorge Sampaio and Yasser Arafat.⁶⁴⁴ On one occasion during the third meeting 2001 -23 November– Aznar and Mubarak met Arafat and Peres in the attempt of boosting the peace process in the Middle East.⁶⁴⁵

The third meeting of the Formentor Forum was the moment when José María Aznar announced his clear intention to re-launch the Barcelona Process and hence, to become again a policy entrepreneur by marketing and selling the Euro-Mediterranean issue. Aznar took advantage of President Bush's first visit to Spain in July 2011 and the events of the 9/11 to develop this new Spanish strategy and foreign policy. His speech at the third Formentor Forum underlines this. He began by highlighting the deadlock in Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. It was in this context, he argued, that it was "very important what happened here in Formentor. Because, evidently in my opinion, I think that this can be the beginning of a recovery of trust between the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and the Israeli government".⁶⁴⁶

It is important to note how Aznar started this speech by stressing the importance of this Forum, and its location, by addressing the most sensitive political in the Mediterranean. Immediately after this introduction he spoke about the role of the Spain within the Euro-Mediterranean politics, which, after 9/11 became global politics.

"The second point I would like to make is that we want reinforce and re-launch in a very clear and decisive manner the Barcelona Process. I think, (...) that the Barcelona

⁶⁴³ To learn more about the Foro Formentor see http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-20-05-2005/abc/Nacional/el-gobierno-deja-desaparecer-el-foro-formmentor-tras-seis-ediciones-exitosas_202591020506.html (Retrieved 1 February 2012)

⁶⁴⁴ Pérez-Maura, R. (2005): "El Gobierno Deja Desaparecer el Foro Formentor Tras 6 Ediciones Exitosas". *ABC*. 25th of May 2005. Available at: http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-20-05-2005/abc/Nacional/el-gobierno-deja-desaparecer-el-foro-formmentor-tras-seis-ediciones-exitosas_202591020506.html (Retrieved 1 February 2012). Probably the disappearance of this Forum was due to the lack of interest demonstrated by Spain's president José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. On the 8 and 9 October 2005, he cancelled his presence during that meeting and sent Spain's minister of Foreign Affairs, Miguel Ángel Moratinos.

⁶⁴⁵ Guerrero, C. (2001): "El III Foro Formentor Impulsa el Proceso de Paz En Oriente Próximo". *La Semana*. 4 November 2001. Available at: <http://www.lasemana.es/periodico/noticia.php?cod=1545> (Retrieved 12 February 2012)

⁶⁴⁶ See Aznar's allocution: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PqduRdImH88> (Retrieved 12 February 2012)

Process in all its aspects, intercultural dialogue among civilizations, the economic aspect and its political aspect, it is worth re-launching toward the future (...)⁶⁴⁷

Here Aznar is arguing that Barcelona needs to be reconceived in the context of 9/11, which required that the security pillar play the crucial role. As he subsequently argued: “From a political point of view, we have to increase, evidently our dialogue and to work clearly on the issues related to security, to arms, to the fight against terror for everybody. We have to create new financing instruments, because it has been demonstrated that the current mechanisms are not enough. And, we have to demonstrate, with our political dialogue, that we are not currently facing a clash among cultures, but we are in front of an operation, among very clear operations to end the terror in the world”.⁶⁴⁸

His discourse and political purposes in adopting this approach were very much aligned/influenced by the tense political and diplomatic environment post 9/11 and by the rhetoric deployed by the Bush’s administration. To understand better Aznar’s intentions regarding the exploitation of this political window one should note that subsequently he described the: Barcelona Process and the Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue as “one of the key aspects of our action and our presidency”.⁶⁴⁹

The political and entrepreneurial strategy here seems to be clear – to build a “Mediterranean-Atlantic” approach to address key security issues emanating from the Mediterranean. As Carnero has explained to this author in an interview: “All the Arab world saw Spain as a guide and a channel to send the messages to the US. And this does not happen only in the Mediterranean, it happened also with Iran”.⁶⁵⁰

Despite these political initiatives, justifications and declarations of intentions, Aznar’s relations with crucial strategic countries such as Morocco were not as strong as he desired. His presidential approach to foreign policy in his second term resulted in a quite nationalistic way of understanding foreign relations. This led to a worsening of relations with Spain’s most important southern neighbour, Morocco.

Aznar did attempt to offer a welcome approach to Morocco. He visited the country in May 2000, where he spoke positively in favour of better cooperation between the two countries.⁶⁵¹ However following Mohammed VI’s accession to power in 1999 relations

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁰ Cited interview with Alberto Carnero.

⁶⁵¹ José María Aznar. Official speech. 9 May 2000. Available at: <http://jmaznar.es/discursos/pdfs/00940A0940.pdf> (Retrieved 2 January 2012)

deteriorated as tensions escalated. In April 2001, for example, there was a deep crisis between Rabat and Madrid over fishing negotiations with the EU.⁶⁵² According to Andreu Claret, Aznar overreacted in his dealings with Morocco once relations started to worsen, a move that impacted negatively on perceptions of the Spanish leader, especially as there had always been “difficulties” with Morocco.”⁶⁵³

Tense bilateral relations between Spain and Morocco did not, however, stop Spain’s interest in developing and fostering a multilateral engagement with regards to Euro-Mediterranean issues. As Barbé, Mestre and Soler i Lecha point out, both during the PP and the PSOE mandates there were two events that reconfirmed the interest and the engagement of the Spanish government and its diplomacy in the Barcelona Process.⁶⁵⁴ In fact, in 2002, during the Spanish Presidency of the Council of Europe the international community assisted Spanish attempt to reactivate the Barcelona agenda.⁶⁵⁵

The first event coincided with the Euro-Mediterranean Conference held in Valencia in April of 2002.⁶⁵⁶ The success of this conference was compromised by the escalation in violence between Israel and the Palestinians since the start of the al-Aqsa intifada in 2000 as well as by the evolving US plans to invade Iraq.⁶⁵⁷ However as Claret recognised during a personal interview for this thesis, this ministerial meeting was successful in establishing the Action Plan for the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA)⁶⁵⁸ and the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue Between Cultures and Civilizations. The latter idea was the Anna Lindh Foundation. According to Claret, vice-president of this organisation, this was a key proposal that contradicts in some ways Aznar’s subsequent approach to foreign policy:

“Various ministerial meetings were important, but the one held in Valencia was essential for the creation of the Anna Lindh Foundation. And this is interesting because this is a Foundation to promote intercultural dialogue. It was finally created in 2004 in Valencia as well, and it was the moderate reaction to the 9/11 events. I mean,

⁶⁵² Vaquer I Fanes, J. (2003): The Domestic Dimension of EU External Policies: The Case of EU-Morocco 2000-2001 Fisheries Negotiations. *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 8. Issue 1. Pp. 59-82.

⁶⁵³ Cited interview with Andreu Claret.

⁶⁵⁴ The case related to the PSOE is going to be discussed in the successive chapter.

⁶⁵⁵ Montobbio, M. (2002): The Spanish Presidency of the Council of the EU 2002 and the Relaunching of the Barcelona Process. *Real Instituto Elcano*. Working Paper WP5-2000.

⁶⁵⁶ Barbé, E., Mestres, L. and Soler I Lecha, E. (2007): La Política Mediterránea de España: Entre el Proceso de Barcelona y la Política Europea de Vecindad. *Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals*. Nº. 79-80. P. 40.

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁸ Established in Naples the 3 December 2003.

it was a reaction that said, *let's avoid the combat*. Let's look for the way of dialoguing, of understanding”⁶⁵⁹

It is possible to argue, as Soler i Lecha and Weltner-Puig have done, that the Spain's image as a leading Mediterranean power was reinforced by the decisions taken at this meeting.⁶⁶⁰ Nevertheless, the presidential approach would ultimately be a cause of reduced Spanish political effectiveness in regard to the Barcelona process. Indeed, one can argue that the decline of Spain in the political sphere, as one of the leading political entrepreneurs of Euro-Mediterranean policy, brought about the wider decline in the Barcelona process. This situation was compounded from 2004 onwards by the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) that promoted bilateral relations and shifted away from a multilateral and multidimensional approach.

The events of 9/11 marked a point of no return in Aznar's foreign policy and ruled out any attempt to reformulate Euro-Mediterranean dialogue or politics. The last two years of his second term were decisive on this front. Tensions between Spain and Morocco that started in 1999, and led to the retirement of the Moroccan ambassador to Madrid in 2001 and clashes over the ratification of the fisheries agreements, culminated with the incident on Perejil island between 11-20 July 2002. The Moroccan government set up base on the disputed island explaining that the presence there was needed to better control illegal immigration. However the tension with the Spanish government started straight away.

This happened three months after the Valencia meeting and the response of the international community was illuminating. This is crucial to understanding how the dynamics between Spain and the EU had started to shift. The Spanish response to that event was massive and disproportionate and clear evidence of a new level of power projection. Both Commission president Romano Prodi and the Danish EU presidency urged Rabat to leave the island. Gillespie has considered that this avoidable conflict evidenced another failure of the CFSP and the lack of commitment both from the Spanish and Moroccan side to remain committed to the exigencies of the EMP.⁶⁶¹

This event can also be analysed from a different perspective that views Aznar's political strategy, as driven by personal ambition, which in turned generated a negative

⁶⁵⁹ Cited interview with Andreu Claret.

⁶⁶⁰ Soler i Lecha, E. and Weltner-Puig, R. (2002): “Dialogo Euromediterráneo: ¿Una Segunda Oportunidad? In Barbé, E. (Ed.): *España y la Política Exterior de la UE. Entre las Prioridades Españolas y los Desafíos del Contexto Internacional*. Institut Universitari d'Estudis Europeus. Working Paper. N°40. Pp. 53-71.

⁶⁶¹ Gillespie, R. (2006): “This Stupid Little Island”: A Neighbourhood Confrontation in the Western Mediterranean. *International Politics*. N°43. Pp. 110-132.

political response from European partners such as France and Germany. The consequences were negative. As Fernando Jaúregui explains:

“They generate arrogance. Aznar thought that in a given moment Spain could dominate and lead Europe and he allied with the wrong people, against those countries that are Europe’s engine: France and Germany. And obviously, both France and Germany did not forget this movement.”⁶⁶²

In effect, the Perejil affair highlighted the lack of support from the big European powers for Spain. It also highlighted, as it has been said above, the weaknesses in the Common Foreign and Security Policy mechanism. Ultimately the US, in the form of secretary of state Colin Powell, had to intervene to mediate the clash. This in turn marked a clear point when Aznar and his senior officials chose to move away from the European political sphere and establish a stronger alliance with the US. As Cembreno points out, the relationship between France and Spain became more difficult and Aznar later accused Jacques Chirac of causing problems for Spain during the crisis.⁶⁶³

However, according to Barreñada, Martín and Sanahuja and Iglesias Cavicchioli, the most relevant event that changed definitely the Aznar’s conception of foreign policy was 9/11.⁶⁶⁴ Aznar’s political discourse started to be strongly influenced by the fight against terrorism a new “political window”, to be used to propel Spain to a leading global role. Strategically speaking the post 9/11 context was favourable to this approach. As Sistiaga has pointed out, from 2001-2002 the fight against the terrorism constituted the main pillar, of both Spain’s domestic and foreign policies.⁶⁶⁵ This reminds us of and reinforces the point made above that for Aznar the best foreign policy was one that was also at the heart of domestic policy.

It is arguable that Aznar’s own personal experience as a victim of a terrorist attack in 1995, influenced this approach. Certainly the centrality of terrorism in his political discourse and diplomatic action was a constant from 2001 to 2004.

In January 2002 during a speech setting out Spain’s EU presidency programme in Strasbourg, Aznar proposed to work to develop three main priorities: To design a response

⁶⁶² Interview cited with Fernando Jaúregui.

⁶⁶³ Op. Cit. Cembrero, I. (2006): P. 10.

⁶⁶⁴ Barreñada, I., Martín, I. and Sanahuja, J.A. (2004): L’Espagne et la Guerre en Iraq: Ruptures Dans la Politique Extérieure. *Critique Internationale*. N° 23. Pp. 9-21; Iglesias Cavicchioli, M. (2007): A Period of Turbulent Change: Spanish-US Relations Since 2002. *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*. Vol. 8. N°. 2. Pp. 1-17.

⁶⁶⁵ Sistiaga, G. (2003): “Terrorismo y Seguridad Internacional en Europa”. In Valle Gálvez, A. (Ed.): *Los Nuevos Escenarios Internacionales y Europeos del Derecho Internacional y Relaciones Internacionales*. BOE. Pp. 87-92.

against the terrorism; to create an area of greater economic prosperity to safeguard the European social model; to work towards the consolidation of the foundations required for an enlarged Union.⁶⁶⁶

From this perspective, his approach found a staunch supporter in US president George W. Bush who saw in Aznar “a firm combatant in the fight against terrorism”⁶⁶⁷ Both leaders believed that the future of the global peace depended upon the disarmament of Iraq and Bush claimed that Aznar was championing the battle against the post 9/11 threats at the UN, the EU and inside NATO.⁶⁶⁸

Aznar’s decision to develop an increasingly presidential foreign policy, the alignment with Washington and the preoccupation with terrorism had negative effects in the medium term. Most importantly, it pushed Spain away from its past role as a valued interlocutor with the Arab world and from its tendency to see its foreign policy in terms of the interests of the EU’s common foreign policy. As Fernández Molina stated, if since the Spain’s accession to the EU, the socialist governments consolidated the relationship between the European dimensions and the Mediterranean, Aznar, oversaw the separation. In effect the triangular Spanish-EU-Mediterranean relationship was substituted by a Spanish-US-Mediterranean relationship.⁶⁶⁹

7.6. Aznar *versus* the EU? A Converging Attitude, Different Approaches.

From 2001-2002 onwards, after 9/11 Aznar’s rhetoric integrated more the elements Islam and Arab world. However his most important rhetoric resource, his most important “product” as political broker, was terrorism. The graphic below, number 14, shows the number of articles where the selected variables are represented and they correspond to his entire political life.⁶⁷⁰ Beyond the most representative geographical variables, it is possible to see how terrorism and global occupy both third and fourth position, whereas Arab/Islam are underrepresented.

⁶⁶⁶ Aznar, J.M. (2002): Discurso del Presidente del Gobierno, José María Aznar, Para Presentar el Programa de la Presidencia Española de la Unión Europea. Intervenciones Institucionales. Available at: <http://www.jmaznar.es/discursos/pdfs/01317A1317.pdf> (Retrieved 25 April 2012)


⁶⁶⁷ Press conference, José María Aznar and George Bush. Crawford, USA. 22 February 2003. Available at: <http://www.jmaznar.es/discursos/pdfs/01613A1613.pdf> (Retrieved 25 April 2012)

⁶⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁹ Op. Cit. Fernández Molina, I. (2007): P. 62.

⁶⁷⁰ The database is accessible at: www.jmaznar.es Corpus Linguistics has not been applied for this case due to the lack of consistency among the types of discourses.

Graph (14) José María Aznar, Discourses 1983-2013.



Source: www.jmaznar.es Elaborated by the author.

Aznar was convinced that his foreign policy would make Spain an international power of the first rank. Over his second mandate his speech towards Islam and the Arab world was moderated. During his first visit to Egypt in 2000 he mentioned that the Arab, Islamic and Jewish heritage that is present in Spain's history gives the opportunity to Spain to become a mediator with the Arab world.⁶⁷¹ During his official trip to Iran in 2000 he even said that "Hezbollah is a movement, a Lebanese stream (...) that it is fighting for the country's freedom, with a lot of sacrifices and, in reality, it is the symbol of the Lebanese resistance against their occupants".⁶⁷²

After 9/11 his discourse immediately started to be aligned towards the theses –fight on global terror- defended by the Bush administration. This context represented the best opportunity for Aznar as a political broker to launch his foreign policy despite the lack of consensus from most of European countries, including Spain. In October 2001, he explained to the Congress of Deputies that Spain decided to join the US in Afghanistan because after 9/11 "it has been created a new alliance of countries, sharing a consensus without precedents in contemporary history: active consensus against the terrorism".⁶⁷³ He also stated that the

⁶⁷¹ Nafie, I. (2000): "Interview to José María Aznar". *Al Ahram*. Available at: http://www.jmaznar.es/file_upload/discursos/pdfs/01162A1162.pdf (Retrieved 1 August 2013)

⁶⁷² Aznar, J.M. (2000): Discourse. Official Visit to Iran. Available at: http://www.jmaznar.es/file_upload/discursos/pdfs/01045A1045.pdf (Retrieved 1 August 2013)

⁶⁷³ Aznar, J.M. (2001): Speech, Congress of Deputies. 18 October. Available at: http://www.jmaznar.es/file_upload/discursos/pdfs/01250A1250.pdf (Retrieved 1 August 2013)

“Islam practiced by those fanatics, is an historic invention (...) and this battle is not against Islam”.⁶⁷⁴ Therefore it is clear that Aznar splits up and does not generalise –at least rhetorically speaking- over the concepts of terrorism and Islam. This idea was repeated in Madrid during Mubarak’s official visit to Spain one month later when he said that “Spain was not in conflict neither with Islam nor with among cultures”.⁶⁷⁵ However, it is clear how he tries to convince the deputies by arguing that the new diplomatic alliance has not precedent in the contemporary history, what places Aznar –he wants to place himself- in a central position within this new historical moment.

As Bush’s foreign policy started to be more focused on the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) owned by Saddam Hussein, Aznar was more convince about his support to the US and his support was the strongest in history as Iglesias-Cavicchioli has stated.⁶⁷⁶ One of the most relevant events of this period was represented by the Azores Summit where Bush, Blair and Aznar –and Portuguese President José Manuel Durao Barroso- launched an ultimatum to Iraq quoting UN resolutions 1441, 1483 and 1511. This summit can be also assessed as an ultimatum to Iraq but also to the UN. Within this context, Aznar expressed that “this transatlantic link, this Atlantic solidarity has been always, it is, and it has to continue being, to my mind, a great European commitment”.⁶⁷⁷ Aznar places Europe at the centre of this statement complaining for the lack of support to his foreign policy.

Spain’s president was aware of both this lack of European and Spanish support. In the same intervention he mentioned that they knew that the international public opinion was very worried about these developments, however “we also know very well our responsibilities and our obligations”.⁶⁷⁸ It is clear that Aznar was defying the international public opinion. In line with this example during a personal interview for this thesis with Fernando Jaúregui he said:

“During a lunch with him –Aznar- I asked: *The 85 per cent of the Spanish public opinion is against the intervention in Iraq. How do you dare to maintain that policy?* Aznar replied: *It is characteristic of the statesman to defy the public opinion when is convenient.*”⁶⁷⁹

⁶⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁵ Aznar, J.M. (2001): Speech during Hosni Mubarak’s visit to Spain.

http://www.jmaznar.es/file_upload/discursos/pdfs/01275A1275.pdf (Retrieved 1 August 2013)

⁶⁷⁶ Iglesias-Cavicchioli, M. (2007): A Period of Turbulent Change: Spanish-US Relations since 2002. *Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*. N°113. P. 113.

⁶⁷⁷ Aznar, J.M. (2003): Azores Summit, Intervention. Available at:

http://www.jmaznar.es/file_upload/discursos/pdfs/01659A1659.pdf (Retrieved 1 August 2013)

⁶⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁹ Cited interview with Fernando Jaúregui.

In questioning this challenging and provocative attitude towards both the international and the Spanish public opinion, some months later -after the killing of seven Spanish soldiers in Iraq- Aznar had to explain to the Spanish Deputies Congress -2 December 2003- his political stances and manipulative political communication strategies, especially once it was also demonstrated that WMD did not exist.⁶⁸⁰ In defending his postures, he stated that we “are defending the international peace and the international security and also combating a network of international terrorist. They are threatening our lives and liberties. The withdrawal cannot be an option to terrorism”.⁶⁸¹

Analyses on this speech have been also conducted by van Dijk, Pujante and Morales López.⁶⁸² According to the last two authors Aznar developed his speech following three ideological meanings. First, terrorism represents a global threat and within this global threat is possible to place ETA as well. Second, Spanish support to the US is embedded in a universal mission. Third, “the PP government has the clearest insight into our destiny as a nation” –the nationalistic vision-.⁶⁸³ In fact, Aznar was very much interested in defending his posture because he focused mostly on internal security matters –due to his nationalistic approach- and the fight against ETA. That is why Aznar was very interested in getting the US support and acknowledgement of ETA as an international terrorist organization.

Aznar’s foreign policy strategy was characterized by a number of inconsistencies and contradictions, as well as political opportunism and incoherence. While in office he repeatedly argued that his policies challenged such failings. In a speech in Washington in 2003, for example, he said: “I think that the political action, the coherence and maybe, or surely, responsibility, do not always trigger applause; but they are, at the end of the day, the elements that create trust within the citizens to whom is commended the task of governing and adopting decisions”.⁶⁸⁴ Aznar was convinced that over his eight years in office he was able to create an economically strong country and a respected medium size power within the

⁶⁸⁰ Kull, S., Ramsay, C. and Lewis, E. (2003): Misperceptions, the Media and the Iraq War. *Political Sciences Quarterly*. Vol. 118. Issue 4. Pp. 569-598.

⁶⁸¹ Aznar, J.M. (2003): Speech. Deputies Congress. 2 December 2003. Available at: http://www.jmaznar.es/file_upload/discursos/pdfs/01841A1841.pdf (Retrieved 12 July 2013)

⁶⁸² Van Dijk, T. (2005): War Rhetoric of a Little Ally: Political Implications and Aznar’s Legitimation of the War in Iraq. *Journal of Language and Politics*. Vol. 4. Nº1. Pp. 65-91.

⁶⁸³ Pujante, D. and Morales López, E. (2008): A Political Action against Popular Opinion: Aznar’s Final Speech before the Spanish Parliament Justifying the War in Iraq. *Journal of Language and Politics*. Vol. 7. Nº1. Pp. 71-96.

⁶⁸⁴ Aznar, J.M. (2003): Discurso del Presidente del Gobierno, José María Aznar en la Academy of Achievements. Intervenciones Institucionales. Official trip to the US. 8 May 2003. Available at: <http://www.jmaznar.es/discursos/pdfs/01695A1695.pdf> (Retrieved 1 January 2012)

international realm, although this does not mean that Spain became a leading international player.

The Mediterranean and North Africa occupied fourth place on Aznar's list of foreign policy priorities going into the 2004 elections behind Europe, Latin America and the US and transatlantic relations. Officials working in the Mediterranean at the time were not impressed.⁶⁸⁵ As EU Ambassador to Morocco Eneko Landaburu explained in an interview for this thesis:

“For me Aznar's policy was very negative for Spain's interests. Aznar and his people were not committed to Europe. They are Spanish nationalists, and they believe that, all of a sudden, when the things change economically and they go well, they think that they can play a new role alone within the international community being a privileged ally of the US. And of course, at the end of the day they consider Europe as simply a source of structural funds to ensure the development.”⁶⁸⁶

Ambassador Landaburu added that in Europe, Spain under Aznar was increasingly not considered as a partner. It was, at least by some, viewed as nationalistic, anti-French and not truly European. Another interpretation is that under Aznar Spain, or at least the Spanish right wing, regained its own ideology, history and identity. This however, may well be the Spain that fears other Europeans, refused to trust liberal ideas and placed its interests alongside those of the US under George W. Bush. For all these reasons, Ambassador Landaburu argues, Spain lost significant influence.⁶⁸⁷

Consistent and coherent public discourse and political actions and policies constitute the fundamental pillars of international dialogue, especially a dialogue maintained between stakeholders separated by cultural, religious, demographic, economic and political factors. The strategy developed by Aznar deepened the initial inconsistencies that existed in the past. He did so by accentuating a type of political entrepreneurship focused on the fight against terrorism and building up ties with a US administration deeply distrusted in Europe, the Arab world and North Africa.

However, it results also necessary to explain and understand if this European disagreement towards Aznar's foreign policy is completely justified. To be justified the EU would have to follow a different and more integrative approach with regards to its foreign


⁶⁸⁵ Partido Popular. (2004): Programa Electoral. Avanzamos Juntos. *Partido Popular*. Pp. 308-309. Available at: http://www.pp.es/file_upload/recursos/pdf/20090915095704_1630412855.pdf (Retrieved 2 February 2012)

⁶⁸⁶ Personal interview with Eneko Landaburu. EU Ambassador to Morocco and former Director General of EU Foreign Policy. Rabat, 30 of June 2011.

⁶⁸⁷ Cited interview with Eneko Landaburu.

policy especially focusing on Mediterranean issues. Following the CL approach and searching for the same variables as in the precedent case the next graphic number 15 has been produced. This graphic considers Aznar's second mandate and covers the period 2001-2004.

Graph (15): European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency



Source: European Council. Elaborated by the Author.

As the graphic number 15 shows, over this period beyond the security issue that remains the most important concern, there are also two variables that were not especially relevant during the last period 1996-2000: terrorism and migration. The aftermaths of the 9/11 provoked these reactions. During the council of Laeken in 2001, it was already commented the necessity to start managing migration flows in order to control illegal migration and crime as well as the need of strengthening the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in a context in which “religious fanaticism, ethnic nationalism, racism and terrorism are on increase, and regional conflicts, poverty and underdevelopment still provide a constant seedbed for them”.⁶⁸⁸ This statement marked the trend to follow in the successive years.

During the Council celebrated in Seville in 2002, it was said that terrorism was a “real challenge for Europe and the world and poses a threat on our security and our

⁶⁸⁸ European Council (2001): Conclusions of the Presidency. Laeken. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/background/docs/laeken_concl_en.pdf (Retrieved 1 July 2013)

stability”.⁶⁸⁹ Therefore it was highlighted the importance of strengthening the contribution of the CFSP and the ESDP in order to fight against this European and global threat.⁶⁹⁰

Variables like Muslims, Islam or Arabs were not present over the last period of study. However over this period these variables were raised several times, linking them to security, migration or terrorism beyond the traditional Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Already during the extraordinary European Council celebrated in Brussels in 2001 it was mentioned that the European Council “needs to combat any nationalistic, racist or xenophobic drift, just as it rejects any terrorism with the Arab and Muslim world.”⁶⁹¹

The linkage between Muslims/Arabs and terrorism/security was integrated then within the European public discourse of this period. In 2002 during the second meeting celebrated in Brussels, Iran and its nuclear plan was related to terrorism and its relations with the rest of the Middle East.⁶⁹² In order to face and to deal with this problem from 2003 to 2004 it was stressed the importance of “deepen the dialogue and collaboration in all fields with the Arab and Islamic worlds”.⁶⁹³

The lack of tangible results provided by the EMP since its inception in 1995 urged the EU to invent new and parallel mechanisms to deal with these challenges. Within this context in 2003 it was proposed the Wider Europe New Neighbourhood Initiative –afterwards ENP– that originally was supposed to reinforce the activities developed by the EMP.⁶⁹⁴

Migration represents the other relevant variable given that the migratory flows from Southern Mediterranean countries skyrocketed within this context of increasing “securitization” as it has been explained in chapter four. In spite of the successful Euro-Mediterranean conferences of Naples, Palermo, Venice and Rome -2003- during the third Council celebrated in 2003 in Brussels, it was raised the question of the adoption of “the mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating third countries against illegal migration”

⁶⁸⁹ European Council (2002): Conclusions of the Presidency. Seville. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/pdf/sev1_en.pdf (Retrieved 1 July 2013)

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁹¹ European Council (2001): Conclusions of the Presidency. Brussels. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140.en.pdf (Retrieved 1 July 2013)

⁶⁹² European Council (2003): Conclusions of the Presidency. Brussels, 2nd Council. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/75136.pdf (Retrieved 1 July 2013)

⁶⁹³ European Council (2003): Conclusions of the Presidency. Brussels, 1st Council. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/75136.pdf (Retrieved 1 July 2013)
Important to note that during the Council of Thessaloniki it was presented the EC report on EU External Action to fight against terrorism. This report was produced after the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting held in Crete in 2003 where was stressed again the importance of boosting dialogue between cultures and civilizations. See: European Council (2003): Conclusions of the Presidency. Thessaloniki. Available at:

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/76279.pdf (Retrieved 1 July 2013)

⁶⁹⁴ Op. Cit. European Council (2003): Brussels, 2nd Council.

following the principles implemented by the European Security Strategy, and taking into account the existing policies and programmes of the EMP and the ENP.⁶⁹⁵

Over 2004, as it is possible to see in the graphic, migration, terrorism and security related issues were the correlated variables that topped European Council's agenda. Within this context during the 1st Council celebrated in Brussels that year, it was raised the question of the necessity of implementing a strategic partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East.⁶⁹⁶ During the 3rd Council celebrated in 2004 the correlation between security and migration was definitely evident. It was proposed to intensify the cooperation and dialogue on migration and asylum with Mediterranean countries together with terrorism and border control.⁶⁹⁷

As it is possible to say the variables used and correlated by Aznar and his foreign policy and EU's public speech and approaches did not differ strongly. Both kept the same tone and approach towards Southern Mediterranean countries and linked security problems. Therefore, it is true that Aznar tried to follow his own political strategy beyond the European circles, however, both the objectives and the philosophy was almost the same.

7.7. Aznar's Strong Political Stances and the End of his Mandate.

Gustavo de Arístegui, a Spanish diplomat affiliated to the PP has made the point that it was important to increase the international cooperation and promote stability, prosperity and freedom in the Islamic world in general and especially in neighbouring countries. And the way to do so should be through cooperation and dialogue.⁶⁹⁸ Aznar as a political broker was also interested in using the Centrist Democrat International (CDI) –evolution of the Christian Democrat International (CDI) - as a platform to increase this dialogue and to overcome the idea of war of civilizations or religions. During the CDI international conference celebrated

⁶⁹⁵ European Council (2003): Conclusions of the Presidency. Brussels. 3rd Meeting. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/78364.pdf (Retrieved 1 June 2013)

⁶⁹⁶ European Council (2004): Conclusions of the Presidency. Brussels. 1st Meeting. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/79637.pdf (Retrieved 1 June 2013)

⁶⁹⁷ European Council (2004): Conclusions of the Presidency. Brussels. 3rd Meeting. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/82534.pdf (Retrieved 1 June 2013)

⁶⁹⁸ Arístegui, G. (2000): "Nuestra Postura Ante los Conflictos Cercanos, Oriente Medio, Balcanes, Terrorismo y Narcotráfico" In Anon. (Eds.): *España, Un Actor Destacado en el Ámbito Internacional*. FAES. Madrid. Pp. 181-247. From the same author see also, Arístegui, G. (2003): "El Terrorismo y las Nuevas Amenazas". In Valle Gálvez, A. (Ed.): *Los Nuevos Escenarios Internacionales y Europeos del Derecho y la Seguridad*. Madrid. Escuela Diplomática. Pp. 109-124.

in June 2003 Aznar said: “Is it possible to say that we have already overcome the threat the Islamic world posed to the Western world?”⁶⁹⁹

However, it is not possible to increase cooperation and dialogue if the basis of such communication is bound up with the securitization and criminalization of the migration issue. The consequence was a notable isolation of Spain from the EU’s political objectives and policies and the weakening of the mechanisms that allowed in the past a more fluent communication with the Arab world specially after supporting the invasion of Iraq and after being aligned with the US. However, Aznar tried to defend several times that his foreign policy did not isolated Spain.

In fact in 2003 he stated that he was proud that Spain was not living isolated because the real isolation would come through “some socialist and communist proposals that bring straight away to an international isolation and straight away towards the confrontation against our allies in the international world.”⁷⁰⁰

As Fernando Jaúregui said during a personal interview with regards to the foreign policy towards North Africa and the Middle East: (Aznar) “destroyed everything that was built in the past”.⁷⁰¹ This view is also shared by Keating.⁷⁰² Aznar’s attitudes and foreign policy defined him as a political broker. As a politician who speculated deploying a political communication strategy defined to achieve his objectives rather than constructing an environment of co-operation and social peace.

The Madrid bombings of 11 March 2004 confirmed that Aznar’s foreign policy provoked reactions from the radical Islamist rim.⁷⁰³ Soon after the PP lost the elections because Aznar kept on confirming stubbornly that ETA was responsible for the attack. The US immediately rejected this hypothesis.⁷⁰⁴ Despite these episodes Aznar during a seminar held in Siena in July 2004 –four months after the elections- said: “I believed in the role of

⁶⁹⁹ Aznar, J.M. (2003): Conferencia de la Internacional Demócrata de Centro. 4 June 2003. Lisbon.

⁷⁰⁰ Aznar, J.M. (2003): Conference During the Seminar on Terrorism and Democracy Organised by the PP New Generations. Available at: http://www.jmaznar.es/file_upload/discursos/pdfs/02081A2081.pdf (Retrieved 1 August 2013)

⁷⁰¹ Cited interview with Fernando Jaúregui.

⁷⁰² Keating, J. (2010): Bad Exes. *Foreign Policy*. 1 October 2010. Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/01/bad_exes?page=0,1 (Retrieved 12 February 2012). Within the same article, the author reviews the example of other four former presidents. The article introduces these cases by saying “Most ex-presidents and former prime ministers devote their lives to making a positive difference in the world, or at least fade away into obscurity. Here are five former leaders who have done neither”. Those examples are: Gerhard Schröder (Germany), José María Aznar (Spain), Olesegun Obasanjo (Nigeria), Joseph Estrada (Philippines) and Thaksin Shinawatra (Thailand).

⁷⁰³ Reinares, F. (2010): The Madrid Bombings and Global Jihadism. *Survival. Global Politics and Strategy*. Vol. 52. Issue 2. Pp. 83-104.

⁷⁰⁴ Lara, R. (2010): EEUU se Desinteresó Pronto de la Hipótesis ETA/11M. Available at: <http://www.laproximaguerra.com/2010/12/eeuu-se-desintereso-pronto-de-la.html> (Retrieved 1 August 2013)

Spain as an active and constructive nation within the international realm and I did whatever I could over the eight years of government to achieve that. And I think that in part I achieved it. I equally believed that the transatlantic link was the backbone of our security and prosperity and I did as much as I could to reinforce it”.⁷⁰⁵

After his mandate Aznar became more outspoken with regards to the Arab and Muslim world. In 2006 he spoke at the Hudson Institute in Washington. In assessing Pope Benedict XVI’s latest considerations on violence and Islam, he said that “Muslims should apologize for occupying Spain for 800 years and an UN-backed programme to encourage dialogue between them and West is stupid. (...) it is them or it is us. There is no middle ground”.⁷⁰⁶ This confirmed his real nationalistic and catholic-rooted stances towards Islam. Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero replaced him as Spanish leader. One of his primary tasks was reactivating the previous Spanish role as a bridge between Europe and Southern Mediterranean countries.

⁷⁰⁵ Aznar, J.M. (2004): Conference. Seminar from Yalta to the 9/11. Siena. Available at: http://www.jmaznar.es/file_upload/discursos/pdfs/2004%2007%2009%20DE%20YALTA%20AL%2011-S.pdf (Retrieved 1 July 2013)

⁷⁰⁶ Available at: <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1707057/posts> (Retrieved 9 February 2012). These remarks were done two years after his presidency finished.

CHAPTER 8

ZAPATERO's ATTEMPT to REPOSITION SPAIN IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Following the, 2004 Spanish elections, the PSOE after 8 years in opposition, were now back in power. The new government critiqued the PP for breaking the “Política de Estado” in the realm of foreign affairs while in office.⁷⁰⁷ During his inaugural speech Zapatero, talked about re-developing a foreign policy where all major political forces would share the same objectives and approach.⁷⁰⁸ Even though he recognised that Spain's new time could not start from scratch but taking advantage of a shared political experience that has evolved over different phases.⁷⁰⁹ However Catalan party *Convergència i Unió* (CiU) in September 2004 criticized Zapatero's political stances by saying that it seemed that he wanted to establish a “new transition”.⁷¹⁰ A second transition that, as Woodworth has mentioned, he seemed to be unaware “of the legacy of the first transition”.⁷¹¹

It was now a priority for Spain to return to its central role in European affairs. In fact PSOE's five political axes were represented by: a renewed public life; a foreign policy characterized by a European and Europeanist vision; economic development supported by education, research and innovation; new social policies and; development and expansion of civil and political rights and equality.⁷¹² Aznar may have attacked González for begging from Europe in 1992 but was Spain's support for German reunification that won his government the support of Germany in its foreign policy approach and in its effort to become one of the biggest beneficiaries of the EU cohesion fund.⁷¹³

The bombings in Madrid represented the extremist response to a foreign policy that increasingly developed a more public speech slanted to US's foreign policy theses. In his inaugural speech, Zapatero stressed the fact that Aznar's decisions in foreign policy were

⁷⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁸ Del Arenal, C. (2004): La Política Exterior del Gobierno Socialista. *Política Exterior*. Vol. 18, N°100.

⁷⁰⁹ Rodríguez Zapatero, J.L. (2004): Discurso de Investidura. PSOE. Available at: <http://estaticos.elmundo.es/documentos/2004/04/15/discurso.pdf> (Retrieved 3 March 2012)

⁷¹⁰ Fied, B.N. (2009): A “Second Transition” in Spain? Policy, Institutions and Interparty Politics under Zapatero (2004-2008) *South European Society and Politics*. Vol. 14. Issue 4. Pp. 379-397.

⁷¹¹ Woodworth, P. (2005): Spain's “Second Transition”. Reforming Zeal and Dire Omens. *World Policy Journal*. Vol. 22. N°3. P. 69. The author stressed that Zapatero has been ignoring implicitly and explicitly the limits of period set on political change.

⁷¹² Op. Cit. Rodríguez Zapatero, J.L. (2004): P. 6.

⁷¹³ Marks, G. (1996): “Exploring and Explaining Variation in EU Cohesion Policy” in Hooghe, L. (Ed.): *Cohesion Policy and European Interpretation Building Multilateral Governance*. Oxford University Press. Pp. 388-422.

wrong in issues that affected Spain's coexistence and progress.⁷¹⁴ In analysing Zapatero's discourse it is important to note that his speech started mentioning the Madrid bombings and the victims. Beyond the contextual importance of this event, the bombings represented the material evidence of Aznar's mistakes and the issue of terrorism topped again Spain's political agenda. In his discourse, Zapatero mentioned 18 times the variable terrorism whereas another important issue such as democracy was mentioned 4 times. Now, following his accession to power in March 2004, Zapatero looked to return to the mandate of Felipe González following a legacy of "dialogue, respect, pluralism, tolerance and transparency".⁷¹⁵

As Gillespie and Youngs have noted, by the early 1990s Spanish foreign policy interests were channelled and pursued overwhelmingly through Europe.⁷¹⁶ The success of this depended on Spain's ability to sell its particular geographic interests.⁷¹⁷ As has been stressed by Viñas and Pollack and Hunter⁷¹⁸ North Africa and by extension, the Mediterranean represented an essential part of that tradition.

But following the Aznar era, the environment was especially challenging with regards to the reactivation of the Spain's role in the Mediterranean. The new socialist government had to face a very peculiar political, social, cultural and economic context. An unknown leader lacking charisma, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero faced a tough task in re-asserting Spain's position as global political entrepreneur.

8.1. Back to the Mediterranean. Back to the Roots.

In 2004, Spain's new foreign minister, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, an expert on Middle East and Mediterranean issues looked to develop a new foreign policy to rebuild the consensual role that he believed Spain had lost during the Aznar era.⁷¹⁹ In considering the Aznar era Moratinos stressed that:

"Spain during the last 25 years, knew how to develop [a genuine State policy] through a integrative spirit, understanding that all decisions in the foreign policy ambit are

⁷¹⁴ Op. Cit. Rodríguez Zapatero, J.L. (2004): P. 6.

⁷¹⁵ Ibid.

⁷¹⁶ Gillespie, R. and Youngs, R. (2007): Spain's International Challenges at the Turn of the Century. *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 5. Nº2. P. 6.

⁷¹⁷ Op.Cit. P. 7.

⁷¹⁸ Pollack, B. and Hunter, G. (1987): *The Paradox of Spanish Foreign Policy: Spain's International Relations From Franco to Democracy*. Pinter. London; Viñas, A. (1999): "Breaking the Shackles from the Past: Spanish Foreign Policy from Franco to Felipe González" in Balfour, S. and Preston, P. (Eds.): *Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century*. Routledge.

⁷¹⁹ Moratinos, M.A. (2004): Una Nueva Política Exterior para España. *Política Exterior*. Nº99. May/June. P. 65.

rooted on internal reasons, and, by adopting them, revert to the ambit of domestic policy. A responsible government should know what it wants and what is in the interests of its country; only on this basis is it possible to develop a coherent foreign policy, solid and ambitious”.⁷²⁰

Though some argued that Moratinos was not a strong supporter of the EU, the first step towards this was the rapprochement with the EU.⁷²¹ Without this initial movement it would not be possible to propose and legitimize complex policies and mechanisms. Moreover, it was required to achieve both political consensus and support and the financial means to develop new policies focused on Spain’s diplomatic and politic interests. This was the same strategy Felipe González followed from 1986 onward. First Europe. Second, the identification of a political window that would benefit national interests. Third, an action of political lobbying in order to get political and diplomatic support and financial means to increase diplomatic power and presence.

Strategically speaking, following this return to Europe, so to speak, was the need to identify a political window that would benefit national interests. This included a new relationship with the US based on the principle of sovereign equality, as set out in the 1988 Cooperation Agreement. However, Zapatero’s distant approach towards the US marked one of his most important U-turns with regards to Aznar’s foreign policy. As Cavicchioli has mentioned, Zapatero was the first Spanish prime minister in the thirty years of democracy that has not had any summit with an American president over the first years of mandate.⁷²² As Woodworth mentioned Zapatero was very interested in taking Spain out from “that photograph in the Azores”.⁷²³ In April 2004 Zapatero ordered Spain’s Minister of Defence José Bono to withdraw Spanish troops from Afghanistan as soon as possible.⁷²⁴ Nevertheless, Zapatero had to pay the price of placing Spain away from the US. US government, press and public opinion ignored Zapatero in numerous times.⁷²⁵

Moratinos also elaborated on relations with Latin America and the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Moratinos appointment as foreign minister had confirmed Spanish

⁷²⁰ Ibid.

⁷²¹ The informant preferred not to be quoted.

⁷²² Op. Cit. Cavicchioli, M.I. (2007): P. 113.

⁷²³ Woodworth, P. (2004): Spain Changes Course: Aznar’s Legacy, Zapatero’s Prospects. *World Policy Journal*. N°21. Pp. 7-26.

⁷²⁴ Anon. (2004): “Zapatero Anuncia la Retirada Inmediata de las Tropas de Irak”. *El Mundo*. 19 April. Available at: <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2004/04/18/espana/1082303152.html> (Retrieved 13 July 2013)

⁷²⁵ González, R. (2010): “Zapatero ... y Quién es Ese?” *El Mundo*. 4 February. Available at: http://www.elmundo.es/america/2010/02/04/estados_unidos/1265313851.html (Retrieved 13 July 2013) In 2010, Obama also declined the invitation to attend an EU summit to be held in Madrid under the auspices of the Spanish Presidency. See Charlemagne (2010): Obama, Breaker of European Hearts. *The Economist*. 2 February. Available at: http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2010/02/obama_snubs_eu (Retrieved 13 July 2013)

intentions with regards to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Western Sahara conflict, and Iraq. His approach, like that of his prime minister, was based on dialogue, negotiation, cooperation. On the other hand, the new Spanish foreign policy with the US changed its views as far as Jauregui pointed out, Moratinos has been a diplomat concentrated on the Palestinian side, not on the Israeli one.⁷²⁶

In Zapatero's inaugural address in office he noted his desire to place dialogue, understanding and respect to other's opinions at the centre of his foreign policy. "I am willing to make this the legislature of dialogue, understanding and, the meeting (...) In the Mediterranean we have to recover the objective of the dialogue, the understanding and cooperation present in the declaration of Barcelona".⁷²⁷ In considering his priorities, Zapatero explained in an interview for this thesis that:

"Improving relations with Morocco was an important objective that I established for our foreign policy towards the Mediterranean. Since then, relations with Rabat have been acquiring greater specific weight, covering all the fields and permeating all the sectors integrating a strategic relation of neighbourhood. This spans from tight cooperation on issues such as the fight against the illegal immigration or the terrorism, to economic relations and Euro-Mediterranean co-operation".⁷²⁸

Here it is possible to see that the conception and political postures with regards to the Maghreb as a whole and to Morocco in particular, marked the most evident difference between the PP and the PSOE. Actually approaches to the Western Sahara issue were probably where the strongest differences between the PP and the PSOE lay. In effect, as Fernández Molina recognises, the accession of the PSOE to power coincided with a moment where Morocco addressed the proposals of former US secretary of state James Baker –Plan Baker II-, which had been approved by the UN Security Council on 31 July 2003.⁷²⁹

The PSOE supported new plans put forward by Rabat. These plans would guarantee the independence of the Western Sahara territory under Moroccan sovereignty. While the proposal covered socio-cultural aspects that were common to past Spanish approaches to the problem, the Spanish embrace was viewed in some quarters as evidence of the abandonment

⁷²⁶ Cited interview with Fernando Jauregui.

⁷²⁷ Zapatero, J.L. (2004): Discurso de Investidura ante el Congreso de los Diputados. PSOE. Available at: <http://estaticos.elmundo.es/documentos/2004/04/15/discurso.pdf> (Retrieved 9 November 2012)

⁷²⁸ Personal interview with José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Madrid, 28 January 2011.

⁷²⁹ Op. Cit. Fernández Molina, I. (2003): P. 66. For the Plan Baker II is important to see: Ludena, J. (2003): El Plan Baker II: ¿Solución Para el Sahara Occidental? *Papeles de Cuestiones Internacionales*. Nº84. Pp. 121-127; Fernández Árias, L. (2005): Sahara Occidental: Un Año Después Baker. *Política Exterior*. Vol. 19. Nº107. Pp. 73-82.

of the traditional Spanish position on this sensitive issue.⁷³⁰ Ruiz Miguel, for example, argued that it would be prejudicial to Spain's national interests as it would be the legitimisation of independence for the Western Sahara.⁷³¹

As mentioned previously according to Bardají and Portero, who were clearly criticising the new PSOE government's Moroccan policy,⁷³² the PP was more interested in developing commercial relations with Algeria.⁷³³ This policy unbalanced regional dynamics and created more complex situations and misunderstandings between Madrid and Rabat.

Zapatero came to power at the same time as the Barcelona Process reached its tenth anniversary. As President Zapatero stated during a personal interview:

“When I acceded to the Presidency, I felt a very wide support from Europe, and in general from the whole international sphere. We were conscious of the weight and influence of Spain, and I perceived that it would be possible to reinforce Spain's role as global actor (...) The European policy towards the Mediterranean shows Spanish efforts to establish the bases in order to create a space of peace, security and prosperity between both rims. This approach was defined in 1995 with the signature of the Barcelona Declaration, that illuminated the Euro-Mediterranean Association. Spain was central in this process and continued being crucial for the construction of the institutional architecture of the Euro-Mediterranean Association until the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008”.⁷³⁴

There are few politicians or diplomats who would openly criticise the Barcelona process. Ambassador Navarro described it as a multidimensional political programme that deserves praise on a number of levels, notably as the ‘only place’ where Israel and Syria sat together.⁷³⁵ Ambassador Landaburu, speaking more pragmatically acknowledged that:

“We made many mistakes, very big mistakes. One of these mistakes was that we believed that we could develop a dialogue with these Arab countries, from region to region without taking into consideration the internal fractures that exist in these countries. Another mistake is that we did not took into consideration the radical influence in the conflict between Israel and Palestine.”⁷³⁶

⁷³⁰ Op. cit. Fernandez Molina, I. (2003): P. 66.

⁷³¹ Ruiz Miguel, C. (2006): Sáhara Occidental: Independencia, Paz y Seguridad. *Cuadernos de Pensamiento Político*. Nº12. P. 152; Ruiz Miguel, C. (2007): La Conveniencia de Pensar el Giro de Nuestra Política Exterior. *GEES*. P. 147.

⁷³² Op. Cit. Ruiz Miguel, C. (2006): P. 6.

⁷³³ Bardají, R. and Portero, F. (2007): La España Menguante...Menguada. *FAES*. Nº46. P. 6.

⁷³⁴ Cited Interview. José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero.

⁷³⁵ Cited interview with Alberto Navarro.

⁷³⁶ Ibid.

As has been already mentioned, the Barcelona process was based on the conviction that a neo-liberal economic and trade model would trigger off long-term socio-political and cultural transformations to the benefit of Euro-Mediterranean relations. However, as Bassols pointed out, the key point of the Barcelona process was the creation of the Mediterranean free trade area by 2010 was the only exact date that was present in the Barcelona declaration.⁷³⁷ This target date was very important for the EC because, as Bassols has highlighted during an interview for this thesis, Europe had very strong commercial policy but “today if we would have proposed the same, Southern Mediterranean partners would not have accepted”.⁷³⁸

While this objective –the economic one- was partly the reason for the weakness of the process, it is debatable whether Aznar’s political shift towards the Atlantic during his second term deserves the majority blame for this. According to Ambassador Eneko Landaburu: “I don’t think so. I mean, the strength we had was not important enough to leave a gap in case of disappearing”.⁷³⁹ On top of this Spain’s priorities did not cause the divisions within the Mediterranean countries that made progress on the Barcelona front so difficult.

On the other hand and putting aside the technical difficulties of the Barcelona Process, the ENP was conceptualized between 2002 and 2004 but it was implemented in 2007, and highlighted some contradictions in the Euro-Mediterranean Policy’s philosophical and practical pillars. Nevertheless as Ambassador Landaburu stressed, “we luckily had the capacity of launching and developing the ENP. Because at least that has allowed us to maintain certain contact with southern Mediterranean partners”.⁷⁴⁰ As Barbé, Mestres and Soler have stressed, within this period of time both the PP and the PSOE had two splendid opportunities to re-launch Spain as a Mediterranean power by hosting two important conferences.⁷⁴¹

As mentioned in the preceding chapter, Aznar had a very good opportunity during the Valencia conference in 2002 to showcase Spanish diplomatic power.⁷⁴² In Barcelona in 2005 the PSOE hosted a celebration of the Euro-Mediterranean Summit that reflected its goal to

⁷³⁷ Ibid.

⁷³⁸ Ibid.

⁷³⁹ Cited interview with Ambassador Eneko Landaburu.

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁴¹ Barbé, E., Mestres I Camps, L. and Soler I Lecha, E. (2007): La Política Mediterránea de España: Entre el Proceso de Barcelona y la Política Europea de Vecindad. *Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals*. Nº79-80. P. 41.

⁷⁴² Gillespie, R. (2003): Reshaping the Agenda? The Internal Politics of the Barcelona Process in the Aftermath of September 11. *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 8. Issue 2-3. Pp. 22-36.

“re-launch the Barcelona Process with strength and determination”.⁷⁴³ The PSOE also wanted to build a new defence and security policy, and develop transatlantic relations, Latin America and the Mediterranean.⁷⁴⁴

Zapatero also wanted to use the Euro-Mediterranean Summit to show Europe, and his PP critics, that he had a vision for Spain and a vision for Spain in the international arena. In fact what the PP criticised more of Zapatero’s foreign policy was his vision of Spain.⁷⁴⁵ As Carnero has stated, Zapatero did not have a clear idea of which kind of Spain he wanted to defend and without that clear idea it was difficult to defend and develop a coherent foreign policy.⁷⁴⁶

These initial diplomatic efforts began to be rewarded during the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial meeting held in The Hague in 2004. During this conference, 2005 was chosen as the “Year of the Mediterranean”.⁷⁴⁷ The Barcelona meeting the following year, attended by leading figures from almost all the EU members, was the main event celebrating this. However as Barbé, Mestres and Soler i Lecha have noted, the majority of the Southern Mediterranean members did not send top level representatives.⁷⁴⁸ However, the 2005 Barcelona conference was intended first and foremost, from a Spanish perspective, to gain support from the UK, who held the EU presidency between June and December. This came at a time of major crisis inside the Community with the Dutch and French ‘No’ votes on the EU Constitutional Treaty.⁷⁴⁹

The UK wanted initially to preside over a low key presidency. However, Prime Minister Blair, in June 2005, ultimately presented himself as the saviour of the EU in its time of crisis. This was important for Zapatero’s purposes. Blair’s public support for an early Turkish accession into the EU and his wider approach to the Mediterranean was very much in line with Zapatero’s approach. The British leader declared that the accession of Turkey to the EU would be clear proof that “Europe is committed not just in word but indeed to a Europe of diverse races, cultures and religions, all bound together by common rules and a sense of

⁷⁴³ PSOE (2004): *Merecemos una España Mejor. Programa Electoral 2004. Elecciones Generales*. PSOE. P. 24. Available at: http://www.cadenaser.com/comunes/2004/elecciones2004/programas/psoe_programa.pdf (Retrieved 5 May 2012)

⁷⁴⁴ Op. Cit. Pp. 15-24.

⁷⁴⁵ Op. Cit. Barbé, E., Mestres, I Camps, L. and Soler y Lecha, E. (2007): P. 41.

⁷⁴⁶ Carnero, A. (2007): Foreign Policy without an Idea of Spain. *FAES Papers*. Nº60. P. 1. Available at: http://www.fundacionfaes.org/record_file/filename/1566/papeles60_ingles.indd.pdf (Retrieved 1 March 2012)

⁷⁴⁷ EU. (2004): *Presidency Conclusions for the Euro-Mediterranean Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs*. The Hague. 29 and 30 November 2004. Available at:

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/82876.pdf (Retrieved 4 April 2012)

⁷⁴⁸ Op. Cit. Barbé, E., Mestres i Camps, L. and Soler i Lecha, E. (2007): P. 41.

⁷⁴⁹ Whitman, R. and Thomas, G. (2006): Two Cheers for the UK’s EU Presidency. *Chatham House, European Research*. EPBP/06/01. P. 1.

human solidarity and mutual respect”.⁷⁵⁰ This request represents the cornerstone of any Euro-Mediterranean policy or mechanism. If rhetoric is not ensued by concrete facts –measurable facts within the sort, medium and long term that involve and empower southern Mediterranean countries beyond European interests- these policies and projects are doomed to fail.

This UK leadership was important for Zapatero’s purposes. The Turkish accession was actually very much criticised long time ago by France. As Leparmentier and Zecchini remind, Valerie Giscard D’Estaing, manifested that the Turkish accession to the EU would mean the end of the EU.⁷⁵¹ France, on the contrary did not share the same vision. Chirac did not follow the extremist vision of D’Estaing and reluctantly said that the French population should be call to decide upon referendum.⁷⁵² Zapatero also considered that an earlier accession of Turkey to the EU would contribute to the creation of a space of security and prosperity.⁷⁵³

Zapatero started to develop his foreign policy from where Felipe González decided to act: the Mediterranean. At this time it was suggested that Spain should be leading Mediterranean politics as Germany was leading Eastern politics.⁷⁵⁴ Once the Mediterranean political window was definitely re-identified as the opportunity to increase Spain’s diplomatic stature, it was necessary to formalise this ambition with a concrete mechanism.

8.2.The Alliance of Civilizations: Building On the Sand.

Contextual elements such as increasing influx of migrants from Southern Mediterranean countries or the threat of terrorism of Islamic matrix among others provided Zapatero a good starting point to design and justify Spain’s own entrepreneurial proposal. Diplomatically speaking a number of initiatives started to develop in the aftermaths of the 9/11. On one hand, the UN defined 2001 as the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations. As Dallmayr has put it, these initiatives somehow tried to raise awareness on the consequences of an unstoppable

⁷⁵⁰ Kubicek, P. (2005): Turkish Accession to the EU: Challenges and Opportunities. *World Affairs* 168, N°2 Platinum Periodicals. P. 72.

⁷⁵¹ Leparmentier, A. and Zecchini, L. (2002): Pour ou Contre L’Adhesion de la Turquie a l’Union Europeenne. *Le Monde*. 8 November.

⁷⁵² Op. Cit. Mathieson, D. (2005): P. 5.

⁷⁵³ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁴ Claret, A. (2005): Zapatero y el Mediterráneo. *El País*. 2 February. Available at: http://www.almendron.com/politica/pdf/2005/spain/spain_1965.pdf (Retrieved 2 March 2012)

globalization process and related consequences on global social justice and inequality.⁷⁵⁵ In November 2001 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution aiming at developing the Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations. Article 6 of 56/6 resolution highlighted that “governments shall promote, encourage and facilitate dialogue among civilizations”.⁷⁵⁶

This article opened the path for political entrepreneurs willing to fill that gap. However within the short run there was not an immediate response from any particular western government aiming at covering this political opportunity. In February 2002 it was held in Istanbul the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC)-EU joint initiative. Despite the nature of the meeting –designed to enhance intercultural dialogue- governmental representatives from Iraq, Syria, Iran, Kuwait and Lebanon openly criticized the US for their unilateral efforts in defending homeland interests and its hegemony and Israel for the Palestinian question.⁷⁵⁷ These manifestations are the evidence of the challenges any initiative aiming at fostering intercultural communication and dialogue has to face.

This initiative celebrated in Turkey opened the path for a new phase of Turkish foreign policy. As Balci and Mis have highlighted from 2002 onward, new Turkish government administered by Justice and Development Party (JDP) and headed up by Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, was interested in accelerating Turkish presence in the world. This new attitude represented a major turning point for Turkey’s both domestic and foreign policy.⁷⁵⁸ The JDP’s “non-confrontational and consensus-seeking” approach was relevant for the domestic realm and for international politics alike.⁷⁵⁹ This approach was publicised and spread by Erdogan since the beginning of his mandate.⁷⁶⁰ Erdogan’s approach to become one of the fulcrums of intercultural dialogue summarizes a political strategy that would have facilitated and justified a process of integration to Europe. Process that should have started by 2004.⁷⁶¹

⁷⁵⁵ Dallmayr, F.R. (2002): Globalization and Inequality: A Plea for Global Justice. *International Studies Review*. Vol. 4. Issue 2. Pp. 137-156.

⁷⁵⁶ UN. (2001): Resolution 56/6. Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations. New York. 21 November. Available at: <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2004/04/18/espana/1082303152.html> (Retrieved 2 March 2012)

⁷⁵⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2001): Brief Summary of the Proceedings of the OIC-EU Joint Forum. Republic of Turkey. Available at: www.google.ch/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fww.mfa.gov.tr%2Fbrief-summary-of-the-proceedings-of-the-oic-eu-joint-forum.en.mfa&ei=28gdUqHAN-WA7Qau2YDgDg&usg=AFQjCNErRafhxEO2JIOVSAQEmHKdv-0csg&bvm=bv.51156542,d.ZGU (Retrieved 2 March 2012)

⁷⁵⁸ Balci, A. and Mis, N. (2008): Turkey’s Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy? *Turkish Studies*. Vol. 9. Issue 3. P. 387.

⁷⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁰ Op. Cit. P. 390.

⁷⁶¹ Erdogan, R.T. (2007): A Union of Civilizations. *New Perspectives Quarterly*. Vol. 24. Issue 3. P. 27.

The post 9/11 international context, the interest of Turkey in getting greater international integration by bridging the existing cultural and political gap and the interest of Spain for developing its Mediterranean card announced and justified a Spanish-Turkish joint initiative.

One of his first Zapatero's initiatives a political entrepreneur was his proposal of a project to the UN General Assembly -24 September 2004- named "Alliance of Civilizations". As it has been noted by Balci, Zapatero's concept of "alliance" evolved from the concept of "dialogue" that was the central idea from 9/11 onwards. Conversely it was according to Barreñada, an initiative that, though sharing the same theoretical background, challenged Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" thesis.⁷⁶²

However as Balci mentions, the idea of "alliance" entails the acceptance of "clash" and the potential survival of such an initiative would depend on the continuation of such a "clash" of civilizations, otherwise it would not make sense. As Zank has suggested the concept cooperation of civilizations would have entailed a more proactive and less belligerent approach.⁷⁶³ Nevertheless the idea of clash –more sellable politically speaking- was shared both by Zapatero and Erdogan.⁷⁶⁴ As a matter of fact, Zapatero very timely announced this concept of "alliance of civilizations" right after the Madrid bombings as a way to combat terrorism.

This means that Zapatero reacted like an opportunist and used the concept "alliance" ambivalently: as a means to fight terrorism at a domestic level and to reach international audience as well. This rhetoric strategy using terrorism as a variable to get political and diplomatic consensus, recognition and influence was also used by Aznar as we demonstrated in the precedent chapter. Therefore it is possible to say that Zapatero despite his interest in detaching his foreign policy from Aznar resorted to very similar strategies as a political broker.

Technically speaking, Zapatero's speech at the United Nations followed a very understandable rhetoric. Before presenting his proposal he focused his attention on the threat posed by international and national terrorism. He mentioned 11 times the variable terrorism within his discourse. After that he linked the variables terrorism-security with an alliance between the western and the Arab-Muslim world. Therefore he was narrowing the idea of

⁷⁶² Barreñada, I. (2006): Alliance of Civilizations; Spanish Public Diplomacy and Cosmopolitan proposal. *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 11. Nº1. P. 99.

⁷⁶³ Zank, W. (Ed.) (2009): *Cooperation or Clash of Civilizations? Overlapping Integration and Identities*. Ashgate Publishing House, London.

⁷⁶⁴ Balci, A. (2009): The Alliance of Civilizations: The Poverty of the Clash/Alliance Dichotomy. *Insight Turkey*. Vol. 11. Nº9. P. 103.

alliance of civilizations and targeting Western societies versus Islam. None other religion or civilization was mentioned. Hence the concept of “alliance of civilizations” was not appropriate from a philosophical and practical point of view. On 13 June 2005, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan agreed to co-sponsor this initiative with Spain and it was finally adopted in 2007.⁷⁶⁵

As shown above, French disenchantment towards the EU allowed Spain to identify a new political window by re-launching its EU and global leadership via Mediterranean-related issues. In these terms the “Alliance of Civilizations” can be considered one of Spain’s most successful foreign policy projects within the short and medium term.⁷⁶⁶

In promoting this, Spain was attempting once again to play the role of political broker. However from an organizational point of view, this initiative was neither carefully planned nor strategically developed. The PSOE’s electoral programme did not mention it for instance and it has been suggested that this initiative was originally formulated during a flight over the Atlantic a few hours before the UN meeting in New York.⁷⁶⁷

If it was improvised this would reveal one of the most relevant features of Zapatero’s government and both policy making and decision making processes. This improvisation has been harshly criticized members of FAES, the PP’s think-tank. Borrowing the expression coined by Spanish journalist Miguez attacked Zapatero’s diplomacy as the “diplomacy of the smile”.⁷⁶⁸

So, the argument went, the PSOE’s foreign policy would align national interests to the EU’s global objectives; would go beyond the defence of national sovereignty and the national dignity; reject the expansion of the “liberal democracy” because its principles were not universal; the “democratic fundamentalism” incarnated by the US model would represent the main triggering factor of terrorism around the world.⁷⁶⁹ Abstraction and relativism seem to be the main ingredients of such diplomacy.

After presenting the idea very abstractly, The Alliance of Civilizations would operate on three main pillars: anti-terror cooperation, addressing economic inequalities and cultural dialogue. These priorities were set out in a more structured way in 2006 when they were published in a report written by a high level group established under the AoC.

⁷⁶⁵ Kausch, K. and Barreñada, I. (2005): Alliance of Civilizations: International Security and Cosmopolitan Democracy. *FRIDE Foundation*. Available at: http://eprints.ucm.es/10533/1/WP_03-05.pdf (Retrieved 2 March 2012)

⁷⁶⁶ Op. Cit. Kausch, K. and Barreñada, I. (2005): P. 1.

⁷⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁸ Portero, F. (2005): La Democracia Como Amenaza. *Cuadernos de Pensamiento Político*. FAES. Nº8. P. 121.

⁷⁶⁹ Op. Cit. Pp. 121-122.

The whole document skirts around the idea of the emergence of Islamic extremism.⁷⁷⁰ All the other pillars such as cultural dialogue, or the measures to improve socio-economic cleavages were justified as a means to fight against the potential threat of Islamist terrorism. The Spanish newspaper *El País* reported on how the Spanish government in 2004, following the Madrid bombings, had wanted also to propose the renovation of the national pact on international terrorism including cooperation with Muslim countries.⁷⁷¹ The interesting element of this document is that it stressed the necessity of eliminating the link between Islam and terrorism. This trend ensued over the coming years and by 2009 Spanish Ministry of Defence published a document titled: “From the Clash of Cultures to the Alliance of Civilizations: New Contributions for the Security in the Mediterranean”.⁷⁷²

All these aspects shaped and determined the impreciseness and blandness of the Alliance of Civilizations. Interestingly, Zapatero’s proposal was not far away from Franco’s approach with regards to the Arab world. In fact, during the dictatorship, Franco was very much trying to establish diplomatic relations with the Arab world by claiming a sort of shared lineage and history.⁷⁷³ In fact, during the years of the international isolation Franco developed a sort of cultural diplomacy through the “Hispano-Arab brotherhood”.⁷⁷⁴ Regardless these historical reminiscences and similitudes it is important now to assess the consistency and political seriousness of Zapatero and his government as political brokers in presenting and managing this proposal.

8.3. A Political Broker Managing an Abstract Political Opportunity.

Henry Kamen dissects the Alliance proposal by analysing three important vectors. They are vital to understanding how a political entrepreneur or broker should identify a political window and opportunity and, after that, determine a conceptual and material strategy to achieve objectives within the short, medium and long term. The questions Kamen ask are

⁷⁷⁰ Anon. (2006): Alliance of Civilizations. Informe del Grupo de Alto Nivel. Istanbul, 13 November 2006. P. 6.

⁷⁷¹ Aizpeolea, L.R. (2004): “El nuevo pacto antiterrorista propone mayor colaboración entre occidente y países islámicos”. *El País*. 12 December. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/2004/12/12/espana/1102806002_850215.html (Retrieved 1 May 2012)

⁷⁷² Sanz Roldán, F. (Ed.) (2009): Del Desencuentro Entre Las Culturas a la Alianza de Civilizaciones: Nuevas Aportaciones Para la Seguridad en el Mediterráneo. *Cuadernos de Estrategia*. Nº142. Dirección General de Relaciones Institucionales. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos. Ministerio de Defensa. Available at: http://www.portalcultura.mde.es/Galerias/publicaciones/fichero/CE_142.pdf (Retrieved 14 April 2012)

⁷⁷³ Kamen, H. (2004): “¿Qué Alianza? ¿Qué Civilizaciones?” *El Mundo*. 10 December 2004. Available at: <http://viaforastore2004.blogspot.ch/2004/12/kamen-qu-alianza-qu-civilizaciones.html> (Retrieved 1 May 2012)

⁷⁷⁴ González González, I. (2007): La “Hermandad Hispano-Árabe” en la Política Cultural del Franquismo. *Anales de Historia Contemporánea*. Universidad de Murcia. Nº23.

with whom and with what is the Alliance constituted? Who should finance this project and how? And ending by interrogating on the conceptual, historical and ideological flaws and inconsistencies of the proposal.⁷⁷⁵

On the first point, Zapatero was not interested in -either conceptually or practically- exporting to the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East “obsolete” concepts such as women rights, freedom of speech, liberal democracy or religious freedom. This cultural relativist approach looked to avoid the “imposition” of certain values and norms that are constituent features of Western democracies as a way of fostering dialogue.

The opposite would block any potential dialogue according to Zapatero’s approach. However, to what extent this hypothesis would work? Is it possible to say that this approach was naïf? Probably it would be more dangerous and would have entailed more risks and failures than benefits. Actually in the aforementioned working paper published by the Spanish Ministry of Defence, Sáenz Roldán by quoting scholar Pedro Martínez Montávez, concurred with an idea that is anchored to the dependency theory. He considered that the origin of the problems with the Islamic-Arab contemporary world today is the European colonialist expansion that entered in those geographic spaces without understanding what existed there over the centuries. That generated strong traumas, some of them not solved, like for instance the deep division among Arab people and the great tragedy of the loss of Palestine.⁷⁷⁶

However, it is practically impossible to ensure a solid alliance between partners through dialogue and mutual understanding alone unless essential political, philosophical and ideological elements are shared. The events of the Arab uprising have demonstrated that Zapatero’s hypothesis was wrong. Ambassador Eneko Landaburu addressed this point during a personal interview:

“It was tacitly accepted in Europe that these southern countries were going directly towards a political and religious radicalism. What we had to do was maintaining and supporting stabilization policies and that explains the EU’s help to Ben Ali, Mubarak and others’ regimes. We supported dictators because they ensured us a certain security, because they controlled migration flows and terrorism. And, of course, we did not check closely what they were doing with their citizens. This is the *realpolitik*.”⁷⁷⁷

⁷⁷⁵ Op. Cit. Kamen, H. (2004): P.2.

⁷⁷⁶ Op. Cit. Sanz Roldán, F. (2009): P. 13.

⁷⁷⁷ Cited Interview with Ambassador Eneko Landaburu.

In Strasburg, on 27 January 2011, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) acknowledged this failing: “Europe also has its share of responsibility since it failed to condemn the nature of the regimes, preferring to take advantage of its apparent stability to carry out its business”.⁷⁷⁸ These two episodes confirm the conceptual, organizational and strategic failure of initiatives such as the Alliance for Civilizations.

Funding requirements were also key for the success of the Alliance of Civilizations. For this, it is essential to map potential stakeholders and “investors” who eventually are going to fund the proposal. But money alone, while it can help to establish and maintain short-term stability in an area, does not necessarily bring substantial or sustained change.

This second aspect is intrinsically related to the first element discussed above. Elaborating a congruent concept and project is crucial before starting mapping potential stakeholders and “investors” who eventually are going to fund the proposal. Initially, the first Muslim country to adhere to Zapatero’s proposal was Mongolia, country that was clearly interested in attracting the attention from the West.⁷⁷⁹

There are some other alliances or associations that are well funded, such as the Arab League, which existence depends greatly on US funds.⁷⁸⁰ Since 9/11 the US has been strengthening financial collaboration with Middle Eastern governments aiming at exporting democratic values and norms. As Dalacoura mentions, the USAID increased aid to this region from 2001 and by 2002. Colin Powell launched the Middle East Partnership (MEPI) - 2002- in order to support this approach.⁷⁸¹ Within this same context also the US planned to create a free trade area in the region by assuming that an economic liberalization would allow a better implementation of democratic values and practices.⁷⁸² These alliances can work within the short term normally, thanks to political will, funds, and someone promising to follow and respect certain common principles and values and a set of protocols. However it

⁷⁷⁸ Anon. (2011): Tunisia: PACE Calls on Political Forces to Start Democratic Reforms Without Delay. *Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe*. Winter Session. Resolution 27/01/11. Available at: http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/NewsManager/EMB_NewsManagerView.asp?ID=6307 (Retrieved 29 January 2011)

⁷⁷⁹ Anon. (2004): “Exito de la Diplomacia Española: Mongolia es el Primer País que Apoya la Alianza de Civilizaciones de Zapatero”. *La Razón*. 15 October 2004.

⁷⁸⁰ For instance in 2003, the total US budget of foreign aid was 14.000 million US\$. Egypt, probably one of the most representative elements of the Arab League received 1.300 million US\$ in military aid and 615 million US\$ for social programmes. Egypt was the second country receiving more aid. Jordan received 250 million US\$ for socio-economic support and 198 million US\$ for the military. Source: USAID.

⁷⁸¹ Craner, L. (2006): Will US Democratization Policy Work? Democracy in the Middle East. *Middle East Quarterly*. Summer. Pp. 3-10.

⁷⁸² Dalacoura, K. (2005): US Democracy Promotion in the Arab Middle East Since 11 Sept 2001. A Critique. *International Affairs*. 81(5). P. 964.

has been demonstrated how –i.e. Arab spring, African ODA⁷⁸³ - even with millionaire figures, socio-economic and political changes are very often doomed to fail. The money can help to establish and maintain –“buy”- stability in an area, but not necessarily provoking neither substantial nor sustained and enduring changes.

Kamen was not sure about how Zapatero could ensure enough financial resources to bolster his initiative. However as is going to be shown Zapatero was able to do so. Nevertheless, probably a better question then would be; once the diplomatic and financial support has been achieved, how is going to be used those resources? According to that it is fundamental to set the precise criterions that should be guaranteeing the efficiency and sustainability of the project. These aspects are related to the capacity or incapacity of managing a complex programme by achieving short, medium and long run objectives. This is going to be discussed later. However a question that could be asked is: to what extent Zapatero and his supporters were interested in effectively solving the existing problems and threats –Islamist terrorism- through the hypothesis of increasing dialogue and mutual understanding? Or, was it enough to try “buying” the aforementioned stability and the “obedience” from Southern countries? These questions are answered in the following epigraph.

8.4. Lack of Clarity and a Fainted Strategy: Missed Opportunities?

Zapatero was able to gain enough funds to support his initiative. The question then was how were those resources going to be used? The organizational model of any project should be defined by a clear strategy. This is only possible if the political entrepreneur leading the project has identified clearly the political window or opportunity. On top of that it is important that the political broker leading the proposal remains being interested in developing the mechanism forward within the medium and long term. However, from its initial inception the Alliance proposal lacked this coherence and consistency. Linked to this, Zapatero, as Balci has mentioned, lost his motivation in the “alliance” over the three years after the bombings because “the lesser the clash threatens to spread in his country, the lesser Spain needs the Alliance”.⁷⁸⁴

⁷⁸³ To see more on the failures of ODA refer to: Riddell, R.C. (2007): *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?* Oxford University Press. Oxford; Moyo, D. and Ferguson, N. (2010): *Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How There's a Better Way for Africa*. Farrar, Strans and Giroux.

⁷⁸⁴ Op. Cit. Balci, A. (2009): P. 103.

This comment would reinforce the idea role of political broker. However the PSOE's 2008-2011 electoral program shown a different approach. The second section of the program was dedicated to foreign affairs under the title "A stronger Spain within a fairer world".⁷⁸⁵ The sequence of priorities –the top five ones- presented by the PSOE was as follows: Alliance of Civilizations for peace and protection of human rights; co-operation and development; Latin America; transatlantic relations; promotion of peace, democracy and development in the Mediterranean.⁷⁸⁶ This means that the flagship of Zapatero's foreign policy remained the AoC.


Using CL to analyse relevant variables of the proposed program it is possible to appreciate that policy development at different levels, cooperation and security were the some of the most representative variables and this is shown in graphic 16. That expresses the priorities and approach the PSOE wanted to communicate to the voters. A second layer would be integrated by issues such as migration, human rights, future and terrorism whereas AoC was mentioned more times than the word crisis –element that is almost as quoted as radical Islam-. This is meaningful especially considering that from 2008 onward Spain started to suffer the consequences of a rampant –global and national- economic and financial crisis. This crisis was initially accepted in July 2008 and communicated to the congress in September 2008.⁷⁸⁷

⁷⁸⁵ PSOE (2008): *Motivos Para Crecer. Programa Electoral 2008-2011*. PSOE. Available at: <http://www.psoe.es/source-media/000000118500/000000118784.pdf> (Retrieved 10 June 2012)

⁷⁸⁶ Op. Cit. Pp. 281-299.

⁷⁸⁷ Navas, J.A. and García, A. (2008): Zapatero Anuncia Tiempos Duros y Presume de Dar la Cara en el Congreso. *El Mundo*. 10 September. Available at: <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/09/10/espana/1221039317.html> (Retrieved 10 June 2012) See also: Rodríguez Zapatero, J.L. (2008): Discurso del Presidente del Gobierno en el Pleno del Congreso de los Diputados para Informar de las Medidas del Gobierno Ante la Situación Económica y en Relación con la Creación de Empleo. Available at: <http://estaticos.elmundo.es/documentos/2008/09/10/zapatero.pdf> (Retrieved 10 June 2012) P.1.

Graph (16) PSOE 2008-2011 Electoral Program



Source: PSOE Electoral Program. Elaborated by the Author.


Considering this renewed interest in the AoC as the main diplomatic mechanism to propel Spain's role in international politics, it is important to assess how the initiative was managed from 2008 onward. Zapatero's second mandate would have been important for the consolidation of the AoC.

The first AoC Global Forum was celebrated in Madrid in January 2008.⁷⁸⁸ In April 2009 a second forum has held in Istanbul.⁷⁸⁹ In analysing the reports produced after these two summits it is possible to say, that according to what it was said before, the AoC was an initiative that bipolarised –since the beginning and over its consolidation phase- the concept of “civilizations”. The tension Western/Islam worlds is evident. As the graphic number 17 shows, among the selected variables “religion” represents the most quoted concept. The variables “muslim”, “Islam” and “Arab” are also relevant and superior when compared with some other potential competitors such as “hindus” “jews” “protestants” or “catholics”. It is also relevant to appreciate how geographical factors place the initiative very close to Europe, whereas the US plays a marginal role in contributing to the AoC. Therefore it is possible to define the AoC as a Eurocentric initiative that has assumed and incorporated the concept of clash of civilizations.

⁷⁸⁸ UNAOC (2008): *First Alliance of Civilizations Global Forum. Madrid*. Alliance of Civilizations Secretariat. New York. Available at: <http://www.unaoc.org/images/aoc%20forum%20report%20madrid%20complete.pdf> (Retrieved 1 August 2013)

⁷⁸⁹ UNAOC (2009): *Second Alliance of Civilizations Global Forum. Istanbul*. Alliance of Civilizations Secretariat. New York. Available at: http://www.unaoc.org/docs/AoC_Istanbul-09web.pdf (Retrieved 1 August 2013)

Graph (17) AoC Madrid 2008-Istambul 2009.



Source: UNAOC Reports, Madrid and Istanbul. Elaborated by the Author.

As the precedent comments and graphic number 17 suggest, the AoC was not conceived neither as global alliance nor as an inclusive mechanism. This biased and asymmetric approach –especially over the period of consolidation- endangered the sustainability of the proposal. As Lachmann has stressed, the “universalistic outlook of such efforts is challenged by the essential place of states, the singling out of tensions between the ‘West’ and the ‘Muslim world’ which points to exclusionary tendencies, and the reliance on security references to favour stakeholdership by international actors in the community-building attempt”.⁷⁹⁰

In assuming these institutional and organisational limitations, the selection process of new members and supporters can deepen existing unbalances especially if they contribute to potentially increase this asymmetry. Over 2008 and 2009 Spanish diplomacy played a very important role in attracting political and diplomatic supporters. These efforts contributed to the creation of the AoC group of friends.⁷⁹¹ This group grew up to 136 members by

⁷⁹⁰ Lachmann, N. (2011): In the Labyrinth of International Community: The Alliance of Civilizations Programme at the UN. *Cooperation Conflict*. Vol. 46. Issue 2. P. 185.

⁷⁹¹ UN (2011): Letter Dated 11 August 2011 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the General Assembly. UN General Assembly, A/66/305. P. 7. Available at: http://www.unaoc.org/wp-content/uploads/Report-Published_English-copy.pdf (Retrieved 10 June 2013)

2013.⁷⁹² Within this strategic effort of project building Spain and involved partners worked to achieve a greater recognisance. In November 2009 the UN approved resolution 64/14 supporting the activities of the alliance.⁷⁹³ Another important partner, the US joined AoC's Group of Friends by May 2010 under Obama's administration. This association accompanied Obama's first steps in foreign policy focused on the rapprochement between Western and Muslim Worlds. His political and diplomatic stances towards the achievement of this objective were expressed during his speech –“A new beginning”-in Cairo on 4 June 2009.⁷⁹⁴

As it has been said above, within AoC's phase of consolidation choosing controversial partners might entail miscommunication consequences and therefore potential failures. For instance, some Israeli media players considered that Obama was joining a “pro-Muslim” association.⁷⁹⁵ However, considering the ethos of the Alliance and its peculiarities the most controversial partner was NATO.

In April 2009, Zapatero offered NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the AoC as a platform to help reduce conflict and strengthen coexistence.⁷⁹⁶ This offer did not take into account the impact such a NATO role would have in damaging the possibility of strengthening dialogue between “different” civilizations.⁷⁹⁷

The NATO had both interests and experiences in the Mediterranean. In 1994 NATO established its Mediterranean Dialogue. This originally included Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Israel, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt. This initiative was a clear example of the organisation's attempt to find a political role after the end of the Cold War. Continuing with the focus on the Mediterranean, in 2001 –after 9/11- the NATO activated the Operation Active Endeavour to fight against terrorism.⁷⁹⁸ Following this trend of institutional innovation and identity renovation on 2009 – organization's Sixtieth anniversary- during the

⁷⁹² MAEC (2013): Alianza de Civilizaciones. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. Spain. Available at: <http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/PoliticaExteriorCooperacion/NacionesUnidas/Paginas/AlianzaCivilizaciones.aspx> (Retrieved 10 June 2013)

⁷⁹³ UN (2009): Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly. A/Res/64/14. Available at: <http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/UNGARsn/2009/65.pdf> (Retrieved 10 June 2013)

⁷⁹⁴ Obama, B.H. (2009): A New Beginning. Speech in Cairo. 4 June. The White House. Available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/presidents-speech-cairo-a-new-beginning> (Retrieved 13 November 2012)

⁷⁹⁵ Levi Julian, H. (2010): US Joins Pro-Muslim ‘Alliance of Civilizations’. *Arutz Sheva*. 20 May. Available at: <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/137610#.UiOkKT-rxzc> (Retrieved 13 November 2012)

⁷⁹⁶ Anon. (2009): Zapatero Ofrece que la Alianza de las Civilizaciones Colabore con la OTAN Para Reducir Conflictos. *El País*. 7 April. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/2009/04/07/internacional/1239055210_850215.html (Retrieved 10 June 2012)

⁷⁹⁷ Sjursen, M. (2004): On the Identity of NATO. *International Affairs*. Vol. 80. Pp. 687-703.

⁷⁹⁸ Mayer, S. (2011): “Die NATO Nach Dem 11. September: Aufgaben, Strategien und Institutionelles Design” In Jäger, T. (Ed.): *Die Welt Nach 9/11*. University of Bremen. Pp. 489-507.

NATO summit held in Strassburg/Khel, the heads of state and government adopted the new Declaration on Alliance Security.⁷⁹⁹

Strategically speaking it is possible to say that Zapatero's invitation to NATO would help to damage any existing pillar or possibility to strengthen dialogue between "different" civilizations. Seems to be certain that the NATO over the last years has been trying to find a new identity or a justification to exist as Sjursen points out.⁸⁰⁰ As has been arguing authors like Williams and Neumann⁸⁰¹ NATO has been trying to become a security community. This opinion is also shared by Gheciu. She expresses serious doubts, however, about the NATO's real possibilities to become an agent of socialization.⁸⁰²

However, this reorientation, this seek of a new identity, cannot eliminate its history. As Sjursen has argued, the attempt to define NATO as an association or community of liberal democratic values and norms is problematic.⁸⁰³ Within the first decade of the twenty-first century, these historical and institutional contradictions have become increasingly evident. As has been acknowledged by Razoux, despite NATO's increasing activity in the Mediterranean, its institutional and organizational image remains negative.⁸⁰⁴

Zapatero's belief that NATO was a legitimate partner in the Alliance project shows that he failed to identify a proper political stakeholder to support his agenda in the Mediterranean. This damaged Zapatero's credibility in the Mediterranean as a leader and interlocutor between the Arab and the western worlds. As a direct consequence, the Alliance of Civilizations suffered from this lack of leadership.

By 2009 Spain had to face a contradictory and worrying scenario. On one hand, when the global economic crisis started to hit, Zapatero failed to fully acknowledge the dimensions and scope of the economic crisis.⁸⁰⁵ But at the same time Spain was a participant at the G20 meeting in London, the NATO summit, the EU-US meeting held in Prague and the second meeting of the AoC celebrated in Istanbul where it served as co-president.⁸⁰⁶ As former

⁷⁹⁹ NATO (2009): Declaration on Alliance Security. NATO Declaration Strassbourg/Khel. 4 April. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-CA112F05-4BEF0170/natolive/news_52838.htm (Retrieved 13 June 2012)

⁸⁰⁰ Sjursen, M. (2004): On the Identity of NATO. *International Affairs*. Vol. 80. Pp. 687-703.

⁸⁰¹ Williams, M.C., and Neumann, I.B. (2000): From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia and the Power of Identity. *Millennium, Journal of International Studies*. Vol. 29. N°2. Pp. 357-387.

⁸⁰² Gheciu, A. (2005): Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the "New Europe". *International Organization*. N°59. Pp. 973-1012.

⁸⁰³ Op. Cit. Sjursen, M. (2004): P. 687.

⁸⁰⁴ Razoux, P. (2008): The NATO Mediterranean Dialogue at a Crossroads. *NATO Research Division*. Defence College, Rome. N°35. P.3.

⁸⁰⁵ Conference of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero at the CEOE assembly (Spanish Confederation of Entrepreneurial Organizations). 11 and 12 December 2008.

⁸⁰⁶ Moratinos, M.A. (2009): España por fin en su Sitio. Cuatro Cumbres para la Historia. *Política Exterior*. N°120. May/June. P. 19.

foreign minister Moratinos acknowledged, the country had re-established its standing and this “represents a historic moment in the role of Spain’s international relations, without precedent in our contemporary history”.⁸⁰⁷

From 2004 to 2008, according to Moratinos, Spain’s foreign policy and strategy was the removed the unilateralism that characterized Aznar’s style of governing. Moratinos believed that Zapatero understood that the new international order of the twenty first century required multilateralism and a global approach to the most pressing issues.⁸⁰⁸

This culminated in the AoC, a multilateral formula that placed Spain at the heart of the international system. However both Spain’s and Zapatero’s image and reputation as international players were delicate. On one hand new migration dynamics and the way Spain started to manage them, rapidly demonstrated the inconsistency between Zapatero’s international speech and more pressing national demands. The increasing securitization of migration related issues promoted a fiscal and punishing image within Southern Mediterranean countries.⁸⁰⁹ This hostile image was spread throughout the EU as well as long as countries such as France, the Netherlands, UK and Germany failed their integration processes and started to experience xenophobic sentiments against migrants as Zapata Barrero and Witte have studied.⁸¹⁰ These facts were especially salient since the beginning of the global economic crisis.⁸¹¹

Therefore both the economic crisis –with the sharp and intense deterioration of the labour market-⁸¹² and new migration policies started darkening Spain’s immediate future as a successful Euro-Mediterranean leader. In considering this context Spain started to face a very delicate situation. On one hand Spain in behaving as an entrepreneur and broker used migration related issues as one of the most important leverages to get support from the EU and attain greater diplomatic influence. Spain achieved success within the short and medium term. But on the other hand, once Spain had to implement restrictive migration policies from 2006 onward –and therefore abandon an inclusive and progressive rhetoric- Spain started to

⁸⁰⁷ Op. Cit. Moratinos, M. A. (2009): P. 19.

⁸⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁹ Lavenex, S. (2006): Immigration Policy in Europe: The Politics of Control. *West European Politics*. Vol. 29. Issue 2. Pp. 329-350; Leonard, S. (2010): EU Border Security and Migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and Securitisation Through Practices. *European Security*. Vol. 19. Issue 2. Pp. 231-254; Balch, A. (2010): Economic Migration and the Politics of Hospitality in Spain: Ideas and Policy Change. *Politics and Policy*. Vol. 38. Issue 5. Pp. 1037-1065.

⁸¹⁰ Zapata Barrero, R. and De Witte, N. (2007): The Spanish Governance of EU Borders: Normative Questions. *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 12. Issue 1. Pp. 85-90.

⁸¹¹ Furlong, A. (2010): Cultural Integration in the European Union: A Comparative Analysis of the Immigration Policies of France and Spain. *Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems*. Vol. 19. Pp. 681-703.

⁸¹² Royo, S. (2009): After the Fiesta: The Spanish Economy Meets the Global Financial Crisis. *South European Society and Politics*. Vol. 14. Issue 1. Pp. 19-34.

be targeted by Southern Mediterranean countries as a hostile government. This diminished Spain's negotiation power and diplomatic ability.

This loss of credibility - from a Southern point of view- was also replicated at a European level once Spain demonstrated its incapacity to manage the financial crisis. On one hand as Guillen has demonstrated it is true that Spain over its economic and industrial growth period –from 1995 to 2005- gained also international stature.⁸¹³ On the other hand, and despite good economic and financial contexts, Spain had always to fight against a historical and enduring image problem. As Guillen stresses that the “remarkable economic progress of the 1990s and early 2000's has not yet fully erased the perception of decadence, relative backwardness and exoticism”.⁸¹⁴

Within this context and diplomatic environment, in 2010, Spain acceded to the EU presidency. During this period the intention remained constant – using an international diplomatic role to increase prestige by engaging with global priorities in the service of national interests and priorities. In other words, the role of the political entrepreneur and broker in promoting self-interest needs to do so by embracing multilateral concerns. This is arguably the very root of the failure of multilateral diplomacy and mechanisms.

Spain's intentions for becoming a regional leader is clear and all national efforts to lead euro-Mediterranean politics where in a way threatened by the initiative launched by Sarkozy, the UfM. As it was said before, when Sarkozy presented the proposal Spain started to be nationally and internationally weakened. However the Spanish official discourse insisted in situating the UfM inside the broader framework of the Barcelona process. This is a rhetoric attempt of fortifying Spain's dominance within the Euro-Mediterranean politics:

“With regards to the Mediterranean, Spain will lead a needed and urgent debate to consolidate a Euro-Mediterranean area as a space of peace, prosperity and progress throughout the development of the Barcelona process that frames the proposal Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean”.⁸¹⁵

This paragraph insists in the factor of Spanish leadership within a process that should be designed to delineate the areas of cooperation. How possible is cooperation when a particular or individual government or group of governments design their diplomatic strategy in order to reinforce their international dominance? Leadership and cooperation are two

⁸¹³ Guillen, M.F. (2005): *The Rise of Spanish Multinationals: European Business in the Global Economy*. Cambridge University Press. P. 143.

⁸¹⁴ Op. Cit. P. 170.


⁸¹⁵ Op. Cit. Moratinos, M.A. (2009): P. 19.

vectors that can work together when national interests are put aside. When this condition is not respected the future of diplomatic strategies and multilateral mechanisms and policies may be doomed to fail in the medium and short term. The communicational component that is present in this model tends to be vertical, excluding and restricted to specific priority elements the dominant player wants to develop according to the agenda. This model does not enhance cooperation but aims at creating or reinforcing –even unconsciously- systems of dependence.

8.5.European Reactions.

In applying the CL approach and in selecting the same variables studied in precedent chapters it is important to see how the European Council has been translating the worries and the political priorities of EU member states and how political brokers and entrepreneurs have been impacting and shaping European politics and decision-making processes. The graphic below, number 18, shows the period of Zapatero's first mandate.

Graph. (18) European Councils, Conclusions of the Presidency.



Source: European Council. Elaborated by the Author.

This graphic number 18 shows that for the studied period of time there are three main variables that stick out from the other ones: security, migration and Mediterranean. In considering this period, it is clear that terrorism, even though, it remains an important topic over 2005, its presence within the official texts curbs. However it is important to note how migration related issues remain the second relevant political issue for European countries.

This trend confirms the evolution of this variable over the period of time studied in precedence, 2001-2004. Therefore, this trend reinforces this dissertation's hypothesis which has considered that migration related issues represent the most important political and diplomatic factor that allows understanding the challenges and failures of both EU public speech and diplomatic communication strategies.

As it has been stated above, 2005 represented the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process. Within the framework of this review, the EU approved the report on the implementation of the Strategic Partnership between the EU and the Mediterranean Region and the Middle East.⁸¹⁶ In considering the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and the Middle East for the interests of the EU this partnership –based on the interim report of 2004 that was mentioned earlier- aimed at strengthening all the mechanisms and policies supported by the Barcelona Process and the ENP.⁸¹⁷ At a rhetorical level there are a number of interesting elements that have to be analysed. This partnership insists in the idea of designing policies and mechanisms reinforcing the “principles of joint ownership and partnership”.⁸¹⁸

Technically speaking joint ownership is the fundamental aspect that might guarantee win-win scenarios. However it would also entail the existence of control and accountability systems to allow a reciprocal evaluation. In any case, due to the strong institutional development of European partners and the opposite structure in southern Mediterranean countries, this symmetric approach cannot be possible. Therefore the achievement of these win-win or co-operative scenarios is doomed to fail. This stronger political consensus and diplomatic structure in the EU, allowed at least the discussion -during the 7th Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in 2005- on “joint conclusions to be adopted for the first time, on the need to promote political and social reforms in the partners countries”.⁸¹⁹ In the conclusions published after this conference it was said that “its vast potential is far from being exhausted and sets the objectives for many years to come”.⁸²⁰ Although the potential of these policies remained very vague from an operational-managerial point of view considering

⁸¹⁶ European Council. (2005): European Council. Conclusions of the Presidency. June 2005. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/85349.pdf (Retrieved 1 August 2013)

⁸¹⁷ European Council (2005): EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Partnership%20Mediterranean%20and%20Middle%20East.pdf> (Retrieved 13 July 2012)

⁸¹⁸ Ibid.


⁸¹⁹ Ibid.

⁸²⁰ EMP (2005): Conclusions for the Seventh Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Luxembourg, 30-31 May. Available at: <http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/conseil/2005/05/31euromed/euromed.pdf> (Retrieved 12 June 2012) P. 1.

that the only exact –and measurable date- was 2010 when it was supposed to create the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area.

On the other hand, in the same conclusions, this concept of “joint conclusions” was restricted to a paper presented by southern Mediterranean countries where they were exposing their diplomatic stances and desires.⁸²¹ After the problems and challenges posed by an increasing southern migration towards Europe or by the Middle East peace process among others, the mentioned phase of “realisation” advised diplomats to consider dialogue among partners as the baseline of the futures Euro-Mediterranean project. The graphic number 19 shows that at a rhetorical level, the European Council placed dialogue before economic, trading or security objectives.

Graph (19): Strategic Partnership between the EU and the Mediterranean and the Middle East



Source: Strategic Partnership EU-Med-ME. Elaborated by the Author.

Despite this apparent –rhetoric- convincement to strengthen dialogue among partners, the migratory issue remains very sensitive as it was explained in chapter 6. Especially when according to the graphic and the contents of these European councils the variables migration and security –European security- are imbricated. This element represents the basic failure of the symmetric proposal based on the reinforcement of the feeling of co-ownership.

During the third 2005 Council it was also adopted the five year work programme and a code of conduct on countering-terrorism. This programme established the medium term objectives in the fields of political and security partnership –first priority-; sustainable

⁸²¹ Op. Cit. P.2.

economic growth and reform; education and socio-cultural exchanges; migration, social integration; justice and security.⁸²² It was also highlighted the need of developing a consistent global approach to migration and it was planned that for 2006 it was necessary to hold the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meeting focusing on migration issues.

Following the same line –and clashing with the rhetoric betting for a Euro-Mediterranean dialogue- it was also discussed the Mediterranean Coastal Patrol Network –the Mediterranean Surveillance System- named FRONTEX.⁸²³ During the second Council celebrated in 2006, it was linked “organised crime, corruption, illegal migration and terrorism”.⁸²⁴ It was also stressed that cooperation on migration it was an important part of EU’s Neighbourhood Policy.⁸²⁵ During the third 2006 council it was highlighted that migration represented challenges and opportunities and that it represented one of the “major priorities of the EU at the start of the 21st Century”.⁸²⁶

During the third council of 2007 it was expressed that the “council calls for better coordination between migration and integration policies. In the context of the 2008 year of Intercultural Dialogue”.⁸²⁷ This statement is contradictory and clashes against the increasing securitization and criminalization of migratory issues. Integration policies cannot be fully develop within an environment of restriction and securitization, because as it has been demonstrated in chapter 4, public opinion reacts negatively against migrants –and therefore it blocks potential integration processes- when political communication strategies use migration as a political opportunity.

After showing how Spain during Zapatero’s mandates tried to continue working along the same lines to remain a relevant international player, both national and international dynamics challenged the hypotheses and policies defended by Spain as a political entrepreneur and broker. Spain identified this moment of weakness and Sarkozy was ready to take over the Euro-Mediterranean leadership. The next, and final, chapter explores how Sarkozy developed his Mediterranean project and assesses how Spain, in losing part of the

⁸²² European Council (2005): Conclusions of the Presidency. Third Meeting. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/87642.pdf (Retrieved 1 August 2013)
See also Euromed (2005):

⁸²³ Ibid.

⁸²⁴ European Council (2006): European Council. Conclusions of the Presidency. Third. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/89013.pdf (Retrieved 1 August 2013)

⁸²⁵ Ibid.

⁸²⁶ Ibid.

⁸²⁷ European Council (2007): European Council. Conclusions of the Presidency. Third. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/97669.pdf (Retrieved 1 August 2013)

diplomatic capacity weakened by strategic and managerial errors had to accommodate and re-think a diplomatic strategy aiming at ensuring a certain leadership.

CHAPTER 9

THE PRESIDENCY OF NICOLAS SARKOZY AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

Frustrated Ambitions, Failed Leadership

9.1. Jacques Chirac's Foreign Policy and the Arab World.

Analysing Sarkozy's political and diplomatic engagement in the Mediterranean requires a brief review of President Jacques Chirac's political initiative with regards to French and Euro-Mediterranean relations. During his period as France's Prime Minister -1974 to 1976- he demonstrated a clear enthusiasm to promote the *Politique Arab de France* (PAF).⁸²⁸ Chirac's presidency -1995 to 2007- covered important years for the development of a communitarian Mediterranean policy. As Guitta points out, Chirac inherited a strong pro-Arab foreign policy.⁸²⁹ A policy that was consistent with the Gaullist tradition established in 1967 onward.⁸³⁰

Even though as Gerecht and Schmitt have demonstrated, Chirac during his second mandate –from 2002 to 2007- differed from De Gaulle is showing a more proactive attitude towards the US.⁸³¹ Putting aside this comment, Chirac immediately after taking office aimed at boosting further French-Arab relations by implementing a new *politique arabe*. Chirac wanted to reverse François Mitterrand's partial lack of engagement within the Mediterranean and the Arab World.⁸³² In fact during Mitterrand's mandate France's foreign policy developed more its European side and marginalised the relations with the Arab World. On one hand, that attitude provoked the obsolescence France's foreign policy towards the Middle East – especially during his second mandate from 1988 to 1995-and did not allow France's full engagement in the design of the new Euro-Mediterranean project.⁸³³

As soon as Chirac announced his intentions to further develop French-Arab relations,

⁸²⁸ Taheri, A. (2003): France's "Arab" Policy: Time for Debate. *American Foreign Policy Interests*. Vol. 25. Issue 4. P. 323.

⁸²⁹ Guitta, O. (2005): The Chirac Doctrine. *Middle East Quarterly*. Vol. XII. N°4. P. 43.

⁸³⁰ Behr, T. (2009): *France, Germany and Europe's Middle East Dilemma: The Impact of National Foreign Policy Tradition on Europe's Middle East Policy*. Johns Hopkins University. PhD. Thesis. P. 145.

⁸³¹ Gerecht, R.M. and Schmitt, G. (2006): A Post-Gaullist, Pro-American France? *American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research*. N°1. P. 1.

⁸³² Moisi, D. (1982): La France de Mitterrand et le Conflit du Proche-Orient: Comment Concilier Emotion et Politique. *Politique Etrangere*. Vol. 47. N°2. Pp. 395-402.

⁸³³ Kodmani-Darwish, B. (1995): La France et le Moyen-Orient: Entre Nostalgie et Réalisme. *Politique Etrangere*. Vol. 60. N°4. P. 941; El Moustouai, F. (2011): *Mitterrand et le Moyen Orient*. L'Harmattan. Paris.

Arab leaders welcomed his decision.⁸³⁴ This announcement was pronounced at the University of Cairo in April 1996 during an official trip to Lebanon and Egypt. Chirac mentioned that a new French-Arab policy should be developed because at that time in France there were already four million Muslims. On the other hand, Chirac, taking advantage of the developments promoted by the Barcelona Process assured that France's engagement in the region should be shared also with EU institutions, mechanisms and political actors.⁸³⁵ This attitude revealed France's interest in repositioning the country as a Euro-Mediterranean political and diplomatic leader after the socialist hiatus.

However beyond these rhetoric aspects, the question that remained was: how did Chirac plan to re-launch France's *politique arab*? Strategically speaking, as Wood has noted, it is clear that Chirac wanted to reverse France's marginalization. As a part of this strategy, Chirac also wanted to play an important and leading role in contributing to the solution of the Middle East peace process.⁸³⁶ But the fulfilment of his goals depended upon US's interests in the area, so the best possible alliance had to be developed together with the EU.⁸³⁷ This position between powers was already tested and experienced by France between 1970 and 1974 within the context of the oil crisis.⁸³⁸ However even though Chirac supported EU's initiatives towards the Mediterranean, he wanted to take advantage of the previous economic and cultural influence within the region. The Élysée deployed a strategy that could be defined as entrepreneurial and industrial diplomacy. This is not the same as being political or diplomatic entrepreneur.

By entrepreneurial and industrial diplomacy the author means the inner-national impulse –bilateral- one given single country works out in order to achieve greater regional influence through economic and trade relations. This attitude does not seek photo-opportunities. This attitude is not guided by visual effects but by a productive and tangible approach that aims at developing long-term collaborations.

During Chirac's first mandate –from 1995 to 2002- France reached the top three among trade partners within the Arab World.⁸³⁹ This position has been consolidated over the

⁸³⁴ Op. Cit. P. 942.

⁸³⁵ Chirac, J. (1996): Discourse sur la Cooperation Culturelle, Economique, et Technologique avec l'Egypt, sur la Politique Arabe de la France. 8 April. Available at : <http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/967005600.html> (Retrieved 1 August 2013)

⁸³⁶ Hollis, R. (1997): Europe and the Middle East. Power by Stealth? *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 73. N°1. P. 15.

⁸³⁷ Wood, P.C. (1998): Chirac's "New Arab Policy" and Middle East Challenges: The Arab-Israeli Conflict in Iraq-Iran. *Middle East Journal*. Vol. 52. N°4. P. 563.

⁸³⁸ Gfeller, A.E. (2011): A European Voice in the Arab World: France, the Superpowers and the Middle East, 1970-1974. *Cold War History*. Vol. 11. Issue 4. Pp. 659-676.

⁸³⁹ Op. Cit. Guitta, O. (2005): P. 3.

next decade. By 2012-2013 France was number one trade partner –imports- in Morocco, Tunisia; second trade partner in Morocco –exports-, Algeria –imports-, Libya –exports-.⁸⁴⁰ That demonstrates French economic influence in North Africa. Nevertheless this intense entrepreneurial and industrial diplomacy was not articulated or architected to increase France's leadership in boosting EU's Mediterranean policy. It basically remained as a national effort addressing French national interests.

As Telhani has studied through a survey, among Arab countries President Chirac was one of the most admired leaders.⁸⁴¹ Within the same survey references to Spain or any Spanish President were inexistent. However, beyond a charming attitude and a sporadic activism, Aeschiman and Boltanski have defined Chirac as a leader who has understood very well on-going transformations within the Arab World. But at the same time, he has been showing incapacity to overcome a diplomatic inefficiency that has generated immobility and lack of concrete results.⁸⁴² These two authors concurred with the fact that at the end, beyond the PAF's potential, Chirac's *politique arabe*, has been reduced to a particular "vendetta" against Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. This tense relation with Damascus impeded a fluid integration of Syria within the Euro-Mediterranean process. Therefore, this fact added complications to a process that was already damaged by these complicated regional and international relations. Nevertheless, if France wanted to play a more active and leading role within the Euro-Mediterranean process relations with Syria had to be solved. The next France's president –Nicolas Sarkozy- had to change strategy and include Syria within his agenda if he wanted to gain leadership.⁸⁴³

Against this background France had a chance to recover its Mediterranean diplomatic ambitions within a context of institutional decadence. Decadence shared by the limited results provided by Chirac's foreign policy towards the Middle East, on one hand, and by the quasi-failure of the Barcelona Process on the other hand. All this framed by increasing migration flows from Southern Mediterranean countries and the beginning of the global financial crisis.

The 2007 French presidential campaign seemed very much to focus on domestic problems rather than foreign policy. But as the Spanish case has shown there is often a fine line between how issues – such as migration or terrorism – are located in the domestic and

⁸⁴⁰ Database: *Observatory of Economic Complexity*. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. MIT. Available at: http://atlas.media.mit.edu/explore/tree_map/export/usa/all/show/2010/ (Retrieved 1-5 August 2013)

⁸⁴¹ Telhani, S. (2003): A View from the Arab World: A Survey in Five Countries. *The Brookings Institution*. P.4.

⁸⁴² Aeschiman, E. and Boltanski, C. (2007): *Chirac d'Arabie. Les Mirages d'Une Politique Française*. Grasset. Paris.

⁸⁴³ Zisser, E. (2009): Syria's Diplomatic Comeback: What Next? *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 14. N°1. P.108.

foreign spheres.

France, for example, with the highest number of immigrants of Muslim origin in Europe - Seven million, from 1995 to 2007 this number increased of three million- knows this better than most. So did Nicolas Sarkozy. When Chirac was elected as President in 1995 he defended the new PAF considering also French -Muslim population. However, the acceleration of migration flows experienced by Europe since the 2000s, started to challenge this pro-migrant rhetoric. As Minister of Interior –under Chirac’s presidency- Sarkozy demonstrated a zero-tolerance policy in tackling riots by second and third generations of immigrants in Rouen, Aubervilliers, Sein-S. Denis, Rennes, Dijon, Nice and Marseille.

Many on the left of the political spectrum believed that his actions during this period destroyed his chances in the 2007 election. Others such as US diplomats based in Paris thought foreign policy would not matter in the election. In a cable from the US Embassy in Paris back to Washington it was noted that “foreign policy has not and probably will not play a prominent role in the French presidential election campaign, and neither Nicolas Sarkozy nor Segolene Royal has enunciated a fleshed out foreign policy vision”.⁸⁴⁴ They were wrong. He won and in doing so highlighted that France’s domestic problems are often also its foreign policy problems.

During their campaigns both Sarkozy and his socialist opponent Royal engaged in political discourse very similar to that of de Gaulle’s. Both emphasized human rights and democratization as a way of restoring France to its proper international standing and underlined its “universal mission” on a global stage. Despite the rhetoric, it needs to be assessed just how much, following his victory was Sarkozy genuinely interested in these issues and especially in how they related to the Mediterranean?

9.2.Sarkozy and the Mediterranean Window: Launching the Mediterranean Union.

The relationship between Sarkozy and the Mediterranean became evident during 2005 when in a speech in Morocco he commented on the possibility of creating a Mediterranean Union.⁸⁴⁵ However, it was not until two years later when Sarkozy was elected president that he launched his Mediterranean program. As Romain Nadal, an adviser to the French president, noted during an interview for this thesis, while Sarkozy was interior minister he


⁸⁴⁴ Available at :<http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/03/07PARIS921.html> (Retrieved 4 December 2010)

⁸⁴⁵ Schmid, D. (2008): La Turquie et l’Union pour la Méditerranée: Un Partenariat Calculé. *Politique Étrangere*. 2008/1. Prémtemps. P. 66.

worked closely with Spanish officials and leaders in the area of counter-terrorism.⁸⁴⁶ Whether this continued once Sarkozy came up with his personal Mediterranean project is an interesting issue examined below.

During his presidential campaign, in Toulon in February 2007, Sarkozy announced his intention to launch a “Mediterranean Union”. He raised this objective in the context of ending the “lack of hope” in contemporary France, where there is no certainty about itself, its “identity, its role, its future”.⁸⁴⁷ Indeed, within nine sentences Sarkozy used the word “hope” six times. As Balfour has mentioned there was also a strong post-colonial component to Sarkozy’s words.⁸⁴⁸ “In Toulon, I came to tell the French that their future is here, in the Mediterranean. Here where everything has began (...)”.⁸⁴⁹ In using the CL approach it is possible to appreciate in the graphic number 20, that Sarkozy was -quantitatively speaking considering both ranking and frequency- articulating his speech in a very precise way: first putting first himself as the agent of change; second mentioning “we” including and involving French citizens within this new process: third, incorporating within the process the “Mediterranean” as the chosen element to boost this change being; four “France” the country to be responsible for it; five, placing “Europe” in a secondary position.

Graph (20) Sarkozy, Discourse Toulon. 2007.



Source: Sarkozy’s complete discourse, Toulon, 2007.

⁸⁴⁶ Interview with Romain Nadal. Paris, 29 October 2012.

⁸⁴⁷ Available at: <http://mouveuropeprovence.free.fr/serendipity/index.php?/archives/17-Discours-Nicolas-Sarkozy-a-Toulon,-Mercredi-7-fevrier-2007.html> (Retrieved 4 December 2010)

⁸⁴⁸ Balfour, R. (2009): The Transformation of the Union for the Mediterranean. *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 14. N°1. P. 99.

⁸⁴⁹ Op. Cit. Sarkozy, N. (2007): Discourse, Toulon.

Undoubtedly, this rhetoric was mainly an electoral strategy directed to address some French problems. As Gillespie has noted there were also a number of economic and commercial interests behind Sarkozy's proposal.⁸⁵⁰ In three interviews for this thesis, with Monica Frassoni, co-spoke person of the Green Party in Brussels and Paolo Bergamaschi and Michelle Rieu, Green party foreign policy advisors, it was noted that Sarkozy's interest was in part making France into the main supplier and provider of nuclear energy technology and infrastructure in the Southern Mediterranean in general and in Libya in particular.⁸⁵¹

In fact during June 2007, one month after being elected as president, Sarkozy visited Tripoli on an official visit to meet with Colonel Qaddafi. Sarkozy described this as an attempt to "help Libya to come back to the international order".⁸⁵² However the trip also had strong political, strategic and economic connotations. As *Le Figaro* noted, it was during this trip that French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner and his Libyan counterpart, Abderrahmane Chalgham, signed a "Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Civilian Nuclear Applications", and a number of parallel agreements on defense and security. Subsequently commercial agreements were signed to develop civilian nuclear energy.⁸⁵³

This relationship with Libya was representative of Sarkozy's development as a political entrepreneur in the Mediterranean by providing a "brilliant and aggressive foreign policy to satisfy the French and pull them out of depression".⁸⁵⁴ Some argued his plans for the Mediterranean would be a "duplication" of the EU.⁸⁵⁵ If this proposal intended, as Jamet hypothesized,⁸⁵⁶ to be a more regional "Union" from a conceptual point of view, any envisaged process of regional integration would have been much more difficult than a union

⁸⁵⁰ Op. Cit. Gillespie, R. (2008): P. 278.

⁸⁵¹ Personal interview with Ms. Monica Frassoni. Barcelona, 26 October 2011. Personal interviews with Mr. Paolo Bergamaschi and Ms. Michelle Rieu. European Parliament. Brussels. 15 May 2012.

⁸⁵² Anon. (2007): "La France et la Libye Signent un Accord Sur le Nucléaire Civil". *Le Figaro*. 25 June 2007. Available at: http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2007/07/25/01003-20070725ARTWWW90355-la_france_et_la_libye_signent_un_accord_sur_le_nucleaire_civil.php (Retrieved 7 June 2012). See the official documents related to this French nuclear policy at: Laurent, S. (2008): "Nucléaire Libyen: Des Documents Officiels Démentent la Version de Sarkozy". *Le Monde*. 18 April 2012. Available at: http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2012/article/2012/04/18/nucleaire-libyen-des-documents-officiels-dementent-la-version-de-sarkozy_1687018_1471069.html (Retrieved 7 June 2012)

⁸⁵³ Girard, Q. (2011): "Fin 2010, La France Voulait Toujours Vendre du Nucléaire à la Libye". *Liberation*. 21 March 2011. Available at: <http://www.liberation.fr/monde/01012326917-fin-2010-la-france-voulait-toujours-vendre-du-nucleaire-a-la-libye> (Retrieved 7 June 2012)

⁸⁵⁴ Quoted by Torreblanca, J.I. (2008): Sarkozy's Foreign Policy: Where Do European Interests and Values Stand? *Fride, Comments*. February. Available at: <http://ecfr.eu/page/-/documents/Torreblanca-Sarkozy-Foreign-Policy.pdf> (Retrieved 29 February 2012)

⁸⁵⁵ Op. Cit. Schmid, D. (2008): P. 67.

⁸⁵⁶ Jamet, J.F. (2008): Intégration Régionale: Processus de Barcelone et Union pour la Méditerranée, Quels Scénarios d'avenir? *Questions d'Europe*. N°105. Foundation Robert Schuman. P. 1.

among European partners.

This explains the badly planned diplomatic and political strategy Sarkozy deployed. This chapter intends to demonstrate that this proposal from its inception to its partial implementation was an unnecessary political initiative. First, it showed a lack of understanding with regards to the socio-economic needs and obstacles of the broader Southern Mediterranean. Second, those who wanted to lead this project, like Spain, Italy and France demonstrated a lack of willingness to develop a flexible approach to the development of the project. Third, the willingness of some EU Member States to provide EU-taxpayer funds on a poorly thought out project. Fourth, the lack of political responsibility in negotiating with dictatorial regimes in the Mediterranean countries.

These issues raise an important question as to what exactly was the strategic objective of Sarkozy's Mediterranean project? As Nadal put it in an interview for this thesis:

“I think that he did it very *à la* Sarkozy. With egocentrism (...) The main difficulty at the Elysée at that time is that the one who brings up and pushes this project is Henry Guaino, who conceptualized it with Jean-Louis Guigou. Henry Guaino is very anti-European, and he considers this project as an alternative project to the Barcelona Process, not as an occasion to modernise it. Because of this approach there was a very strong fight at the Elysée between Guaino and Jean Davide Levitte, diplomatic advisor”.⁸⁵⁷

According to this view there was a divide between Sarkozy's senior advisors and according to Nadal, these tensions impacted negatively on this project from the beginning.⁸⁵⁸ According to Guigou – founder and general delegate of the Institute de Prospective Économique du Monde Méditerranéen (IPEMED)-, also in an interview for this thesis, there was not a particular ideology driving Sarkozy's actions: “Sarkozy did not prepare anything. It was a bomb. Like a terrorist... This is political terrorism. He scared, he was strong and he was malignant”.⁸⁵⁹ Guigou's strong statement against Guaino's and Sarkozy's proposal was justified by the strong work developed by Guigou and the IPEMED within the Mediterranean world since 2006. It is possible to say that many of the ideas taken by Guaino and Sarkozy were rooted in Guigou's Mediterranean thought.

Sarkozy launched his proposal without taking into consideration any other potential partners. As Balfour and Schmid noted, “Paris has (...) begun seeking consensus *ex post* on

⁸⁵⁷ Cited interview with Romain Nadal.

⁸⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁹ Interview with Jean Louis Guigou. Paris, 19 November 2012.

an idea that it did not discuss in advance with potential partners but now cannot afford to either drop or pursue in isolation”.⁸⁶⁰ This lack of strategy clashed with the EU’s interests in the area and challenged those countries like Spain and Italy playing an important role in leading the EMP. As Schumacher has also stated, Sarkozy underestimated the internal dynamics “that a bloated framework of 43 members which such different political, economic and socio-cultural backgrounds would generate.”⁸⁶¹

As some political commentators have stated, it seemed that Sarkozy was trying to consolidate his political credentials on a global level by acting as the diplomatic bridge between the North and the South of the Mediterranean.⁸⁶² In doing this Sarkozy forgot or ignored the fact that the Mediterranean was a zone of common interest. As Daoud has stated, during his five years of leadership, part of the reason Sarkozy failed to “leverage appropriately and responsibly his country’s global leadership position as a major economic and military power”,⁸⁶³ was because he looked to take the lead in the Mediterranean alone. The EU did not wait to react against this manoeuvre.

9.3.European Reactions.

Sarkozy decision to engage unilaterally in the Mediterranean provoked severe responses from his EU partners and fuelled existing rivalries –economic and political – that did not help to develop a coordinated Euro-Mediterranean process.⁸⁶⁴ It is important to bear in mind that economically speaking, as Guigou has mentioned, among European countries there is pure rivalry and therefore, spurring those geo-strategic and economic tensions would contribute to annihilate or weaken any socio-political initiative.⁸⁶⁵

Initially Sarkozy’s political discourse designed by Guaino was based both on emotion and nationalism. In strategic terms his first rhetorical approach was aimed at three specific objectives: 1) Criticizing any existing policy, 2) offering a new alternative and 3) opening a

⁸⁶⁰ Balfour, R. and Schmid, D. (2008): Union for The Mediterranean, Disunity for the EU? *European Policy Centre*. Policy Brief. February 2008. P. 2.

⁸⁶¹ Schumacher, T. (2009): A Fading Mediterranean Dream. *European Voice*. Available at: <http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/a-fading-mediterranean-dream/65512.aspx> (Retrieved 12 August 2012)

⁸⁶² Simons, S. (2008): “Nicolas Sarkozy’s New Club Med”. *Spiegel Online International*. 7 December 2008. Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/union-for-the-mediterranean-nicolas-sarkozy-s-new-club-med-a-565667.html> (Retrieved 12 August 2012)

⁸⁶³ Daoud, A. (2012): France’s New President: Foreign Policy and Where North Africa Stands. *The North African Journal*. Available at: <http://www.north-africa.com/premium/opinions/2012/05/09/frances-new-president-foreign-policy-and-where-north-africa-stands/> (Retrieved 21 July 2012)

⁸⁶⁴ Cited interview Jean Louis Guigou.

⁸⁶⁵ Ibid.

new frame of multilateral relations in parallel to the EU but led by France.

In retrospect it is possible to say that the first objective was successful. Sarkozy actively criticised and disqualified the Barcelona Process during his official visit to Tunisia in April 2008.⁸⁶⁶ However, Spain's Secretary of State for the EU, Diego González Garrido reacted immediately and defended the Barcelona Process.⁸⁶⁷

As the director of the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMeD), Andreu Bassols has noted the second one –proposing an alternative- offered the possibility of achieving certain consensus. However: "...this alternative did not work out with the Turkish who immediately received that discourse with great scepticism, and even with certain hostility. And I know that because few weeks after the discourse I was in Ankara and the message we got from the Ministry was very clear."⁸⁶⁸

The third objective did not succeed. That is why, according to Bassols, there was a desire to call it the Mediterranean Union from the start.⁸⁶⁹ However, this was a very ambitious name for a very underdeveloped organization. As such, the name chosen was the Union for the Mediterranean.⁸⁷⁰

European stakeholders did not welcome this specifically nationalistic proposal launched independently by Sarkozy. As ambassador Landaburu has stressed, Sarkozy's proposal was unexpected in Spanish political and diplomatic circles.⁸⁷¹ Former president of Catalonia Jordi Pujol also expressed this view: "Sarkozy had a political campaign where he never spoke about the Mediterranean. (...) I was amazed when during his first discourse after winning the elections he said that they would create a Mediterranean Union that would integrate North African countries and Europe."⁸⁷² Spanish diplomats found very difficult to accept the proposal.

Sarkozy lobbied hard across Europe and as ambassador Landaburu highlights: "They did not dare to oppose against Sarkozy. And there, there was also a pact of Southern countries against the Eurocrats and Germany, a pact that France wanted to avoid."⁸⁷³ Having said that

⁸⁶⁶ Marti Font, J.M. (2008): "Sarkozy Descalifica el Proceso de Barcelona de la Unión Europea". *El País*. 1 May. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/2008/05/01/internacional/1209592805_850215.html (Retrieved 27 October 2011)

⁸⁶⁷ González, M. (2008): "España Defiende de las Críticas de París el Proceso de Barcelona". 2 May. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/2008/05/02/internacional/1209679206_850215.html (Retrieved 27 October 2011)

⁸⁶⁸ Personal interview with IEMeD Director General Andreu Bassols. Barcelona, 27 October 2011.

⁸⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁷¹ Cited interview with Ambassador Eneko Landaburu.

⁸⁷² Available at: http://www.support-sarkozy-france.com/nicolas_sarkozy/victory_speech.pdf (Retrieved 21 July 2012). Cited interview with Pujol.

⁸⁷³ Ibid. Op. Cit. Balfour, R. and Schmid, D. (2008): P. 1.

Spain did not react due to two reasons, first it had no other alternative proposals and second they were also happy to let Sarkozy “burn himself in the Mediterranean”.⁸⁷⁴ On the other hand it is also true that this political and diplomatic storm helped to reposition the Mediterranean within the European agenda.

However, Sarkozy was willing to cooperate because he wanted the initiative to succeed. In particular, he wanted the support of the larger northern European EU powers Germany and the UK “German Chancellor Angela Merkel, openly accused France of excluding non-Mediterranean countries in an attempt to sideline existing EU policies and hijack European funds to support French foreign policy initiatives”. The UK said that it “would not spend an extra penny on the project”.⁸⁷⁵

Smaller member states such as Portugal and Slovenia, both of whom held EU presidencies during this time were suspicious of the proposal as contradicting the EU’s own plans for the Mediterranean during their presidencies. The important Mediterranean stakeholders of Italy and Spain were also suspicious. In June 2007, Sarkozy had a meeting with Romano Prodi in the Elysée in order to try to get Italian support. But the proposal as it was presented was rejected immediately.⁸⁷⁶

The context was very difficult as Echeverría states. This new ambiguous proposal should have to solve the problems that were not solved over the last twelve years. It seemed to be more a question of political will, idealism and illusion rather than political efficiency and realism. Summarizing, apart from internal opposition, Sarkozy’s proposal had to contend with deadlock in the Middle East peace process, differences over the potential accession of Turkey to the EU and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).⁸⁷⁷ According to Turkey’s Ambassador to the UN Oguz Demiralp who was interviewed for this thesis, Turkey viewed Sarkozy’s proposal as “a trap designed only for Turkey” so Turkey could be told “you have the Mediterranean Union, a virtual or fictitious entity, so, don’t try to come to the European Union. But at the end he had to change”.⁸⁷⁸

⁸⁷⁴ Cited interview with ambassador Landaburu.

⁸⁷⁵ Op. cit. Balfour, R., and Schmid, D. (2008): P.1.

⁸⁷⁶ Op. Cit. Gillespie, R. (2008): P. 279.

⁸⁷⁷ Echeverría, C. (2007): *La Unión Mediterránea del Presidente Nicolás Sarkozy: ¿La Superación del Proceso de Barcelona?* *UNISCI Discussion Papers*. N. 15. Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia. P. 236.

⁸⁷⁸ Personal interview with Ambassador Oguz Demiralp. Turkey’s ambassador to the United Nations Oguz Demiralp. Former Turkey’s ambassador to the EU. Geneva, 30 August 2012. It is pertinent to say that within this context, Turkey asked already in 1997 the accession to the EU in Luxemburg when the country was invited to the conference of the European council where it was presented the plan for the EU enlargement. In EU. (1997): *European Union Enlargement. Presidency Conclusions*. European Council. 12 and 13 December 1997. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/032a0008.htm (Retrieved 1 September 2012)

With these challenges Sarkozy realised that without the Spanish and the Italian support the proposal would sink. The French president organised a dinner with Zapatero in Rome in order to explain the proposal. Spanish foreign minister Moratinos supported the proposal because he believed that it was in Spain's interests to back the initiative in terms of Spain's role within the overall Mediterranean process.⁸⁷⁹ These strategic actions demonstrate how the French diplomacy had to react very actively in order to get the proposal afloat.

As Bassols pointed out during the interview, Spain's minister of Foreign Affairs, Miguel Ángel Moratinos went on board quickly as understood that it was in Spain's interest to support this initiative in order to promote the advancement of the process, even though, probably, Moratinos not being a very convinced Europeanist, was mostly thinking about Spain's role within the overall Mediterranean process. Nevertheless at a diplomatic level, the interest in pushing the proposal towards Europe was probably the most pragmatic option to gain some time in order to re-channel the initial project and to have more chances to gain some political influence.⁸⁸⁰

From Moratinos' perspective, Sarkozy's proposal was an instrumental tool to overcome the problems the Barcelona Process faced in its attempt to construct a real Euro-Mediterranean geopolitical space.⁸⁸¹ In other words, its support was an attempt to transform and translate French moves into a specific action that should benefit all the stakeholders involved in the Euro-Mediterranean process.⁸⁸²

On top of that it would not be prudent forgetting the global economic crisis that started to be widely recognised from 2008 onwards. This factor, has been contributing to deepen the difficulties of such a complex multilateral project on a number of vectors: a global economic crisis summed to a less Mediterranean approach makes more difficult the allocation of limited financial resources to develop required political projects; the bilateralism proposed by the ENP would also block a multilateral approach; as a consequence, the diminishing interest in the Mediterranean linked to the difficult global economic situation would constitute one of the most difficult obstacles to overcome by the project, beyond any kind of political willing or particular/national geopolitical or geostrategic interest.

⁸⁷⁹ Cited interview with Andreu Bassols.

⁸⁸⁰ Bassols pointed out that: "In effect, Spain perceived perfectly the need of supporting the French initiative since the beginning. And in order to do that, it was necessary to tilt it towards Europe, making out of it a more European proposal and pushing for a more Spanish presence". Cited interview with Andreu Bassols.

⁸⁸¹ Moratinos, M.A. (2007): "Del Proceso de Barcelona a la Unión Mediterránea". *El País*. 2 August 2007. P. 4.

⁸⁸² Cited interview with Andreu Bassols.

9.4. Europeanizing the Project: Rebuilding Trust.

On the 5 December 2007 a summit met to discuss Mediterranean issues. Both Prodi and Zapatero offered political support to Sarkozy if the new proposal was integrated into existing EU mechanisms and objectives and if it complemented the existing EMP. Later that month, on the 20 December 2007, the presidents of Italy, France and Spain met in Rome. They released a statement –*L’Appel de Rome*– in support of the UfM describing it as a mechanism that would be at the heart of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in the region. It also made the point that the Union should be established over the principle of co-operation but not over the principle of integration”.⁸⁸³

Through this statement they also called for the first UfM meeting to be celebrated by 2008. Nevertheless, this summit was also important given that it worked out as an event where Sarkozy, Prodi and Zapatero tried to rebuild the trust among them. As former French diplomat Denis Bauchard has stated, the potential success of this initiative was linked to three fundamental factors: trust among southern Mediterranean partners; trust among EU partners, and; a clear and specific method to implement the new mechanisms.⁸⁸⁴

With this, Sarkozy’s proposal was being Europeanized. Nevertheless, Germany was still not entirely convinced that these changes were substantial enough. Merkel’s harsh criticism in 2008 was focused on her belief that the project was not compatible with existing EU mechanisms, objectives and policies.⁸⁸⁵

This Franco-German tension made the role played by Spain and Italy more important but the key remained Franco-German agreement. That came during the European Council on 13 March 2008 and this was the moment when the proposal was finally Europeanized in full.

This decision guaranteed, at least in principle, a sort of continuation between the Barcelona Process and the “new” concept related to a Union for the Mediterranean, which explains why it was re-baptised as the “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” as Gillespie has pointed out.⁸⁸⁶

Linking this new project to Barcelona made sense, as abandoning it would have given credence to those who believed that the whole Euro-Med process was a failure. Barcelona also provided the institutional framework and experience for the EU to deal with the

⁸⁸³ French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007): *Appel de Rome pour l’Union pour la Méditerranée. French Embassy to Rome*. Available at: <http://www.ambafrance-it.org/spip.php?article2721> (Retrieved 2 January 2012)

⁸⁸⁴ Bauchard, D. (2008): *L’Union Pour la Méditerranée : Un Défi Européen. Politique Étrangère* Spring. Pp. 51-64.

⁸⁸⁵ Op. Cit. Gillespie, R. (2008): P. 280.

⁸⁸⁶ Gillespie, R. (2008): A ‘Union for the Mediterranean’...or for the EU? *Mediterranean Politics*. Vol. 13. N.2. P. 227.

Mediterranean and despite internal differences within the EU, there was still a very big political, economic and strategic need to find a way of dealing with the region.

In fact, this institutional and diplomatic interest can be justified at least for three main factors. First, despite existing contradictory versions with regards to the failure or the success of the Barcelona process, a “re-shaped” project would give the idea –to the public opinion mainly- that the new concept would polish and re-launch a worthy common project. Second, from a theoretical and accountable point of view, if it would be possible to say that the Barcelona Process failed since its conceptualization and inception, it had to be justified that all the financial and economic resources that were wasted underpinning all mechanisms launched by the Barcelona Process could not be simply stopped. Abandoning and closing the “Barcelona Process” chapter would have supported the ideas of those who thought that the overall experience failed.

Considering this scenario, the EU would have been vulnerable and a serious evaluation should have been launched in order to look for responsibilities. Third, probably, considering the strategic needs of the EU with regards to Southern Mediterranean countries, the “new” project, at both rhetorical and practical levels would be very much needed to exert political, economic and diplomatic influence over the Southern Mediterranean rim.

All three aspects are reflected in the European Parliament resolution issued of 5 June 2008.⁸⁸⁷ Specifically interesting are the points where the resolution expresses its strategic concerns and its reflection upon the partial failure of the Barcelona Process: (A) “Whereas the Mediterranean region and the Middle East are of strategic importance to the EU and whereas there is a need for a Mediterranean policy based on solidarity, dialogue, cooperation and exchange, with a view to meeting common challenges and achieving the aim of creating an area of peace, stability and shared prosperity” and (D1). “Whereas the overall assessment of the Barcelona Process is that despite its insufficient achievements, compared to the initial objectives, it has potential which should be optimised.... Welcomes the above-mentioned Communication from the Commission entitled 'the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean', and shares the aim of this new initiative to give fresh political and practical impetus to the multilateral relations of the EU with its Mediterranean partners by upgrading the political level of relations, through greater co- ownership and enhanced sharing of

⁸⁸⁷ European Parliament (2008): European Parliament Resolution of 5 June 2008 on the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean. European Parliament. P6_TA(2008)0257. Available at: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/afet/dv/p6_ta\(2008\)0257_/p6_ta\(2008\)0257_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/afet/dv/p6_ta(2008)0257_/p6_ta(2008)0257_en.pdf) (Retrieved 1 August 2012). pp. 1-2.

responsibilities, as well as by developing regional projects responding to the needs of citizens in the region”.⁸⁸⁸

The Euro-Mediterranean summit held in Paris on 13 July 2008, may well have been, in the words of Turkey’s Ambassador Demiralp, a “good photo opportunity”.⁸⁸⁹ But it also revealed also some challenges that the new process faced. The first was the Mediterranean partners Sarkozy had to deal with- Mubarak, Ben Ali, Assad. As Claret asked rhetorically in his interview for this thesis, “you had to wonder how you could build a future with these people. I understand the *Realpolitik* but we should say the things very clearly.”⁸⁹⁰

It is true that since the Barcelona Process there was a principle of conditionality. However practically speaking, this principle was segregated to few declarations and the way of working was mainly bilateral. As Claret highlights, with the UfM it was introduced the issue of the positive conditionality, which seems to be more relevant. To his mind, this principle had to be applied much earlier, and, in addition to this, much more support to those organisations advocating for human rights would have been to be supported more intensively and consistently.⁸⁹¹

Nevertheless, considering the partners involved in the project it was very difficult to ensure a neither continuity nor any substantial novelty with regards to a new process involving new objectives and mechanisms. Reflecting upon the possibilities of succeeding, as Gillespie states, a strong and honest analysis of the main failures of the Barcelona Process was not conducted.⁸⁹² Therefore without any kind of evaluation or systematization of good or bad practices, the UfM was launched. But the problem was not simply the capacity or commitment of external partners. It is arguable that there has not been a real euro-Mediterranean leader –neither Spain nor France- able to identify regional priorities, goals and mechanisms beyond particular national interests.

As Balfour and Schmid have pointed out the Quai d’Orsay explored a number of options over the summer 2008 in order to define the geography of the new project. They examined whether it should be a Western Mediterranean approach or cover the whole Mediterranean including the Balkans or an enlarged option involving all EU member states

⁸⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁹ Cited interview with Ambassador Oguz Demiralp.

⁸⁹⁰ Cited interview with Andreu Claret.

⁸⁹¹ Ibid.

⁸⁹² Op. Cit. Gillespie, R. (2008): P. 227.

and all other countries with interests in the Mediterranean, including the states of the Persian Gulf.⁸⁹³

The first option was the most realistic as it did not have to address the Arab-Israeli conflict. It would also have allowed for the creation of an intermediate platform to negotiate - prior to a wider Mediterranean approach. As Jordi Pujol noted in an interview for this thesis, the Western Mediterranean also had the advantage of not being a space dominated mostly by the US.⁸⁹⁴ The second and the third options were more ambitious, but past experience had underscored their propensity for failure.⁸⁹⁵

The ministerial meeting in Marseille between the 3 and 4 November 2008, organised under the EU French presidency and attended by foreign ministers was a key step in the process during which the Union idea broke its links from the Barcelona framework.⁸⁹⁶

The Union now committed itself to the creation and the reinforcement of a common area of “peace, stability, security and shared prosperity, as well as full respect of democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms and promotion of understanding between cultures and civilizations in the Euro-Mediterranean region”.⁸⁹⁷

Present in this statement, as expected, is the classic EU rhetoric regarding the noble intentions and objectives of such a partnership. However, at the very same time, EU member states were operating in the opposite way in the pursuit of national interests and domestic agendas in the face of the global economic crisis and the Arab uprisings of 2011 (known as the Arab Spring). Within the declaration of Marseille as the graph number 21 shows, there is continuity with the main driving elements that characterized the Barcelona Process. Both “dialogue” and “cooperation” represent the operational elements that act as common denominators, whereas the most important aspects are related to “trade”, “security”, “migration” and “economic” related issues, whereas “human rights” occupy a marginal position. This consistent trend shows that the same theoretical mistakes that provoked the partial failure of the EMP were repeated by the UfM.

⁸⁹³ Op. Cit. Balfour, R. and Schmid, D. (2008): P. 2.


⁸⁹⁴ Cited interview with Jordi Pujol.

⁸⁹⁵ Cornet, C. (2007): Is the ‘Mediterranean Union’ Suffering From Amnesia? *Babelmed Network*. Available at: <http://eng.babelmed.net/cultura-e-societa/36-mediterraneo/2703-is-the-mediterranean-union-suffering-from-amnesia.html> (Retrieved 23 August 2012)

⁸⁹⁶ EU. (2008): Barcelona Process; Union for the Mediterranean Ministerial Conference. Final Declaration. *Council of the European Union*. Marseille 3-4 November. P. 2. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/103733.pdf (Retrieved 1 August 2012)

⁸⁹⁷ Ibid.

Graph. (21) Declaration of Marseille. Variables.



Source: Declaration of Marseille. European Council. Elaborated by the Author.

Leaving these considerations aside for the moment, it is worth noting that the Marseille document continued by setting out the main areas that the UfM should develop: “De-pollution of the Mediterranean, Maritime and Land Highways, Civil Protection, Alternative Energies: Mediterranean Solar Plan, Higher Education and Research, Euro-Mediterranean University and the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative”.⁸⁹⁸

It also noted the main obstacles the UfM faced in achieving this. Most were diplomatic and related to inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli tension and the relationship of Balkan countries and transnational entities like the League of Arab States in the process.⁸⁹⁹

The declaration also addressed technical issues such as the operational mechanisms and the role of the co-presidency, senior officials, the joint permanent committee and the secretariat.⁹⁰⁰ The secretariat would have a technical role and political matters would be tackled by foreign ministers and senior civil servants.⁹⁰¹

9.5.Initial reactions from the South

Any project-building process such as the one set out in the UfM has to integrate all stakeholders from the start. The communicational process is crucial in order to ensure a sense

⁸⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁹ Op. Cit. Pp. 3-4.

⁹⁰⁰ Op. Cit. Pp. 7-9.

⁹⁰¹ Op. Cit. P. 12.

of ownership. The UfM, firstly a French-centric project and secondly a Euro-centric proposal, did not take this properly into account. Southern Mediterranean countries were informed directly, or followed the events from a certain distance, but were not directly involved in discussions despite the lesson of Barcelona, where Arab countries became further removed from the process as it developed.⁹⁰²

In specifically analysing the process of discussion and implementation of the UfM it is possible to say that Southern Mediterranean countries were not considered in the negotiation process. In fact, given that the process had to be Europeanized in order for it to be accepted by Sarkozy's EU partners, the initial priority was to include EU member states and stakeholders in early discussions. For their part, non-EU countries were informed about how the project was progressing but were not consulted fully until the process had already become a European affair.⁹⁰³

On top of this were all the traditional challenges to engaging the South in a viable way. The EU was very institutionalized, whereas southern states were very fragmented. Ongoing regional tensions between Morocco and Algeria for instance were an obstacle to progress. Notably, the proposal to appoint a Moroccan to a senior post in the process was strongly opposed by Algeria.⁹⁰⁴

9.6. Spain becomes home to the UfM

From a strategic point of view, establishing the UfM's headquarters in Barcelona would give the impression of continuity with the Barcelona process and would reassure Spain of its importance in the making of Euro-Mediterranean policy. However, as Anna Terron declared during an interview for this thesis –former Spain's Secretary of State and Spanish politician who was part of Moratinos' team that negotiated this- Spain still had to “work a lot to get the secretariat”.⁹⁰⁵

These efforts were facilitated by French interests and desires. As Terron noted, though many felt that Marseille might be a candidate for the headquarters, “France is Paris. And something that is important for France cannot be based in Marseille.. A French diplomat would consider that establishing something in Marseille is downgrading the project”.⁹⁰⁶

⁹⁰² Kausch, K. and Young, R. (2009): The End of the “Euro-Mediterranean Vision”. *International Affairs*. N°. 85(5). P. 964.

⁹⁰³ Op. Cit. Gillespie. R. (2008): P. 278.

⁹⁰⁴ Governmental sources. Reserved. The interviewee preferred not to be quoted.

⁹⁰⁵ Cited interview with Anna Terron.

⁹⁰⁶ Ibid.

However according to confidential sources France had reasons, other than geography, for supporting Barcelona as a location.⁹⁰⁷ France wanted was the UfM's secretary to be based in Tunis with a French secretary-general. This approach would have given to France total control over the project. However, as Bassols acknowledged during an interview, EU partners would not have accepted a French secretary based in an Arab country.⁹⁰⁸ It had major political implications, all the more so in the context of Israel's invasion of Gaza in December 2008. This happened few months after the celebration of the summit held in Paris.

When this idea fell through and with Marseille ruled out the two alternatives for France were Malta and Spain. As the more powerful candidate Spain won out because France, in the words of Bassols "wanted to avoid, in any case, the failure of this initiative. I think that the French diplomacy was behind this proposal with all the power and they demonstrated an important political will."⁹⁰⁹

Speaking from a French perspective Nadal believes that it was good that Spain won this battle because a base in Tunisia would have collapsed during the Arab Spring that followed.⁹¹⁰ Classified information expresses that in the beginning before the designation of a Moroccan secretary, Algeria opposed to that hypothesis.⁹¹¹

The start of the Barcelona-based secretariat was difficult. Its efforts were paralysed the Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza. In June 2009, when discussions restarted there were further complications and planning was hampered further by the lack of poor objectives and poor coordination. Extra complications and disagreements delayed the start of the Secretary that at the end initiated during March 2010. All these institutional efforts to re-develop and revamp a Euro-Mediterranean policy were marked by lack of objectives, poor coordination, and it may seem that the entire proposal followed a hectic calendar that would represent a new total or partial failure.

9.7.The benefits of the Union for the Mediterranean or for the South?

The success or the failure of such a complex project as the UfM depends on the relationship between stakeholders involved. In this case there was a very asymmetric relationship –

⁹⁰⁷ Governmental sources. Reserved. The interviewees preferred not to be quoted. The information was obtained during two different interviews and both sources concurred with the same version of the facts.

⁹⁰⁸ Cited interview with Andreu Bassols.

⁹⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁹¹⁰ Cited interview with Romain Nadal.

⁹¹¹ The informant preferred to remain anonymous.

culturally, economically, politically, socially, financially and institutionally. In these terms was the UfM presented as an opportunity for Southern Mediterranean countries?

As the communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council noted in 2008 its main objective was to “enhance multilateral relations, increase co-ownership of the process and make it more visible to citizens. Now is time to inject more momentum into the Barcelona Process”.⁹¹²

The question of ownership or co-ownership is the most relevant and decisive aspect a complex project like the UfM should face. It is also the key element that can support or destroy the possibilities of a real partnership.⁹¹³ By using very open and idealistic language, it was hoped that this partnership would ensure that “all dimensions of the process will be open to all participants on an equal footing”.⁹¹⁴ But, what was meant by co-ownership? As Balfour has noted “the equality between states also depends on the distribution of political and economic power, which is by and large tilted in the EU’s favour, though the energy exporting countries of the South can exercise a great deal of leverage”.⁹¹⁵

Beyond the difficulties caused by traditional conflicts in the region (such as the Arab-Israeli conflict), it is almost impossible to set a regional agenda, prioritize objectives, define the mechanisms to achieve goals and design common strategies when strong political barriers exist. On top of this there are also economic, politic, social and demographic differences that pose major problems. As Bocquillon, Confavreux and Voionmaa have explained, the Mediterranean, in all these ways, is not comparable with other regions in the world.⁹¹⁶

There has been little scholarly research examining how the southern Mediterranean states have perceived the methodological and rhetorical aspects of the UfM. Most of the analyses have come from European or western scholars. Gillespie tried to consider and discuss, partly, these southern responses but his analysis was brief.⁹¹⁷ Gillespie –following a

⁹¹² Commission of the European Communities (2008): Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Brussels, 20 May 2008. P. 4.

⁹¹³ The same declaration in its 17th and 18th points states that the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean “will be a multilateral partnership. By focusing on regional and trans-national projects it should increase the potential for regional integration and cohesion. It will encompass all EU Member States and the European Commission, together with the other members and observers of the Barcelona (...) It will complementary to the EU bilateral relations with these countries which will continue existing under policy frameworks such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (...) It will be also complementary to the regional dimension of the EU enlargement policy”. Op. Cit. Pp. 4-5.

⁹¹⁴ Ibid.

⁹¹⁵ Op. Cit. Balfour, R. (2009): P. 102.

⁹¹⁶ Bocquillon, P., Confavreux, P., and Voionmaa, O. (2009): L’Union pour la Méditerranée, Une Vrai Chance pour le Sud d l’Europe? *Pollens*. Association pour la Politique à l’ENS. Pp.3-4.

⁹¹⁷ Op. Cit. Gillespie, R. (2008): P. 284-285.

similar rationale to that used by Kamen to assess the launch of the AoC⁹¹⁸ - stated that financial resources both from private and public sources would be one of the most evident obstacles the new proposal should face.⁹¹⁹ However Khatib has produced interesting findings, albeit in a different context.⁹²⁰ For southern actors, Khatib argued, financial constraints were not the key issues. Political aspects, most notably, the Arab-Israeli conflict, were the main concerns.⁹²¹

In these terms it is not surprising that the first Euro-Mediterranean Summit, planned for May 2010 had to be postponed to November and put off once more then until further notice due to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The conflict blocked or modified as well the UfM's launch of initiatives.⁹²² The organisation's first secretary-general, Jordan's Ahmed Masa'deh, explained during an interview that UfM's main objectives should be more economic and social rather than political.⁹²³ During a meeting in Brussels in November 2010, the UfM's budget was reduced by a more than 60 per cent for 2011, to €6.2 million, of which €3 million was to be disbursed by the European Commission and the rest of funds via other mechanisms. The refusal as major EU players –Germany, the UK, to invest heavily in this process “this reflects the willingness and the orientation that the countries have”, as former UfM secretary-general Masa'deh stated.⁹²⁴ As Fernández points out, this lack of political was also reflected in the fact that many ministerial meetings did not take place as planned and many of those that did made little progress.⁹²⁵

Water was one of the issues that from a practical point of view was vital to all southern partners to the UfM. This issue was meant to be discussed during the first ministerial meeting -2008- but it was postponed twice due to the tensions produced by the

⁹¹⁸ Op. Cit. Kamen, H. (2004). P. 12.

⁹¹⁹ As Gillespie points out: “The ambition is constrained by insistence on adhering to the existing EU budget for Euro-Med activity which applies through to 2013. This sets a very clear limit on the possibility of real innovation (...) there are obvious practical obstacles to the achievement of a public-private funding mix, particularly in view of European Union auditing practices”. Op. Cit. Gillespie, R. (2008): P. 281.

⁹²⁰ Khatib, K. (2010): The Union for the Mediterranean: Views from the Southern Shores. *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*. Vol. 45:3. Pp. 41-50.

⁹²¹ Op. Cit. Khatib, K. (2010): P. 43.

⁹²² Fernández Noguera, M. (2010) a: ‘The UfM Budget Drops by 60% and Member State Experts Have not been Sent In’ *Catalan News Agency*. Available at: <http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/politics/union-mediterranean-budget-drops-60-and-member-state-experts-have-not-yet-been-sent> (Retrieved 12 August 2012).

⁹²³ Ibid.

⁹²⁴ Fernández Noguera, M. (2010) b: ‘The Union for the Mediterranean Cannot Function Without the Members State Commitment’. Interview to the UfM's Secretary General Ahmed Masa'deh. *Catalan News Agency*. Available at: <http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/politics/union-mediterranean-cannot-function-without-member-states-commitment-states-its-secret> (Retrieved 12 August 2012)

⁹²⁵ Ibid.

Arab-Israeli conflict.⁹²⁶ Political reasons blocked one of the most representative social programmes in the region. NGOs and environmental groups like the World Wide Fund (WWF) expressed frustration over the repeated cancellation of the ministerial summit on the grounds that the UfM “represents a unique opportunity to face all the hottest environmental problems, like water management or the climate change.

This opportunity should not be lost and for that reason the WWF asks to the UfM’s member states to progress and achieve results.”⁹²⁷ The political pressure the Arab-Israeli conflict exerts on any kind of Euro-Mediterranean initiative is huge. For instance in 2012, the Palestinian Contractors Union menaced UNICEF –the organization in charge of building the desalinization plant in the Gaza strip funded by the EU- to boycott the process because it was supposed that two Israeli companies -*Odis Filtering* and *Nirosoft*- would take part in the works.⁹²⁸

In operational terms, the lack of political will to overcome regional obstacles was evident from the beginning in terms of allocation of personnel. Six months after its establishment only 25 officials were in post (a quarter of the agreed total). Officials were even briefing the press that the organisation was “something completely conceptual, nothing has passed to a practical level”.⁹²⁹ On January 2011, after less than one year into the job, the first secretary-general resigned.⁹³⁰

When the author visited the UfM headquarters in Barcelona for meetings with the Deputy Directors Ambassador Attard-Pirotta and Rafik Hussein on 24 January 2012, the building was quite empty and was hidden and isolated from the vibrant streets of Barcelona. This detail evidences the lack of integration of the UfM headquarters within the vibrant and vivid atmosphere of Barcelona. As Mr. Masa’deh highlighted, if Member States don’t send

⁹²⁶ UfM. (2008): Ministerial Conference on Water. A Calendar of Concrete Projects from 2009. UFM. Jordan, 22 December. Available at: <http://www.medaquaministerial2008.net/> (Retrieved 15 August 2012)

⁹²⁷ WWF (2011): ‘WWF Insta a los Países Miembros de la Unión por el Mediterráneo a que se Reúnan y Aporten Soluciones para los Retos Ambientales de la Región’. Observatorio de la Sostenibilidad en España. OSE. Available at: <http://www.sostenibilidad-es.org/es/plataformas-de-comunicacion/agua-y-sostenibilidad/noticias/wwf-insta-a-los-paises-miembros-de-la-union-por-el-mediterraneo-a-que> (Retrieved 25 August 2012)

⁹²⁸ Anon. (2012): ‘Water Desalinization Projects to Solve Gaza’s Problems: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?’ *The Electronic Intifada*. Available at: <http://electronicintifada.net/content/water-desalination-projects-solve-gazas-problems-wolf-sheeps-clothing/11370> (Retrieved 25 August 2012).

⁹²⁹ Anon. (2011): ‘L’Union pour la Méditerranée Décapitée’. *Le Nouvel Observateur*. Available at: <http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/20110126.OBS6993/1-union-pour-la-mediterranee-decapitee.html> (Retrieved 22nd August 2012). As Colombo mentioned: “The whole architecture of the UfM has suffered from its inability to deliver concrete results”. Op. Cit. Colombo, S. (2011): P. 280.

⁹³⁰ Fernández Noguera, M. (2011): ‘The Secretary General Resigns’. *Catalan News Agency*. Available at: <http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/politics/secretary-general-union-mediterranean-resigns> (Retrieved 22 August 2012)

their experts “who is going to do the job?”⁹³¹ On January 2011, after less than one year of sterile hope, the first Secretary General resigned.⁹³² According to an interview to AFP a UfM’s officer acknowledged that the organization “is something completely conceptual, nothing has passed to a practical level”.⁹³³

Aliboni and Ammor have asked, “What does the UfM really want to achieve: a more political, or a more developmental oriented agenda?”⁹³⁴ This fundamental question was also posed, though somewhat differently, in relation to the Barcelona Process. On both occasions, and in practical terms, the most satisfactory answer is that the political vision, shared both by EU and non-EU partners, is to maintain a status-quo by adopting a neo-realist approach.

As Khatib has noted, one of his interviewees, from Tunisia, argued that “there are too many projects and too many speeches, sources for funding are rare and projects are the weakest link (...) there is a lot of rhetoric and much weakness on the ‘citizens/people dimension. At the end of the day there is little new in the UfM’”⁹³⁵

This negative perception amongst Mediterranean partners encapsulates the common tendency of southern officials attack the hypocrisy of the EU, blaming European stakeholders. This criticism is very understandable but it is also somewhat rhetorical and only tells part of the full story. The reality is that despite rhetoric many leaders of southern governments do not necessarily maximise the value or benefits of relations with the EU to push for policies that are not in the interests of the local population.

As Spanish Ambassador to Morocco Alberto Navarro commented on the UfM that what the EMP attempted to do was very meritorious. However Sarkozy’s project so far did not produce any result:

“In fact today I have been speaking with the Moroccan ambassador to the UfM, Amrani, who starts tomorrow acting as the Secretary General in Barcelona. I said to him that is necessary to initiate the UfM on the 6 or 7 aspects that are integrated in the process. It has to be done following a communitarian method. Doing things, small steps, and step by step you can do a lot. It is necessary to impulse projects in all the

⁹³¹ Op. Cit. Fernández Noguera, M. (2010): B.

⁹³² Fernández Noguera, M. (2011): ‘The Secretary General Resigns’. *Catalan News Agency*. Available at: <http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/politics/secretary-general-union-mediterranean-resigns> (Retrieved 22 August 2012)

⁹³³ Anon. (2011): ‘L’Union pour la Méditerranée Décapitée’. *Le Nouvel Observateur*. Available at: <http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/20110126.OBS6993/l-union-pour-la-mediterranee-decapitee.html> (Retrieved 22 August 2012). As Colombo mentioned: “The whole architecture of the UfM has suffered from its inability to deliver concrete results”. Op. Cit. Colombo, S. (2011): P. 280.

⁹³⁴ Aliboni, R. and Ammor, F.M. (2009): Under the Shadow of ‘Barcelona’: From the EMP to the Union for the Mediterranean. *Euromesco Paper*. N°77. P. 14.

⁹³⁵ Op. Cit. Khatib, K. (2010): P. 44.

proposed ambits. And I have told him that his legitimacy is going to be granted if he acts and if he works.”⁹³⁶

Bearing these considerations in mind it is valuable to examine the actual projects that were underway as part of the UfM by late 2011. The following table number 2 compiled by the author shows these projects, the beneficiary countries, their status and the allocated budget.

Table (2) Distribution and Status of UfM’s Projects, August 2012.

Programme	Project	Year	Budget	Beneficiaries/Partners	Status
Transport and Urban Development	“The Euro-Mediterranean Sustainable Urban Strategy”	Nov. 2011	Not specified.	Euro-Mediterranean Cities. Not specified.	In preparation. Not specific data.
	Logismedtda	Nov. 2011	Not specified.	Euro-Mediterranean Partners.	In preparation. Not specific data.
Energy	Mediterranean Solar Plan Project	2011	Not specified.	Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria ⁹³⁷ , Tunisia, and West Bank & Gaza.	In preparation. Not specific data.
Environment and Water	“Desalinization Facility for the	June 2011	Estimated 455 m\$	Gaza Strip. 1.6 million inhabitants	In preparation.

⁹³⁶ Personal interview with Spanish Ambassador to Morocco Alberto Navarro. 1 July 2011. Yussif Amrani resigned 7 months before after he took office in May 2011. Available at: <http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/politics/union-mediterranean-loses-its-secretary-general-once-again> (Retrieved 1 February 2013).

⁹³⁷ The European Investment Bank, EIB, by November 2011 suspended all loan disbursements and technical assistance contracts with Syria. Union for the Mediterranean (2012): Neighbourhood Investment Facility- NIF- Summary Sheet Mediterranean Solar Plan Project Preparation Initiative, MSP-PPI. *Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean*. Available at: http://www.ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/MSP-PPI_brochure.pdf (Retrieved 25 August 2012)

	Gaza Strip”	(First UfM Project)	from 2012 to 2017.	(beneficiaries).	Not specific data.
Higher Education and Research	1 MA, 3 EMUNI Masters Programmes 3 areas of EMUNI PhD.	Sept. 2011.	Not specified.	Students from different Euro-Mediterranean Countries.	In preparation. Not specific data available.
Social and Civil Affairs.	“Promoting Women Entrepreneurship in Universities.	Sept 2011.	Not specified.	Jordan, Morocco, Palestine and Spain.	In preparation. Not specific data.

Source: Compiled by author. UfM official website⁹³⁸ and other sources.

This data demonstrates the limited action that the UfM had been engaged in terms of submission, evaluation, funding and execution of projects over this time period. In most of these there is not the available information about specific objectives, costs, and execution to make substantive assessments of their value. One of the most representative projects in terms of the large number of beneficiaries is the desalinization facility for the Gaza strip. It was costed at US\$455 million. But that is the exception rather than the norm.

As Ambassador Cecilia Attard-Pirotta, UfM’s deputy secretary-general reflected in an interview for this thesis, between the Barcelona Process and the UfM: “The tangible results have been very little, but on the diplomatic front it has been acknowledged the importance of meeting”.⁹³⁹

Despite such sentiments the actual practical role of the UfM does not appear to justify its existence. Certainly, the impact of dissolving the UfM would not be high in developmental, economic, political and social terms across the Mediterranean.


⁹³⁸ Data available at: <http://www.ufmsecretariat.org/en/projects/> (Retrieved 25 August 2012)

⁹³⁹ Personal interview with Ambassador Cecilia Attard-Pirotta, Deputy Secretary General, UfM. Barcelona, 24 January 2012.

9.8. Europe and the Future of the UfM.

EU's political discourse helps to understand further UfM's developments. In order to better understand and evaluate the evolution of the UfM it has been analysed again the conclusions of the European Council. For the purpose of this analysis it has been considered the period 2009-2013. As the graphic number 22 shows, after 2009 it is possible to appreciate a general trend where analysed variables curb their presence and frequency.

Graph (22): European Council. Conclusions of the Presidency 2009-2013.



Source: European Council.

Overall the most cited variable remains “security”. However, in analysing possible correlations, the use of “security” within this period of time is not correlated to issues such as “terrorism”. There is a strong correlation between “security” and energy related issues. That reveals a special interest for ensuring the supply of energy to the EU. Conversely to what happened during the three “Mediterranean” waves -1994 to 1996, 1999 to 2000 and 2005-2006- after the presentation and institutionalization of the UfM, explicit references to the “Mediterranean” were very scarce as the graphic 22 shows. “Migration”, “Mediterranean” and “Security” are also correlated within 2009, 2010 and 2011 but in a very slight way.

It is interesting to appreciate, however, how the variable “Arab” was proportionally high, especially from 2011-2012. This coincided with the Arab Spring and the role the Arab League should have to play to solve –or mediate- these uprisings. The tense and delicate episodes of the Arab uprising and aftermaths would have represented a golden opportunity – and justification- for the UfM to develop projects within the region. References to the role of

the UfM within this context were very limited. There is a reference in 2011 underlining the potential contribution of the UfM in solving or mediating certain aspects derived from the Arab Spring.⁹⁴⁰

Summarizing, European Council's public speech confirms the decadence of the Euro-Mediterranean process –UfM- and its potential as an agent to promote collaboration and cooperation between European and Southern Mediterranean countries. In analysing through the CL approach these conclusions, the Mediterranean lost political and diplomatic momentum. Therefore, political and diplomatic brokers and entrepreneurs like Spain and France sold the Mediterranean as a commodity to gain greater diplomatic stature within the EU, mostly pursuing short and medium term national interests.

⁹⁴⁰ European Council (2011): Conclusions of the Presidency. EU. Third Meeting. Brussels. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/126714.pdf (Retrieve 1 September 2013)

SECTION 3

CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSIONS

10.1. Originality and Contribution to the Literature.

As it has been detailed in the early part of this thesis, scholarly attempts to explain the processes involved in the creation, development, implementation, and management of Euro-Mediterranean politics have been numerous. However most of them have taken a non-interdisciplinary approach to understand these complex dynamics. Gillespie has been very prolific in explaining these complex processes and mechanisms. As part of his methodology he has also interviewed a good number of political and civil actors. Bicchi also looked to explain how Euro-Mediterranean politics were developed by introducing the concept of political entrepreneur. As part of her methodology she also interviewed a number of political and civil actors.

Apart from these authors, as it has been explained in the literature review, some other scholars have tried to identify pros, cons, deficiencies and strengths linked to Euro-Mediterranean politics. However, methodologically speaking, most of time, the analysis has been conducted on the basis of secondary sources and publications.

Moreover, apart from experts in the fields of socio-linguistics and discourse analysis like Van Dijk, no one has used the methodological tools used in this thesis to explain how political brokers and entrepreneurs construct their communicational strategies, and how public opinion is shaped by them.

The greater part of these works has been also concentrated on the description and analysis of these multilateral policies and mechanisms from a “foreign policy” point of view. Scholars have barely considered the importance of even national-domestic politics in the success or failure of such initiatives.

Most authors dealing with this broad area have not focused enough attention on the evaluation of these policies. In order to propose a valid evaluation system it is important to use a wide number of methodological tools that will allow the researcher to understand –and explain and demonstrate – complex scenarios and dynamics, avoiding generalizations and speculation in the process.

This dissertation has attempted to cover the aforementioned conceptual, procedural and methodological gaps. In order to do so it has adopted a long-term, multivariable analysis that allows a better understanding of political, diplomatic and socio-economic trends, mechanisms and processes. Methodologically speaking, and in terms of content, the research adds value to the literature due to the following:

- Interviews with key French and Spanish actors who have shaped and developed these policies and mechanisms in their professional roles.
- The application of innovative methodological tools such as Corpus Linguistics (CL) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to analyse how political entrepreneurs or brokers have been developing political discourse and communication strategies in order to, on the one hand, identify political opportunities/needs and on the other hand to see how they have been designing, managing and institutionalizing policies; how public opinion has been reacting to these communication strategies in order to understand the consistency and sustainability of these policies or proposals from a contextual point of view.
- The application and combination of these methodological tools associated with the discussed theoretical framework offered by the literature on political entrepreneurs, allows for both theoretical and methodological advancements. Theoretically speaking, in the conclusions, the dissertation proposes the Political Entrepreneur Cycle (PEC) which represents a proposal to understand how the action of political entrepreneurs or brokers does not stop or end with the institutionalization of a policy, but with the evaluation, within the short, medium and long term, of such a policy on multiple levels.
- This dissertation opens therefore a path to develop new studies aiming at providing a systematic and multivariable analysis of complex dynamics integrating European and MENA approaches aiming at reducing the existing asymmetries.

10.2 Leaders and Their Characteristics.

Spain and France historically coexisted with tension and rivalry due to their geographical situation, geo-strategic interests and ambitions. However, in contemporary times this long-

standing rivalry was asymmetric as France was stronger politically, diplomatically and economically speaking.

Since 1985-1986 Spain, as a small power, looked to re-define its diplomatic and foreign policy strategy in order to achieve greater diplomatic stature. President Felipe González, as both a political entrepreneur and broker, started to “sell” both Latin America and the Mediterranean.

Political communication and lobbying strategies deployed by political entrepreneurs and brokers, as well as broader political and diplomatic institutions, were defined to construct a new socio-political imaginary and to gather political and public opinion’ consensus in order to achieve planned aims and objectives.

Following on from this political entrepreneurs and brokers like Spain and France identified opportunities, designed projects and worked towards their institutionalization on the basis of a competitive and non-cooperative approach. Rhetorically speaking they sold Euro-Mediterranean problems as European problems, but the strongest interest behind this strategy was related to the defence and protection of national objectives.

Political communication strategies deployed first by France or Spain and later by the EU were characterized by a double discourse. On one hand, once a political entrepreneur and broker identified a political window, in order to convince potential partners the “selling” and “marketing” discourse raised questions related to common European security issues. Once the policy was designed, in order to attract the consensus from Southern Mediterranean partners, the discourse was defined by the necessity of implementing win-win and cooperative mechanisms. However southern Mediterranean countries were not actively involved in the process of design and implementation. That generated an asymmetrical Euro-Mediterranean relation and encouraged economic and political dependency.

The EU and national political entrepreneurs and brokers alike hypothesized that improving socio-economic standards – through trade, investments (FDI), development aid (ODA) - in southern Mediterranean countries, would reduce incentives to migrate. This, in turn would bring more security to Europe. This hypothesis proved wrong as an improvement of socio-economic standards in sending countries accelerated migration within the short and medium term.

Beyond the aforementioned double discourse, that entailed an operational and instrumental dimension, European priorities continued to be European security, broadly understood, regional stability and increasing trade opportunities. Cultural, educational, socio-economic projects remained relegated to a secondary position. In that sense changing socio-

economic and political contexts –like the global economic crisis or increasing migration flows from Southern Mediterranean countries – compromised the continuity of those programmes and the consistency of the policies and mechanisms.

In considering these changing contexts, along with economic issues, migration-management policies and their evolution represent one of the most relevant aspects to analyse the consistency and coherence of multilateral and multicultural projects, policies and mechanisms.

If political and trade interests and objectives are not accompanied by an integrative common migration policy, the sustainability of common projects, mechanisms and policies is weak and within the medium and long term they are doomed to fail.

The EU's international politics, policies, mechanisms and diplomacy are strictly bound to local, regional and national levels. The EU can design, institutionalize and implement policies and mechanisms but their overall performance will depend on how local, regional and national politics evolve and adapt according to changing scenarios on the ground.

From 2006 onwards a more restrictive attitude towards migration, culminating in the “criminalization” of the issue across Europe occurred. This increasing tendency of political parties to display negative attitudes towards migrants in general and against Muslim migrants in particular resulted in the deterioration of Euro-Mediterranean relations. This, in turn led to a progressive deterioration in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and confidence building and associated policies and mechanisms.

Western leaders, political entrepreneurs and brokers, have been trying to find and support cooperative and collaborative regimes. In parallel, leaders from Southern Mediterranean countries have been playing that game in order to consolidate their leadership.

Despite the number of Euro-Mediterranean initiatives, projects and mechanisms European partners did not show a commitment to choosing the right objectives and expectations for the challenges they faced. Therefore, at a managerial level, these policies have been ambiguous and scarcely productive.

In line with this lack the EU's political discourse was dominated by the term “will”. On one hand this connotes the political “will” needed to develop and build mechanisms and policies. On the other hand there is a notable absence of rhetoric formulas indicating accomplished strategies, policies or objectives.

In these terms, this thesis has attempted to compare, understand how Spanish and French leaders have acted as entrepreneurs and brokers in creating, designing, implementing


and institutionalizing –also communicating- Euro-Mediterranean politics. In order to do this it has developed 12 factors that are relevant to achieving these objectives. One of these factors is contextual, whereas the rest are transversal. The contextual factor is “Europeanism”. Transversal factors are: opportunism, individualism, originality, entrepreneurship, brokerage, consistency, negotiation, cooperative and competitive behaviour, analytic skills, charisma and, communication skills. All are ranked on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being the minimum and 5 the maximum.

The graph below –number 23- shows the ideal representation of a political broker and entrepreneur. Nevertheless in applying this approach it is necessary to explain how “entrepreneurs”, “brokers” and “opportunists” are interpreted. In considering this graphic, “entrepreneurs” and “brokers” are defined by a positive connotation. Therefore, “entrepreneurs” and “brokers” would start new ideas and projects and broker them on the basis of socio-political and cultural responsibility.

They would aim to produce sustainable change, establish win-win situations and pursue their objectives consistently and coherently. They would work towards the completion of short, mid and long term objectives.

Conversely, “opportunists” are defined here by their short term-speculative behaviour. There are also two variables that have to be explained: cooperative and competitive behaviour. With regards to multilateral political projects involving heterogeneous partners, cooperative behaviour would be expected from political brokers and entrepreneurs. This behaviour would ensure the design, implementation, institutionalization and development of win-win political projects. A competitive behaviour would be linked to an “opportunist” approach that seeks to maximize individual gains. This attitude is counterproductive for the achievement of common strategic goals. The graphic number 23 displays the ideal image of a political broker and entrepreneur bearing in mind the aforementioned comments and specifications.


Graph. (23): Ideal Political Broker/Entrepreneur.



Source: Elaborated by the author.

The graphic number 24 compares the political profiles of: Felipe González, José María Aznar, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and Nicolas Sarkozy. On this point it was not possible to gain access to more French senior politicians and diplomats that would have allowed a more balanced appraisal of Franco-Spanish competition and cooperation. With regards to Spanish politicians and diplomats, it is possible to appreciate a higher number of personalities affiliated to the PSOE. However, on the other hand politicians and diplomats from the PSOE were more involved than those affiliated to the PP in developing a Euro-Mediterranean approach.

Graph. (24): Leaders. Behaviour and Characteristics.



Source: Elaborated by the author.


In considering the four leaders, Felipe González is the one who is closer to the ideal of political entrepreneur and broker considering abovementioned comments and specifications. In line with this, González was the most consistent and coherent political entrepreneur in designing, negotiating and lobbying for creating a cooperative and European project that would also serve Spanish interests. This resulted in the launch of the Barcelona Process.

Aznar and Sarkozy were typical examples of opportunists and individualists deploying a competitive and non-Europeanist attitude. Whereas Zapatero coincided more with González's style. However he did not display the negotiating and communication skills or strong charisma of his predecessor as Spanish leader. However, Sarkozy, Aznar and Zapatero all acted more like opportunists in terms of launching initiatives without ensuring strong planning.

10.3 Political Entrepreneurship Cycle (PEC)

The Political Entrepreneur Cycle (PEC) can be applied to a number of contexts where the role of political brokers, entrepreneurs and other kind of socio-political actors and agents has to be analysed. The PEC should be applied to a number of different socio-cultural, economic and political contexts in order to better identify transversal –constant- and contextual variables. From this point of view, next steps aimed at developing the PEC should focus on the elaboration of a replicable and scalable system –or a sort of metrics- to measure the five stages of the cycle. The PEC using the CL a CDA approach, will be useful to assess long cycles and micro-cycles alike. In considering both multilateral and bilateral political projects and mechanisms, the PCE will be also useful to determine political responsibilities and identify in advance potential failures. As was defined in the first section of this thesis, political entrepreneurs follow a four stage process to develop their interest and ambitions. This process is linear because it considers the creation, design, implementation and institutionalization of policies and mechanisms. However, this process should be circular not a mere linear description and figure number 1 shows.

Figure (1). Political Entrepreneurship Cycle



Source: Elaborated by the author.

10.3.1 Creation.

The creation of Euro-Mediterranean policies and mechanisms –from the EMP to the UfM– were led by political entrepreneurs and brokers, notably France and Spain, who had particular national interests. Beyond these political brokers and entrepreneurs were also interested in increasing their political and diplomatic stature and influence within the international system. During this first stage, political entrepreneurs and brokers lobbied massively with European partners –especially key ones like Germany- in order to gather the necessary support.

10.3.2. Design.

The stage of design did not correspond strictly to political entrepreneurs and brokers. The design stage entailed the Europeanization of the project. Within this stage small and medium powers like Spain tried to collaborate with major powers like Germany in order to get support and influence in the design process in the service of their own interests. During this stage both the debate on and the design of Euro-Mediterranean policies and mechanisms were mostly concentrated on the European side. Although these policies included the participation of southern Mediterranean countries, their involvement and participation were hardly considered. At the same time the planning and design was very abstract and was not considered in terms of clear short, medium or long term goals.

10.3.3. Implementation.

The implementation of these mechanisms and policies were problematic due to the above bad planning and design. Once initiated these policies were inefficient and vulnerable to contextual socio-economic and political changes due to a lack of objectives and benchmarks. However, the division between northern and southern Mediterranean partners was also very apparent in this stage. This absence of multilateral coordination, horizontal communication and clear shared objectives and tasks contributed to the weak implementation that ended up with the failure of the processes within the medium and long term. In considering this stage, the political entrepreneurs and brokers that launched these projects and mechanisms did not actively engage in correcting these deficiencies. Therefore their role was secondary and barely operative.

10.3.4. Institutionalization.

These common mechanisms were designed to defend EU's interests and overall security. The institutionalization established the structure, the budget and the official procedures to put into motion the objectives and ideas developed over the previous stages. However, institutionalized mechanism to evaluate the fulfilment of objectives and milestones were not available. That contributed to generate more ambiguity and institutional weakness. On top of that, within this institutionalization, again, southern Mediterranean countries were not fully integrated. This occasioned the verticalization of communication processes.

The decision-making processes were mostly concentrated on the EU side for two reasons. First it was easier to institutionalize these policies and mechanisms within the EU due to its higher socio-cultural, political and economic homogeneity. Second, southern Mediterranean countries were not organized around strong common institutional bodies and therefore their organizational and negotiation capacities were very limited. This prevented the possibility of solving problems and facing contextual challenges.

10.3.5. Evaluation.

Analysing the EU's public speech is important in understanding how political brokers and entrepreneurs have been impacting and shaping the EU's political agenda. With regards to Euro-Mediterranean politics the graph below –number 25- enables us to appreciate the cycle that started in 1992 and ended in 2013. One can see how relevant issues such as migration, Mediterranean, Security, Arab/Muslim, terrorism and racism, have all played a role over this period of time. This is reflected in graphic number 25.


Indeed, within this 20 years cycle it is possible to identify three micro-cycles. The first micro-cycle lasted between 1993 and 1996. That represented the inception and launch of the Barcelona process and within this first micro-cycle it is possible to appreciate the convergence of the topics security and Mediterranean. This reveals that the interest in developing this Euro-Mediterranean mechanism was mostly due to strict security issues and concerns.

The second micro-cycle spanned the period between 1999 and the beginning of 2002. Again the convergence between Mediterranean and security is evident, especially after the 9/11 al-Qaeda attacks on the United States. The third and last micro-cycle extended from 2004 to 2008. Within this last micro-cycle the converging variables were: terrorism,

migration and security, whereas Mediterranean started to lost momentum. However, this micro-cycle coincided with the evaluation of the Barcelona process in 2005. The last year of this micro-cycle, 2008, coincided both with the start of the global financial crisis and the launch of the UfM. The last part of the cycle between 2009 and 2013 shows that Euro-Mediterranean politics declined and its presence within the EU's public speech almost disappeared.

In analysing these factors it is possible to say that Euro-Mediterranean politics as a communitarian project failed. The three micro-cycles show the peaks where political entrepreneurs and brokers were more active. This also shows that there was political inconsistency and coherence. This trend also shows that political entrepreneurs and brokers were mostly interested in short-medium term results, rather than developing a consistent and cooperative –and responsible- political and diplomatic project.

Graph. (25): Long-Term Comparative Analysis Council of Europe, Public Speech. 1993-2013




Source: European Council. Elaborated by the author.

Connected to the graphic number 25, it is also important to understand how European public opinion integrated and understood the EU's public speech. The analysed variables in this case were immigration, security, terrorism, crime and unemployment. Whereas unemployment played an independent role because in reality it is not linked to other contextual variations, the other variables tended to converge between 2005 and 2009. This

coincides with the third micro-cycle presented above and it is represented in graphic number 26.

Graphic (26): Trend line. European Public Opinion, 1997-2011.



Source: Eurobarometer. Elaborated by the author.

The connections between the EU's public speech and EU public opinion crossover. This convergence is also important in evaluating why Euro-Mediterranean mechanisms and platforms failed. It is not possible to try to develop multilateral political, diplomatic, economic and socio-cultural projects and mechanisms involving heterogeneous stakeholders, while at local, regional and national levels, political brokers and entrepreneurs try to gather socio-political consensus manipulating sensitive variables such as migration, terrorism, security and crime that would contribute to generate mistrust and misunderstandings between European and Southern Mediterranean countries.

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APPENDIX

-INTERVIEWS-

Interviews.

1. Mr. Abel Matutes. Former Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs (Aznar era) and Member of the European Parliament. (Madrid, 14 December 2011).
2. Mr. Alberto Carnero. Spanish Diplomat. Advisor of Jose María Aznar. (Madrid, 10 January 2012).
3. Mr. Alberto Navarro. Spanish Ambassador to Morocco. Former Secretary of State, EU. (Rabat, 1 July 2011).
4. Mr. Andreu Bassols. Director General of IEMED. Former Deputy Head of the Unit EuroMed and Regional Affairs Directorate General of Foreign Affairs of the European Commission. (Barcelona, 26 October 2011).
5. Mr. Andreu Claret. Executive Director of Anna Lindh Foundation. (Barcelona, 25 October 2011).
6. Mr. Carlos Westendorp. Former Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1995-1996 and Negotiator of the Spanish Accession to the European Community. (Madrid, 30 December 2012).
7. Mr. Cristina Gallach. Spokesperson of the Office of the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union. Former Spokesperson of Mr. Javier Solana at NATO and EU. (Brussels, 12 March 2010). Not recorded.
8. Mr. Eneko Landaburu. EU Ambassador to Morocco. Former Director General of the EU Foreign Policy and Director General of Committee of the Regions. (Rabat, 30 June 2011).
9. Mr. Fernando Jauregui. Political Journalist. (Madrid, 6 July 2010).
10. Mr. Fidel Sendagorta. EU Ambassador to Egypt. Former EU Director General for the Mediterranean, Maghreb and the Middle East. Not recorded.
11. Mr. Ibrahim Kraishi. Ambassador of Palestine (Geneva, 6 September 2012). Not recorded.
12. Mr. Jordi Pujol. Former President of Catalonia. (Barcelona, 25 January 2012).
13. Mr. José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Former President of Spain. (Madrid, 28 January 2011).
14. Mr. Oguz Demiralp. Ambassador of Turkey to the UN (Geneva, 30 August 2012).
15. Mr. Romain Nadal. Spoke person of the Elysée. (Paris, 29 October 2012).
16. Ms. Anna Terrón. Secretary of State of Immigration and Emigration, Spain. Former Secretary for the European Union and Spanish Delegate to the EU. (Madrid, 29 June 2011).
17. Mr. Paolo Bergamaschi. Political Expert and Parliamentarian. The Green Party (Brussels, 15 May 2012). Not recorded.
18. Ms. Michelle Rieu. Parliamentarian. The Green Party. (Brussels, 15 May 2012) Not recorded.
19. Ms. Monica Frassoni. Parliamentarian. The Green Party. (Barcelona, 26 October 2011) Not recorded.
20. Mr. Jean Louis Guigou. Director General, IPEMED. (Paris, 19 November 2012).

FERNANDO JAÚREGUI

Fernando, cuándo comienzas a trabajar como periodista?

En 1970. Mi primer trabajo fue en 1970. Entonces estudiaba periodismo y derecho al mismo tiempo. O sea que de esto hace más de cuarenta años.

Que me puedes decir, aunque puede parecer una paradoja hablar de comunicación política durante el franquismo, en un momento en el que quizá las libertades democráticas no estaban establecidas. Como se hacía en ese momento la comunicación política? Que restricciones reales había?

Yo no tenía entonces contacto con la comunicación oficial. En realidad a nivel profesional 1970 y 1971 no cuentan para mí. En 1972 comienzo a hacer lo que puedo. En 1974, es mi año de bautismo de fuego, porque volviendo yo del servicio militar, de las prácticas de milicias, el director de Fimesa que era la oficina de prensa del movimiento, me ofrece irme a Lisboa, que estaba con cierta inestabilidad. Desde Marzo de 1974, se veía que en Portugal había inestabilidad. Naturalmente dije que sí y así me metí de hoz y coz en la Revolución de los Claveles.

Esta fue una experiencia maravillosa para un chaval de 23 años. A esa edad no sabía lo que eran partidos políticos, no sabía lo que eran las instituciones, no sabía lo que era una comunicación democrática, no solo con los medios oficiales, sino con los medios privados. No existía nada de eso. Ni aquí, en España, ni en Portugal. Que era lo bueno de Portugal? Que tu veías como ellos también aprendían al mismo tiempo que nosotros.

Así que mi primer contacto con el mundo de la comunicación oficial fue con Portugal. Es decir mi primer contacto instituciones-periodista comenzó allí. En España había lo que había. En ese caso tendrías que hablar con Joaquín Bardavío, que es un personaje clave. Bardavío era el jefe de prensa de Carrero Blanco, así que imagínate, lo más de lo más. Y estaba en el mismo edificio donde estaba López Rodó. Estuvo en el Diario Madrid, etc.

Entonces, yo, donde aprendo comunicación política, es en Portugal, en plena guerra. Y hay que tener en cuenta que en aquella época lo que pasaba en Portugal era importantísimo para España. En el primer verano que paso en Portugal, pasaron por mi casa 150 personas. Todo el mundo. Todos los amigos que uno tenía. Yo estaba más o menos conectado con la oposición, del partido comunista entonces, de modo que me vino a ver toda la clandestinidad. Porque date cuenta, de que lo que hacíamos los periodistas españoles en ese tiempo era resistencia. No estábamos por tanto en la comunicación oficial sino en la clandestinidad.

En 1974, un año antes de que se muera Franco, empiezo a hacer comunicación política cuando vuelvo a Madrid y soy el responsable del suplemento político del Diario Informaciones. El Diario Informaciones era el único periódico liberal que había entonces en Madrid. Liberal con todas las comillas que quieras. Ese suplemento político que estaba dirigido por Guillermo Medina (que fue diputado por Jerez), sería un poco el embrión del pensamiento intelectual de lo que luego sería UCD. Obviamente en 1974 no existía UCD pero se estaba comenzando a montar y constituye un primer contacto que teníamos los periodistas con una oposición moderada. Los periodistas no estábamos en general en la oposición moderada, sino que estábamos del Partido Comunista hacia allá, porque PSOE tampoco había. Pero en Informaciones, gente como Guillermo Medina que estaba más en

áreas demo-cristianas, pues nos iba conectando a todos con la oposición posible, que luego dió paso a UCD.

Entonces supongo que una vez que se muere Franco, la comunicación política por tanto, cambia totalmente, y la introducción de las libertades democráticas dentro del proceso de la transición creo que inaugurarían un momento también de entusiasmo para una gente que habíais estado en una situación de represión.

Entusiasmo quizá no, pero si, desde luego, muchísima actividad. Es una época de actividad frenética en la que todos tenemos que aprender. Que todos aprendemos significa que el gobierno naciente que forma Adolfo Suárez, más los partidos que habían estado en la semi-clandestinidad tolerada (el embrión de UCD) más la oposición verdadera, estaban aprendiendo como eran las relaciones instituciones-periodistas. Claro, aquí había que aprender a hacer democracia, que no sabía nadie, y los periodistas tampoco.

En ese momento nos encontramos todos, periodistas, la oposición moderada (la transición) y la oposición real, estamos de alguna manera trabajando todos juntos. Esta historia no se ha contado así, pero es muy importante. Estábamos trabajando juntos por tanto para cimentar una democracia. Con restos de censura, con restos de autoritarismo, con maximalismos por parte de la oposición que no se habían quitado todavía y los periodistas que estábamos allí mirando todo esto.

Y este periodo de acomodación cuánto dura?

Esto dura exactamente dos años, desde noviembre del 75 (cuando se muere Franco y se produce la explosión –al día siguiente me detuvieron y como yo era periodista y la Guardia Civil tenía que demostrar que aquí todo estaba atado y bien atado porque venían algunas personalidades. Nos detuvieron a Juan Diego, a Aurora Bautista a María Luisa San José, etc, y nos tuvieron una noche detenidos junto a otros periodistas en las Salesas –yo entonces era dirigente de la Prensa Democrática, que no representaba nada de nada pero que armaba mucho ruido) Por tanto se inaugura un periodo de transición donde todos aprendemos a como funcionar hasta Junio del 77 que es cuando se producen las primeras elecciones, las constituyentes. Imagínate lo que es aquello, es la primera que votamos, es la primera vez que vemos un parlamento, porque yo a las cortes franquistas no había ido en mi vida.

En Junio del 1977 ya empezamos a incorporarnos a lo que se puede definir como una cierta normalidad democrática. Date cuenta que aquello eran más relaciones personales que otra cosa; yo me acuerdo por ejemplo cuando Suárez gana aquellas elecciones, hay un periodista más veterano que yo, que se llama Pedro Calvo Hernando, quien esa mañana cuando se constituyen las cortes democráticas, llega a los pasillos de las cortes y le dice a Adolfo Suárez:

-Cabron!

Y Suárez le responde:

-Oye Pedro, te recuerdo que ahora soy el Presidente del gobierno.

Con muy buen talante los dos, pero para que te des un poco cuenta de como eran las cosas. Muchos de nosotros, luego cuando llega Felipe González, llevábamos tal trayectoria de relaciones personales con los políticos, que nos es muy difícil después asimilar nuestro papel

real. Y si las relaciones eran tan personales durante la época de UCD con el PSOE esa tendencia se magnifica. Es que había periodistas que habían sido novias del vicepresidente del gobierno o de ministros. Entonces había que romper ese modelo amistoso. Se dio, pero con mucho tiempo. Y hay muchos periodistas que se pasan a la oposición de Felipe González, porque ellos creían que como habían viajado tanto con Felipe, se creían que iban a ser directamente Secretarios de Estado de Comunicación o ministros de no se que. Entonces cuando ven que no, se pasan a otras tesis más hostiles.

Con todo este cambio el país entra en una transición democrática, en los que sí, es cierto que en los últimos años del franquismo, España también tiene una mayor proyección internacional, entre comillas, pero hablando prácticamente de política exterior ¿cómo se proyecta España hacia el exterior y como es percibida y vista por otros países europeos como por ejemplo Francia, Italia, Alemania, dentro del contexto internacional?

Lo que yo vivo cuando acompaño al Presidente del gobierno por diferentes sitios, es un desprecio absoluto, pero absoluto. Las relaciones con Valéry Giscard d'Estaing eran de una prepotencia y de una superioridad tremenda. Con respecto a Europa éramos una gente muy despreciada. Del año 77 al 82. Sin embargo en América Latina éramos ya un poco un modelo a seguir. España en ese sentido ha sido un modelo para América Latina, pero en Europa muy mal. Esa visión negativa duro hasta el 85 más o menos. Hasta el 85 aquello no andaba. Éramos como los que íbamos a tocar a la puerta de la Comunidad Económica Europea para pedir y esa era nuestra máxima aspiración. Porque hay que darse cuenta de que por ejemplo mi padre estaba en la oposición y era europeísta. Durante el franquismo ser europeísta era casi peor que ser comunista. Mi padre era un sénior de lo más demócrata (a lo Cánovas del Castillo).

El 86 es un hito en todos los sentidos, pero hasta ese momento no sabíamos andar solos y estábamos despreciados por todas partes. No había canales de comunicación, los periodistas sabíamos muy poco. Sabíamos acompañar a los políticos o al rey, pero no teníamos canales de comunicación.

Y esta ansia de España por subirse al carro de la Comunidad Económica Europea, ¿cómo es vista según vosotros con relación a otros países, como por ejemplo Francia?

Francia siempre nos ha despreciado hasta el año 1986 y creo que en el 86 también. La época de Giscard fue terrible. Con Mitterrand fue un poco mejor. En ese momento funcionaban las internacionales, y tú tienes que darte cuenta que el panorama era completamente distinto. La internacional socialista funcionaba. Había una internacional liberal que funcionaba más o menos y la internacional demo-cristiana funcionaba de puta madre. Y ahí estaban peleándose Unión Democrática y el PNV a muerte siempre, pero funcionaba.

Pero España salía de la autarquía, coño. Estaba muy complicado que tuviéramos buenas relaciones con otros países que desconocíamos totalmente. Nosotros que sabíamos de los eurócratas, de Bruselas, etc.

Entonces el rol de Felipe González en ese sentido es clave.

Es clave. Clave. Porque Adolfo Suárez yo creo que hacia el exterior representaba un poco al Evo Morales de España, que salía de las filas del franquismo, que no hablaba idiomas, que no había salido de España. Felipe González es ya un tipo de una internacional, que sustituía al mítico Yopis. Pero González tenía la legitimidad histórica del socialismo. El año 1982 era

como un ruptura con el pasado, no radical, pero se comenzaba a intuir. En el 86 ya mejora mucho y a partir de entonces la trayectoria es completamente diferente.

Supongo que sobre ese particular, los esfuerzos de Felipe González en el gobierno por llevar un poco de la mano a España hacia una esfera un poco más internacional habrán sido muy intensos.

González es el que marca toda la diferencia aquí. Es el que da una cierta patina internacional a España. Es el que de alguna manera nos hace respetable por ahí. Es el que en América Latina entra a fondo, porque González es un hombre enormemente respetado en América Latina. O sea, que el cabalga el tigre de la nueva situación. Tiene un mal ministro de exteriores en principio que es Fernando Morán, porque venía lleno de dogmatismos y de ideas preconcebidas y quizá un infantil. A él le sucede un gran ministro de exteriores que es Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, que es quien de alguna manera normaliza la situación de España. Porque Ordóñez representaba esa izquierda que tanto gusta a los europeos.

Luego vino Javier Solana, que era otra cosa. Ya se comenzó a desarrollar una relación más normal con esa Europa que iba en sintonía con las ideas de Felipe González. Hoy ya no hay nada de eso, ya no hay ni internacionales, ni grandes ideas, González se ha vuelto un mercantilista. Entonces, en aquel momento del 1982 al 1986 aquí era la leche. En el año 1982 al 90 si quieres. En el 92 España se convierte en un protagonista internacional haciendo muy bien lo de los quintos centenarios, la Expo de Sevilla. Y eso fue lo último que hizo bien Felipe González y ahí se acabó.

¿Cómo valoras tú, por ejemplo, la incorporación de España a la OTAN?

Ahí no quedaba más remedio, no? Esto es como lo de ahora. Si Merkel y Obama dicen que ustedes tienen que hacer el decretazo de esto o de lo otro, se hace y punto. El PSOE con mucho pragmatismo se dio cuenta de que tenía que hacer eso. Con mucho pragmatismo, un tipo muy olvidado, que aquí nadie hace caso, que es Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, decide que hay que entrar ahí. En ese momento a él le cae eso, y le dicen, hay que ir a la OTAN y él dice, pues a la OTAN. Yo creo que convenció a sus sucesores de que había que entrar en la OTAN. Les da los datos a sus sucesores que no tenían ni idea. Aquí la tragedia es que los primeros ministros cuando llegaban a la Moncloa por primera vez no tenían demasiada idea de las cosas. En el libro de las memorias de Calvo Sotelo hay una anécdota muy buena, que llega el tío a la Moncloa al despacho que iba a ser suyo, y le dicen; esta es la caja de los secretos oficiales. No tenían ni la combinación de la caja fuerte ni nada, llaman al tipo que abría este tipo de cajas, por fin la abren, la gente que estaba allí miraba discretamente por la ventana, y mete la mano dentro y saca un papel. En el papel estaba escrita la combinación de la caja fuerte, no había nada más.

El Estado estaba completamente desmembrado. No había tejido estatal. Yo conocí las Moncloas de Suárez y de González y eran de una debilidad extrema. Adolfo Suárez tenía allí a cuatro gatos. No era un palacio presidencial a la francesa, era una cosa reducidísima. Con González se comienza a fortalecer un poco la cosa, pero cuando él llega, no había nada. Felipe González solo tenía un par de secretarías, un individuo que se llama Eduardo Sotillos (que también te podría ayudar mucho en esto) que era el Secretario de Estado de Comunicación y poco más.

La política de Felipe González por ejemplo en el Mediterráneo, especialmente en el norte de África y Marruecos estuvo bien desarrollada, ¿qué más podrías decir sobre esto?

Eso Felipe González lo hace muy bien. Yo creo que es de verdad cuando comenzamos a tener unas relaciones con Marruecos. A pesar de Hassan II, que no toleraba nada. Con Marruecos, el partido socialista tiene una cierta presencia desde hace muchos años y sigue funcionando. Se comenzó a meter gente allí, del CSID. El Coronel San Martín se dio cuenta de que había que tener muy controlado aquello y metieron militares, y además se notaba que eran militares. Metieron decenas de agentes. Entonces, la política mediterránea era la política con Marruecos. Argelia, Túnez, Mauritania desde luego no, Libia no existía, Egipto tampoco. En esos países no pintábamos nada. Solo era con Marruecos. Hay un tema que es muy importante y es el nacimiento de las televisiones privadas en España que tienen una enorme, una enorme difusión en Marruecos. La influencia de las televisiones privadas españolas en el norte de Marruecos es inmensa. Y creo que de eso se dio cuenta el gobierno de Felipe González y lo potenció bastante y lo hicieron bien.

En general con Francisco Fernández Ordóñez hubo un servicio diplomático muy bueno. Se potenció mucho el servicio exterior hacia América Latina y los países Árabes y norte Africanos fundamentalmente. En Europa, no, en Europa estábamos comenzando a andar y en el resto del mundo no existíamos. (Cumbre Israel palestina, Madrid 1991). (También te puedo poner en contacto con algún embajador que te podría ayudar en estas cosas)

Después del gobierno de González, 1995-1996, se comienza a cambiar.

Esa es una época de una decadencia absoluta. Felipe González desde el año 1989 está yéndose. A una amiga mía que es Susana Olmo que estaba en la agencia Colpisa, en el 1989 González le dice que se quiere ir en una entrevista que fue un escándalo. Entonces a partir de ahí yo diría que hay un momento de gran renacimiento y de gran esplendor que es el 92 a nivel exterior, que no interior, con continuas crisis y vaivenes económicos provocados por gente como Solchaga, pero yo te diría que desde el punto de vista exterior son momentos de gran relieve e importancia. Desde el 92 hasta el 96 estamos en una decadencia absoluta a todos los niveles, internos y externos. Al Rey no le puedes olvidar en esto. En esta época el Rey lo hace muy bien con el norte de África y con Marruecos especialmente, ya que es primo o algo así de Hassan, se hablan mucho por teléfono, que Hassan le habla con mucha confianza.

Si te parece podemos pasar ahora al gobierno de José María Aznar a nivel de política interna y externa. ¿Cuáles son según tú las principales claves, las diferencias con el gobierno de González?

Desde el punto de vista de la comunicación González puso ministros o ministrables en las relaciones con la prensa. Hablo de Javier Solana o de Rosa Conde, de Rubalcaba, de Sotillos que tenía la lacra de ser periodista. Aznar rompe todos esos moldes y pone a un chaval que había conocido en Valladolid que se llama Miguel Ángel Rodríguez, que es una especie de Maquiavelo de la comunicación y que monta unos moldes completamente diferentes de relación entre los periodistas y el mundo oficial y entre el Partido Popular y la Moncloa. De modo que pone un filtro tremendo. Pero es un filtro y a la vez un acicate porque es puro personalismo. Si te caes bien bien, si te caes mal mal y entonces ya está todo etiquetado. Y eso generó para siempre una nueva forma de hacer comunicación política: o sea, entre los periodistas y el mundo monclovita, oficial. Hasta entonces no se había producido este personalismo, era una cosa más horizontal y más relaciones personales.

Esa horizontalidad seguramente favorecía un clima de mayor confianza, supongo, ¿no?

Claro, claro, date cuenta de que todos veníamos de la misma guerra. Hasta Felipe González todos veníamos de la guerra de trincheras contra el franquismo. Porque muchos periodistas tuvimos mucha relación con gente que luego fueron ministros; claro, habíamos conspirado juntos. Obviamente con Aznar eso se acaba. Ponen a un chico que tendría como 27 o 28 años, que era un redactor del Norte de Castilla y hacía deshacía. Y cuando digo que hacía y deshacía quiero decir que querían montar un conglomerado de prensa, de medios de comunicación para enfrentarse al poderío de El País. Ellos entendían que el mundo de Prisa era una fuerza muy pujante y que podía ir contra los intereses del Partido Popular, y entonces ellos tratan de contrarrestar eso a través de diferentes medios: Televisa de México, Onda Cero, pasando por El Mundo y por ABC, medios de provincias etc. Este conglomerado fracasa porque aquello era muy difícil de dirigir, pero sí, intentan hacerlo. Se podría decir que es fue el primer intento de hacerse con medios de comunicación desde el poder.

En la época de los socialistas lo único que ocurrió fue el nacimiento de las televisiones privadas, al cual se habían opuesto inicialmente los socialistas por cierto. O sea, intentaron hacer grupos afines, pero todo salió como salió y de ninguna manera era una correa de transmisión. En tiempos de Aznar esto es la primera vez que se intenta y casi lo hacen.

España es cierto que experimentó un gran avance con relación a lo que fue en la época franquista, se convierte en un país, con comillas o sin comillas, de primera línea internacional, o que al menos tiene un sitio en la escena internacional. ¿Se puede decir que España fue un gigante que se despertó? ¿Un gigante con pies de barro?

Sí es verdad, pero digamos gigantito. Pero a ver, España en comparación con los países del norte de África y con los países de la Europa del este, obviamente era otra cosa. Era un país con una buena economía, con una industria muy sólida, en el turismo ya era una potencia mundial. Con Felipe González tuvimos un primer paso europeo, nos sentíamos ya europeos y tuvimos una increíble penetración en América Latina. Con Aznar eso se consumó. De pronto nos convertimos en los mayores inversores del mundo en casi todos los países de América Latina. No me lo creía ni yo. Y dos, la convergencia con Europa, que parecía algo imposible se consigue en tres años. De pronto nos encontramos con que nuestras cifras son parecidas a las de Europa, a nivel de PBI, de paro, de renta per cápita.

Cómo hemos hecho esto? De dos maneras con Aznar: Privatizando las empresas públicas, de modo que si ahí no consigues un superávit del estado ya me dirás como se puede conseguir: Iberia, Repsol, Endesa... Fue una política de privatización durísima pero bien hecha. Pero bien hecho. Y 2, de alguna manera, y no se quién es el mago de esto, no lo se, alguien descubre de cómo beneficiarse de los fondos de cohesión de la Unión Europea. Ahí debe haber un mago. De la noche a la mañana todos los fondos de cohesión vienen a España! Todas las carreteras que hay aquí las ha hecho Alemania. Por tanto, superávit del estado todo, porque se había vendido todo menos Enresa que es la nuclear. Supo cómo hacer la cosa con Europa, de modo que nos pusimos no en el pelotón de cabeza, pero no somos el pelotón de los torpes.

Y cuando Europa va creciendo hacia el este incorporando países absolutamente lamentables, de pronto te das cuenta que España está ahí. Eso significa que Francia nos mira ya con otros ojos completamente diferentes y los italianos nos llaman los alemanes del sur de Europa. Qué ha ocurrido? No lo se, no se quien ha permitido dar ese salto. En el año 1995 estábamos muy desprestigiados por el tema de la corrupción, pero del año 1996, cuando llega este cabrón, al año 2000, esos 4 años que además son años de gobierno de pactos con los nacionalistas son unos años fantásticos y España da un salto increíble. Y en el 2000-2002 nos encontramos con

que nos miran con respeto en Europa, que el español de la maleta de cartón ya no existe. Son años también de esplendor de Europa. Con todo eso es cierto que se produce la figura de ese gigante que se despierta.

A niveles de personas, de representaciones del gobierno, hemos hablado antes de los primeros momentos de la transición, en los que hay complejos de inferioridad, reales, sentidos. González lleva las cosas un poco más adelante y poco a poco, España comienza a ser más respetado internacionalmente. Cuando llega Aznar la percepción de España en el exterior es positiva; Aznar se encuentra con un país que es admirado fuera: ¿Cómo reacciona Aznar a nivel de política exterior al comenzar a sentirse representante de un país respetado y que se está desarrollando? ¿Qué impactos tiene esta nueva coyuntura en la forma de proyectarse hacia el exterior?

Los impactos son malos, claro. Son malos porque generan prepotencia. Aznar se cree en un momento determinado que va a liderar Europa y se alía con los polacos de extrema derecha y otros locos, contra los países que son los verdaderos motores de Europa, que son Francia y Alemania. Y claro, ni Francia ni España le perdonan este movimiento. Se alinea con un tipo como Bush frente a América Latina. Tuvo un encuentro fortísimo con Vicente Fox en un determinado momento, y América Latina tampoco se lo perdona. Quien se cree este tío que es? Y sobre todo hay un momento de prepotencia increíble; me acuerdo de un encuentro que tuve con Aznar en una comida con otros 4 periodistas, donde le pregunté (la boda principesca de la hija en el Escorial había sido la semana anterior):

Jaúregui: *-Cómo te atreves habiendo un 85% de los españoles que están en contra de la guerra de Iraq, como te atreves a mantener esa política?*

Aznar-*Propio es del estadista saber desafiar a la opinión pública cuando conviene.*

Aquello me dejó impresionado. Dije, menudo personaje con el que estamos tratando. Este ya está completamente desnortado. Ese momento de auge en Europa y de auge de España en el mundo, al final es mal aprovechado y deriva en una prepotencia que no nos correspondía.

Y que seguramente afeaba la imagen de España en sus relaciones internacionales.

Totalmente. Eso sí que lo noté. Luego teníamos el problema siempre presente de ETA en el exterior. Y eso nos enfrentaba mucho como país a muchos países latinoamericanos. Hay un episodio tremendo cuando se pidió la extradición de 3 etarras, donde hay revueltas y 2 muertos en Montevideo. Ese es un tema que tiene mucha importancia en la imagen de España en el exterior. Hay muchos medios de comunicación importantes que consideran a ETA un movimiento guerrillero, de liberación. El País Vasco está sojuzgado y eso, quieras o no, nos hace daño.

El gobierno Aznar intenta -cuando está Mayor Oreja de interior- una lavada de imagen y de publicidad a través de todas las embajadas principales. No consiguió gran cosa pero lo intenta porque se da cuenta de que ese es un problema.

Antes habíamos hablado del papel de España en el norte de África y en Marruecos durante el gobierno de González; ¿cómo ves la política de Aznar en esta misma área geográfica?

Aznar destroza lo que se había hecho precedentemente. Lo destroza. Hay unas declaraciones de Piqué, (exteriores) completamente desafortunadas que indican que esto va en picado; y luego no te quiero decir nada con el episodio de la Isla Perejil. Un episodio chusco donde los haya, que da el ejemplo de dos países bananeros. En este momento (2002) la influencia del gobierno Aznar se ve que comenzaba a decaer claramente.

En esta época Moratinos con su experiencia en el mundo árabe ¿es considerado?

Aquí es considerado como un señor militante del PSOE, que está completamente centrado del lado de los palestinos y no de Israel y en este momento, España estaba más del lado de Israel que de los palestinos. Obviamente estábamos alineados con los Estados Unidos, de modo que creo que Moratinos en este momento no tiene ninguna influencia. Es un tipo conocido pero pasa por ser un individuo instalado en el buenísimo, a favor de los oprimidos, etc. En este momento es considerado como un militante. Tú sabes que la diplomacia española no es muy profesional. Los diplomáticos y embajadores que estaban en el otro lado se les castiga cuando llega el nuevo gobierno.

Un tema sensible que se vivió intensamente fue el atentado del 11 M. Según tu visión, ¿cómo fue la respuesta de un Aznar un poco desesperado por tratar de cargar las culpas a quien políticamente le podía beneficiar?

Aznar en tres días perdió las elecciones. Si se hubiera presentado él en vez de otro, su reacción con referencia a este atentado hubiera sido muy diferente. Pero ya no se presentaba él y le importaba un huevo que su sucesor perdiese. Porque ya las relaciones entre Aznar y Rajoy ya no eran buenas. Aznar se dejó llevar de sus peores demonios, porque Aznar como todo el mundo, la causalidad es menor que la causalidad muchas veces y siempre estamos pensando en teorías conspiratorias. Las relaciones personales son importantes en política y en ese momento, Aznar se dejó llevar por la soberbia. “A mí me han colado este gol, yo convoco la manifestación, yo pongo la pancarta, etc...”. Si Aznar en ese momento, los días 11,12,13 y 14, tres días que cambiaron el mundo, hubiera convocado una manifestación unitaria, y le dice a Zapatero, vamos los dos encabezando la pancarta, qué pancarta hacemos Zapatero, la ponemos juntos; el PP hubiera ganado las elecciones. Seguro. Si no se hubiera empeinado en la tesis de ETA en la manipulación de los periodistas. Se echó constantemente paladas de tierra sobre la cabeza. Pero si eso no hubiera ocurrido, hubieran ganado las elecciones. La percepción de los españoles era que la opción Zapatero era muy floja, nadie sabía quién era. Era percibido como lo que luego ha demostrado si te digo la verdad.

En general la primera legislatura de Aznar fue estupenda, pero la segunda fue fatal. Al principio tenía a los nacionalistas de su lado, y la verdad es que los nacionalistas siempre ayudan a que las cosas salgan bien. Cuando los tienes como el viento a favor ayudan mucho, si los tienen en contra, desayudan. Luego, en la segunda legislatura el tío ganó con mayoría absoluta, se ensoberbeció, casó a la niña en palacio, empezó a poner los pies sobre la mesa como Bush, etc...ya en este momento perdió el sentido del espacio y de la realidad.

No se por qué se empeñaron en decir que había sido ETA cuando no había ningún indicio de que hubiera sido ETA. Además desde las primeras horas de la mañana había indicios que llevaban a otro lado. Pero habría que dejar aquí claro, que Aznar perdió él solito. A ver, Aznar, que es una persona a quien no tengo ninguna simpatía ni como individuo ni como político, te lo digo, dejó los números estupendos. Los números salían cojonudos, estupendos. El país, de cara al exterior era un país equivocado (aliado con el demonio Bush), pero potente. En su partido tenía todas las filas prietas, sin fisuras, pero eso sí, era enemigo a muerte de los nacionalistas, en Europa pensaban de él que era un cabrón que les había llevado

todos los fondos de cohesión y que ya lo pagaría caro. Así que estaba el germen de la autodestrucción. Pero cuando Zapatero llega a este país, este país es la leche en este momento. Es un país con superávit por todos los lados, modernizado a tope, donde empezaba el boom de la construcción, que ha dado tanto dinero a tantos, y que también ha jodido tanto medioambiente, etc...Pero desde el punto de vista económico, el país iba muy bien. Pero sumado a todo esto, luego Aznar pone como candidato a Rajoy, un tipo a quien no se le conoce muy bien, no tenía imagen y encima ocurre esto...

Yo la sensación que he tenido con el gobierno de Zapatero es que el momento en el que las cosas han comenzado a marchar mal, en el momento en el que se ha perdido la inercia de las vacas gordas de la época de Aznar. ¿Tú como lo ves?

No, creo que no. En la historia todo son péndulos. Péndulo de la prosperidad, péndulo de la miseria, péndulo de social-demócratas, péndulo de liberales, etc...Zapatero llegó con el péndulo estupendo, pero el péndulo se le ha ido a otro lado. Primero ha habido una crisis global. Han pasado muchas cosas. Segundo, el péndulo europeo se ha ido hacia los conservadores, ya no queda nadie. Y luego los propios errores que no han sido pocos.

La figura de Zapatero a nivel internacional, ¿Es una figura respetada?

Yo creo que es una catástrofe. O sea, es un tipo simpático, cae bien. Es como Berlusconi, no es verdad, Berlusconi tiene otras connotaciones. Pero Zapatero tiene cosas buenas; es un tipo honrado, es un tipo simpático, patriota, digan lo que digan, pero luego es un desacertado absoluto y luego es un ignorante tremendo. Es que claro, no puedes ser tan ignorante. El primer ministro de un país, de una potencia industrial del mundo no puede ser tan ignorante. Y sobre todo no puede estar diciendo primero que tu camisa es blanca y que luego es verde. Eso genera una inseguridad jurídica absoluta. Entonces las declaraciones de un primer ministro tienen que ser muy sólidas y las de Zapateros nunca lo son. Zapatero genera inseguridad jurídica y eso es lo que genera él.

Algo de lo que tu dices hay. Ha administrado mal el capital, pero también hay una serie de factores que dificultan que ese capital pueda ser administrado en condiciones, las cosas como son. Y si hubiera estado otro primer ministro quizá no lo hubiera hecho mucho mejor, con la excepción de una cosa, y es que se ha dedicado a despilfarrar todo. Como tenía superávit, venga, 400 euros para todos, y a los discapacitados, la ley de tal y cual (que luego no la adopta), y a las señores que aborten tanto, y al emigrante que llegue, tanto. Y eso no nos los podíamos permitir.

Ahora que has mencionado el tema de inmigración, esta es una cuestión capital.

Sí, pero no con Zapatero, esto viene de antes. Hay un momento en el que hay un secretario general de inmigración, Enrique Fernández, que es cuando se ponen en marcha los “viajes Ecuador”. Es decir, al ecuatoriano que estaba aquí le pagabas el viaje de regreso, porque aquí ya no cabía y luego le pagabas el viaje de vuelta a España, cuando las cosas mejorasen. Entonces claro, un emigrante cuando iba al paro se iba a su país, se gastaba el dinero o se establecía allí o lo que fuese, y luego podía volver con un contrato de trabajo. Cuántos planes de inmigración se han hecho; 15? Luego nunca nos hemos dicho la verdad, de cuántos ilegales había, de cuántos entraban. No hemos sabido luchar con un problema que era serio, pero que al final no era tan serio, porque si te das cuenta, la inmigración es la que nos ha hecho crecer. Ha sido un factor de crecimiento muy importante durante la época de Aznar.

Los emigrantes colaboraban a la Seguridad Social de los españoles, todos los trabajos que los españoles instalados en el súper estado de bienestar no querían hacer, y el inmigrante de turno te llevaba la madre de paseo, y el jardín cuidado, etc. Vivíamos como los romanos con los esclavos y eso no puede ser, eso no se sustenta. Pero el estado de bienestar que tenía Europa no se sustenta en toda Europa. Ya ves lo que está pasando en Inglaterra. Es que el estado de bienestar como se entendía no se puede sustentar, porque estamos como en la caída del imperio romano. La caída del imperio romano tiene cantidad de paralelismos con lo que está ocurriendo ahora.

Entonces a Zapatero, todo esto le ha pillado desprevenido, mal preparado, luego es un optimista antropológico y derrochador manirroto nato. Porque Zapatero nunca ha gestionado nada. Zapatero nunca ha tenido gestión sobre nada. Yo creo que su casa se la lleva Sonsoles. Claro, entonces, un tío que nunca ha tenido gestión sobre nada, ni experiencia de gestión, le metes de pronto a gestionar un país, como este.

Este modelo de gobierno ¿cómo la comparas tú con un homólogo como Sarkozy como presidente de Francia?

Francia ha sido el corazón de un imperio, pero siempre ha sido el corazón. El rol de Francia ha sido siempre diferente.

Claro, esta visión imperial se ve muy bien nuevamente con Sarkozy con este nuevo intento de reconquistar el Mediterráneo, a partir de ser el impulsor de la Unión por el Mediterráneo, de la reformulación del proceso de Barcelona, etc...

Pero es que eso siempre ha sido así. Nosotros nos creíamos que teníamos en Barcelona la capital del Mediterráneo. Eso una Maragallada. Pero eso no es verdad. Marsella pinta mucho más que Barcelona en cuanto a un rol en el Mediterráneo. Pero si es que Marruecos es francés, si Argelia es francesa, Túnez, es francés, es que Libia es francesa, es que Mauritania es francesa, y se habla francés, no español. En Marruecos solo se habla español en Larache y en Tánger. Pero no hemos tenido capacidad de penetración. Es que los franceses lo hacen muy bien, es que tienen una capacidad de hacer política exterior fantástica. Es que en Guinea Ecuatorial se habla francés y eso no es lógico. Los franceses nos han ganado por la mano todo. Pero si en el mediterráneo no hay ni un solo enclave que sea español.

O sea, que las posibles aspiraciones de España para liderar la política euro-mediterránea ¿pueden ser en cierto modo fuegos artificiales?

Pero si es que no hay política euro-mediterránea de España. Con que enclaves? Chafarinas? Ha habido buenos embajadores, buenos intentos, nos hemos gastado dinero de la cooperación en Marruecos lo que no está escrito, pero para qué? Para nada. Además hay ahí 3 o 4 temas que nos enemistan con Marruecos irremisiblemente; Ceuta y Melilla, etc...

Para finalizar, como ves el futuro de España a niveles interiores y a niveles exteriores.

A nivel interior hemos perdido la gran oportunidad de oro de hacer un gobierno de gran coalición en el 2008. Ahí hemos perdido la oportunidad de oro. Esto no sería lo mismo, obviamente, tú te das cuenta, esto no sería lo mismo si tuviéramos un gobierno de gran coalición aquí. Como por ejemplo hay en el país vasco, más o menos. Si en vez de estar aquí dándonos de leches unos con otros nos hubiéramos puesto a trabajar esto no sería lo mismo. Hemos perdido esa oportunidad. Estos grandes acuerdos se tenían que haber hecho desde el 2008, se están haciendo ahora, pero se tenía que haber comenzado a hacer mucho antes.

Se siguen haciendo grandes errores. Se han hecho dos presupuestos que no tienen nada que ver con la realidad y eso es muy grave. Los presupuestos del 2009 y los presupuestos del 2010 son presupuestos que vamos. Como si yo te digo que ahora tienes un jersey de cuello de cisne. Es que nada tiene que ver con nada. Es tremendo. Eso tiene una influencia sobre el devenir interior del país, y claro, las críticas que hace Rajoy tiene mucha razón, pero es que Rajoy no logra romper la barrera del sonido. Por lo que ahora nos encontramos en un nivel de desconfianza del 75% de los españoles con respecto a su clase política. La percepción de que el tercer problema nacional después de la economía y el paro, es la clase política. Acojonante. El 75% no se fía del presidente del gobierno, 83% con respecto a Rajoy, no, y esa es la alternativa. Un nivel de pasotismo terrible. Hemos debilitado institucionalmente España hasta niveles incontenibles desde un punto de vista territorial, desde un punto de vista constitucional; esta constitución no vale. Nadie te lo dirá pero no vale. Fue una constitución que nació para salir de la dictadura pero no para sobrevivir 35 años después. Y encima hay un estado de nacional-pesimismo gravísimo. Porque si la economía como decía Keynes es un estado de espíritu, nuestro espíritu está muy mal... como no ganemos el mundial.

Entonces desde el punto de vista interno, la situación actual es mala por la misma razón que en Argentina era también mala en la época del corralito. Porque el estado de espíritu de la gente era pésimo. Así que desde ese punto de vista no tenemos ninguna riqueza. Seguimos conservando estructura, pero el tejido productivo es malo. Antes se consumía la mitad del cemento de toda Europa y ahora eso ya no existe. Y antes vivíamos de ser un país de servicios y turismo y esa gallina de los huevos de oro la hemos matado. Claro, es que la gente ya no viene aquí a comprar una casa. Por qué? Porque no le hemos dado seguridad jurídica al inversor, ni siquiera al pequeño inversor. Esta inseguridad jurídica al inversor privado la hemos extendido al inversor público. El otro día un fondo de pensiones importante de Estados Unidos le mandó una carta a Zapatero diciéndole textualmente que habíamos invertido casi 33.000 millones de Euros en energías renovables y usted ahora nos cambia las reglas del juego de las energías renovables; qué hacemos ahora? Esa inseguridad jurídica a nivel individual y a nivel colectivo es lo peor que ha ocurrido.

Entonces, paso devastador de este gobierno por el gobierno, valga la redundancia: 1) insuficiencias institucionales serias desde el punto de vista territorial, el estado de las autonomías que no funciona. Las relaciones entre comunidades autónomas no existen, hay una dispersión jurídica tremenda y esto de las 17 leyes de caza no es más que un banal ejemplo. Hay 17 leyes distintas para muchas cosas. Yo como empresario no me meto a invertir en otra comunidad autónoma porque todas las reglas del juego me han cambiado. 2) Hemos perdido la reputación exterior. Hemos dejado de ser los alemanes del sur de Europa para ser los griegos de Grecia. Y de esto no es solamente culpable el gobierno. También tiene la culpa la oposición. La oposición tampoco es fiable. La gente no dice que bien que va a venir Rajoy, eso no se lo oyes a nadie.

El clima de pesimismo es absoluto. Y eso te lo dicen las encuestas donde los personajes más populares son personajes outsiders: Rosa Díez, Durán i Lleida, Gallardón, etc... gente que no va a llegar a la presidencia del gobierno nunca, pero que son los más populares. 3) De cara Europa ya verá. Analiza la presidencia Europea y ya verás. Europa de todas maneras es un barco a la deriva, ya veremos a ver a donde va. Lo que hacen en exteriores de Europa es muy jodido. La ampliación de Europa ha sido muy mala. Hemos metido peras con manzanas, churros con ovejas, se ha metido todo en el túrmix y salga lo que salga, y ha salido muy mal.

Qué otros planos se pueden considerar aquí? En el plano objetivamente económico, no estamos tan mal. Lo que pasa es que si la economía es un estado de espíritu hay estamos muy

mal. Pero por los datos no estamos tan mal. Nuestra deuda está más o menos bien, tenemos 5 millones de parados y vamos a tener más, pero eso es porque vamos a enfriar la economía, pero no es verdad. Porque tenemos un 25% de economía sumergida y con eso consigues amortiguar mucho los efectos sociales. De los 5 millones de parados debe haber 3 trabajando a pleno pulmón. Eso es bueno? Malo? Es injusto. Este probablemente es uno de los países más injustos de Europa y eso tendrá algún día su significación.

Y luego hay un tema que a mí me preocupa mucho. Hay dos aspectos constitucionales, de inadecuación constitucional que son peligrosos: 1) El autonomías no funcionan. No somos un estado federal, ni confederal, ni un federalismo imperfecto como decía Maragall. Somos una amalgama de distintos intereses, de reyes, reyezuelos, etc...con un estado central muy débil. Y además el problema es que el siguiente también va a ser débil. Suponiendo que el siguiente fuera Rajoy, ese gobierno sería muy débil también. Eso constituye la desconfianza ciudadana.

Y 2) la forma de Estado. Nunca se publican las encuestas sobre las conciencias monárquicas o republicanas de la gente. Y no se publican por algo. Una vez que desaparezca el actual jefe del estado, o abdique, que no va a abdicar, que va a pasar? Ya no quiero ni pensar, si ocurriese, que en práctica no puede ocurrir -por algunas razones ginecológicas- que Letizia tuviera un hijo, con ese artículo 57 de la constitución que tenemos. No quiero ni pensar. Pero como tenemos una clase política que nunca piensa a medio plazo, este artículo de la constitución se tenía que haber reformado hace tiempo, junto con otros. La constitución todavía habla del servicio militar obligatorio. Si miras el título 8 de la constitución verás. No tiene nada que ver con la realidad. Fue creado para descentralizar un estado, para el nacimiento del estado de las autonomías, pero no para 32 años después. Entonces a la constitución hay que darle un lavado de cara, urgentemente. Esto no lo asume nadie, y no lo asume nadie y tampoco lo dicen.

Esto que ocurrió con el Estatut de Cataluña demostró que las costuras de la constitución se han quedado pequeñas, para lo que representa la realidad. La realidad es una realidad nacionalista en Cataluña y en el País Vasco, un poco menos en Galicia, y es una realidad en la que el Rey debe representar una cosa distinta al Shogun este tenemos ahí. Eso no puede ser.

En realidad ha sido un país que ha osado crecer, que se ha atrevido a crecer y a convertirse en una potencia internacional pero con miedo a cambiar cuando hay que cambiar.

En realidad hicimos un cambio radical en el año 1977, la primera transición. Pero es que ahora nos encontramos en una segunda transición y que ese cambio hay que hacerlo otra vez. Que ahora ya estamos crecidos y que ya no nos sirve la ropa de marinerito del 1978 y que la Constitución nuestra ni contempla el Internet, ni Europa, ni el Euro, ni nada, joder, ni las 17 autonomías por cierto, ni la inadecuación del Senado, ni la circunscripción provincial (esta normativa electoral va a ser fuente de problemas gordos. No puede ser que si yo, votando a Izquierda Unida si lo fuese, necesitase 4 votos más que el PP o el PSOE para tener un escaño) etc... Hay docenas de cosas que obligarían a cambiar la constitución. Así que estamos favoreciendo alianzas contra natura.

La conclusión que saco de todo esto es que para ser optimista, vivimos un período de grandes potencialidades. De espléndidas potencialidades para cambiar. Que venga un tío con huevos, (que no es el que viene) que diga que gane el mejor, vamos a hacer el gran consenso para arreglar 5 cosas. 4 en la Constitución y punto y acabaron los problemas. Afortunadamente

ETA se va a acabar. Pero se va a acabar por consunción, pero no porque que hayamos hecho nosotros nada por hacer que termine. Por pura vejez.

ANNA TERRON Y CUSÍ.

Me interesa mucho ver, desde un punto de vista oficial, pero también personal, saber las experiencias que hayas podido tener tú, en un ambiente de retos. Porque desde que España entra en la Unión y sobre todo a partir del 1991-1992, sobre todo a partir de Amsterdam. Me gustaría saber desde tu experiencia como fueron esos primeros tiempos en los cuales se comenzaba a razonar en un modo nacional, pero también en un contexto internacional, cuáles eran y como se afrontaban estos iniciales retos, sobre todo relacionados con la inmigración.

Yo empecé a trabajar este tema en el Parlamento Europeo en el 1994. Llegué precisamente en el lugar oportuno en el momento oportuno a la Comisión de Libertades Públicas y fui después portavoz por el Partido Socialista en la misma comisión. Es muy curioso, porque en España había poca conciencia sobre temas de inmigración. La conciencia que había en el ámbito de inmigraciones era reciente, tenía mucho que ver con la salida de españoles. Todavía en el 1994 había entradas, pero todavía no había una preocupación política por este tema. Y con relación a la política europea sobre inmigración, no había nada. No existía nada. Era totalmente ajeno a todo. Era la época del tercer pilar.

Recuerdo por un lado, y casi paralelamente, el aumento por el interés por parte de España en materia migratoria y el desarrollo de la política europea de migración, que fue a partir de la famosa comunicación de la Comisión 2000 de la Declaración del Fin de las políticas de inmigración 0 que fue muy controvertida y la verdad es que nosotros en ese debate incipiente estábamos en una situación un poco extraña. En realidad se seguía viendo lo que había sido la inmigración interna europea (Portugal, España, Grecia) y luego la segunda, digamos Turquía y Marruecos como posteriores pero seguían discutiendo todavía sobre lo que había sido todavía la existente política de inmigración. La clásica política de la inmigración y el post-crisis de los años setenta con el cierre, etc.

Y nosotros que veníamos de esta experiencia migratoria, creo que nos dábamos cuenta más rápidamente que ellos, de que había otro fenómeno de migración internacional muy importante. Y nos dábamos cuenta porque la llegada la teníamos ahí, en España. No porque tuviéramos más, porque Francia, Alemania, Holanda, Bélgica nos superaban por mucho. En España no había ese fenómeno de inmigración internacional, pero se estaba produciendo en un período muy corto y muy intenso. Era todo muy visible. Y además se estaba despertando la conciencia de los españoles en lo referente a la inmigración.

Me acuerdo que en las reuniones preparatorias de la cumbre de Tampere (1999) antes de la comunicación. Fue un año antes que estábamos reunidos después de Amsterdam, la preparación de la cumbre con el Comisario Vitorino, me escribió Ricard Zapata de Barcelona – no no me escribió, escribió un artículo en La Vanguardia, hablando sobre política Europea de Inmigración. Yo me quedé alucinada y dije, mira no eres la única loca de tu ciudad que

estás haciendo esto. Le escribí emocionada. A partir de ahí tuvimos muy buena relación hasta ahora.

Recuerdo esto. Era realmente muy extraño. De esta primera época, la presencia española en las políticas europeas de inmigración pasó de ser muy menor a adquirir un mayor peso. Y yo creo que en aquella época dimos un salto de ser un país que había elaborado una ley de inmigración casi por que la entrada en la Unión Europea la obligaba, porque había una preocupación en el norte de Europa por la extensión al extremo sur del estrecho y de las fronteras exteriores de la Unión, preocupación que para España era nula. Para nosotros en el momento de la entrada en la Unión Europea en el año 1986, la discusión sobre las fronteras exteriores de España no existían. Los marroquíes no tenían visado para pasar en España y no pasaba nada.

Sí hubo esa primera ley de inmigración un poco causada por las exigencias de la Unión Europea. Yo pienso que dimos un salto muy importante a ser uno de los países que lideró una visión de las emigraciones internacionales tan distintas. La emigración del norte estaba muy vinculada a los flujos internos pero también a la cuestión de la emigración por razones humanitarias. Nosotros en España no teníamos nada de eso, nadie quería pedir asilo en España. Éramos un país con mayor tradición de producción de asilados que de recepción. Y claro, no habíamos tenido tiempo en absoluto de entrar en aspectos como la reagrupación familiar etc.

Una cosa que de las que estás comentando que me parece muy interesante y que va al punto de lo que yo quisiera escribir, efectivamente, cuando España entra en la Unión en 1986, el perfil que había mantenido después de tantos años de dictadura, como país subdesarrollado a nivel político, institucional, etc. Llega un momento en el que se tiene que hacer un hueco y ganarse una credibilidad también por parte de sus socios europeos. En la Reunión del Consejo de Europa de Lisboa en 1992, Abel Matutes dice, atención con el norte de África que lo que está sucediendo es una bomba de relojería, palabras textuales, y subraya el aspecto de la emigración. Entonces en el documento principal y en el anexo de las conclusiones la Unión Europea explica que hay unas áreas prioritarias donde hay que hacer una especial atención que son el este, el norte de África y el Medio Oriente. Obviamente el Medio Oriente mucho más relacionado con el tema del proceso de Paz de Israel, Palestina etc. Pero en el norte de África por razones demográficas se estaba preparando una bomba de relojería. Lo que has comentado tú. Ese papel español por individualizar un problema incipiente que va a ser muy importante y capital para el resto de las políticas de la Unión Europea.

Claro. Lo que tú me estás diciendo es en dos vías, ¿no? Por un lado en la vía de las políticas de justicia interior, antiguo tercer pilar, que evoluciona muy rápidamente después de Amsterdam y que nosotros nos metemos en esta línea en una forma muy incipiente pero con una visión más clara como te decía. Y la otra línea por la que evoluciona eso es por la política mediterránea. La incipiente también política exterior de la Unión y la dimensión mediterránea. No era desde el punto de vista de la política exterior, no fue desde el principio la obsesión española. La obsesión de España y Portugal desde el principio del ingreso en la Unión Europea es el viraje de Europa hacia América Latina. Ahí nosotros sí que presionábamos mucho, porque la parte política exterior comunitaria que era más bien de cooperación al desarrollo existía estaba muy orientada a los países del Caribe y a las ex colonias del norte, pero no había una visión muy Europea hacia América Latina. Por lo que España presionó mucho ahí.

Pero, yo creo que nosotros nos dimos muy rápidamente de que tampoco había una dimensión mediterránea más allá de Oriente Medio y más allá de lo relacionado con la propia seguridad por parte de la Unión Europea y nosotros ahí teníamos un vecindario inmediato. Y ahí Abel Matutes comenzó la política Euro-Mediterránea que ha tenido sus altos y bajos y que estamos donde estamos para bien y para mal. El día 5 nos vamos a la toma de posesión del nuevo Secretario de la UPM a Barcelona, un marroquí, Jossef Amrani.

Es curioso como esas dos líneas van confluyendo y separándose. Nosotros empezamos a preocuparnos por la inmigración mediterránea en ese momento y después va aumentando la preocupación. Preocupación compartida por otros países, aunque yo creo que es radicalmente diferente y eso es importante verlo. La posición de Francia respecto a Argelia, o la posición de España respecto a Marruecos por muy diferentes por mil razones; geopolíticas, históricas. Porque los comportamientos migratorios no son los mismos. Pero bueno, al final, a nosotros nos interesa esa visión mediterránea y ese pilar migratorio, y nos interesa sobre todo Marruecos. Que se haya bien o mal, tengo muchas dudas sobre todo el proceso. Tanto en el ámbito mediterráneo como en el ámbito de las políticas PESC como en el ámbito JAI, vivimos desde hace muchos años, por lo menos desde mitad de los noventa en una fortísima tensión entre el miedo y la necesidad de cierre y la gestión del espacio Euro-Mediterráneo y de las migraciones con otros criterios más vinculados a la política exterior, a la cooperación, al desarrollo. Seguimos viviendo de una forma muy dramática.

Te lo juro. Los suecos y nosotros éramos los únicos que hablábamos de democratización en el norte de África. Lo demás....yo recuerdo como cayó un papel sobre la mesa del consejo que habían pactado los italianos con los mediterráneos una semana antes donde la primera frase era, si no literalmente, sí en espíritu, decía, se está produciendo en el norte de África, cambios que pueden traer efectos dramáticos para Europa. Nos levantamos los suecos y nosotros diciendo “se están produciendo cambios que pueden ser esperanzadores”.

Es lo que nos pasó a nosotros en las Canarias en el 2006. En Canarias en 2006 se gestionó la llegada de 30.000 personas. No se acudió a España, no se acudió a Europa, repatriamos a muchos, etc. Bueno pero ya llegaremos a este tema.

El punto interesante que has mencionado, ese rol español por identificar un problema incipiente que es el tema de la inmigración, y obviamente también que a nivel diplomático, a nivel de reuniones con los otros miembros de la Unión Europea, pudieron existir algunas reticencias por hacer pasar este mensaje. Por parte de otros miembros, pero por parte de Francia también particularmente?

Yo creo que esto se circunscribe a esta tensión entre el refuerzo de las fronteras y la necesidad de establecer este marco, más amplio especialmente en el ámbito mediterráneo. Hay un elemento que creo que es interesante. España, sobre todo a partir del 2004, cuando ya se había producido la entrada masiva por decirlo así, asociado a unas condiciones de un mercado que reclaman mano de obra en condiciones económicas por debajo del precio. Lo cual además hace que haya una presión fuerte en España para el contrato de personas para el servicio doméstico, etc. Después de esta entrada fuerte en el 2004, yo creo que es interesante ver, como España y seguramente esto se gestó antes, es un país que ante los retos migratorios, lo que hace es pedir más a Europa. España al revés de lo que se sucede en el centro y en el norte de Europa, que hay básicamente reacciones de repliegue....yo recuerdo las discusiones desde el 1998 hasta hoy, que el número de entradas solo las pueden controlar los estados y la política migratoria es nacional, los Europeos son de mínimos, nunca avanzó ninguna de las propuestas de Tampere para construir un marco común migratorio. En cambio España ahí, tal

vez fue uno de los pocos países que no, que cuando tiene un problema en 2006, lo que hace es que se refuerce FRONTEX, que impide que haya una política comunitaria de inmigración que cree que la política exterior es básica en materia de migraciones...

Nosotros pusimos en marcha el Plan África, que África para España era una completa desconocida en materia de política exterior y de cooperación, al hilo de los eventos de 2006. Pero nosotros vimos que la única forma de gestionar el flujo de personas, en el siglo XXI era con más Europa y con más relación con los países de origen. Y esta es nuestra historia reciente con Marruecos y con el África subsahariana. Marruecos, puede ser más o menos complicado, porque nosotros con Marruecos tenemos todos los dossiers del mundo. La primera cosa que tenemos que hacer es reconocer que es nuestro vecino, y que por lo tanto tenemos una relación transfronteriza. La gente piensa que podemos hacer la misma política migratoria con Ecuador que con Marruecos y que la política migratoria es una, y que no tiene nada que ver con los factores geopolíticos. Las reglas que se imponen para América Latina, no tienen que funcionar necesariamente para tu entorno inmediato y para países que tienen una componente transfronteriza muy fuerte.

Pero para todo el conjunto, España tiene ese rol –en algunos momentos de forma más evidente que en otros- pero muy fuertemente después del 2004, de ese Estado que no se repliega y dice vamos a organizar esto del ámbito Europeo y desde el ámbito de las relaciones internacionales.

En el 2004 el papel de España en este sentido, buscando de alguna manera de levantar la conciencia sobre estas cuestiones que efectivamente cristaliza en el 2004, pero supongo que en el período precedente, supongo que fue un poco de lucha también por intentar hacer llegar un mensaje...

Sí, hombre, muy muy orientado desde una visión muy conservadora, porque Aznar tenía una visión muy conservadora. Y como siempre las visiones muy conservadoras sobre la inmigración, produciendo esa paradoja liberal, por un lado es hiper tolerante con las fuerzas del mercado que exige mano de obra barata, y por el otro lado es hiper restrictiva en términos normativos y en términos retóricos y eso genera en general situaciones bastante explosivas. Pero es verdad que en aquella época, eso se fue gestando también desde este punto de vista. Yo recuerdo por ejemplo que en el **Consejo Europeo de Sevilla**, la propuesta de Aznar sobre la condicionalidad de la ayuda al desarrollo al control migratorio. Que además recuerdo perfectamente que cayó por la absoluta oposición entonces de Anna Lindh, que era la ministra de exteriores sueca que vetó la propuesta. Pero la propuesta Española era la de condicionar la ayuda a África al control migratorio.

Nosotros la verdad es que hemos hecho después una cosa más sofisticada, que es decir, vamos a trabajar juntos en cooperación y en control migratorio, pero no vamos a condicionar, a dar solo si. Pero bueno, además de esa idea había más y la recuerdo como espectacular, pero también como un indicio como de que en aquel momento se estaba trabajando de una forma importante en el ámbito Europeo de las migraciones.

Cuál era la reacción de Francia como gran protagonista de las políticas europeas con relación a lo que España comenzaba a proponer?

A ver, yo creo que en esa época ellos, los franceses estaban muy obsesionados con Argelia. Recuerda que los noventa en Argelia fueron muy duros, luego, Francia llegó a tener cerrados los servicios consulares en Argelia. Era una situación muy complicada, y para de la historia de la UPM tiene que ver con esto, y es que Francia tenía que liderar las políticas

mediterráneas en Europa. Tampoco vieron a España como un problema porque nunca lo vieron como un competidor. Ellos se creían sobre, en un papel dominador por una trayectoria histórica. Estamos hablando de un período muy largo, pero por ejemplo Francia avaló la conferencia Euro-Mediterránea en Barcelona, y después de 10 años se volvió a reunir en Barcelona y la UPM acabó teniendo su sede en Barcelona. Eso nos costó mucho! Yo estaba en el gobierno de la Generalitat en aquel momento apretando.

Entonces había un cierto combate diplomático de alguna manera por atraer.

Ellos, los Franceses estaban o se creían muy por encima de España. El punto de inflexión fue que ahí fue la ampliación porque ellos daban por sentado que el ámbito de influencia Alemana era uno y entonces pensaban que el Mediterráneo era su ámbito natural. Pero ahí curiosamente, incluso con Marruecos, y mira que con Marruecos la historia de España es complicada, pero incluso con Marruecos por falta de pasado colonial descriptible, damos menos miedo al mediterráneo. Nosotros por ejemplo con Egipto tenemos una relación de Partners, una relación muy fuerte entre asociaciones, sociedad civil española por la transición, por la experiencia de la transición, etc. Nuestra relación es fácil, no hay un pasado como el británico o incluso como el francés, que aunque no tenga una relación directa con Egipto si la tiene con los vecinos de la zona lo que hace que se vean de una forma más sospechosa.

Yo creo, que esto ha beneficiado mucho el rol de España en las políticas Euro-Mediterráneas. El resto que el partner no te vea como el ex colono que vuelves otra vez con fórmulas de soft power, para intentar imponerte, sino que puedes una relación con ellos mucho más fluida.

Exacto, a pesar de que con Marruecos tenemos todos los contenciosos del mundo abiertos, tenemos Ceutas, Melilla. Muchas veces Marruecos dice, esto vamos a hacerlo con España, porque se sienten más cómodos en el fondo. Hay menos tensión histórica. Ahora desde ese punto de vista del cruce de las políticas Euro-Mediterráneas y de las políticas migratorias, Francia lleva muchos años haciendo frente al discurso de Le Pen y yo creo que de una forma equivocada, porque cuando los partidos del mainstream caen en la retórica del populismo xenófobo lo que haces es legitimar y ensanchar el espacio de juego y eso se ha demostrado, y se demostró en las elecciones Chirac-Le Pen y se ha demostrado siempre. En Holanda también, en Dinamarca. Y yo creo que ahí Francia está incómoda porque por un lado tiene que ofrecer esa política de espacio común mediterráneo y por otro lado se siente muy presionada en materia migratoria. El tema migratorio está más fuerte que nunca y además creo que Francia lo lleva muy mal, porque ellos siempre tuvieron esa idea republicana del francés universal. Es complicado. Tienen muchos franceses de origen mediterráneo y Maghrebí. No acaban de llevarlo, no acaban de encontrar el discurso que les permita trabajar esto.

España, es verdad que estamos en un período duro. Es la primera vez que tenemos una situación de crisis con un 10% de inmigración y venimos de una experiencia intensa y muy corta, pero yo creo que seguimos que teniendo esa visión de gestión global de los flujos una de cuyas piernas fundamentales es la Unión Europea. Yo recuerdo estos días, algunas anécdotas, cuando estaba Antonio Vitorino de comisario y cuando se hizo la comunicación de la Comisión y antes el plan de trabajo de Tampere que era un plan de trabajo con un esquema racional de migraciones que empezaban por las entradas por motivos económicos, por entradas humanitarias, hablábamos de que no era posible sostener el espacio de libre

circulación interior y el mercado único sin una política común de inmigración. Por razones obvias.

Y yo el otro día lo pensaba durante una reunión que teníamos y decíamos, lo que yo nunca hubiese imaginado en aquel momento es que lo que acabaríamos poniendo en cuestión era Schengen! Si no cómo consolidamos una política migratoria que nos permita tener ese espacio interior! Teníamos razón en el planteamiento de la tesis pero nos equivocamos completamente en la conclusión. La conclusión no es que debía haber una política de inmigración, sino que no íbamos a consolidar Schengen. Es muy sorprendente.

Claro, desde este punto de vista y teniendo que las políticas migratorias son motor de muchas de tensiones entre países emisores, de recepción y de tránsito, yo recuerdo de una reunión que tuvimos en Egipto con Euromesco, allí, uno de los diplomáticos egipcios, Gamal Bayouni, y este hombre decía, sí de un lado las políticas generales, la apertura del mercado, el área de libre comercio, pero a la hora de verdad a la hora de las políticas migratorias nos bloqueáis. Nos castigáis. Siendo una tan sensible, que resta a flor de piel, que tiene que ver con seres humanos, cómo un cambio de políticas puede cambiar las relaciones multilaterales y bilaterales con los socios del sur desde el punto de vista.

Este es un factor muy patente. Yo si quieres te hago una visión pesimista desde el punto de vista más de la relación política, que tiene la realidad, a mi hay un fenómeno ahí detrás que me preocupa mucho y que yo lo describo con la frase de “doble populismo”. En el debate internacional, en las relaciones internacionales, puedes coger por ejemplo, el esfuerzo sobre las migraciones, las incipientes y fragilísimas estructuras del diálogo internacional sobre la migración, lo que se está produciendo es por un lado esa emergencia del discurso europeo populista, duro. Y por otro lado un discurso, y lamento decirlo, igualmente populista, izquierdoso, donde países de origen de la emigración, donde no hay el mayor esfuerzo por mejorar la situación de su gente y en cambio han desarrollado un discurso de protección de sus ciudadanos en el exterior.

Yo que me ocupo de las dos cosas en España, de emigración e inmigración creo que es una deriva muy preocupante. Yo por ejemplo me tuve que pelear para que la organización ecuatoriana de la inmigración, la SENAMI, no armara un lío en Lorca después del terremoto. Porque nuestra preocupación allí era que allí no había inmigrantes, había lorquinos, y que en cualquier caso, antes que ecuatorianos, o marroquíes o senegaleses, eran víctimas del terremoto que iban a entrar por el carril normal de ayuda, y tuvimos nuestros momentos de tensión. Porque había gente que decía, este paquete que se lo trague inmigración.

En términos retóricos inflama mucho. Hay un elemento complicado que es el de meter la política europea y la política norte-americana en un mismo paquete, y donde Arizona parece lo mismo que la directiva de retorno, pero esperen, un momento.

Pero claro eso a los gobiernos populistas les ayuda mucho. Marruecos en otro orden de cosas también lanza ese mensaje a su gente en el exterior. Es diferente, pero existe. Yo me acuerdo en El Salvador en la preparatoria regional iberoamericana del Foro Global que al final, me molestó todo tanto, que dije, mire, igual es verdad que somos un poco racistas, pero en mi país si un niño ecuatoriano con su familia o sin familia no tiene papeles para un riñón y está en una lista antes del mío, le van a transplantar un riñón antes que al mío. Y la gente ha accedido a eso. Y si tiene que entrar en un colegio entra, y si queda otro niño fuera, queda fuera. Hay una cierta aceptación social que es así mientras que en sus países esos niños en sus países no tienen garantizada la asistencia básica sanitaria.

Entonces, claro, hay que meter todas estas cosas en un paquete. Por tanto este discurso está emborronando mucho las relaciones internacionales. En cambio, luego si aterrizamos en el terreno de la realidad, yo creo que hay una dramática falta de institucionalización de la gestión de las migraciones y de lo que yo creo que es un fenómeno cada vez más diferente de la migración tradicional que es la movilidad de las personas en el siglo XXI.

Y que no es exactamente como el movimiento de las migraciones en el siglo XX. Ya nos es el hombre que llega que encuentra trabajo, que luego trae a la mujer y a los hijos con la idea de permanecer. No, estamos viendo una aceleración muy grande de los procesos. En España hay gente que se va, que se mueve por la Unión Europea. La inmigración en España se ha convertido, a nivel de géneros en casi lo mismo, con los costes que significa eso también para las mujeres, a nivel personal y profesional y no digo que la mujer se deba ocupar de los hijos, etc, pero que es lo que sucede en los países de origen. Y no hay ningún nivel de institucionalización. Es una pena la situación que vivimos en Europa porque la renacionalización en este terreno nos va a hacer perder mucho tiempo. Deberíamos estar pensando en cómo gestionar ese marco migratorio.

Idea de estado-nación inventado 300 años atrás que no se corresponde con la realidad.

Y es que nunca hemos salido de esa idea. Por esa razón que la afirmación: “no puede haber un mercado único en un espacio de libre circulación sin política migratoria” era correcta, y era la conclusión práctica que nosotros pensábamos en aquel momento que era la política europea de migraciones, no es lo que está pasando.

Hay un momento también de recesión económica que cada país debe responder ante su ciudadanía.

Y está claro, en época de recesión no puedes tener una política migratoria que facilite la entrada. Pero si necesitas tener un marco claro de cómo y porqué se admite el ingreso y cuál es la relación entre los estados europeos sobre los flujos migratorios.

Y cómo veis vosotros por ejemplo que la reformulación de Sarkozy de la Unión por el Mediterráneo haya metido el tema de la emigración como un tema fuerte. Se puede ver como una idea de Francia por querer tomar el tema de la emigración como aspecto fundamental de las relaciones Euro-Mediterráneas y tratar de controlarlo a través de este marco?

En realidad ese tema ha estado siempre allí y es la patata caliente con la que nadie sabe como trabajar. Porque por un lado Sarkozy hace eso y por otro lado hace ese acuerdo con Italia. Es una boutade para para la opinión pública y cuando intentas que eso tenga algún recorrido... Los últimos consejos de las comisiones JAI del Consejo Europeo con relación a Schengen es para verlo.

Yo estoy muy contenta porque hemos sido una de las fuerzas que hemos conseguido reconducir esto al terreno de la racionalidad. Porque las primeras propuestas eran... La primera propuesta de las conclusiones de Consejo que decía que “la inmigración irregular y la presión inmigratoria irregular era un motivo para el cierre de fronteras interiores a través de un mecanismo comunitario” es que vamos. En primer lugar, técnicamente era insostenible. O que hay un terremoto en Argel y sale gente... qué haces. Además tenía un potencial destructivo enorme. Al final lo que hemos hecho ha sido una cosa mucho más razonable. En la propuesta del Consejo lo que dice es que es que el mecanismo se va a poner en marcha cuando haya una quiebra en el control de fronteras. Es decir, si sucede como en el 2006,

llegan 30.000 personas a España y nosotros ponemos en marcha todos los mecanismos de política interior y exterior para gestionar esto, lo que tiene que hacer la Unión Europea es venir a ayudarnos. No cerramos los Pirineos.

Ahora bien, si hay un país que sistemáticamente quiebra el control de fronteras y además tiene una presión fuerte, ahí sí que parece razonable que además de los mecanismos de ayuda podamos actuar, y la Unión Europea pueda proponer un cierre temporal de fronteras. Entonces las primeras propuestas eran absurdas. Se vive siempre un poco esta tensión. Inmigración siempre ha sido la patata caliente de la política euro-mediterránea, pero no de la UPM, ya el famoso espacio de libre comercio de 2010 del que ya nadie habla. Siempre se ha tenido el elemento frágil de la circulación de personas. Siempre lo ha tenido. En la UPM se plantea ya desde el punto de vista de la liberalización del espacio desde una perspectiva de la política migratoria. También es el típico tópico de la agenda mediterránea, muy válida para el Maghreb y menos para oriente medio. Bueno, la UPM debería ocuparse de eso. Es la enésima vez que se intenta y se repite.

La realidad ahora es interesante la propuesta que hay sobre la mesa sobre la circularidad en el Mediterráneo al hilo de la primavera árabe. Vuelven a cruzarse las políticas euro-mediterráneas, las políticas de inmigración, el consejo JAI, podría reforzar esa línea en la UPM, pero yo creo que vamos a empezar con cosas como investigadores, estudiantes, trabajadores cualificados. Pero vamos...

Entonces creéis que el hecho que la sede de UPM se sitúe en Barcelona sea un éxito de la diplomacia española?

Sí, se ha trabajado duro en eso. Yo estuve con Moratinos en la delegación que fue a Marsella y yo en aquel momento estaba en el gobierno de la Generalitat, fui una de las pocas de un gobierno autonómico que formó parte de una delegación del Estado. La verdad que España lo trabajó mucho.

Hubo oposiciones también por parte de Francia?

No, había una propuesta de Marsella, pero Francia nunca iba a elegir Marsella. Francia es París. Y algo a lo que ellos dan importancia no puede estar en Marsella. Cuando aquí todos estaban preocupados por Marsella, decía, mira, Marsella es una candidatura del alcalde de Marsella. Tener nada que hacer. Un diplomático francés considera que poner algo en Marsella es degradarlo. Ellos en Marsella tienen el Institute de la Méditerranée y el observatorio económico del mar de la señora Guigou.

Pero el problema que tenemos en las relaciones euro-mediterráneas es que la parte europea está muy institucionalizada y la parte mediterránea no. Con lo cual, tu no tienes una contraparte árabe.

Claro, las relaciones intra-maghrebíes dificultan eso. Argelia y Marruecos se eliminan de entrada.

Es bueno que el secretario general de la UPM sea un marroquí, piensa que aquel momento no pudo ser por la oposición argelina y eso también es secreto. Pero es bueno que este momento se haya aceptado por todo el mundo este secretario general marroquí. Pero claro, ha una situación de desigualdad que Sarkozy trató de romper con esa tontería de que eso ya no va a ser Europa y que las cosas se iban a hacer Estado a Estado y claro es falso, porque necesitas a la Unión. Y ahora vamos a ver como van las cosas, porque por un lado está Amrani y por el otro la señora Ashton, en presidencia esta, porque creo que el co-presidente árabe está en la

cárcel que era Mubarak. Es decir, hay algunos inconvenientes. Y vamos a ver. Ahora yo tengo todo el interés del mundo por trabajar en este ámbito.

Es una cosa necesaria para la estabilidad de todos.

Es imprescindible. Yo creo que es francamente necesario que podamos trabajar en ese tema.

Sí, porque puedes hablar de política económica, puedes hablar de ayuda al desarrollo, puedes hablar de lo que quieras, pero si las bases de la comunicación no existe, hacer estas cosas es abocar las cosas al fracaso una y otra vez.

Tenemos que hacerlo con un punto de partida totalmente diferente. Hay que reconocer la vecindad, hay que reconocer que el espacio es siempre más pequeño. Yo siempre digo que la diferencia entre Latinoamérica y Marruecos es que un emigrante está a 1200 euros de distancia y Marruecos a 30 euros de Madrid con *EasyJet*. Entonces cuando la gente está a 30 euros de *Easyjet*...

Ejemplo: Vacaciones de los niños que van a Marruecos al pueblo durante el verano. Algo que ocurría con los catalanes cuando en verano se iban al pueblo 3 meses a Extremadura.

Y claro, esto te rompe los esquemas de cualquier ley de extranjería. Hay unos líos increíbles. Muchos marroquíes en el paro, vuelven a Marruecos, vienen a firmar la tarjeta de residencia, la mujer está con los niños allí porque es más barato, y luego para mantener los papeles van viajando. Entonces tu intentas meter esto en la misma ley de extranjería que regula a los chinos a los ecuatorianos, etc. Ahora hay un problema porque les estamos quitando la prestación de desempleo a muchos marroquíes. Pero claro, es que estos tíos en su pueblo viven, y aquí no. Entonces creo que tendríamos que ver en esa mirada transfronteriza para ver cómo podemos organizar la circulación de personas en el mediterráneo, sabiendo que es una cuestión maghrebí. Porque Egipto no tiene ese problema, el Líbano es otro universo, con Siria veremos lo que pasa.

Lo que es terrible es que para mantener un cierto orden y estabilidad (caso Sirio, Arab Spring) la gente tenga que vivir en malas condiciones.

La situación actual en el Mediterráneo me recuerda mucho al debate de los primeros años sobre el Este. Me recuerda mucho a los 89-90 y 91. Cuando la gente decía que sorpresa! Cómo podemos decir esto por segunda vez? Cómo podemos estar diciendo 25 años después lo mismo que se nos ocurrió decir cuando cayó el muro de Berlín. Sorpresa que la gente no quiera vivir más de 40 años en la miseria? Pero la reacción Europea ha sido muy conservadora. Ahora migraciones va a seguir ahí. What's next? No se que será next. Ahora mismo y me pongo el gorro de gobierno Español, hemos hecho un esfuerzo muy para situar una cierta política migratoria adaptada al momento actual de crisis y para mantener eso frío. Con éxitos diferentes.

La gran población de la población inmigrante de Cataluña es maghrebí y eso no es que sea más preocupante, pero es que antes no votaban en las municipales. En otros espacios los latinoamericanos son mayoría, en Madrid, por ejemplo. Luego veremos que pasará con las generales. Pero los partidos de izquierdas de derechas en Europa tendrán que ponerse al hilo de si seguimos la deriva de la retórica populista o no. Que no quiere decir no hacer política de inmigración, ni hacer discursos sobre la inmigración, que hay que hacerlos. Pero lo que no puedes hacer es retórica. Tiene que estar fundamentada con elementos de la realidad. Pero es muy difícil dar argumentos racionales contra los slogans populistas.

Por otro lado, nosotros seguimos pensando que necesitamos una política Europea y una política euro-mediterránea que incluya migraciones, incluso en este momento de crisis seguimos teniendo un interés activo en la relación con los países de origen, seguimos trabajando con África. Estamos trabajando programas de retorno desde otros puntos de vista. Ni van a entrar ni se van a marchar los inmigrantes en masa. No. Hay ayudas de repatriación, tratando de reconocer la experiencia profesional de los que han estado aquí, acompañando, intentando vincularla a proyectos económicos en origen. Senegal está pidiendo a algunos inversores extranjeros que guarden algunos puestos de trabajo para senegaleses que quieran volver al país. Generar esos flujos, y luego ver un poco como nosotros avanzamos hacia una gestión política de los flujos internacionales. En 2013, se celebrará la conferencia de las Naciones Unidas, confío poco porque está muy orientada hacia los temas de desarrollo por la propia naturaleza de la emigración y yo creo que debería estar más orientada a ver como en el ámbito del derecho internacional la gobernanza mundial puede encauzar el tema migratorio. Pero creo que todo esto seguirá siendo en forma de escalera sino en forma de sierra. Idealmente en forma de escalera, sino en forma de sierra. Los quince años de Tampere han sido esto, a forma de sierra.

Y esto es muy difícil para mantener una cierta coherencia política.

Claro, y es decir, oiga, que teníamos una estructura una lógica y ahora tenemos una explosión cósmica donde las piezas legislativas sobre inmigración avanzan en perfecto orden de caos. Ahora tenemos esto, mañana tenemos otra cosa. Yo creo que la política migratoria está inventada. Por un lado tienes que controlar las fuerzas del mercado, equilibrar, y por otro lado evitar los espacios de exclusión de derechos. Porque los espacios de exclusión de derechos comienzan por el último que ha llegado, pero luego no se sabe donde terminan. Mira Dinamarca, que empezó con la retórica contra los inmigrantes y terminó proponiendo fronteras con Suecia y Alemania. Es que menos mal que en Alemania han levantado la mano y han dicho perdone usted, hasta aquí hemos llegado. Pero es que con el miedo a lo otro nos podemos cargar la libre circulación interior y por lo tanto el dinamismo mínimo que nos queda en el espacio. Y se propone todo lo contrario.

Vamos a ver, what's next. Yo no me atrevo. Te acuerdas de Barcelona en el 95 y ves lo que hay ahora y dices, Dios mio.

Claro, pero en aquel momento se vivía un período muy optimista.

Sí, obviamente, se venía de la conferencia de Paz de Madrid. El otro día estuve cenando en la casa Ana Palacio con el ministro de exteriores palestino y con Shlomo Ben Ami que dijo una cosa que me aterrorizó: El problema es que el conflicto entre Palestina e Israel está en la cara oculta de la luna al común de los ciudadanos israelíes. Lo han congelado, lo han metido ahí, pero les da igual. Forma parte del paisaje. Les da igual. El coste es aceptable. Entonces claro, con esos mimbres nos vamos al garete. Es muy complicado.

Mira que yo he estado en el parlamento europeo 10 años, luego me pasé en el gobierno de Cataluña estaba en el comité de las regiones, que es un lugar que habría que pasar obligatoriamente todo el mundo que se ocupa de Europa, porque, el resto de las instituciones son muy sofisticadas y aquello es Europa en estado puro. Te lo juro. Es el concejal o el consejero de la región norte. Es política local. Y ahora estoy aquí y estoy en la mesa del consejo JAI (Consejo de Justicia y Asuntos de Interior, el 2008 fue consagrado a la inmigración) y te juro que yo creo que las fuerzas son estas. Un repliegue de las regiones muy fuerte. El repliegue era local. Los landers alemanes reivindicaban contra Europa la capacidad de establecer ellos el número de personas que podían entrar en las políticas migratorias.

ALBERTO NAVARRO

Básicamente me interesaría trazar un poco la historia de las relaciones internacionales entre España y el Norte de África con relación a tres puntos fundamentales, como pueden ser la política económica, el tema de la seguridad y el tema de la emigración desde que España entra en la CCE, 1985-1986, en un momento en el que obviamente España venía de un pasado muy largo de aislamiento político y de descrédito a los ojos de una Europa que tenía unas cartas sobre la mesa muy diferentes. Me interesa por tanto mucho ver como la política exterior de España con relación a Europa y con relación a algunos países importantes en el área como pueden ser Francia ha ido evolucionando desde ese 1985-1986, marcado un poco por el ritmo de los gobiernos que desde entonces han estado presentes. Y me interesa ver esto desde una perspectiva tanto oficial, lo que habéis visto vosotros desde dentro como también una cuestión más personal, una reflexión donde quizá ciertas anécdotas se puedan contar.

Yo soy más experto en temas europeos que en temas del norte de África y estoy dedicado a los temas europeos desde el año 1985 que llegué a Bruselas desde Praga donde estaba destinado en el consejo de la Embajada. Trabajé en diferentes sectores hasta llegar a ser Secretario de Estado para la Unión Europea durante la primera legislatura de Zapatero. Luego me fui a Lisboa de embajador y después el Rey y el presidente me pidieron de venir aquí a Rabat. Por tanto no soy un experto en el Norte de África.

Desde mi perspectiva, España cuando entra en las Comunidades Europeas en el 85-86, era casi un país en vías de desarrollo. Habíamos recibido el último préstamo del Banco Mundial y desde el punto comercial por ejemplo, para otros países éramos considerados un país en vías de desarrollo. La renta per cápita debía estar en unos 5000 dólares de la época y la claro, la transformación que se ha vivido en estos últimos 25 años de pertenencia a la Unión Europea y no he visto ningún período de la historia de España con tanta estabilidad. Muchas veces no se valora lo suficiente en España, pero hemos recibido de Bruselas más de 3 veces el plan Marshall actualizado, solo para España a precios de hoy. Y los saldos netos, y las transferencias netas que han venido de fondos, es decir, para poner un ejemplo: las transferencias netas de lo que España paga a los presupuestos comunitarios es lo que recibe cada año de los presupuestos comunitarios pues ahora se sitúa más o menos en el 1% de nuestro PIL cada año de media. Esto se puede ver casi como el ejemplo de solidaridad entre países mayor de la historia, no? Y eso todavía se valora poco en nuestra sociedad. Pero la verdad es que España pasó de ser un país pobre a un país próspero, estamos por encima de la media comunitaria, somos el octavo o noveno país más donante del mundo, ya no somos un país en vías de desarrollo, ya no somos un país de emigración, lo fuimos hasta el año 1996, a partir de entonces empezamos a recibir más. Por tanto en los últimos diez años, España, detrás de los Estados Unidos es el país del mundo que ha recibido más inmigración. Y ahora más del 5% de la población española tiene origen emigrante.

Y desde ahí, digamos la relación con Marruecos, no ha podido más que ir a bien. Tiene un pasado que se desconoce mucho, más en España que en Marruecos, cuyas élites conocen mejor la historia de España que muchos españoles la historia de Marruecos. Hay todavía algunos clichés muy fuertes.

Entonces cuando vosotros políticos españoles comenzáis a estar presentes en la comunidad Europea y a ser considerados como fuerza política. Teniendo en cuenta este

pasado que usted ha descrito muy bien. Cómo ven ustedes la aceptación que tienen desde Europa como políticos españoles, se vieron ciertas resistencias o no?

Efectivamente al inicio había un poco de miedo y desconfianza porque España tenía una economía cerrada, culpa de la autarquía de Franco, luego viene el plan de estabilización de Ullastres en el 1959 y empieza a abrirse un poquito. España tenía una economía más cerrada que Portugal. El 85 llegó con ciertos resabios autárquicos y había un cierto miedo en Europa, sobre todo en Francia, con relación a la agricultura y por el tema de inmigración también, pensando que quizá podría haber una avalancha de españoles. Incluso, en aquel momento España tenía un 23% de paro, una inflación de 2 dígitos también, una situación económica mala. Y eso a Francia le ponía nervioso. Nosotros pedimos la adhesión a la vez que Grecia y Giscard dijo que Grecia podía entrar pero que España era un problema para los intereses franceses y que debía esperar.

Grecia así protagoniza la segunda entrada en la CEE, la primera fue la de Dinamarca y el Reino Unido en el 1973, la segunda es la de Grecia en el 81. Pero el Giscardazo famoso nos retrasó la adhesión de 5 años porque después la señora Thatcher vino con el famoso Money back y después en el consejo europeo de Fontainebleau del 1984 esto terminó regulándose.

Visto ahora con perspectiva, Giscard que es un hombre muy inteligente que fundó el G7, el G8, quien habló del Euro y ha hecho grandes cosas, sin embargo en esto se equivocó, porque España podría haber entrado en el 81, y si hay alguien que se ha beneficiado de la adhesión de España ha sido Francia y la presencia francesa en España, los Carrefour, etc. Francia tiene su mayor expediente comercial del mundo lo cual demuestra que ha sido un excelente negocio. Sin embargo, había sus miedos. Por tanto los tratados de adhesión de España y Portugal son muy duros, con unas condiciones y unas cláusulas de salvaguardia y de períodos transitorios muy largos y mucho más duros que los países que ingresan en la EU en el año 2004. Y claro, durante 10 años se tuvieron que mantener ciertas normas. 7 años para la libre circulación de personas, es decir una serie de condiciones que ahora se nos han olvidado porque está Schengen, etc. Después hay más comunitarios que vienen a instalarse a España que españoles que se instalan en el extranjero.

Pero en general se debe aceptar que aportó sabia nueva. La entrada de Portugal y España son reconocidas. Son dos países profundamente europeístas, que ya se está viendo ahora los problemas que tienen Italia y Francia con los tunecinos, que básicamente quieren liquidar uno de los grandes Aquiles de la construcción que es junto con el Euro, el tratado de Schengen, eso en España no ocurre. En España valoramos esas libertades que se no ha dado Europa y no hay ese sentimiento que puede haber en Italia o en Francia, ese populismo, y de Sarkozy que se pone a jugar con Schengen, al revés, es una reacción de decir, oiga, que esto no se puede tocar. Y eso en Europa se valora mucho, y la actuación Española se ha puesto como ejemplo del éxito de integración a diferencia con Portugal que ha tenido algunas dificultades, a diferencia de Grecia. En general porque España mandó a Bruselas a las y a los mejores, Abel Matutes, Terrón, José Borrell, José María Gil Robles, Pedro Solbes, Loyola de Palacios, Javier Solana. Gente que ha dejado huella en la Unión Europea.

Ahora que menciona a Abel Matutes. En el 1992, durante el consejo Europeo de Lisboa, dice, atención con el Norte de África porque tenemos una bomba de relojería. Una incipiente presión migratoria. Pero Europa estaba también en un momento en el que estaba mirando hacia el Este. Qué rol está jugando España en este contexto tratando de desarrollar políticas y de proyectar una cierta imagen España, o una cierta fuerza

diplomática en el esfuerzo de crear una política común europea que mire más hacia los intereses que tiene España que podrían ser Latinoamérica o el Norte de África.

Sí. Mirando hacia atrás no hace más falta que ver como estábamos. América Latina prácticamente no existía a efectos comunitarios, había solo una comisión, una delegación que estaba en Caracas, que es donde se traslada después del golpe de Pinochet en Santiago de Chile, con el mismo personal que tenía la comisión en Togo, porque, pues porque Togo recibía tanto volumen de recurso como toda América Latina junta en 1986. Y los países latinoamericanos formaban parte de lo que se llamaba los países no asociados. Por tanto una terminología un tanto peyorativa y una forma de decir que no eran países preferenciales. Francia tenía sus relaciones con América Latina, Italia, Alemania, pero eran relaciones solamente de tipo bilateral. Europa como tal ya te digo, eran países no asociados con una sola oficina para todo el continente, que estaba en Caracas. En estos años, gracias a la tarea que han hecho entre otros Abel Matutes, Javier Solana que han trabajado en Europa. Ahora hay oficinas de la Unión en todas las capitales. España no tenía un esquema comercial cuando entramos en la CEE. Al contrario.

Por el Mediterráneo sur, el norte de África sería hablar del proceso de Barcelona, que ha sido mucho más exitoso de lo que muchas veces se dice y ahora con la UPM vamos a ver, pero hasta ahora no ha estado haciendo nada en comparación con el proceso de Barcelona desde el año 1995, con lo que fue la segunda presidencia española de la Unión Europea. Ahí se han hecho también muchas cosas. Se han creado instrumentos financieros nuevos. Ahora en estos momentos la presencia que tiene Europa es muy mejorable y se va a mejorar, ahora va a haber un representante oficial de la Unión para los países árabes y las reformas que va a ser un español, Bernardino León. España va a seguir trabajando obviamente en todos los ámbitos, igual que se impuso FRONTEX, políticas en el ámbito migratorio, y liderando todas la serie de iniciativas para el mediterráneo. Dicho todo eso, pues Europa está en crisis y no este el mejor momento para hacer iniciativas porque la propia Europa está en serios problemas internos, con el Euro bajo ataques, los que no creen en el Euro, varias Europas, porque hablar de la Unión Europea, pues, no es lo mismo hablar de Rumanía que es un país que no está en Schengen, que no tiene el Euro, que tiene todavía unas cláusulas que tienen los rumanos que les impiden entrar a algunos mercados laborales. O la situación del Reino Unido que tampoco está en Schengen ni en el Euro. Es decir no todos los países están en todas las políticas como está España, en Schengen, en el Euro, etc. Hay países que como Dinamarca no participan en la defensa Europea y se ha vuelto una Europa muy compleja y además ahora estamos viviendo momentos de crisis. Entonces eso se traduce en falta de liderazgo, de digestión del tratado de Lisboa. Y en esos momentos de crisis, que hace la gente? Pues tirar hacia lo suyo.

Entonces ahora hay una ausencia de Europa en el Norte de África clamorosa. La gente se queja de que la Unión Europea no está presente.

Y esa falta de presencia se ha manifestado fuertemente en los primeros días, en las primeras semanas de la explosión de la primavera Árabe.

Sí, y aquí se ve una presencia cada vez mayor de Turquía que quiere ir cubriendo espacios. Es una presencia también mayor de Qatar y de los Emiratos Árabes, una mayor ausencia de Europa. Luego países independientemente como Francia en Libia en una operación dirigida por los Estados Unidos y la OTAN, pero Israel está ahora muy discreto, no ha hablado para nada de estas reformas y en ninguna ha habido un acto hostil a Israel, o sea Israel no ha dado

la bienvenida a estas reformas, al contrario. Ha estado queriendo que Mubarak no se fuera y bueno estamos en una situación muy intensa.

Una de las palabras interesantes que ha mencionado antes es: liderazgo. España, por lo que he visto, por lo que he leído, por lo que intuyo, ha desarrollado un trabajo diplomático fuerte en Europa a la hora de proyectar poder en estas áreas, sea Latinoamérica o el Norte de África. Son zonas estratégicas, estas zonas estratégicas todavía se ven más ahora con los fenómenos migratorios, etc, quizá desde el 92 al 95 todavía no era tan evidente la importancia que hoy está adquiriendo la zona. Entonces España dio como un paso adelante, también por que le interesaba a ella como país, donde estaba Francia en esos momentos en los que España estaba proyectando esta acción diplomática?

Francia, de otra manera ha estado siempre delante de nosotros. Pues porque han tenido más presencia, por ejemplo una presencia muy fuerte a nivel de material de inversiones, bancos, seguros y en ese sentido estamos a una gran distancia de Francia. En el tema comercial estamos muy pegaditos y España va a superar a Francia porque estamos más cerca. Pero digamos que Francia ha ido por delante. Es un país permanente del consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. España ha aprendido de algunas cosas que ha hecho Francia, hemos hecho algunas cosas juntos. Yo cuando era secretario de estado con mi colega francés, a iniciativa mía hicimos un viaje aquí juntos a Marruecos y eso se recuerda aquí porque fue la primera vez que Francia y España vinieron juntos para ofrecer a Marruecos un anclaje más profundo en Europa. Pidió la adhesión Hassan II, siempre se ha querido sentir un país más occidental y el más europeo de todo el mundo árabe. Entonces, para nosotros, Francia ha ido muchos pasos por delante y hay que tratar de adelantarles todo lo que podamos y acercarnos más a ese, y apostar por todo aquello que contribuya a tejer un colchón de intereses entre los dos países porque esos son los que amortiguan los conflictos y bueno, es claro que también la estabilidad de Marruecos es la estabilidad de España, que la prosperidad de Marruecos es la prosperidad de España y esta visión de antigua que existía que al vecino había que empobrecerlo y cortarles las vías de comunicación etc., pues ahora es todo lo contrario, y si Marruecos prospera, eso va a beneficiar mucho a España.

Y ya aunque hay muchas limitaciones porque hay mucha gente que tiene una visión muy cerrada ya cuando hablas de naranjas de pepinos marroquíes, como toca nuestros intereses ya no interesa. Cuando eso es un completo error. Yo creo que nosotros somos el país del mundo más interesado en Marruecos, no veo otro. Quizá Argelia, el día de mañana, pero hoy por hoy, si Marruecos prospera y se estabiliza el que más se va a beneficiar va a ser España. En ese sentido espero que poco a poco podamos ir cambiando esa mentalidad y somos conscientes que no podemos levantar el muro que levantaron en Alemania, levantarlo aquí, y decir aquí no pasan las personas, pero tampoco pasan los productos, etc. Eso es insostenible a corto y medio plazo. No se puede decir no a las personas, no a los productos y decir sí a tus peces y sí a tus fosfatos. O sea que esto tiene que ir cambiando. Pero en España hay una mentalidad todavía muy cerrada.

Y esto es lo que pasó entre nosotros y Francia. Francia era un país más evolucionado, pero bueno, eso está muy activo en la menta, la agricultura y la pesca y en un momento de crisis salta. Eso pasa hasta en Suiza, cuando España quería introducir su queso manchego. Y en eso cuando se va a la realidad y se rascan los detalles las realidades se ven. En Europa ya hay programas exitosos como el Erasmus, de intercambio de jóvenes universitarios, y eso hay que hacerlo también con países del norte de África, porque cuesta poco dinero y cambia las mentalidades. Pero con los visados etc., es el problema que tenemos siempre.

Sobre el proceso de Barcelona, como quizás una de las políticas multilaterales de largo aliento, 10 años, envolviendo tantos sectores, tantas críticas, cuáles han sido sin embargo los elementos positivos que se podrían subrayar?

Como sabes, el proceso de Barcelona tiene muchos elementos. Pero bueno, al menos se puede decir, que es el único sitio en que se sientan juntos Israel y Siria. Ya solo eso tiene un valor increíble. No ninguna otra organización, no hay ninguna otra plataforma del mundo donde se sienten a hablar Siria e Israel. A los niveles que sean. Es decir, están juntos dos países que están en guerra formalmente. Bueno, pues solo con eso ya vale. Y eso si no existiera habría que inventarlo, la diplomacia multilateral. Luego hay una serie de programas que se han puesto en marcha, ahora se va a intentar con la UPM poner en marcha nuevamente todo lo que se había hecho con el proceso de Barcelona. Ha habido multitud de encuentros, de ciudades, de sociedad civil, hay programa de intercambio de jóvenes universitarios, hay mucha labor hecha en un marco que es complejo, porque está el conflicto de oriente medio, y va a seguir estando ahí, y hay todo tipo de conflictos, porque comienzas por aquí y ves Ceuta y Melilla y pasas y ves cómo está Túnez y ves cómo está Libia, en guerra, y vas a Egipto y vas a Gaza y vas a Oriente Medio y vas a Chipre, con el norte y el sur, Grecia, Turquía, entonces, con todos esos temas y con todos esos problemas, al menos tenemos algo donde se sienta todo el mundo.

Y salvo Libia, pero bueno. Al menos hay una alternativa de algo, como se han mejorado las cosas, que se puede hacer. La UPM ha sido muy loable, lo que ha intentado Sarkozy, pues por ahora no ha hecho nada. No se ha aprobado un solo proyecto. Hoy estaba hablando en Barcelona con Amrani, con el secretario General que se incorpora mañana. Hay que levantar la UPM, hay que ponerla en marcha en unos 6 o 7 ámbitos que tiene, porque lo tiene que hacer es el método comunitario, ir haciendo cosas, pequeños pasos, y a base de pequeños pasos te das cuenta que has hecho mucho. Hay que ir impulsando proyectos en cada uno. Y yo le dije, mira, la legitimidad te la va a dar el trabajo y la acción. Por ejemplo como Solana. Cuando llegó Solana nadie daba un duro. Y sin embargo al final Solana estaba negociando no solo en nombre de la EU sino también de los Estados Unidos. Creó el cuarteto que no existía para oriente medio, algo que no existía. Claro, esos 10 años de Solana, pues claro, para la señora Ashton. Ahora veremos si Amrani es capaz.

Quizá me estoy equivocando, pero se ve que Sarkozy ha querido tener un protagonismo, y quizá ha sido una estrategia más efectista que de trabajo a través de acciones concretas. Pero por ejemplo, si Sarkozy está interesado en desarrollar UPM, porque no defiende más la candidatura de Marsella y poner allí la sede.

Él defendió Marsella, por supuesto. Pero ganó España. Al final se vota y se decide y no siempre se consigue todo lo que quieres. No ganas por goleada y Francia no gana siempre. Y Francia no gana siempre, en algunas cosas si, pero no en todo. Ahora Lagard se ha llevado el Fondo Monetario Internacional otra vez. España tiene una diplomacia muy activa que a veces consigue cosas. Barcelona es una capital del Mediterráneo en muchos sentido. Lo han hecho muy bien, son muy listos, en comunicación, en imagen y si tu pides a todos, a ver, donde quieres que se ponga la sede, pues hoy por hoy, la gente prefiere Barcelona. Es más abierta, más simpática. Por eso la imagen de Barcelona es muy buena. Esto cuesta hacerlo, pero lo han hecho muy bien durante el tiempo, y tiene una imagen y unas infraestructuras etc, que no tiene Marsella.

Hablando más macro, los noventa eran más optimistas, de más colaboración, un interés por crear un espacio Euro-Mediterráneo más consolidado, es claro que por ejemplo la

UE forma como bloque, un interlocutor más sólido que lo que es el Norte de África, en momentos de crisis económica, donde ese optimismo se pierde por razones naturales, en la que cada país busca por responder de forma rápida a sus exigencias, cómo es posible defender la coherencia de las políticas de largo plazo, donde cada país tiende a cerrarse.

Es obvio que hay países más afectados que otros. Lo que hay que intentar uno desde su puesto tratar de hacer cosas. Yo por ejemplo cuando llegué aquí me sorprendió que no hubiera vuelo Rabat-Madrid. Y mañana comenzará Iberia. Y ha costado mucho, pero estoy muy satisfecho. Y esto lo he conseguido en época de crisis, algo que no había sido conseguido en épocas de muchísima mayor bonanza económica. Y eso sin lugar a dudas va a acercar a dos reinos vecinos. Antes solo había vuelos de Rabat con París. La semana que viene habrá un encuentro de rectores españoles y marroquíes, para ver si se puede hacer algo. Entonces cada uno en la medida que puede va haciendo sus cosas. Intentas acercar a las sociedades, en crisis más que nunca hay que apostar por este tipo de políticas de vínculos, de crear riqueza, empleo y comercio. Pero es verdad que los gobiernos están más tratando de solucionar problemas internos. Como aquí en Marruecos, reforma constitucional, el referendun, etc.

ENEKO LANDABURU

Pues mira, el tema de migraciones es un tema que la EU intenta ir poco a poco tener competencias, tener capacidad de propuesta para definir una política a nivel europeo con los estados miembros. Pero es un campo muy complicado donde hemos hecho avances, pero que sigue en una situación un poco híbrida. Tenemos unas competencias europeas bien determinadas, pero sigue siendo una materia inter-gubernamental. Porque son temas que en gran parte, los Estados miembros no quieren delegar parte de su soberanía. Y desde ese punto de vista, migración y soberanía es un tema difícil. Sin embargo, gracias al tratado de Amsterdam y de otras evoluciones políticas, es verdad que nos vamos, se van dando cuenta los estados miembros, que si quieren desarrollar una política eficaz y transparente y visible, es necesario articular reglas que se adecuen a todos.

Si eso lo reflejamos en los problemas existentes en este país y en los países Árabes, en primer lugar con Marruecos estamos en una dificultad real de no concretar desde hace bastante tiempo un proyecto importante que era el acuerdo de readmisión. Que fijamos a nivel europeo de hace ya unos cuantos años la idea de que íbamos a negociar con los países externos acuerdos de readmisión a nivel global a toda la UE y en cambio una vez esto adquirido desarrollar políticas más abiertas de facilitación de los visados.

Estamos en un momento donde no hemos logrado que esto se acepte. Y gracias a una iniciativa que acabamos de tomar en Bruselas a través de una comunicación de Ashton y de de la comisión al parlamento y al consejo de ministros sobre una nueva política de vecindad que hemos hecho que se aprobó en el consejo de ministros, el viernes de la semana pasada y hubo bendición por parte de los jefes de estado y de gobierno que se reunieron en Bruselas en viernes pasado. Sobre esta nueva estrategia hacia los países árabes para tomar en cuenta la condición política de la primavera árabe. Esta nueva propuesta espero va a modificar la realidad en el sentido de que.

Ahora hablamos de un pacto de movilidad donde para Marruecos, Egipto y Túnez, podemos entablar y empezar un diálogo que ponga sobre la mesa la totalidad de la problemática de la inmigración. Y lo importante es que se ha considerado el principio de no condicionar el diálogo sobre movilidad y facilitación de visas al tema de la represión. Y que ponemos todo encima de la mesa. Era una reclamación de los marroquíes con toda la razón. Pero a nivel de asuntos exteriores podemos llegar a acuerdos, pero cuando llegamos a los ministros de asuntos interiores la cosa cambia. Esta realidad nueva política en el mundo árabe y la presión ejercida por los acontecimientos y las declaraciones al más alto nivel, de jefes de estado y de gobierno permitan meter esto en acto. La conclusión de la cumbre de jefes de estado y de gobierno indica que tenemos de forma urgente de empezar un diálogo nuevo con estos países.

A mí me interesaría mucho conocer mucho sus opiniones, desde los años 85-86 sobre estas cuestiones de acción diplomática de la unión europea. Es verdad que el tema de la emigración ha surgido, ha explotado como algo fundamental. Quizá en el año 92 esto se intuía, no estaba todavía claro, España comenzó a hablar sobre esto, entre los primeros países en Europa. Matutes. Bomba de relojería. Yo creo que ahí, España jugó un papel importante en intuir lo que quizá podría pasar. Algo que la historia más tarde se ha encargado de demostrar. Pero en ese momento en el que España entra en Europa, Europa como veía la participación de España. “Es que los españoles lo hacen muy bien”. Después de una época de dictadura y país subdesarrollado, España casi de la noche a la mañana juega un papel, y quiere jugarlo.

Esto es muy interesante porque vamos de la mano de Felipe González, entramos en Europa y con la idea fundamental que yo oía al presidente de Gobierno, diciéndome antes de ir a Bruselas diciéndome, allí no vamos a pedir, allí vamos a trabajar con los demás, a construir Europa, así que los que vayáis allá y teníamos a Abel Matutes y Manuel Marín de Comisarios, Eduardo Peña y yo como director general, éramos los más destacados como españoles y el mensaje fue claro. Y nos involucramos totalmente en la tarea en una actividad fantástica. Había un proyecto, el mercado interior y la cohesión económica y social. González insistió mucho en que nos dieran la dirección general de política regional y ahí me metieron. El caso es que llegamos con un proyecto político de participación en una tarea política más allá de la defensa de nuestros intereses como país, aunque eso también sea legítimo.

Claro, aparecemos ahí y con entusiasmo y juventud y con ganas es verdad que al cabo del tiempo contamos más de lo que representa España en ese momento en el conjunto y gran parte se debió al trabajo de Felipe González en todos los procesos de decisión y su gran confianza con Jacques Delors, su gran amistad y su visión Europea aunque no hubo una gran química con François Mitterrand, eso está claro. Esto, qué consecuencias tiene? Por un lado que nos consideran como socios y luego que si podemos influir en una serie de temas donde aportamos una sensibilidad, una experiencia y un conocimiento que muchos de los miembros no tienen.

Y todo el tema es esta cuestión del acercamiento con el mundo árabe, la historia española y de la necesidad de desarrollar una política mediterránea, hacia el mediterráneo, que sea una política consistente. Y el papel que tenemos es doble. 1 ayudamos a permitir una cierta conciencia a esta gente de la realidad del mundo árabe y 2 participamos en que estas cuestiones se sitúen en un nivel en la agenda a un nivel adecuado. Y es esto. Y se va adelante hasta llegar hasta a Barcelona.

Pero antes de Barcelona, EU estaba interesada también hacia el este, no? Como se podían armonizar estos intereses divergentes?

Yo no he sentido esta rivalidad. Me he sensibilizado cuando llegué como director general de ampliación y negociador jefe de la adhesión de países candidatos. Es decir, yo ya estaba en ese momento muy volcado con los países del este, una negociación durísima. Pero no había una real oposición. Había una competencia y competencia que nos llevaba a negociar fuertemente los dineros. Y es verdad la prioridad hasta 2004 fue la adhesión de los países candidatos. Para eso se trataba de cómo les tratamos, cómo les metemos en la familia y con qué condiciones. Ucrania y todo lo demás, lo que iba más allá no tenía consistencia. Y en el 2004 comenzamos a pensar en las políticas de vecindad que no solo se desarrolla con el sur con estas políticas existentes, sino también al este al este de la Europa anexionada. Y eso empezamos, con la Merkel, que intenta empujar y comienza una operación de relanzamiento de Trading de la relación con los países del Este durante la presidencia alemana, le pedimos que haga esto, diciendo que no tienen que ser los alemanes ni la presidencia alemana que lleven a cabo tal y cual, lo que nos permitió más tarde poder ir a Sarkozy y decirle que no tenía que ser Francia el único protagonista de una política del Mediterráneo. Y hubo los líos, que hubo.

Pero digamos, que hasta 2004 no hay realmente ningún de conflicto a partir de ese momento competencia. Y se traduce sobre todo en la cuestión de la distribución de los dineros. Y llegamos a un acuerdo, que seguimos hoy a la regla, que es que en el paquete global del dinero las 2/3 son para el sur y 1/3 para el este. Ahora con lo que ha pasado en el sur, hemos añadido más de 1200 millones de euros para el sur. Pero yo creo que hay una, nunca me ha

preocupado este tema. Porque siempre he pensado que a finales de cuentas, lo que es importante, es que, seamos del sur o del este apoyar una política de vecindad fuerte, como un elemento prioritario de la política exterior europea. Política exterior europea que es: los Balcanes porque hay están y luego la política de vecindad, donde es en esa zona, en el este y en el sur donde podemos ser una potencia no solo económica, sino política. Está claro, como EU. China claro, sí, nos interesa, porque los chinos quieren que Europa se abra, y por eso podemos hacer. Pero como corazón y prioridad absoluta de la política exterior europea, donde podemos contar más que los otros, más que los demás que las otras potencias es ahí. Y aquí tenemos intereses para trabajar juntos para englobar esta política de vecindad. Y luego tenemos nuestra cocina interna para saber, pero no hay contradicción.

El Proceso de Barcelona, un concepto muy importante, en un momento de optimismo, donde el multiculturalismo tiene importancia, España, creo que se sitúa bien como negociador. Que evaluación haces de estos primeros compases en los que se comienza a gestar esta política euro-mediterránea.

No cabe duda de que la oferta de este proceso, fue en primer lugar un salto cualitativo importante para que el mediterráneo sea tomado mejor en consideración por el conjunto de la UE y no solo por los españoles o los italianos. Era un proyecto global, europeo y no cabe duda que España jugó un papel muy fuerte, y que logramos eso por la influencia que tuvimos durante la época de Felipe González. Está claro, está claro. Interesante. Pero cometimos errores, errores muy grandes. De creer que podíamos con estos países árabes, entablar un tipo de diálogo de región a región sin tomar en cuenta las divisiones internas que existen en estos países. Y ni tomar en cuenta la influencia radical que tenía en este contexto el proceso bélico entre Israel y Palestina. Ahí cometimos un error muy grande muy grande que estamos pagando hoy todavía, ese tipo de imposibilidad de ir más allá que haya un diálogo bilateral entre la unión europea y cada uno de los países dentro de la política de vecindad.

Menos mal que inventamos y Romano Prodi fue uno de los grandes protagonistas de eso, y que analizando, me acuerdo muy bien, era el 2003 y 2004 analizando ya la dificultad del proceso de Barcelona, cómo podemos salir de esta dificultad donde está todo bloqueado, pues empezamos a decir, a ver si podemos tener con cada uno de los países una política muy diferenciada y entablar con ellos un tipo de cooperación que vaya donde ellos tengan la ambición de ir: que los argelinos no quieren, pues no quieren, pero vamos adelante. Y eso es lo que nos ha permitido como Unión Europea tener una presencia fuerte en diversos países, pero acordando las ambiciones y el contenido de esta cooperación a la realidad de cada país, pero claro, por allá negando la posibilidad del diálogo regional.

Es decir, hacer una política Taylor-made para cada país.

Claro, pero que no es ideal, porque lo ideal sería la política tener la política que tenemos y que la vamos a llevar en el futuro con cada país en función a sus ambiciones democráticas de integración en el mercado interior. Pero luego tienes que tener una política de regionalización, y esto mientras exista el conflicto israelo-palestino. Y ahí pecamos y tenemos responsabilidades los españoles un poco. Porque el tema se planteaba, no se planteó realmente, o sea, no se planteó directamente pero estaba ahí sobre la mesa. Temíamos meter a los israelíes en este tinglado, porque es la presencia de Israel en el proceso la que impide todo tipo de reunión ministerial o demás, porque su presencia es vetada por los demás debido a su política y a partir de ahí está todo bloqueado. Si no hubiese estado Israel en esa realidad, creo que hubiéramos avanzado mucho más.

A nivel de los gobiernos de España, el papel de Felipe González, fundamental sin ninguna duda, Aznar, que papel juega la política exterior de España durante este proceso durante su gobierno? Cambian las cosas?

Sí, cambian, cambian. Para mi Aznar fue, la política de Aznar fue muy negativa para los intereses españoles. Porque creo que en el fondo, Aznar y su gente no tenían una apuesta real y comprometida hacia Europa. Son nacionalistas españoles, que creen que de repente cuando las cosas económicamente van bien pueden jugar un papel de nuevo, por si misma en el mundo internacional y en la comunidad internacional siendo el aliado privilegiado de los US. Y claro, se cree esto y al final considera a Europa simplemente como una fuente de fondos estructurales de dinero para asegurar el desarrollo, y de ahí viene su incomprensión y mala relación con los líderes europeos, sea con Schröder que con Chirac, por qué? Porque se ve a España, no ya como un socio, que participa de los que asegura el funcionamiento de la locomotora europea, que arriman el hombro, que se sacrifican, que piensan en el interés general que dan ejemplo. Pero esta imagen. Y una España más nacionalista, no verdaderamente europea, anti-francesa, anti-francesa y es decir, vuelve, lo que es la derecha española. Gente que tiene su ideología que tiene su propia historia e identidad y es eso. Es la España cerrada, es la España que teme de los otros europeos, que no tienen confianza en las ideas liberales y que cree que el señor Bush es el aliado y que le va a regalar todo y bueno hay perdimos mucha influencia.

Si España jugó un papel tan importante con relación al establecimiento de estas políticas con el sur durante Felipe González, con Aznar se produce este cambio de orientación más atlantista, de más relación con los Estados Unidos, lo que se puede intuir es que esta fuerza que empuja, por parte de España por crear estas condiciones de diálogo, de apertura, de europeísmo, de cercanía con los Partners del sur, se ve que si esa fuerza que existía antes, ahora con Aznar, no existe ya, quizá uno de los puntos negativos que luego se evalúan de fracaso del proceso de Barcelona etc, se puede deber también a este vacío, a esta falta de fuerza que España deja de hacer.

Yo no lo creo. Es decir, que la fuerza que teníamos no era lo suficientemente importante como para que en caso de desaparecer dejar un vacío. Es verdad y creo que lo que dices es totalmente objetivo, pero no es un factor determinante. Aún teniendo esa capacidad de influencia y siguiendo la misma política, no hubiese permitido el fracaso del proceso de Barcelona. El tema ha sido más una política agresiva Israelí que ya no permitía a los árabes de juntarse en una mesa y poder trabajar técnicamente. Esto ya fue más que suficiente como para derrotar al proceso. Y luego la división del mundo árabe. Que no se tomó en cuenta lo suficiente, el peso de esta división, y claro, ante la incapacidad e impotencia de los países árabes del sur de tener posturas conjuntas con Europa lo que esto se achacaba más allá de las críticas que se hacían de nuestras políticas demasiado simpáticas a las tesis políticas israelíes, en este proceso, lo que quieren ustedes es imponernos algo. Imponer nada. Esto no es imponer. Pero claro esto era el pretexto para ocultar de definir posturas respecto a nosotros. Menos mal que tuvimos la capacidad de lanzar y de desarrollar la política de vecindad, porque por lo menos eso es lo que nos ha mantenido con cierta capacidad de contacto pero bueno.

Y en estos primeros compases, de gestación de estas primeras políticas euro-mediterráneas, Francia un socio importante, fundamental de la Unión Europea, del Mediterráneo, como ve, como interactúa con España. Hay ciertas competencia entre los dos países?

Se que hay mucha rivalidad entre los dos países, está claro. Yo creo que si bien hay bastante rivalidad, hay en términos de posturas, posiciones, en la familia europea, hay una coincidencia muy fuerte. Es decir, que estos dos países con Italia incluida, estos países, están absolutamente de acuerdo, que, para defender sus intereses, para ampliar la influencia que tienen en el mundo árabe, como con el sur del mediterráneo, tienen que trabajar juntos para arrancar a nivel Europeo las decisiones que les favorecen a ellos. Luego habrá una lucha de influencias a ciertos niveles, está claro, la iniciativa tomada por Sarkozy por iniciar la Unión por el Mediterráneo, no gustó nada a los españoles. Vamos a ver. Pero por otra parte, Zapatero y Moratinos, aguantaron, tragaron el cactus y tuvieron que adaptarse, porque veían que la locomotora Sarkozy era tal que no podían oponerse y no dieron la cara. Nosotros dimos la cara en Bruselas, con Merkel, oiga, esto no es de recibo, usted no puede hacer una política europea determinada por un grupillo de países. Hay una política europea, o no hay una política europea. Y de la misma manera que impedimos a Merkel el año pasado que tuviera una política propia, con medios europeos con Polonia y hacia el este, y esto es una política global de todos, incluidos los suecos y griegos.

Porqué Sarkozy se lanza?

Se lanza porque es un hombre que reacciona en función a intuiciones, no es un hombre de pensamiento profundo, no es un hombre que haya elaborado durante años una doctrina particular. Es un pragmático, con una energía increíble, increíble, y que actúa en función de elementos tácticos políticos. Es un señor que tiene mucha habilidad y tiene un asesor que es Henry Guinoud, que es un neo-gaullista nostálgico de la Francia gaullienne, esta y que da un discurso en Marsella para crear la Unión del Mediterráneo. Y luego otro discurso en Tánger, donde es una visión completamente neo-soberanista francesa, pero que quiere aplicar a Europa en su conjunto. Yo me acuerdo de una reunión que tuve en un grupo de reflexión parisino, y estaba Felipe González, Juppè, y hace 2 años y en este coloquio, me pidieron presentar un poco la postura de Bruselas en cuanto este UPM y tal y cual, y terminé diciendo que eso era una utopía. Y eso es, un concepto intelectual fuera de toda realidad, donde nadie puede estar en contra. Porque hacer la unión, y la unión no se ha hecho todavía, pues claro que no hay una persona sensata.

Con los países del sur, una unión de la misma forma. Pero es que para nosotros la unión, para los europeístas significa algo. Es decir, libre circulación de personas, de servicios, de capitales, es políticas comunes, tiene un cuerpo de identidad y de definición, y vemos lo que ha costado en 60 años la ampliación europea, y las dificultades que hay, pero lo que se ha logrado es extraordinario. Y si Barcelona no funciona, cómo va a funcionar la unión del mediterráneo. Es totalmente absurdo. Porque claro, y eso que consecuencias tiene. Que lanzar este tipo de iniciativa política que no tiene capacidad de concretarse realmente a corto plazo, tiene efectos muy negativos en las relaciones políticas. En política lo peor es crear expectativas. Es la falta de coherencia de mandar mensajes a la gente y luego se ve que aquí hay la realidad objetiva de los hechos políticos, económicos, culturales, no permiten en ningún momento hacerlo. En Europa comenzamos a hacerlo porque tuvimos una segunda guerra mundial. Y de repente unas personas que tienen una visión de futuro y que además tienen capacidad de concretar el proceso empezando por el acero, involucrando las dos potencias que hicieron entre si 3 guerras en menos de un siglo, y dos mundiales, Adenauer, etc., y es un proceso.

Es un proceso entonces donde la idea general existe, pero existe también una estructura de objetivos de corto, medio y largo plazo. Que obviamente siempre hay momentos de

altas y bajas donde estos objetivos no se pueden cumplir pero con esa estructura, al menos, la factibilidad es mayor. Ahora obviamente no.

Yo tuve 2 enganchadas muy fuertes con Henry Guaino, porque claro me consideraba como un tecnócrata. Eurocrata. Y parecía que yo quería impedir la puesta en marcha de su gran proyecto del siglo. Y lo que decía a Henry, precisamente en París, el 13 de Julio de 2008. Las mismas causas produciendo los mismos efectos, el fracaso de Barcelona, es el fracaso de la UPM si no se cambia lo que ha originado el fracaso parcial de Barcelona. Si no hay ninguna posibilidad a corto plazo de arreglar el caso israelo-palestino, y si no hay capacidad de ir hacia un mejoramiento de las relaciones entre países árabes, olvídase. Y la realidad fue tal que París lanza la gran iniciativa, en el Grand Palais, y a los tres meses tenemos los acontecimientos de Gaza. Y esto en primer lugar.

En segundo lugar dije, no se hace nada bueno criticando sin ningún tipo de objetividad las experiencias del pasado. Barcelona era una mierda y los españoles no reaccionan. Cuando habían sido parte importantísima del pasado.

Porque no reaccionan?

Porque no se atrevían a oponerse a Sarkozy. Y había ahí el pacto de los del sur ante un ataque de los eurocratas de Bruselas y de los alemanes que ellos quieren evitar. En la actitud de Merkel, se interpretó que fue un ataque directo para que este tipo de políticas no recoja demasiado apoyo por parte de la EU en detrimento del este que puede ser verdad. Yo creo que convencimos a Merkel de que nada más iniciar los discursos de Marsella y tal, que era un peligro enorme para la política exterior de la UE que tengamos socios depende de la proximidad y que desarrollen su propia política sin que vosotros participéis. O hacemos algo unidos, o si no, no existe. Y los polacos tienen que estar interesados en esto, como los españoles tenemos que estar interesados con lo que puede pasar en Ucrania o donde sea. Está clarísimo. Esto lo integró. Que ella haya tenido más allá de eso intereses propios para limitar el éxito, eso sin duda, pero es aparte. Y bueno, pues hubo este tipo de incapacidad de los españoles de desquitarse. Hubo explicación, sí, porque al final Sarkozy organiza una cena en Roma con Zapatero, para que se pusieran todos de acuerdo.

Pero porqué cree usted que España no reacciona?

Por dos razones. La primera que España no tiene las soluciones. Está claro, España, considera que el proceso de Barcelona tiene sus grandes defectos y tiene grandes limitaciones aunque se hayan hecho cosas muy positivas, yo siempre he insistido en esto, y claro, al no tener una respuesta clara de decir lo que hay que hacer, pues claro, no puede llevar un protagonismo al no tener argumentos ni instrumentos en mano. Y segundo, porque no viene mal que Sarkozy, sacuda un poco todo el tinglado en beneficio del sur. Que se queme él, pero algo ya quedará. Y es verdad que provocó Sarkozy de positivo, es el de reponer el Mediterráneo en la agenda arriba de los temas que se hablaban en Europa. Y si vemos lo que ha pasado estos meses en el mundo árabe, todavía fuerza más la necesidad de corresponder y de tener una política consistente y fuerte. No únicamente porque son fuentes de peligro, de emigración de terrorismo o demás, sino porque hay luchas internas en estos países con protagonistas modernos que quieren cierta democracia que nos interesan para organizar este espacio de estabilidad y seguridad que necesitamos todos, y hemos entendido por fin esto.

Se había integrado en Europa de forma tácita pero estaba integrado en las mentes, y era que estos países del sur, iban de forma ineluctable hacia un radicalismo político-religioso. Era una realidad que no nos gustaba pero no íbamos a iniciar nuevamente unas cruzadas. Y lo que

había que hacer era mantener estas políticas de estabilización y de ahí la explicación de estas políticas de ayuda a Ben Ali, a Mubarak y demás. Apoyábamos dictadores porque nos daban cierta seguridad que controlaban los flujos de inmigración y controlaban el terrorismo. Y luego claro no mirábamos muy de cerca lo que hacían con sus pueblos. La *realpolitik*.

Y hoy pues de repente nos damos cuenta de que la gente en estos países no forzosamente no quiere un gobierno como el de Irán. Y lo que los jóvenes quieren son libertades, quieren que se eche mano a la corrupción, que haya menos desigualdades y que los jóvenes diplomados puedan encontrar trabajo. Ahora yo creo que es interesante la estrategia que ponemos en marcha, veamos cómo se concreta, pero ya te digo, apoyaremos de forma privilegiada a todos los países que se encaminan hacia una profundización de democracia, hacia una defensa de los derechos humanos, etc. Tenemos ahora una política mucho más arriesgada de lo que teníamos hasta ahora. Pero ahora tenemos que hacerlo. Porque hay coincidencia de movimientos, incluyendo este de fondo, pero hay una realidad profunda. Es una tendencia pesada, no son acontecimientos políticos coyunturales, es algo estructural que va hacia delante, y al mismo tiempo tenemos una respuesta europea que es rápida.

En este caso de la primavera árabe hemos reaccionado muy rápidamente. El 8 de marzo cumbre de los jefes de estado y de gobierno que toman unas orientaciones en un papel que presenta Barroso, y a finales de mayo una política de orientación de la política de vecindad. Más apoyo democrático, más apoyo a la sociedad civil más apoyo, y el pacto de movilidad, etc. Que puede pasar? Esto no nos acerca de la política de Sarkozy, porque lo que vamos a tener es una diferenciación mayor, una heterogeneidad mayor, pero es el mismo café descafeinado para todos o la diferenciación que pueda agudizar las contradicciones del mundo árabe y dificultar un diálogo global.

Pero bueno, si por otra parte tenemos el día de mañana no solo con Marruecos, pero también con Libia y con Túnez un estatuto avanzado, y Jordania, podemos crear un club de países avanzados que reciben mucho más de Europa en términos de acuerdos comerciales, de apoyos financieros, de apertura, que podría estimular todo lo demás. Y el tema de migraciones, esto es muy importante, porque si de verdad, vamos a ser un poco optimistas, dentro de algunos meses logramos un acuerdo con Egipto, Túnez y Marruecos en términos de pacto de movilidad, que permita a mucha de este país de poder ir a Europa con facilidad, que consolide la cooperación de las políticas contra la inmigración ilegal, que den más capacidad a la migración legal, de desarrollarse en plenas condiciones en respeto de las condiciones, etc. Es decir que pongan en funcionamiento los principios de una política global, pues eso aquí será muy importante porque es una herida muy grande que hay aquí.

Se sienten humillados, es lo que intento explicar. Qué peligro hay para un profesor de universidad que venga a dar una conferencia en Amberes, que no le den el visado o que le tengan que. Y lo mismo para los businessmen, porque si no aparecemos como una fortaleza, totalmente contradictorio, entre los discursos maravillosos que hacen y luego las realidades concretas donde les despreciamos.

Caso Bayoumi. Egipto.

Y más aún cuando damos beneficios de este tipo a países que representan un peligro mucho más grande en temas de inmigración. Como Ucrania, por razones políticas, tuvimos que apoyar la revolución y yo estuve muy implicado en eso. Pero no hay nada de coherencia.

Hay 3 cosas que tenemos que mejorar para tener una mayor credibilidad en estos países. Todo el tema de la movilidad de la gente. Tener una forma menos dura, más abierta, más de

partenariado, y si esto lo logramos cambiaremos muchas cosas en la mente y en la percepción de la gente con respecto a nosotros. Tenemos por otra parte que abrir más nuestros mercados, porque si no no hay credibilidad, porque al final resulta que ellos no pueden exportar 3 toneladas de lo que sea. Es absurdo. Y esto está en los documentos firmados por los jefes de estado, a ver si lo concretamos. Y tercero es una ayuda más grande financiera, no solo a temas de desarrollo económico, sino al desarrollo proceso político democrático. Sin en estos tres temas logramos en los próximos años, crear cierto cambio, se mejoraran mucho las cosas.

Pero bueno están las cosas muy interesantes. Vamos a tener complicaciones, está claro. Muy provocado por lo de Túnez, Egipto está controlando las cosas, pero digamos que aquí no, no va a haber nada. Esto (Marruecos) me hace recordar a la España de Franco, al final, que es un cierto autoritarismo, expresión de ciertas libertades, de propaganda, pero bueno, donde hay avances. Contradicciones muy grandes, donde hay ciertas libertades que no hay en otros sitios, donde hay poco dinamismo, etc. Y si, muchas contradicciones, pero al final, un monarca que tiene muchos poderes, que ha cedido muy poco, pero ha permitido que se desarrolle todo el espacio de libertades públicas. En eso es un avance muy grande. Pero en términos de control no va a cambiar nada.

Taxista, usted cómo ve esto del referendum? Y me dice, Oui, non, mais oui.

Es que esto, es muy hábil. Si uno no es republicano de convicción profunda y los hay, o islamista extremista, es muy difícil decir que no. Es una oferta de rebajas. Pero por lo menos ahí está. Así que es una sociedad que se mueve, que tiene muchas contradicciones, pero que está en movimiento.

Está en ciertos aspectos como cuando estábamos nosotros muy jóvenes. En esa época al final de franquismo, con una esperanza tremenda, con un optimismo tremendo, no podíamos vivir peor que nuestros padres, íbamos a comernos el mundo y también en una situación objetiva muy difícil, muy complicada, pero y eso es fundamental. Es algo que hemos perdido en Europa. Eso en España también se ha perdido. Somos nuevos ricos, y perder riqueza es mucho más duro que ganarla. Con España hemos crecido demasiado, sin control político serio, ni intelectual maduro, hemos desarrollado comportamientos de nuevos ricos. Todo tiene un precio. Hemos tenido autopistas, etc. Pero todo tiene un precio.

Pero es cierto, estoy convencido desde que llegué como director general de las redes, que las evoluciones de nuestro mundo, evoluciones pesadas, obligan a, si queremos como ciudadanos del mundo, y hablo de Europa, continuar existiendo con cierta influencia en este mundo multipolar, que se desarrolla a grande velocidad, no hay otro remedio que mejorar las condiciones de una presencia Europea como tal en la gobernanza global. Y eso exige una profundización de la integración de la Unión Europea a niveles políticos, que no tiene. Y ni Francia ni Inglaterra solos van a poder. Las fuerzas de ese tsunami es tan fuerte, que o bien hacemos un muro muy grande o bien desaparecemos. Esa es la condición primaria.

Y en segundo lugar, si queremos de verdad, en ese pilar europeo, del mundo multipolar, tener más influencia aún, debemos sin dudas, desarrollar con nuestros vecinos, una política estratégica de cooperación fuerte, para asentar y consolidar esa presencia ante los americanos, ante China, y eso quiere decir que con Rusia, con Turquía y con el Maghreb, debemos tener una visión estratégica que corresponda a una puesta en marcha que nos guste o no nos guste habrá que hacerlo. Y no hay otra manera. Y yo no creo en la unión del mundo árabe para nada. Pero creo que para nosotros europeos en un plazo político de 10 o 20 años debemos hacer muchos más esfuerzos para que este Maghreb exista, porque estos países no van a solucionar sus problemas si no entran en un proceso de integración regional.

Si queremos atraer aquí las inversiones necesarias para provocar un crecimiento, un dinamismo, una creación de empleo, como es necesario, tiene que haber Maghreb, porque es una realidad de 100 millones de personas comienza a ser interesante y a partir de ahí cuando la gente trabaja, abre sus fronteras, crea una unión aduanera, se hace más responsable también de estos temas. Tenemos una contradicción fuerte, pero que debemos absolutamente superar, que son nuestras posturas respecto a las relaciones entre Argelia y Marruecos. Estas decisiones internas son las que se pueden bloquear todo.

Exacto, y se piensa en el AMU, en realidad nunca existió desde que se originó.

Así es. Yo creo que con Turquía y Rusia será más fácil. El mundo árabe es difícil. Por donde se puede empezar? El sueño de Sarkozy: por el Maghreb. Es ahí donde se ve posibilidad, hay cierta homogeneidad étnica, hay muchas cosas, pero claro, eso requiere muchas iniciativas. Pero por ahí irán las cosas.

Me interesa sobre todo reflexionar sobre el papel que ha ido jugando España en las políticas euro-mediterráneas desde que entra en Europa. Como al principio, por ejemplo, el Mediterráneo para Europa, contaba, pero contaba poco, y como España, fue, sobre todo llevada de la mano al principio por Felipe González, evaluando también esta carta que podía jugar de forma que tuviera un papel cada vez más importante y verse cada vez más respetado por los miembros-colegas de la CEE. También como poder ver, como un país más consolidado como Francia, las reacciones que ha podido tener con relación a estas acciones de proyección diplomática Española donde obviamente el proceso de Barcelona juega un papel fundamental, donde el 9/11 también hasta llegar hasta la situación actual. La idea es buscar este hilo conductor.

Tal y como yo lo veo y puedo equivocarme, aunque he trabajado ininterrumpidamente en este sector desde el año 1997. He trabajado con el mundo árabe desde el año 1995, principalmente con los países del golfo, pero desde el 1997 en el Mediterráneo. Entonces desde mi punto de vista, el proceso de Barcelona que surgió en el año 1995, es el resultado de dos factores históricos: la caída del muro de Berlín y la necesidad por parte de España y los países mediterráneos de que había falta hacer alguna cosa para los países del sur. Que Europa no podía exclusivamente centrarse en los países del este y que luego se unirían a la UE desde el 2004, así que teníamos que dar un mensaje claro y esperanzador a los países del sur del Mediterráneo.

Segundo factor histórico: la perspectiva de paz de Medio Oriente después de la conferencia de Madrid en que se abría una perspectiva de paz. En esa época que se consideraba prometedora.

Y como resultado de estas dos cosas y como resultado de una cierta coincidencia, esa gestión e iniciativa de Felipe González como tú muy bien has mencionado, de la presidencia del señor Marín como comisario europeo de relaciones exteriores, surgió la propuesta del proceso de Barcelona. Desde una perspectiva comunitaria, muy Europea. Con un señor Delors que tenía un perfil político e intelectual importante, que tenía capacidad de intelectual y capacidad de proposición. Entonces, surgió el proceso de Barcelona y surgió como ese partenariado (entre comillas) para cubrir toda la región y para hacer una propuesta atractiva, sexy, interesante a los países. Y esa propuesta consistía en ofrecer un reforzamiento de las relaciones políticas y un reforzamiento de las relaciones económicas. Con un punto clave que era la creación de una zona de libre cambio mediterránea. El objetivo del 2010, que era la única fecha que había en la declaración de Barcelona.

Eso a menudo se olvida. Es decir, había muchos objetivos pero no fechados. Como se dice en inglés, cuando uno tiene un martillo se cree que todos los problemas son clavos. Entonces la comisión Europea en aquella época, que tenía una política comercial muy potente, y la sigue teniendo (aunque hoy en día la política comercial es cada vez menos importante) pero en aquella época la política comercial era muy importante, y entonces se ofreció esto. Se ofreció el librecambio con los países del sur del Mediterráneo. Hoy si lo propusiéramos, no conseguiríamos. En esa época se consiguió.

A veces creo que se infravalora la importancia de lo conseguido en esos años. Y efectivamente, la comisión europea propuso su arma de política exterior más importante que era reducir aranceles y concluir acuerdos de libre cambio. Y concluirlos con un objetivo,

reconocidamente economicista pero aún así lo suficientemente inteligente como para tenerlo en cuenta y era que al ofrecer acuerdos de libre cambio recíprocos, no solamente acceso al mercado europeo sin pagar aranceles que ya existía en esa época, sino reciprocidad en ambos lados, se pensaba que esto era una forma de inducir cambios en la gobernanza económica de esos países que tarde o temprano experimentarían cambios en la gobernanza política. El esquema era lógico, que a lo mejor un día dicen, pues tenían razón. Mira lo que está sucediendo ahora, ¿no? A lo mejor hasta funcionó.

En alguna medida ha sucedido efectivamente el surgimiento de un cierto sector privado. Una transición económica de economías basadas en el sector público y de economías basadas en el sector privado. El surgimiento de una clase media. Todo esto, pues ha producido cambios en esas sociedades. Ha producido mejoras en la gobernanza económica, inducidas por muchas cosas. La intervención del Banco Mundial, tan criticado, creo que este caso ha trabajado muy bien en estos países. La cooperación con la UE, ha sido importante. Y los cambios en la gobernanza económica.

Pues esto, ha traído, yo creo que cambios positivos que a su vez han introducido mejoras en el tejido productivo, en la competitividad de estos países. Y en el surgimiento de una clase media. En Túnez eso es muy claro, en Marruecos también. En Argelia, menos, ya sabes que el acuerdo acaba de comenzar a aplicarse y ahora ya hay críticas en el país. En Egipto estaba funcionando bastante bien y seguirá funcionando bien. En el Líbano también. En Siria, nunca se ha hecho este acuerdo. Se ha cumplido el acuerdo pero no se ha ratificado todavía. En Jordania también con efectos positivos. Es decir, todo esto era la esencia del proceso de Barcelona, que tenía una vertiente bilateral que son los acuerdos de asociación con ese núcleo duro que era el libre cambio y que tenía una vertiente multilateral, con un trabajo colectivo, que ha dado menos resultados pero que aún así ha producido un cierto ambiente de comunicación y de diálogo. A veces se ha limitado a un talk show, pero ha permitido comunicar a los países.

Y eso fue en gran parte una iniciativa Española, con esa constelación Felipe González, Marín, Delors...y la voluntad de los países de hacer un gesto político-económico con los países del sur de Mediterráneo en unos momentos en los que el protagonismo lo tenían los países del este.

El protagonismo español, nominal, porque se llamaba proceso de Barcelona, y sustancial porque había habido mucha contribución española, fue importante. Luego vino la política de vecindad. Fundamentalmente ideada en el 2003 por una comunicación de la Comisión Europea y puesta en práctica a partir del año 2005, con los planes de acción. La política de vecindad es, fundamentalmente, una idea británica, danesa con influencia anglosajona, de todos modos, para que, la UE estableciera, nuevas políticas con respecto a los nuevos vecinos. Y ahí el señor Prodi, entonces presidente de la Comisión Europea, quiso que los países del sur del Mediterráneo estuvieran también integrados. Aunque ellos no eran los destinatarios, al principio, porque se consideraba que eso era únicamente para los países del este europeo más allá de las fronteras comunitarias, pero yo creo que con buen criterio se dijo, pero bueno, es que Chipre y Malta son también. Y establecen así nuevas fronteras. Y hace falta que en esa política de vecindad se incluya también el sur, en este anillo de amigos y de vecinos, desde Rabat hasta Moscú, por decirlo de alguna manera.

La política de vecindad ha sido muy criticada, por muchas cosas, pero ha tenido aspectos muy positivos. Ha sido, introducir la metodología de la ampliación, para países que no tenían vocación para ser miembros de la UE a excepción de otros como Ucrania u otros. Aunque

algunos de ellos hicieron una demanda oficial como Marruecos. Y entonces esta oferta, esa política de vecindad, tenía una metodología que era buena, pero quizá tenía un horizonte que era menos claro. ¿Qué se ofrecía a cambio?

Entonces la comunicación del 2003 era muy ambiciosa. Se hablaba de las cuatro libertades, movimiento de capitales, de personas, de mercancías y de servicios. Entonces, bueno, esa ambición ha quedado muy reducida. Luego hubo esa famosa entrevista y eso ha quedado, porque las ideas simples pero atractivas se quedan. Que decía: “todo excepto las instituciones”. Y eso es algo que dijo Prodi en el año 2005, creo recordar, el caso es que lo dijo y eso quedo en el espíritu de la gente. Pero no era rigurosamente cierto, porque la participación en el mercado interior, porque al final las cuatro libertades significan participar en el mercado interior, exige o puede demandar la participación en algunas instituciones. Y de hecho la política de vecindad preveía la participación de los países vecinos en algunas instituciones. Ahora Marruecos por ejemplo participa en la agenda europea del medio ambiente pero es cierto, no significa sentarse en el consejo ni tener un comisario.

En este contexto, reconociendo el papel estimulante Español por desarrollar estas políticas muy llevadas de la mano por Felipe González al inicio, y por personas capaces, respetadas en Europa, desde el inicio del acceso de España en la EEC, esta fuerza que consigue tener España, o esta representación, ¿cómo cambió si es que cambió y qué efectos crees que tuvo en la segunda legislatura de Aznar con relación a su política exterior? ¿Cómo afecta esto al trabajo de diálogo euro-mediterráneo y de las instituciones?

Yo creo que lo que afecta el diálogo euro-mediterráneo no es tanto el cambio político que haya podido existir durante la época de Aznar, que afectó particularmente a Marruecos. La política exterior española siempre tiene que encontrar o buscar un equilibrio con Marruecos y Argelia. Esto es evidente. En esta época, la balanza quizá se inclinó más hacia Argelia que hacia Marruecos. Es más cuestión de opiniones que de datos. Es verdad que perejil tiene una influencia, no cabe duda de que un cierto nacionalismo puede tener también una influencia, no cabe duda que algunas cartas no se jugaron bien. En esa época contó más Argelia. La componente energética, el hecho que había un choque de nacionalismos marroquíes. Y el proceso de Barcelona y el diálogo euro-mediterráneo entraron en crisis porque entró también en crisis el proceso de paz. Y era muy dependiente del proceso de paz. Inevitablemente dependiente.

En una entrevista con Eneko Landaburu me comentaba precisamente eso, quizá hemos sido un poco optimistas en pensar que podríamos resolver el conflicto de Israel-Palestina.

Sí, este era el aspecto más difícil. Y no solo era un aspecto muy difícil, sino que nunca se creyó que el proceso de Barcelona debiera servir para resolver el conflicto. Se crearon para apoyar en el desarrollo y la consolidación una vez el conflicto se hubiera resuelto. Para dar ese marco de relación una vez que el conflicto se hubiera resuelto. Pero claro, falló la primera premisa y no se pudo completar el proyecto. Lo cual ha sido una pena en muchos sentidos. Pero bueno, ha sido una víctima colateral del conflicto como otras cosas y esa ha sido particularmente importante, porque no se ha podido hacer un auténtico trabajo. Y una de esas víctimas fue la conferencia de Marsella en el 2001 sobre la carta de paz y de estabilidad en el Mediterráneo, que hubiera podido crear una auténtica OSCE del Mediterráneo, que hubiera podido crear una organización dedicada a la seguridad colectiva en la región. Pero no pudo hacerse por esto.

Pero el protagonismo de España fue esencial. Pero yo no creo que el hecho de que hubiera un conflicto específico dañara todo esto. Los conflictos bilaterales han tenido un impacto menor curiosamente en el proceso de Barcelona. Con la excepción del proceso de paz. El conflicto entre Marruecos y Argelia nunca tuvo un impacto. El conflicto entre Chipre y Turquía tampoco. Los conflictos que pudieran existir entre España y Marruecos tampoco tuvieron una gran relevancia. Esto es curioso.

Vosotros trabajando en Bruselas, ¿cómo veáis el diálogo, las negociaciones entre los diferentes miembros? ¿Ha habido un cierto consenso entre todos? ¿Han existido momentos en los que haya habido particulares tensiones?

Yo creo que en el Mediterráneo, por lo que respecta a los países de la Unión Europea, siempre ha habido un grupo de países escépticos, y los países que han querido desarrollar estos planes contra viento y marea. Yo siempre explico que el ejemplo que es significativo de las diferencias entre la *realpolitik* y el idealismo, ¿no? Como tú sabes los embajadores y los consejeros a distintos niveles de la UE se reúnen bajo la presidencia de la presidencia Europea y la presidencia del servicio exterior, se reúnen en las capitales. Entonces hay reuniones en Rabat y hay reuniones en el Cairo, como las hay en Argel, etc. Yo siempre digo que cuando tu ibas a una reunión en Rabat ves como el *realpolitik* lo defendía Francia y como el idealismo político por ejemplo era desarrollado por el Reino Unido. La misma reunión en el Cairo era exactamente lo contrario. El que representaba la visión derechos del hombre y tenemos que exigir de la administración de que hagan esfuerzos (esto antes de las revoluciones) de democratización y de participación, era Francia. Después el Reino Unido representaba la *realpolitik*. Esto sucede con mucha frecuencia.

Es la típica dicotomía que aparece en los tratados de la Unión Europea entre intereses y valores. Y en el tratado de Maastricht había un artículo que creaba la PESC, decía: la política exterior de la UE estará basada en intereses y valores. Pero no decía como resolver las contradicciones, cuando las hay y las creamos.

Este es un tema especialmente sensible cuando uno intenta hacer política. Porque tu puedes desarrollar un discurso idealista o más realista que luego en la traducción práctica existe un hueco importante de cubrir y a la hora de entenderlo por las contrapartes del sur pueden decir: oigan señores, ¿qué nos están intentando vender? Y esto hace que se pierda la confianza, ¿no? Sobre en temas muy sensibles que se han estado desarrollando durante los últimos años como es el tema de emigración. Donde quizá cuando el problema se intuía, pero no era una realidad, el discurso era mucho más abierto y multicultural, valores, etc. En el momento en el que se comienza a ver la emigración como una cosa un poco más seria, el discurso cambia. Tú, por un lado puedes sugerir la apertura de mercados siguiendo tesis neo-liberales, que pueden funcionar o no en el corto, mediano o largo plazo, pero eso implica también una apertura del espacio para el movimiento de las personas. Como ha sido el ejemplo de la UE donde primero se abre el espacio a los mercados y luego a las personas. Esto para los países del sur, resulta algo muy delicado. Por un lado nos ofrecen sacar nuestros productos e intercambiar, y por el otro castigan a nuestros emigrantes.

Eso desde un punto de vista emocional, eso me recuerda a una reunión durante una época pretérita de mi carrera profesional, en las discusiones de la ronda del The Uruguay Round en Ginebra, sobre la liberación del comercio. Y entonces yo en esa época me encargaba de Asia. De Asia, excepto de Japón. Y entonces teníamos reuniones bilaterales, muy a menudo y esas

reuniones eran con países como la India, etc. Y en esa época nos reunimos –presididos por un embajador inglés- la Unión Europea con Bangladesh.

Eso para la liberalización del comercio, para una reducción de los aranceles, etc. Entonces el embajador comienza la negociación, y eso se hace como en un mercado de alfombras. Tu proponías tus productos y ellos los suyos y se llegaban a acuerdos. Entonces el embajador europeo le propuso cosas para la liberalización de Bangladesh y el representante de Bangladesh respondió de una forma un tanto caricatural pero muy significativa. Yo acepto todo eso. Pero yo tengo una mercancía que quiero exportar y que es la mercancía que yo más exporto, que son emigrantes. Y las respuestas fueron, no porque esto no se puede cubrir. Y a mí me gustó mucho la reacción del embajador, porque es verdad, ellos exportaban emigrantes.

El problema es muy complejo pero muy interesante y resurge siempre que se negocia sobre la liberalización de los servicios. Y en el GATT, la OMC actualmente, existen los cuatro modos de prestación de servicios y uno de ellos es la representación de tu propia gente en otro país. Servicios transfronterizos. Y ahí hay un gran problema siempre con los países en vías de desarrollo. Quieren poder mandar gente, aunque sea temporalmente para la prestación de servicios. Esto ha sido tema de discusión en el interior de la UE.

Me interesaría también mucho poder discutir contigo el tema de la UFM. ¿Cómo ve Europa las primeras declaraciones de Sarkozy cuando comienza a hablar de la Unión del Mediterráneo, con ese discurso un poco neo-gaullista?

El primero era criticar el proceso de Barcelona y sustituirlo por algo nuevo con Leadership. En eso quizá no han fracasado. Tenían un interés por recuperar el protagonismo por parte francesa de lo que tenía en gran parte, una percepción más comunitaria y más española, donde el share español era más elevado. Así que han querido de alguna manera reincorporar eso en una iniciativa más francesa. Pero había otros aspectos de esa iniciativa que fueron mal orientados y que no han tenido éxito.

Uno fue el de ofrecer una alternativa. No funcionó por ejemplo con los turcos quienes enseguida recibieron ese discurso con mucho escepticismo, incluso con una cierta hostilidad. Y lo sé porque pocas semanas después del discurso estuve en Ankara y el mensaje que recibimos por parte del ministerio fue muy claro. Y luego el tercer objetivo que no podía tener éxito, es que desde una perspectiva claramente nacionalista, ellos querían abrir un marco de relación multilateral, paralelo a la UE donde Francia tuviera el liderazgo. Por eso la quisieron llamar Union Mediterranée. Plantear un nombre tan ambicioso para una unión tan laxa y tan poco concreta, eso eran palabras mayores. Y esa es la razón por la que luego se cambió el nombre. UM podría dar la impresión de que estábamos en un proceso constituyente de un colectivo similar al de la UE. Entonces, claro, ellos querían tener el liderazgo sobre esto. Una visión excesivamente ambiciosa y casi utópica.

Luego el discurso fue aterrizando en la realidad y hasta que desde luego el punto clave fue una discusión si no recuerdo mal, en marzo del 2008 entre Merkel y Sarkozy en el que se llegó al acuerdo de que no participarían solo los estados mediterráneos sino todos los estados miembros de la UE. Y es cuando se comenzó a hablar de la Unión para el Mediterráneo y se establecen las bases que tenemos actualmente y se encarga a la UE de hacer un proyecto, una comunicación que luego se convertiría en el proyecto de la declaración de París.

Entonces este cambio, por ejemplo, desde que se comienza a aterrizar este modelo de Unión por el Mediterráneo hasta que se comienza, hasta que se instituye una sede aquí en Barcelona, pasa tiempo.

En realidad pasó muy poco tiempo, porque esto se hizo entre julio del 2008 y noviembre del mismo año. La ministerial de asuntos exteriores del 3 y 4 de noviembre en Marsella bajo presidencia francesa también, acaba de perfilar el perímetro de la UPM. Lo hace con el establecimiento de una sede y de una sede en Barcelona. Lo que pasa es que eso se concluye y el 27 y 28 de noviembre hay el conflicto en Gaza. La entrada de las tropas israelíes que paró completamente toda cooperación hasta junio del 2009. En junio del 2009 se reemprenden las conversaciones para negociar los estatutos de la secretaría y no se llega a un acuerdo con todas las dificultades inherentes a algo tan complejo hasta marzo del 2010 y en marzo de 2010 arranca la secretaría.

Esta cuestión de poner la sede aquí en Barcelona, o quizá un cierto interés francés por ponerla en Marsella o en otro lugar del norte de África, si es que este fuera el caso, como lo vive Sarkozy o el gobierno, cuando se vota por Barcelona cuando la iniciativa parte de la parte francesa?

Bueno, los franceses querían que la sede, y yo creo que en eso tenían razón, en un país del sur, pero cuando vieron que eso no era posible por razones políticas, porque ningún país del sur, es decir, había una serie de países en el sur que no querían que la sede estuviera en el sur. Aunque había un país que sí que hubiera aceptado la sede. Entonces esos países que decían, que no aceptaban que la sede estuviera por ejemplo en Túnez, pero no aceptamos que en un país árabe haya una sede con una organización internacional integrando a Israel. Entonces cuando se vio que no había consenso en esto, nunca se produjo una candidatura, entonces surgieron dos candidaturas y la tercera, Marsella nunca existió. Malta estuvo hasta el último minuto. Entonces claro el peso político de España fue mayor, entonces fue cuando se aceptó como mal menor, por así decirlo, ya que no podía ser en un país del sur del Mediterráneo, pues establecer la sede en Barcelona, aceptando como contrapartida, que se perdía la denominación de Unión para el Mediterráneo/Proceso de Barcelona.

Evidentemente, para Francia, hubiera sido mucho mejor una sede en Túnez con un secretario francés.

Yo creo que los franceses querían evitar en todo caso evitar el fracaso de la iniciativa. Y yo creo que ellos han estado detrás de esta iniciativa con toda la potencia de la política exterior francesa y con una voluntad política importante. Porque la Unión para el Mediterráneo fundamentalmente tiene 3 cosas importantes que son institucionales las 3. 1 es la creación de la secretaría, 2 es la co-presidencia y 3 la conferencia cada dos años que todavía no se ha podido celebrar. Esas tres cosas constituyen un avance institucional con respecto al proceso de Barcelona.

Y estas iniciativas nacen en un momento en el que se declara de forma abierta la crisis económica mundial. Cómo impacta esto en las políticas que se quieren desarrollar en el Mediterráneo? Los países tienen que ser más cautos, hay una tendencia política más conservadora. Cómo eso impacta en las políticas de diálogo euro-mediterráneo cuando efectivamente hay ciertas urgencias nacionales a las que responder?

Yo creo que impacta hasta ahora poco. Vamos a ver, hay dos cosas fundamentales. Una es, si se me permite la expresión, cuál es el nivel de exportación de la crisis europea a los países del sur. Los cuatro vectores de exportación de la crisis, que son las inversiones, exportaciones,

turismo y transferencias de inmigrantes, han tenido un impacto, pero menos importante de lo que se preveía. Y esos cuatro vectores han existido pero de una forma menos importante. Y Egipto, antes de enero de este año, estaba en tasas de crecimiento del 5-6%, Argelia viven en otra liga, y Marruecos también estaba en 4-5%.

Que va a pasar ahora con la crisis financiera? Ahora se está diciendo mucho esta correlación de la crisis económica de los países mediterráneos del norte del mediterráneo y de crisis política en los países del sur. No se que impacto tendrá sinceramente. Yo no me atrevo a hacer una predicción. Luego, sí, el otro impacto posible son la cooperación al desarrollo. Y ahí los fondos europeos, no han sido aceptados. Y los fondos bilaterales supongo que sí que lo serán, pero es que los fondos bilaterales no eran tan importantes como los fondos europeos. El impacto va a venir por la baja tremenda del turismo en Egipto y en Túnez que vivían mucho de este sector y que les ha afectado mucho. Y luego que claro, las inversiones directas también han bajado.

Pero son las tres etapas a tener en cuenta. 1) El proceso de Barcelona, 2) La política de vecindad y 3) la Unión para el Mediterráneo. 1) Iniciativa española- comunitaria, 2) iniciativa anglosajona si se me permite con Italia también y 3) iniciativa francesa.

Y España, cuando Sarkozy se lanza a esta iniciativa, a este liderazgo, un hombre más de impulsos que de consolidada ideología, cómo reacciona España?

Moratinos se sube al tren enseguida. Hay esa declaración que se llama Appel de Rome en 2007 con la participación de los tres ministros de asuntos exteriores, Francia, Italia y España en la cual juntos declaran su voluntad de lanzar la Unión por el Mediterráneo. Y creo que es ahí donde se produce el cambio de nombre entre Unión “del” a unión “para”. Por voluntad expresa de Moratinos. (**Do not quote me**) pero Moratinos no es un pro-europeo. Por supuesto, era una persona que quería hacer avanzar todo el nuevo proceso y había que apoyar a los franceses.

Es un tema muy complicado que junta muchos vectores, situaciones, contextos políticos, económicos, sociales y culturales.

Efectivamente. España percibió perfectamente la necesidad de apoyar la iniciativa francesa desde el principio. Y hacerlo inclinándola, haciéndola más europea y haciendo que España siguiera teniendo protagonismo.

O sea que no se puede hablar en este sentido de rivalidad, sino de tratar de aprovechar la inercia lanzada por uno para transformarla y traducirla en acción concreta en beneficio de todos.

Exactamente, completamente de acuerdo. Un pragmatismo muy bien orientado desde este punto de vista.

Yo lo que estoy trabajando básicamente es el período desde el cual España entra en la ECC en el 1986 y como comienza España comienza a desarrollar ciertas estrategias diplomáticas de cara a tener una mayor influencia en Europa. Obviamente como apenas entrada tenía que hacer ciertos méritos para ganarse la confianza de los socios europeos. Me gustaría saber mucho que opinas sobre el hecho de cómo España ha sido capaz de vender en una primera instancia una cierta imagen en Europa y vender el Mediterráneo y sus aspectos urgentes, como puede ser la emigración, la seguridad.

Yo creo que hay por un lado hay mucho de geografía. Hay tan solo 18 kilómetros que nos separan de Marruecos por tanto, el hecho de estar en el front line, los riesgos y también las oportunidades de las relaciones de los países de Europa y los países del Norte de África. La geografía es muy determinante, sobre todo al principio durante la transición, porque se puede decir en este sentido que es más importante la geografía que la demografía. La demografía no es muy relevante. España es un país con poca inmigración magrebí, la emigración viene después, es decir, después viene la demografía, que es muy relevante porque es parte del desarrollo socio-económico español, es parte de su milagro económico y quizá eso también sea hoy parte del problema. Una vez que ese milagro ha mostrado sus debilidades.

Y yo creo que la visión que tiene Felipe González con un grupo de embajadores que fueron decisivos para eso, está basado en la necesidad y en la respuesta a la pregunta: España que es en Europa? Es un país discreto económicamente, es un país que tiene una vocación latinoamericana, aunque esa vocación no estaba acompañada de inversiones en América Latina, que vendrían más tarde. Qué cartas tiene España? De qué puede hablar? Qué puede liderar entonces España? Es obvio que es el tema Mediterráneo. Basado en algunos aspectos históricos, de conexión con el mundo árabe, la historia, el mito del Al-Andalus, la proximidad geográfica. Entonces, creo que Felipe entiende enseguida, que si habla del Mediterráneo le escuchan. No solo le escuchan cuando habla de América Latina por ser Español. Entonces se da cuenta de que puede desarrollar una política que dará a España más peso en la Unión Europea.

Se puede entonces hablar de una estrategia?

Claro, una estrategia basada en una necesidad ya que necesita leverage. Juega sus bazas, la latinoamericana es obvia pero un poco abstracta aunque se consolide más adelante con las inversiones de los bancos, etc. La mediterránea es muy importante porque los Europeos comienzan a ver el mediterráneo como una zona de riesgo, y entonces la política Española está ahí, de acuerdo, estamos en la primera línea, pero nosotros somos capaces de transformar esos riesgos en oportunidades con un proyecto Euro-Mediterráneo. Entonces España, aprovechando algunas iniciativas que ya habían desarrollado italianos, etc, pues España apoya y se involucra mucho en el proyecto Euro-Mediterráneo. Está basado en una visión, pero también en una necesidad. Tener una carta en Bruselas y yo creo que esa política fue muy inteligente. Todo el mundo le reconoció a España esta posibilidad, e incluso, es curioso que se le reconoció a España más allá de la auténtica presencia Española en el mediterráneo. Antes de los años 90 esa presencia es muy débil, económicamente, políticamente. España está siempre entre el cuarto o quinto lugar entre los inversores. En términos de comercio, España está muy lejos de Italia, de Alemania, del Reino Unido y de Francia. En países como Egipto, España viene en 6 o 7 posición. Pero bueno, España juega bien la carta geo-política y asume un liderazgo en los temas euro-mediterráneos.

Un liderazgo que de otra parte es contestado por algunas otras potencias que pueden tener también intereses en la zona, como Francia?

Este liderazgo es contestado, bueno, es visto con el escepticismo grandilocuente siempre de los franceses, pero Felipe González que es un hombre hábil y que tiene pronto una cierta personalidad en el contexto europeo, jugó muy bien la carta de Alemania. Cambia el apoyo de la *Ostpolitik* de Khol por el apoyo de Khol a la política, porque España no podía pagar la factura del proyecto euro-mediterráneo. Y es Felipe quien hace esto, tú hagas esta factura y yo te apoyo frente a Mitterrand que era muy escéptico, los ingleses, la *ostpolitik*. Y España tiene una carta en el Mediterráneo para todas estas cosas y ese apoyo de Khol fue fundamental. Los detalles de esta historia los conozco bien porque he tenido una buena relación con Jordi Pujol. Pujol fue un eslabón de este acuerdo con los alemanes. Jordi Pujol era un liberal-conservador, con una buena relación con Khol, habla perfectamente el alemán, entonces tiene una relación privilegiada con Khol y Felipe González le hace jugar a Pujol el papel importante de esta acción. Todo esto ocurre hacia el final del mandato de Felipe González.

El último año de Felipe fue terrible, la corrupción, etc. Durante 1 año, Pujol recibe muchas presiones para abandonar. Felipe ya no tenía mayoría absoluta y su mayoría dependía del apoyo de la minoría catalana, y necesitaba esta ayuda para aprobar los presupuestos. Pujol sigue apoyando a González durante 1 año, en contra de la opinión de otras fuerzas políticas como Convergencia i Unió, que decía que había que abandonar a los socialistas para no estar alineados con esa corrupción y con esa mala imagen. Pero le apoya entre otras muchas razones porque da mucha importancia al proceso que poco a poco se va culminando en el proceso de Barcelona. Es una historia muy interesante que no ha sido contada, pero que merece la pena.

Es Felipe con la intervención de Pujol y eso es lo que coloca a España en la agenda Mediterránea, incluso por encima del potencial real español. Las empresas españolas en Marruecos, por ejemplo, se desarrollan a partir de aquel momento. El contrato de Telefónica en Marruecos es posterior, pero con todo, España juega muy bien la carta geo-política. La juega muy bien, busca aliados, los encuentra en los alemanes fundamentalmente, también con los países nórdicos. Juega bien el bilateral con Italia, Italia apoya siempre.

Francia sigue el proceso sin mucho entusiasmo, porque Francia ha siempre tenido una aproximación muy nacional, muy basada en el papel histórico de Francia, protagonismo que ha tratado de recuperar un poco con la Unión por el Mediterráneo. Francia fue siempre un poco escéptica al principio con el proceso de Barcelona. Después lo siguió, se adaptó, lo apoyó, pero la existencia de una política multilateral juntando los 27 países de la UE en una acción multilateral, Francia era muy escéptica. Francia siempre se opuso mucho al papel de la Comisión Europea. Por eso cuando lanza la propuesta de la Unión del Mediterráneo, en una nueva arquitectura de la Unión en la Comisión Europea, etc. También hay colaboración con Francia después, no es que haya una guerra entre Francia y España en los temas mediterráneos. Son unos años en los que España necesita mucho de Francia, con el tema de ETA, y hay acuerdo, hay negociación, hay convergencia de políticas, y, luego España apoya la propuesta de Francia y tuvo un papel decisivo para el desarrollo de la Unión por el Mediterráneo, pese a las reticencias alemanas.

Pero al principio la historia es esta. Es una historia española con un eje con Alemania, con un acuerdo con Italia, la época de una relación muy intensa entre Moratinos y De Michelis,

ministro italiano de asuntos exteriores. No hace mucho estuve en Italia con De Michelis y coincidía con todos estos puntos de vista.

Crees de alguna manera, que el hecho de tener que vender por fuerza este tema mediterráneo a Europa, se hizo a través de un discurso público muy realista (Abel) y veo un cambio de tendencia en el discurso público de ser realista, en el sentido de tener que vender a través de ciertas “amenazas”, emergencias o urgencias, a convertirse con el Proceso de Barcelona en un discurso un poco más abierto, más optimista, más liberal.

Sí. Hay sensibilidades políticas distintas por parte del partido popular que por definición ha tenido una visión más realista, pero también había que vender esto a Europa. Y Europa, y en Europa hay una cultura muy profunda del mediterráneo como problema, y riesgo. Y esa cultura se ha ido cambiando a través de mucha pedagogía, de mucha relación. Yo creo, que cuando se habla de balances del proceso de Barcelona, etc., evidentemente si se hace un balance de comparar los objetivos conseguidos, etc., una cosa que ha cambiado ha sido esta. Como en Europa al inicio se tenía una visión ligada al Mediterráneo como problema, problema para algunos. Todos los temas del mediterráneo estaban en la agenda migratoria, y la migración era una agenda de interior, o en la agenda del terrorismo. Era el Islám-terrorismo y migraciones-fronteras interiores. Y una cosa muy positiva de todo el proceso es que ha pasado a ser una agenda de la política exterior europea, ha pasado a ser parte de una política de vecindad y con lo cual ahora hay una visión más comprehensiva, más global. No han desaparecido los riesgos que efectivamente siguen ahí, pero la aproximación es más global.

Nunca se ha interesado en discutir esta vocación más vertida de los gobiernos de González hacia Latino América o el Mediterráneo en contraposición al segundo mandato de Aznar mucho más atlantista. Cómo afecta este cambio de visión a las políticas desarrolladas precedentemente y que sentaron las bases de una política Euro-Mediterránea? Porque al final estamos hablando de comunicación política, de cambio de intereses políticos y estratégicos. Afectaron estos cambios al desarrollo del proceso de Barcelona desde entonces?

Aznar tiene 2 gobiernos que son muy distintos entre uno y otro y sobre todo también en temas ligados a la política exterior. El primer mandato donde gobierna en coalición, pero aquel pacto sirvió para que la política de Aznar fuera en general más moderada. Yo estaba todavía como periodista y conocí a Aznar como periodista, y era una persona curiosa, abierta, interesada y hablaba mucho con él sobre los temas del mediterráneo y creo que cuando llega de presidente el primer viaje que hace es un viaje a Marruecos, el primer viaje, hay que ir a Marruecos, y se interesa. Y ve también enseguida como el tema del Mediterráneo era importante. Cuando se va al Consejo cada cual habla de lo que tiene, entonces que tiene Aznar, al principio vende la política mediterránea y la exhibe. Es la época de Piqué que es uno de los grandes de este proceso. La fundación Anna Lindh se crea por ejemplo en la ministerial de Valencia.

Varias ministeriales fueron importantes, pero la ministerial de Valencia fue esencial para la creación de la Fundación Anna Lindh. Interesante porque es una fundación para el diálogo intercultural, se crea en el año 2004 en Valencia, y es la reacción moderada a los eventos del 11 de septiembre. Es decir, no es una reacción de decir vamos a combatir. Vamos a buscar la manera de dialogar, de entender, etc. La primera parte del gobierno de Aznar, es una parte, de profundización en la agenda mediterránea que había lanzado González. Luego las cosas se complican con Marruecos. Aznar recibe muy mal esta actitud de Marruecos. Yo creo que se

equivoca allí porque con Marruecos siempre hay dificultades. Es un país que reacciona siempre de forma un tanto ingrata en algunos temas. Entonces Aznar reaccionó de la forma que todos recordamos y a partir de ahí hay una agenda más atlantista, el tema de las Azores y eso es mal recibido y mal visto por los países árabes y el reacciona así, una reacción global hacia el mundo árabe y hacia el Islam. Y bueno se crea ahí una dinámica que es muy negativa para España, luego vienen los atentados terroristas. Fueron unos años de acción-reacción muy malos.

Estos factores influyen en el proceso de Barcelona?

Claro, influye en todo. El atentado terrorista de Madrid, influye en todo. Eso es un choque para los que gobiernan tremendo. Y esto influye la política de exterior, influye esta voluntad de Aznar de ser casi cabeza de puente de la política americana en Europa. Eso a él le da muchos réditos, como personalidad. España tiene un momento aparentemente brillante en la política exterior, de cierta relevancia. Eso hay que reconocerlo. Y yo creo que gestiona mal y confunde un poco la realidad con las apariencias, se lanza a una política que tenía poco desarrollo y entonces se encuentra con los problemas. Los problemas con la proximidad y eso hay que rebobinarlo, hay que cambiar la política. Pero es importante diferenciar las dos etapas porque si no, no se entiende.

La primera etapa fue muy positiva y de continuidad y de profundización del proceso de Barcelona, en la cual Piqué jugó un papel muy importante. La gran diferencia entre Piqué y la ministra que vino después fue clarísima. Creo que Palacio tiene una actitud con Marruecos por ejemplo. Recuerdo una vez que le regalé un libro sobre la sociedad civil de Marruecos, en el momento en el que yo era miembro del consorcio IEMED, y dijo, ¡ah! “pues no sabía que había sociedad civil en Marruecos”. Entonces fue una anécdota muy divertida. Después de esta sesión en el IEMED viajaba al sur de Marruecos, donde tenía una entrevista con el Rey, para arreglar toda la situación. Entonces en el avión se leyó el libro, entonces la mujer muy estudiosa, se lo estudió. Entonces empezó la entrevista con el Rey y lo sé por un embajador que estaba en ese momento allí, y dio un discurso muy positivo sobre el papel de la sociedad civil marroquí y el Rey se quedó impresionado, de ver que la ministra conocía tanto de la sociedad civil marroquí.

Yo creo que el ciclo es este.

Y luego, claro, salen temas como el que has comentado muy acertadamente, según mi criterio. Este aspecto fundamental se quiera o no, como es el tema de emigración. Que antes era controlada por los ministerios de asuntos interiores y que más tarde pasó a ser parte de la agenda de exteriores.

Sí, pero esto cambió. Por ejemplo, la emigración actúa sobre la política exterior en el Mediterráneo en un doble sentido. Un sentido positivo donde se ve que es una realidad que hay que gestionarla, por tanto hay que desarrollar una política. España pasa a ser pasa a ser un país donde la diversidad de emigrante, sobre todo marroquí, es muy relevante. Pasamos a ser un país europeo normal, como Francia, etc. Y es una carta en las agendas de interior, desarrolló toda la política de seguridad, y España la gestiona bien. Siempre con una visión global, no solo desarrollar solo mecanismos de seguridad y vigilancia en las costas. Pero la migración como es muy repentina y muy masiva, la migración tiene un impacto muy negativo sobre la opinión pública española. Y entonces los políticos son muy sensibles a esto. Esto se ve claro en Cataluña por ejemplo. El gobierno de Pujol continúa siendo muy mediterraneísta, pero claro, hay que gestionar los problemas estos, en los municipios, que tienen que ver con los marroquíes aquí.

El mundo de musulmán pasa de ser una abstracción a ser una realidad. Una realidad, sesgada por el origen rural y masivo y pobre de los que vienen. Por lo que se acentúa una visión del Islam muy primaria. Aquí solo vienen los campesinos que vienen del norte de Marruecos, etc. Entonces hay unos años que coinciden con los años de gobierno del Partido Popular y otros gobiernos donde los gobiernos tienen una posición más avanzada que la misma sociedad. Porque en la sociedad las encuestas son demoledoras. El rating de la islamofobia es muy alto. Hay un papel muy positivo del gobierno, de algunos medios de comunicación. Pero donde de verdad hay un sentimiento difícil de gestionar es en la sociedad española. Y que se vuelve todavía más difícil de gestionar cuando comienza la crisis económica.

Entonces la migración actúa en doble sentido. Yo creo que la emigración en España, porque ahora hay más de 1 millón de marroquíes, a medio plazo será una cuestión fundamental para la política mediterránea española. A corto plazo, de 1 o 2 generaciones, sobre todo en un contexto de crisis tan profunda como la actual, no siempre ayuda.

Tu que trabajas en la Fundación Anna Lindh, donde la comunicación intercultural, la aproximación entre los pueblos, también es un elemento donde la confianza es vital. Cómo afecta la falta de coherencia política (realpolitik vs. Idealismo), a esta comunicación, al entendimiento entre los pueblos del norte y del sur?

Afecta, sí. Afecta todo el proceso de diálogo mediterráneo, porque la opinión pública aquí es reacia y porque el feedback en los países del sur, se traduce en falta de credibilidad del proceso como tal. Se plantea de una forma muy fuerte la cuestión de la movilidad, como se puede pretender crear una zona de libre comercio del 2010 y a la vez con políticas cada vez más restrictivas en términos de visas, incluso para segmentos muy específicos de la población como profesores, etc. Eso sigue siendo en nuestra vida diaria una pesadilla.

Si porque por ejemplo la Unión Europea nace al inicio como una unión económica y comercial, y luego se crea Schengen, un espacio abierto para la movilidad de las personas. Son dos cosas que deben ir de la mano.

Sí, y eso es una dinámica que ha pesado mucho. La falta de credibilidad. Y algunas cosas recientes o actitudes recientes con relación a la emigración procedente de Libia. Claro montar todo este show porque había 18.000 tunecinos en Ventimiglia, sobre 750 millones, deben ser un 0.0005 %. Entonces eso en el sur es percibido, como que en el fondo no se quiere. Que en el fondo lo que se quiere es algunas medidas de libre comercio, destinadas a facilitar las inversiones allí. Pero si eso va acompañado con restricciones en el ámbito de la movilidad y dificultades en una política agraria que dificulta también el acceso a los mercados europeos, entonces los dos principales principios de credibilidad del proceso son estos. Política agraria y política migratoria.

Es verdad, son temas serios. Pero se podría tener a corto plazo las medidas que hay que tener, pero dejar clara la perspectiva. Pero claro, la perspectiva está ahí. La perspectiva es demográfica. Hay una necesidad de mano de obra y de rejuvenecimiento de la población europea evidente. En términos de hacer frente al peligro de decadencia europea, y de mantener ese 14-15 o 16% del PIB mundial que tiene la EU. Hoy creo que estamos en el 18%. Hay algunos estudios demográficos que son demoledores si no hay aportación de demografía, etc, en 2050 se baja al 12 al 13% del PIB mundial.

Es decir, Europa pasa a ser una región mucho menos relevante. Esto que todo el mundo sabe, porqué no se dice? Entonces no es cuestión de decir, vamos a abrir las fronteras. Se trata de tener una estrategia donde los países del sur tienen que saber que hay una posibilidad de

complementariedad demográfica. Pero claro, todos los políticos tienen miedo de eso y luego se crea una paradoja. Como va pasando el tiempo, cuando se va a reconocer eso, como ha dicho Senen Florensa, ya se habrá producido un proceso de cambio demográfico en el sur y ya no podemos tener gente de esta zona, sino que tendremos que tener gente de África. Con las excepciones de Egipto y Palestina se están a estándares europeos.

Entonces creo que es uno de los problemas es eso, la falta de visión. En el proceso de Barcelona, había una cosa, y es que había una visión. Esa visión se ha ido perdiendo por la crisis económica, por dinámicas políticas internas, y también hay que decirlo, por el statu quo en el sur. Uno de los grandes defectos o limitaciones del proceso de Barcelona es que pretendía dibujar un escenario en el medio o largo plazo sin cambiar el statu-quo en los países del sur. Y yo creo que eso fue un error, un statu-quo que fue sellado fundamentalmente por los americanos mucho tiempo atrás por Roosevelt en esa entrevista con el rey de Arabia Saudí en el 45. Este statu-quo los europeos lo deberían haber manejado distintamente. Yo creo que ha habido 2 o 3 cosas que han pesado mucho en dicho statu-quo. Uno es la crisis energética. Otra es la visión estereotipada del mundo Islámico, donde más vale apoyar un dictador laico y conocido que un islamista por conocer. Y después el tema de Israel ha jugado también mucho en este statu-quo, porque cualquier ruptura de este statu-quo ponía en peligro al estado de Israel.

Ahora con la nueva coyuntura, desde Estambul hasta Túnez, hay un marco donde los partidos islamistas pueden tener una posición mayoritaria, y si se crean ellos una corriente reformista, puede ser una oportunidad histórica.

Vosotros ahora dentro de la fundación Anna Lindh, como veis las ciertas dificultades que puede entrañar la falta de coherencia política hasta ahora en el desarrollo de estas nuevas coyunturas.

Yo creo que la Unión Europea como tal, ha reaccionado particularmente. Al principio estaba muy sorprendida, como todos. Después ha reaccionado bastante bien. Todo eso constituye un esfuerzo de reacción muy positivo. Hay falta de dinero. Estas revoluciones llegan en un muy mal momento. No hay los fondos que se atribuyeron cuando las transiciones democráticas se produjeron al este de Europa. Hay una comprensión del papel de la sociedad civil muy importante. Y después hay una voluntad de hablar con todo el mundo.

Yo creo que la EU ahora tiene una buena oportunidad, porque si aplica esa política de more for more y less for less, restricciones con Siria, de gran apertura con Túnez, con Marruecos, con Jordania con Egipto, eso puede hacer re-credibilizar este proceso. Yo estuve en la reunión de la Task Force que se hizo hace 15 días. Fue interesante. Bernardino León tiene un papel muy interesante de coordinador de acciones que se pueden desarrollar en política exterior europea. Luego está Stephan Fülle, comisario de la neighborhood, que es un hombre muy committed en todo esto. Entiende también muy bien que al final todo dependerá de la sociedad civil. Hace falta un marco institucional, una constitución abierta, hacen falta transformaciones, una democracia, pero sobre todo lo que hace falta es una sociedad civil fuerte, plural, abierta que siga desarrollando la democracia en estos países. Y he escuchado de él ideas que no he escuchado en ningún otro dirigente de la Unión Europea. Me parece importante.

Para ir terminando, como habéis percibido cuando Sarkozy anunció su programa de Unión por el Mediterráneo, y cómo ha evolucionado hasta hoy esa percepción?

Cuando se lanzó en Julio de 2008, sorprendió la forma en la que lo hizo. En sí mismo suponía un salto importante. Porque tocaba temas que son de gran interés. Introducía un elemento interesante aunque se gestionó de una manera un poco controvertida que era el tema del sharing responsibilities, de las 2 co-presidencias, para terminar con una idea del proceso de Barcelona como un proceso Europeo.

Yo creo que no se gestionó mal, es que se gestionó con Mubarak. Es que ahora hay que ver la imagen completa. Yo estaba en París en la sala grande con el presidente de la fundación, yo estaba en la silla detrás de los “sherpas”, y no puedo olvidar foto, yo tenía delante a Sarkozy, Ben Ali, Asaad, etc. Yo tengo obsesión con esa foto, eso es lo que había. No estaba el rey de Marruecos, no estaba el rey de Jordania, estaba el primer ministro, pero los que de verdad estaban al máximo nivel, menos Ghadaffi, todos. Entonces la cuestión era que había la ilusión de construir un futuro con esta gente.

Yo entiendo la *realpolitik*, pero habría que decir las cosas más claras. Ya había un criterio de condicionalidad que estaba introducido desde el principio del proceso de Barcelona, pero en la práctica este principio de condicionalidad se dejó para algunas declaraciones y se trabajaba con acuerdos bilaterales, ahora con Argelia, luego con Siria, y había que tener claro esto. Ahora se ha introducido esta condicionalidad positiva que es mucho más relevante. Y ese criterio se tenía que haber introducido más y antes. Como se tendría que haber apoyado más la sociedad civil que abogaba por los derechos humanos.

Esto es muy interesante porque pocos meses antes de que explotaran estas revueltas todos los indicadores económicos y políticos auguraban buenas perspectivas para el norte de África. Incluso el UNHCR hablaba del “milagro norte africano” y poco después salta todo.

Nosotros publicamos en 2010 un informe que analizaba datos de una encuesta de Gallup, y aunque los resultados que se publicaron allí fueron limitados, porque tuvimos problemas con la administración de Mubarak que no quería que se publicara, el report no es sobre valores democráticos, es sobre valores culturales, pero en el report aparece una de las cosas más marginales de lo que está ocurriendo ahora, y esos valores los ves como percepciones distorsionadas. Con el terrorismo, con lo que sea, las percepciones están distorsionadas, pero los valores son mucho más cercanos de lo que imaginábamos.

Lo que descubrimos con ese informe es que ese clash de civilizaciones, no era un clash de valores, era un clash de ignorancia mutua. En el sur también se piensa en el individualismo, en estereotipos del mundo occidental. Pero esto digamos lo sabían. Lo presentamos en Bruselas con Fülle y se hicieron comentarios interesantes. La juventud en el sur está cambiando. Porque lo que mostraba el informe es que hay unos valores sobre los cuales basar un cambio. En el fondo no se puede apoyar una perspectiva democrática, porque será una perspectiva iraní, o lo que sea. Eso se ha acabado. La situación ahora es muy interesante. Ahora hay condiciones para lanzar un proceso de Barcelona, Unión por el Mediterráneo, pero verdadero.

Basado en valores. Basado en transiciones democráticas efectivas, incluso para intercambiar ideas de desarrollo. Si no hay democracia, cómo vas a intercambiar eso. En Alejandría por ejemplo, es una ciudad que no tiene ni alcalde, solo un gobernador nombrado por Mubarak. Qué quiere decir desarrollo sostenible si no hay un mínimo de democracia, si no hay participación de los ciudadanos? Donde no tienen la mínima oportunidad de expresar su opinión sobre aspectos básicos como la recogida de basuras, sobre el tráfico, sobre el desarrollo urbanístico. Ahora la gente está abierta.

Y ahora puedes imaginar un futuro común. La historia de las ministeriales del proceso de Barcelona es una historia de recortes lideradas por Egipto, de recortes sistemáticos a cualquier referencia a la democracia, a la igualdad de las mujeres. Ahora eso comienza a existir. Ahora aunque los gobiernos que vayan a establecerse sean gobiernos conservadores, que lo serán, son gobiernos que también están sometidos a su opinión pública.

ALBERTO CARNERO

Si tuviera que explicar la política exterior de los gobiernos del Partido Popular empezaría por la idea de España que tenía el presidente del Gobierno. La figura del presidente del gobierno es determinante. Este libro, tenía una faja, donde había una frase del presidente Aznar donde decía, ‘teníamos la ambición de hacer de España una de las mejores democracias del mundo’. Eso es lo que encuadraría su visión de política exterior y de política interior. Yo creo que la política es política. Soy diplomático y después de tantos años creo que las dos políticas son indistinguibles. Y cito nuevamente al presidente cuando dice; ‘no hay mejor política exterior que una política interior’. Los países en una sociedad internacional hobbesiana, están basadas en un derecho blando, pero digamos que la fortaleza de un estado de cara al exterior la da la cohesión interior.

Dicho esto, es evidente que si uno estudia esos años hay líneas de continuidad con todo lo anterior. Hay unas líneas maestras de la política exterior española desde la transición, con vectores claros, que son los de siempre: Europa, Iberoamérica, Estados Unidos y el Mediterráneo. El resto también está pero queda más lejos. Pero admitiendo esos vectores de continuidad, hay inflexiones hacia un sentido. Cito una frase de Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, que contrasta con la que figuraba en la faja del libro que he comentado, y él decía que la política exterior de España en la Unión Europea consistía en hablar los quintos. Es decir, después de oír a Francia, Italia, el Reino Unido y Francia, entonces la posición Española era entre medias, donde no se molestara a nadie. Pero, claro eso era conformarse con no ser un país con un estatus cómodo pero, eso, hablar los quintos. Eso conscientemente Aznar lo quiso cambiar. Y eso, consistía en cambiarlo en esos cuatro escenarios. Es cierto que en Iberoamérica se tenía una presencia mayor. Eso está muy bien narrado por Alejandro Muñoz Alonso.

Yo creo que si uno analiza esos años, claramente, el objetivo político que marca el cambio, es que se desarrolle una política exterior que tiene una repercusión en la política interior. Que es el Euro. Entonces, el objetivo político es ingresar en el Euro, en ese momento, cumpliendo todos los objetivos y sin hacer trampas. Eso implicaba romper con una tradición larga de no equilibrio presupuestarios en las cuentas públicas que implicaba unas tasas de inflación mayores que las de la Unión Europea. Eso implicaba un índice de desempleo mayor, etc.

Dicho esto, eso denotaba esa ambición por ser una de las mejores democracias del mundo, eso implicaba renunciar a hablar los quintos. A hablar los primeros. A tener una idea de Europa. A pasar por delante. Ciertas iniciativas innovadoras por ejemplo en Iberoamérica, la creación la Secretaría General Iberoamericana, etc. Cosas que se habían hecho antes pero con una intensidad y una ambición distinta.

Para nosotros el Mediterráneo comienza al sur. Y yo creo que al sur de España, uno tiene dos vecinos: Marruecos y Argelia. Eso es una cosa complicada. Es decir, al sur no limitamos con Austria y Suiza. Son otra cosa. Entonces yo creo que por hacer un resumen muy grande, eso marca mucho la política exterior española, porque en esos años ocurre un hecho determinante, que es la muerte del Rey Hassan II y el acceso al trono de su hijo Mohammed VI. También una cosa que es la no resolución del conflicto del Sahara occidental. Yo creo que los asuntos de política exterior que más importan a España son tres: Sahara, Cuba y Guinea Ecuatorial. Lo demás son cosas a las que se dedican los académicos y diplomáticos. Pero lo que de verdad importa son estos tres puntos. Por tanto se trata de buscar un equilibrio.

Este equilibrio es el que se pactó en la transición. Se sabe que España tiene un pecado original ahí. España abandonó la zona en las condiciones en las que lo hizo, etc.

Con esto ¿qué quiero decir? En este asunto, nominalmente no hubo un cambio de posición, pero lo que creo es que el Partido Socialista, sí había cambiado de postura y lo habían hecho en privado. Pero eso es una cosa muy delicada que no consta. Yo creo que si la posición tradicional de España, era decir, existe un conflicto existente que debe resolverse de acuerdo a la legalidad internacional, el acuerdo de las partes, y esa legalidad internacional exige el reconocimiento del derecho de autodeterminación que tiene el pueblo saharaui y eso implica la celebración de un referendun donde una de las posibles opciones es que se otorgue al pueblo saharaui es la independencia. Yo creo que eso en algún momento, se cuestionó. Yo creo que el gobierno socialista de Felipe González, sin decirlo, se alinea con Marruecos. Entonces, eso trae muchos problemas.

Eso se añade al cambio de monarca en Marruecos, donde se da una posición inicial muy generosa del gobierno Español al nuevo rey, pero luego ocurre la crisis de Perejil, motivada porque por la crisis producida por la retirada del embajador marroquí por la celebración de ese referendun convocado ni más ni menos que por la Junta de Andalucía. Son estas contradicciones de nuestros queridos socialistas que a veces son entrañables. Entonces eso es un dato importante a tener en cuenta por la tensión que eso generó y motivó la aprobación el 31 de Julio de 2003 de una resolución en las Naciones Unidas presidida entonces por España, aprobada por unanimidad, endosando el plan Baker 2. Luego la historia fue distinta.

Creo que este equilibrio se mantuvo con turbulencias graves a lo largo de 8 años. Y yo creo que fue muy importante establecer una relación más franca con Argelia, dada también la importancia que tiene también por cuestiones de abastecimiento energético, etc. A mí lo que me parece relevante es que la política y la retórica que se hizo era congruente y que se puede leer hoy sin sonrojarse. La historia cambia, pero como decía Carlos Alberto Montaner, en una reunión dijo que en contra de lo que decía Lord Palmer, los países no solo tienen que tener intereses permanentes, porque la historia puede cambiar, sino que lo que tienen que tener los países son principios permanentes. Porque los intereses son de los particulares, de las empresas, de las personas y esos pueden cambiar. Entonces lo que debe tener un país, son principios permanentes. Y obviamente para un liberal conservador o para una democracia es; respeto de los derechos humanos, dignidad de la persona, tolerancia, etc. Eso es importante con todo lo que está pasando.

Es importante también señalar de todos esos años, que la cercanía creciente con los Estados Unidos, que también es una cosa que viene de atrás, a finales de los años 90 estaba dando la lata Irak. Sadam Hussein. La primera vez que España y el Gobierno de Aznar apoya al gobierno de los Estados Unidos, lo hace con Bill Clinton, cuando Sadam Hussein expulsa a equipo de observadores de Naciones Unidas. Esa es digamos la primera vez, en el año 1997-1998. Pero a lo que voy es que desde el primer momento, en esos años hay una visión muy definida de hacer de España un socio privilegiado de los Estados Unidos. Algo que venía de la transición, de los acuerdos del 53 pero ratificado con todas las turbulencias que conocemos, OTAN sí, OTAN no, etc., pero se le quería dar otra intensidad.

Eso fue muy importante. También para el Mediterráneo, porque al fin y al cabo si hay una potencia mediterránea, esta son los Estados Unidos. Y eso lo saben todos los que están en el Mediterráneo. Entonces eso es importante. De hecho no se si estará citado, una de las iniciativas que se hicieron en esa época, con el apoyo del Presidente del Gobierno era el Foro Formentor. Que era organizado por la Fundación Repsol. En ese foro se reunían gente del

norte y del sur del Mediterráneo, de los Estados Unidos y Rusia. Era un foro donde se discutían aspectos del Mediterráneo con actores gubernamentales, no gubernamentales, académicos, etc. A lo largo de esos años, lo que pasó, es que primero, España era un país ascendente. Tenía prestigio, una economía dinámica, adquirió mayores responsabilidades en algunas cuestiones internacionales. Comenzó a participar en el presupuesto estructural de la OTAN en 1997 y poco a poco, se fue viendo que había una relación estrecha entre los países y Estados Unidos comenzó a ver a España con un aliado privilegiado.

Eso se vio, antes del 11 de Septiembre ya que Bush en su primera visita oficial internacional a Europa, al primer país que visita es a España. Y eso no es que sea algo casual. Y no es porque se llevara bien con Aznar, que no se conocían en aquella época, sino que en la visión estratégica de los Estados Unidos, se demostraba el interés prioritario que tenía sobre España. Primero como importante socio dentro de la Unión Europea, segundo, con un gran peso en Iberoamérica y por último debido a nuestra posición geográfica en el Mediterráneo y en el estrecho. Esa relación que fue muy buena y muy intensa.

Lo que pasa en esos años, es que todo ese mundo árabe ve que España puede ser una guía, y un canal para hacer llegar mensajes a los Estados Unidos. Y eso ocurre, no en el Mediterráneo, sino también en Irán. Aznar tiene una relación cordial por ejemplo con el presidente Khatami.

La relación con Francia como un protagonista en el Mediterráneo, como se vivió?

Claro, esa fue una relación, que tiene sus más y sus menos. Francia ve el Mediterráneo desde Francia. Ve un Marruecos que tiene una frontera hasta Mauritania y eso es un problema porque no se comparte la misma visión. Esa división tiene una incidencia grave en la crisis de Perejil. La crisis de Perejil se resuelve en una cierta manera y quien sale garante del acuerdo del respeto del statu quo son los Estados Unidos. Y también, claro, la España de esos años que es una potencia ascendente en política internacional, no hay vacíos. Ser una potencia ascendente implica también hacerse un poco sitio.

Sobre el proceso de Barcelona se ha escrito y dicho mucho. Algunos dicen que ha fracasado, otros que ha servido al menos como un instrumento de diálogo. España fue uno de sus máximos impulsores. En la segunda legislatura del Gobierno de Aznar, esta tendencia más atlantista, ¿cree que alejó a España de ese rol líder, y la imagen española perdió consistencia y de imagen frente a los socios del sur del Mediterráneo?

Yo creo que no. Al contrario. Si uno se da cuenta de los datos la presidencia Española en la Unión Europea en el 2002, es la que convoca una reunión del proceso de Barcelona con jefes de Estado y de Gobierno. Amor no quita conocimiento. Entonces, esta retórica de amistad con el mundo árabe está muy bien, y es real, pero también pasa una cosa en todo este tiempo, que es un parte aguas de la historia que es el 11 de Septiembre. Que se puede criticar mucho lo que pasó. Yo creo que la respuesta estratégica que se da, está en el segundo discurso inaugural del presidente Bush es la correcta. O el discurso de Condoleezza Rice en la Universidad del Cairo. Durante mucho tiempo hemos sacrificado la libertad en aras de la estabilidad de la seguridad y la estabilidad y al final nos vamos a quedar sin las dos cosas. Entonces, esa es la reacción al 11 de Septiembre. Entonces la respuesta a este desafío es más democracia y más libertad. Esa cosa ya ni se nombra pero es iniciativa del Greater Middle East, es la reforma democrática de toda una región, etc. A veces decimos democracia y pensamos que es libertad, y no es lo mismo, no es lo mismo. Hay que releer a Ortega. Esto no se ha acabado.

Yo creo que leer todos esos discursos es muy ilustrativo y con todo lo que se pueda criticar de Irak, me parece que con toda su inestabilidad etc., ha tenido ya algunas elecciones. Ha sido un ejemplo para lo que ha ocurrido en las revueltas árabes. Pero hay que ser consciente de que esto no se ha acabado. Todo esto se incubía en este período. El mundo islámico tiene un problema desde hace mucho tiempo y algunos los empezaron a ver y otros no.

CARLOS WESTENDORP

Yo viví estas cosas desde antes, desde el año 1979, durante el gobierno de UCD, yo era asesor para la Secretaría de Estado para las Relaciones con las Comunidades Europeas con el ministro Calvo Sotelo, que era el ministro para las relaciones con Europa. Después vino otro ministro que fue Eduardo Punset, que fue su jefe de gabinete. Después esto se redujo a Secretaría de Estado y es lo que se ha mantenido hasta ahora.

Cómo vivió estos primeros momentos hasta el 86, que era España en Europa?

España en aquella época era una nueva democracia, con una democracia amenazada esporádicamente con el golpe de estado, que produjo una reacción de consternación en las cancillerías europeas, y un sentimiento también de culpa. Las negociaciones para la adhesión se estaban prolongando excesivamente, el principal obstáculo era Francia, con un temor a que la agricultura española y los productos y vino españoles invadieran Francia y los franceses del Languedoc-Rousillon no pudieran vivir, algo que se ha demostrado posteriormente como algo totalmente falso, sino todo lo contrario. Y también la pesca, el problema principal de la flota de la armada invencible española en este sentido que producía pavor. Estos eran los dos obstáculos. Luego era un país todavía muy atrasado, con problemas, que tenía que haberse puesto al día, pero las negociaciones duraron excesivamente. Fue el referéndum de la OTAN lo que las desbloqueó. Para la OTAN hubiera sido un revés que hubiera salido un no, entonces, los principales aliados nuestros, sobre todo Alemania, Gensel fue quien dijo que no se podía pretender que un soldado español nos defiende en la OTAN mientras que les negamos la entrada en la Unión Europea.

Al final todo se desbloquea con Fernando Morán y Manolo Marín. Yo era el jefe del equipo técnico negociador con una serie de problemas y capítulos que vivimos muy intensamente. Tuvimos que aceptar el acta única tal y como estaba redactada porque en aquel periodo en el que la acta única se firma, todavía no éramos miembros. Habíamos llegado a terminar las negociaciones y a firmar en junio de 1985. Y entonces desde junio de 1985 al 1 de enero de 1986, que es cuando se materializaba el ingreso, teníamos voz, pero no teníamos voto. En fin, el acta única nos venía bien. El mercado interior, a pesar de que había unos sectores proteccionistas ancestrales en España, al final se impuso, que un mercado interior en España, no tenía más que beneficiarse, sino lo contrario. Y así entramos en la Comunidad Europea en un momento de euforia, de euro-optimismo. La entrada de España y Portugal coinciden con ese momento de euro-optimismo, y España y Portugal dan una dinámica nueva y fue la época, como la llama Felipe González, “de la gran galopada”.

Es una época en la que se hace prácticamente casi todo, y entre otras cosas, lo que España puede aportar, es básicamente, un europeísmo convencido, es decir una construcción Europea en la que España siempre estuvo en la vanguardia y nuestro gran valor añadido eran nuestras relaciones con América Latina y las relaciones con el norte de África y el sur del Mediterráneo. Las pruebas están en dos elementos. Las presiones para desarrollar los acuerdos de Mercosur, las zonas de libre cambio con América Latina, un acercamiento de la Unión Europea a América Latina evidente. Y en la política mediterránea también.

La política mediterránea, era y sigue siendo una prioridad que nosotros ya lo concebimos como una prioridad española, pero que ahora es también una prioridad europea. Sobre todo a partir de la primavera árabe nos hemos dado cuenta todavía más lo importante que es, y sobre todo en un momento en que hay una deriva del eje de gravedad político hacia el este y hacia

China y los países emergentes y que Europa podría seguir siendo relevante, pero que si no hace nada, como no hace nada, pues vamos a perder relevancia poco a poco. Y el problema es que el Mediterráneo nos podría dar relevancia. Nos podría reforzar, la capacidad de influencia de España como un polo de influencia. Mucho más que nosotros solos, junto los que son afines a nuestros valores como la comunidad trasatlántica, es decir: Estados Unidos, Canadá, Latinoamérica más el Mediterráneo, a mi juicio es lo que a España, con un reforzamiento de la política económica y por lo tanto del reforzamiento de la Unión Europea, podríamos recuperar esta influencia que hemos tenido y que hemos perdido. Es decir, cuando uno crece el otro disminuye relativamente.

El gran drama sería si también disminuimos en términos absolutos. Si es relativo es menos malo, todos podemos crecer, etc., no pasa nada, China crece más, Brasil crece más, eso es normal. El problema es que nosotros como estamos en este momento, pensemos a decrecer y a dismantelar el estado de bienestar, la economía social de mercado. Entonces ahora estamos en esta encrucijada.

Entonces España cuando entra a la CE en el 1986, todavía como un país pequeño, tiene que hacerse un rol en Europa, tiene que hacerse acreedora de la confianza, cómo son estos primeros momentos para España, como es el trabajo de los diplomáticos españoles en Europa, como son vistos?

La percepción es que en Europa y el mundo, porque estando en Europa teníamos más influencia también en América Latina y con los Estados Unidos. Fue durante la presidencia española cuando se organizó la primera cumbre transatlántica donde se firmaba esa agenda transatlántica entre Bill Clinton y Felipe González representando la Unión Europea en 1995. Su secretario de estado Madeleine Albright cuando fui a Naciones Unidas de representante permanente y ella también lo era, había sido antes secretaria de estado, igual que yo fui ministros de asuntos exteriores brevemente, me dijo que: “hay que reconocer que España golpea por encima de su peso”. Es decir que España “punches over its weight”. Es decir que somos un welter pero que golpeamos como uno de peso pesado. Y eso le hacía gracia. Eso como se consigue? En primer lugar, eso se consigue en primer lugar siendo un socio leal de la Unión Europea. Cuando haces favores a tus socios, llegas a compromisos en temas importantes para ellos, y uno de ellos fue fundamental, el de la reunificación alemana. Ahí, la gratitud de Helmut Kohl hacia Felipe González fue grande. Siendo un socio leal, teniendo una presidencia europea donde servías a los intereses europeos y de paso a los españoles, eso te da una gran credibilidad.

En segundo lugar, eso ocurrirá también con los Estados Unidos. El hecho de que cuando Baker estando todavía Bush padre de presidente, le pide a Paco Fernández Ordóñez (ministro de asuntos exteriores 1985-1992) yo estaba en Sevilla y le veo a Paco con el teléfono en la mano con cara de preocupado y me dice: “Era Baker que me pide que le organice la conferencia en Madrid sobre oriente medio porque se fía de nosotros”. Y Paco Fernández Ordóñez que tenía un sentido del gol como hay pocos en términos futbolísticos, acertó inmediatamente y fue otro gol importante, lo que trajo más credibilidad con Estados Unidos y con el mundo, porque no fue fácil convencer a los sirios, convencer a los israelíes. Y se hizo después el proceso de Barcelona y todo eso puso a España como había dicho Fernando Morán, en su sitio. Incluso por encima de sus posibilidades.

Lo que pasa es que eso, hay que pelearlo mucho y no te regalan nunca nada en esas primeras posiciones y hay otros que también van subiendo. Después se produce la ampliación, entra Polonia y España, relativamente pierde la primera línea. Yo ahora como he estado ayudando

a Felipe González allí, he vuelto al “lugar del crimen” a Bruselas, pues haciendo el informe de la Europa del 2030, la gente me decía, quien nos ha visto y quién nos ve! Nosotros además y esto te da credibilidad es que dimos la batalla por conseguir los fondos estructurales, el fondo de cohesión y hemos sido los que más nos hemos beneficiado de los fondos estructurales que ningún otro país.

Quién fue el artífice que permitió que conseguir estos fondos estructurales?

Pues un equipo muy conjuntado, muy entusiasta, el ministerio de exteriores y otros ministerios, y sobre todo, Felipe González que se metió en el bolsillo a Kohl a Mitterrand, a los grandes líderes de la época. Y que a cambio de apoyar la reunificación alemana pues obtuvo la comprensión de una Alemania que al final era la que tenía que pagar el 25 por ciento de lo que contribuía a los fondos. Y luego esa fue en grandes líneas las razones.

Luego era un país que creció bastante, que tuvo un éxito económico, antes de la crisis de la crisis del 2008, España creció más y generó más empleo que toda la Unión Europea junta. Lo que pasa es que estaba fundamentalmente basado en el ladrillo, y ahora estamos donde estamos. Y yo creo que todo es recuperable, pero obviamente antes que nada se debe recuperar Europa, y ahí, España es un aliado. Porque si le va bien a Europa nos irá bien a nosotros y viceversa. Y después estando en Europa, tienes que ser un socio leal, un socio trabajador, tener éxito económico. Tener éxito económico es un punto muy importante y luego con nuestras dos grandes bazas que es una relación buena y natural con el Mediterráneo y con América Latina. Esas son nuestras prioridades eternas. Luego hay otras nuevas. Son otras áreas en las que hay que trabajar como son por ejemplo, el área de extremo oriente, las relaciones con Japón con China, con las potencias emergentes. Pero ahí somos más del montón. No tenemos un rol de líder.

En el tema del Mediterráneo y el norte de África y de Oriente Medio, a parte del conflicto de la madre de todos los conflictos que es el tema de Israel y Palestina, ahí hemos hecho de ayudar en ese proceso y se hizo todo lo que se pudo, pero este proceso sale de nuestras capacidades. Ni siquiera Estados Unidos la tiene y ahora tenemos que ver lo que va a pasar entre Irán e Israel y Siria. Eso es terrible.

En el tema de la primavera árabe y de la política mediterránea, está claro que la Unión Europea ha hecho muchas cosas por política mediterránea, España estaba detrás ayudando y hay como distintos modelos según las épocas. Ahora no me acuerdo de memoria pero hemos pasado por todos los tipos de modelos hasta llegar a la Unión por el Mediterráneo, que es una entelequia, ahí Sarkozy con sus ocurrencias, algunos miembros se quedan fuera, Alemania protesta y al final se hace una cosa general que coincide con lo que ya había. En este contexto ocurre la primavera árabe, y ante la primavera árabe, la Unión Europea hace un nuevo enfoque, que llama algo así como el partenariado para el desarrollo y la democracia, donde hay algo más concreto, más fondos de ayuda y más apertura comercial. Yo estoy convencido que el proceso de democratización es irreversible, que va a pasar sin duda alguna por el acceso al poder de los islamistas, ojala que moderados, pero eso es inevitable. Pero el problema está en que en esos países, los hay que no tienen renta de petróleo y van a tener muchas dificultades para poder atender las demandas de su población descontenta y ahí hay que hacer un esfuerzo titánico, sobre todo en Túnez, Marruecos.

Nosotros por ejemplo hemos propuesto al gobierno de Qatar que el foro de Doha que tendrá lugar en mayo que tengamos una conferencia con la gente del Club de Madrid con jefes de Estado y de gobierno, para lanzar una idea de un plan Marshall para estos países. Esto en realidad ya se ha hecho. Si se pusiera en conjunto y se coordinaran los fondos, fondos

habrían. El problema es que cada uno va por su lado. Hay duplicidades, hay ineficiencias. Ahora es básicamente decir, a ver de qué manera podemos crear una estructura ligera pero que coordine todo esto, y no es fácil. Entonces, a ver si lo hacemos y lo queremos llamar Alianza para el Desarrollo y la Democracia. Tendría que pasar también por una liberalización de los intercambios entre ellos mismos. En este sentido entre Marruecos y Argelia se dan la espalda, y eso no tiene ningún sentido, pero eso son cosas que hay que hacer y empujar.

Y al final, como antes te decía, la estabilidad de Europa y sobre todo de la Europa nuestra, más meridional, pasa por la estabilidad en el norte de África y la estabilidad del norte de África depende de la estabilidad en el medio oriente y de la democratización en esos países. Son como 300 millones de personas o 500 millones o más los que van a habitar en esa región, y claro eso con la Unión Europea etc., pues podríamos tener peso. Eso es como lo vemos.

Entonces usted cree que una vez superadas las dificultades obvias tenidas durante la etapa con Giscard d'Estaing, la nueva etapa de las relaciones España-Francia-Europa con Mitterrand, Felipe González, descubre o abre esta oportunidad política de vender a Europa el Mediterráneo y las preocupaciones que tenía España en esta región?

Sin duda. Yo creo que eso fue así. Es una realidad que está ahí y que se cuenta y que se puede rellenar con hechos. Después entramos en un periodo donde los gobiernos de Aznar son más atlantistas. Era una apuesta interesante, pero un poco digamos, que fue más espectacular en la medida que nos alineamos en las Azores con Bush y Blair. Para sorpresa de Bush que se preguntaba a qué viene este entusiasmo de los españoles. Él lo aprovechó y entre otras cosas atacó Irak para revalidar su segundo mandato. Nadie cambia de comandante en jefe cuando hay una guerra y el hizo la guerra de Irak para ganar las elecciones, eso es así de claro. Y yo creo que ahí es donde Aznar se equivocó. Se equivocó porque al final los Estados Unidos no necesitan tanto de esos estados-cipayo. Estados Unidos hacen más caso a Francia por ejemplo. Porque Francia les lee la cartilla, les dice que no. Los americanos se mueren de gusto con los franceses, les encanta que les maltraten. Y claro, creo que ahí nos equivocamos. Al escorarse mucho hacia el lado atlántico, descuidamos el lado europeo. Había elementos en el gobierno de Aznar que eran bastante euro-escépticos.

Creo que de alguna manera, si, durante la época de González se vende justificadamente, la política del mediterráneo para un interés para España pero también como un interés para Europa, obviamente todo lo que se haga con esos terceros países tiene una dimensión emocional muy grande en el sentido de la comunicación entre el norte y el sur. Que según creo, si al final, no hay una coherencia política todo se viene abajo. Si al principio España tiene un rol de líder en la venta, en la publicidad de esta política euro-mediterránea y llega un momento en el que España, sobre todo durante el segundo mandato de Aznar, desarrolla una versión política mucho más atlantista, toda esta capacidad de dialogar se descompone y todos los esfuerzos hechos previamente se arruinan.

Así es, así es. Es una cuestión de tiempo. No ocurre de la noche a la mañana pero con el tiempo se va erosionando. Y luego que pasa? No solo Aznar, sino también durante los gobiernos de Zapatero, el problema es que había una muy mala relación con los Estados Unidos durante la época de Bush. A mí me tocó ser embajador allí y sufrirlo. Cuando los elementos de relaciones de base, es decir, los acuerdos comerciales, los intercambios, las inversiones españolas en los Estados Unidos, las americanas en España, los acuerdos defensa, la compra de armas, la lucha antiterrorista, etc., todo esto funcionaba bien porque los intereses eran los mismos. Pero esa mala relación en la cumbre lastraba nuestras posibilidades

de influencia en el resto del mundo. También se producía un desinterés de Zapatero hacia la política exterior en general, que se la dejó en manos a Moratinos que es un hombre muy volcado y muy unidimensional en el mundo del medio oriente. Todo esto en un momento en el que ya no teníamos ningún peso. Es decir, no solo fue en la época de Aznar, sino también durante la época de Zapatero.

Al principio éramos la décima o la octava potencia mundial. Habíamos crecido más que los demás y claro, eso se nos viene abajo como un soufflé. En este momento estamos en un momento de muy baja credibilidad. Somos uno de los PIGS, que tampoco es una muy bonita liga en la que jugar. Todo eso hay que volver a pedalear y a recuperarlo. El gobierno de ahora es un gobierno muy europeo, sobre todo porque el aznarismo no está ya tan presente, García Margallo es un hombre convencido de que España puede recuperar peso en Europa y también de recuperar las constantes. Luego ha tenido el detalle de convocarnos en un consejo asesor a todos los que hemos sido ministros, y él quiere hacer de la política exterior una política consensuada y creo que eso te refuerza. Entonces hay que mantener la esperanza.

Pensando en Francia. Es un país muy poderoso alrededor del Mediterráneo y sus intereses por proyectar o liderar la política mediterránea han ido variando. Su gran interés por el Mediterráneo fue muy claro a inicio de los años setenta con Pompidou, luego declina. Después es España la que toma el relevo por proyectar influencia política y por liderar la política mediterránea con Europa, etc. Son dos países vecinos, con un claro interés geo-estratégico sobre el área.

Tampoco se puede olvidar Italia. Italia es otro país que está en horas bajas y que solo le faltaba el comportamiento de este capitán del Costa Concordia, en cambio Monti está haciendo por recuperar posiciones, porque Italia es la tercera economía de la Unión Europea. Y es un país Mediterráneo y tanto España como Italia deberían llevarse mejor, y no nos llevamos bien. Probablemente porque hemos querido a veces superar a los italianos y los italianos llevan en Europa mucho más tiempo que nosotros, eran de los seis fundadores, y eso no lo han visto nunca bien. Siempre que han podido nos han puesto en nuestro lugar. Y bueno, creo que a Italia no habría que descuidarla.

Al mismo tiempo el resto de los Europeos. Yo siempre fui muy partidario de la unión con los países bálticos. Primero porque es Europa, y todo lo que es bueno para Europa es bueno para nosotros. En segundo lugar, si tu apoyas a Suecia, Dinamarca o Finlandia en su política báltica ellos no te van a dejar de apoyar en tu política mediterránea. Y esto es así. Es así como funciona. De lo que hay que ser consciente es de saber lo que quieres. Si lo tenemos claro lo que queremos, las cosas eternas y las coyunturales, hay que luchar por ello.

Enlazando con la anterior pregunta con relación a estos intereses por el Mediterráneo tanto por parte de España y Francia a lo largo de las décadas, se viven momentos de rivalidad entre España y Francia por el Mediterráneo, o ha sido una cooperación.

No no, fue a través de cumbres bilaterales. Una relación con Mitterrand diferente a la que tuvo Felipe con Kohl, más patronizing por parte del viejo socialista francés, y además a los franceses les gusta hacerlo así, así que tienes que dejarles. Poco a poco, cuando yo empecé con aquellas políticas, con el Giscardazo la prensa española era muy antifrancesa y te sacaban cosas incluso de la época de la independencia. Y yo recuerdo que había un periódico llamado Diario 16 y un grupo de escritores, muy antifranceses. Sobre el año 86 y hasta bien entrados los noventa, la opinión pública con relación a la simpatía por países, era muy mala. También con un Chirac que dijo que iba a tratar de renegociar el tratado de adhesión de España y yo le dije, mira, no te arriesgo las ganancias porque renegociar un tratado en primer lugar requiere

la unanimidad y tú a mí no me vas a tocar las pelotas. Así de sencillo y tienes que estar convencido de que no te las toquen.

Obviamente a España se le exigió mucho para adherirse. Pero, los sondeos sobre Francia que fue uno de los principales enemigos, junto probablemente a Gran Bretaña, estaban muy bajos. A mí me sorprendió hace unos dos o tres años, donde Francia para los españoles estaban entre los más simpáticos, lo que no deja de ser curioso el ver como se transforma una conciencia colectiva a través de qué? A través de una Francia cooperadora y que te ha acabado con ETA y que te ha comenzado a mandar etarras. Hasta hace 6 o 7 años, durante la época socialista francesa, mucho más legalistas, se les daba mucha más libertad a los jueces, se veía un movimiento de ETA como un movimiento de liberación nacional. Bueno, yo creo que el gobierno de Sarkozy ha hecho muchísimo en este sentido.

Entonces ha cambiado totalmente la percepción, afortunadamente. Y yo creo que en este momento, no sé cómo estarán los sondeos pero uno de los países con más simpatía para los españoles es Francia, que me parece que es algo insólito pero que demuestra como los países colectivamente pueden cambiar de opinión. Y eso es positivo.

La semana pasada estuve en Barcelona en la sede principal de la Unión por el Mediterráneo y percibí un optimismo enturbiado por una sensación de estar maniatados por el hecho de poder hacer muy pocas cosas. Entonces lo que se generó como una ocurrencia de Sarkozy tratando de reformular un proceso de Barcelona, quizá haya perdido fuerza y consistencia.

Y al final porque quería llevárselo él, y los méritos de él.

Fue un en realidad al final con especie de golpe de efecto para re-acercarse la política mediterránea.

Correcto. Con la enemistad de los países del norte, muy a regañadientes aceptaron y lo que es peor, con la enemistad de las instituciones europeas y de la Comisión.

Y al final para qué?

Pues para tener una sede y un secretario general, no?

Pero dos años después nada de nada.

Claro, es así. Es un fiasco y un fracaso muy grande.

Porque a mí lo que parece de alguna manera es como a través de una política y un discurso público efectista trata de identificar oportunidades políticas de corto plazo, que en el mediano y en largo lo que pase da lo mismo, no?

Sí.

Y, eso es una falta de seriedad muy grande, sobre todo en procesos en los que se requiere generar una confianza muy grande entre los potenciales socios, socios complicados y heterogéneos como son los socios del sur.

Y además creo que ahí se ha metido a todo el mundo, no? Todos países que se llevan fatal entre ellos, están ahí metidos.

Precisamente me había reunido con la embajadora de Malta en la Unión por el Mediterráneo, Cecilia Attard Pirotta y con el representante palestino, Rafik Husseini y coincidían en el hecho de que si uno de los socios dice A, el otro dice B, y si el otro dice D el otro F. Entonces no hay posibilidad de generar un consenso para desarrollar programas o proyectos consistentes.

Así es, y eso además choca también con el proceso de Barcelona, con todo. Yo no conozco en detalle esta cuestión. Yo creo que eso no tiene futuro, a menos que no lo reconduzcan de alguna manera, no? Es una pena, y hoy además Europa está fundamentalmente distraída con el tema económico. Yo creo que en lo que es la unión política de Europa va a haber un paréntesis importante hasta que no haya un relanzamiento económico y una unión que vendrá, económica. Y la unión económica será volver otra vez a la teoría funcionalista, a ver si la economía tira de la política, pero faltará. Y falta dinero. O sea que estamos en unos tiempos complicados.

JORDI PUJOL

Tenemos que tener presente que Cataluña es un punto de confluencia de tres influencias. Nosotros somos un pueblo con una fuerte vinculación y atracción por Europa. Nosotros somos de origen carolingio. Somos la única parte del Estado español que es de origen carolingio, y esto que parece una tontería, no lo es. Tenemos una fuerte influencia europea y centro-europea, número uno. Evidentemente nosotros tenemos una fuerte vinculación con el Mediterráneo. Nuestras gestas más importantes de la historia es cuando tenemos que crear una política potente para el Mediterráneo, porque somos un país mediterráneo, número dos. Y tercero, tenemos la influencia española, un componente español importante.

Por lo tanto, para Cataluña, en el momento en el que Cataluña intenta jugar un papel, todo lo modesto que usted quiera, pero propio, con ideas propias, pues el Mediterráneo siempre surge. Esto por un lado. Por otro lado, nosotros pensamos que nuestro desarrollo económico, cultural y político, va muy ligado a dos dimensiones: la Unión Europea y el Mediterráneo. Frente a lo español tenemos a veces que defendernos. Esto hace que a pesar de las limitaciones de un gobierno como el de la Generalitat, nosotros intentemos practicar una política mediterránea. Estoy hablando desde una perspectiva catalana que no es exactamente la que usted necesita, pero a lo mejor le puede ser de utilidad en varios aspectos.

En primer lugar, intentar dar importancia a lo que nosotros empezamos llamando el Mediterráneo noroccidental, que es el que va desde Murcia a medio camino hasta casi cerca de Roma, este arco. El que entendemos que puede estar llamado al desarrollo económico realmente importante. Esto tiene ciertas conclusiones o propuestas. Cuando nosotros defendemos el corredor del Mediterráneo, está respondiendo a esto. Ciertamente es que la fachada mediterránea de España es una de las que tiene más posibilidades de desarrollo económico. Pero es que España sistemáticamente esto no lo ha aceptado muy bien, pero así. No es que sea la única, porque también está el país vasco con un potencial muy importante, Madrid por supuesto, pero esto es muy importante. Entonces nosotros jugamos esta carta y comenzamos a establecer contactos con el sur de Francia y con Lombardía.

En segundo lugar, en el futuro, el espacio económico del Mediterráneo tiene que ir hacia arriba. Porque si es verdad que el futuro pasará en buena parte por el desarrollo asiático, la relación de Asia con Europa se hace por el Mediterráneo. Otra cosa es que como nosotros los mediterráneos no hemos estado lo suficientemente alertas, pues luego se pasa de largo por el Mediterráneo y se pasa por Rotterdam.

Tercer aspecto. Nosotros como europeístas que somos por nacimiento carolingio, necesitamos no quedar demasiado desplazados de Europa. No solamente nosotros sino el resto del estado español. El centro de gravedad de Europa donde estaba, donde está y donde debe estar? Y si no está aquí, Europa está muerta. Está en Francia y Alemania. Añada a esto usted si quiere al norte de Italia. Es decir, esto de ser carolingios no es una casualidad. La Unión Europea es el antiguo imperio de Carlo Magno. Y por lo tanto nos interesa reforzar el sur, la entrada de Portugal, la entrada de España, la entrada de Grecia, el papel que jugaba todavía boyante de Italia, etc. Por lo tanto nosotros en lo que muy modestamente podemos hacer tenemos que darle auge a esto. Como catalanes, como Generalitat de Cataluña, a través de las organizaciones Europeas, de las regiones de Europa, etc., y luego evidentemente, predicando en Europa y procurando que el gobierno español se interese por esto.

Y entonces sobre estas bases realizamos algunas acciones. Tenga usted presente además, que España, clásicamente, desde hace siglos pero también modernamente más o menos, ha estado más interesada en poner su centro de gravedad más en el Mediterráneo que en el atlántico. Por ejemplo, Felipe González trató de conseguir un equilibrio entre estos ejes: el atlántico, Sudamérica, buena relación con los Estados Unidos, la Unión Europea, jugada a fondo y además con inteligencia y bien. Realmente quien tuvo una gran relación con Kohl fue Felipe González. Y España muy clarividente a favor de la reunificación de Alemania, y el Mediterráneo. Y en el Mediterráneo, en una cosa que nosotros no le habíamos precedido, el norte de África y de forma especial, Marruecos.

Durante Aznar, sin embargo, no se cómo lo consigue, pero consigue totalmente la relación con Marruecos tanto en la primera como en la segunda legislatura. Segundo, no le interesa Europa. Le interesa Europa por los fondos de cohesión. No siente simpatía por Francia, no siente simpatía por Alemania. Por Francia siente gran antipatía, por Alemania simplemente no siente simpatía. Desprecia a Italia, y entonces se enfoca con los Estados Unidos y por consiguiente con Gran Bretaña porque van juntos, y Atlántico. Por tanto la política que inicia Felipe González queda interrumpida.

La política Mediterránea de Felipe González, creo que será una idea de él mismo, pero sí es cierto que yo fui varias veces a decirle que España tenía que tener una política mediterránea. Y nosotros como Generalitat de Cataluña en lo que nos corresponda estamos dispuestos a ayudar a que así sea en lo que nosotros podamos. Di muchas conferencias en Europa. Por ejemplo hice una serie de intervenciones muy diversos. La primera que hice, la hice en Estocolmo en 1987. Ir a hablar del Mediterráneo a Estocolmo es una pérdida de tiempo y darla en Gran Bretaña también. Pero, yo lo hice en Estocolmo, para así, de entrada darle dimensión Europea.

En Alemania que también las di, por ejemplo en Hamburgo, también se perdía tiempo. Obviamente las que di en España, en Francia, en Cataluña por supuesto, en el norte de África, incluso di una, que fue divertimento en la Universidad George Washington, también fue perder el tiempo. En mi intento de hacer entender a nivel europeo la importancia del Mediterráneo, tenía dos discursos. Cuál es la frontera importante de la Unión Europea? Cada vez más, y evidentemente después del 1989, es el Mediterráneo. No es la frontera oriental, hoy sí lo es, pero se sabe cómo funciona, está estabilizada y luego cuando se desestabilizó, se desestabilizó en el sentido de crear problemas, pero no de crear problemas de amenazas de que entraran los tanques, sino de ver como aquello se recomponía.

La frontera peligrosa es el Mediterráneo. Porque el Mediterráneo es la frontera de Europa con el subdesarrollo, la explosión demográfica. Por consiguiente esto quiere decir emigración. Y en cuarto lugar, es una frontera ideológica. No es que haya creado muchos problemas, pero en teoría podría haberlos creado, de hecho algunos ha creado. En todo caso es una frontera ideológica. Por tanto estas cuatro cosas obliga a que Europa se fije más en el Mediterráneo. Esto la verdad es que no lo compró casi nadie. Esto ocurre entre el 1987 hasta que Felipe González, porque yo lo predicaba o porque simplemente quiero creer, porque de verdad se dio cuenta de esto, le quiso dar impulso y lanzó el proceso de Barcelona, con apoyo nuestro obviamente, pero fundamentalmente fue el gobierno español.

Y esto del proceso de Barcelona ha fracasado, la Unión por el Mediterráneo ha vuelto a fracasar, y, por lo tanto, esto no ha funcionado bien. Por culpa europea porque no se ha interesado bien suficientemente por ello y por culpa también de los norte africanos. Conste que no se lo han tomado en serio tampoco. Tienen sus problemas que no pueden resolver. Es

difícil darle empuje a esto, mientras Argelia y Marruecos no se traten. Y mientras España se encuentre incapaz de salir de la cuestión de Sahara.

A nivel práctico, cómo se implementó esta política euro-mediterránea liderada por España?

Se aprovechó un momento de distracción. Italia era incapaz de tomar decisiones de este tipo porque estaba sumida en conflictos y dificultades internas. Y Francia sorprendentemente tampoco se interesó por esto. El caso llevamos adelante nuestra idea. La conferencia de Barcelona quedó muy bien. Y luego, creamos inmediatamente otra reunión en Barcelona sobre la sociedad civil y el hombre que a mí me inspiró en todo esto fue Baltasar Porcel. Baltasar Porcel era un escritor mallorquín, hombre de gran cultura, muy mediterráneo y este es el que me inspiró alguna de estas cosas. Luego comenzamos a desarrollar ciertas cosas de forma modesta, porque la política exterior de Cataluña es modesta, y, evidentemente lo que yo apoyé siempre fue la política pro-marroquí de González. Incluso la política de González yo la apoyé dando discursos por el estado. Y esa política era aceptar que la Unión Europea abriese más la puerta a la exportación de productos marroquíes.

Entonces yo hacía un discurso que decía lo siguiente. Oiga, hay cuatro cosas que cada una por su lado se pueden defender, pero no todas juntas. No queremos que Europa importe tomates marroquíes. Segundo, los pescadores españoles tienen que poder pescar hasta que la barca se embarranque, es decir a 200 metros. Tercero, no hay que hacer inversiones industriales en Marruecos. Yo recuerdo que habíamos tenido protestas aquí en Cataluña por los sindicatos porque que yo y mi ministro, mi consejero de industria nos habíamos pronunciado muy a favor de la inversión industrial en Marruecos por parte de empresas catalanas. Decíamos que llegaría un momento en el que no seríamos más competitivos aquí y que por lo tanto había que buscar otros países, y bueno, pues se podría poner estas industrias en Marruecos. Y cuarta cosa, no queremos inmigración. Conste que a mí, me preocupa mucho la inmigración en general y en particular la inmigración marroquí. Pero claro, no se puede decir, ni tomates, ni pescado, ni fábricas y además quédense ustedes allí.

Al final para tratar de resolver estas limitaciones y dificultades, se celebró la reunión de Barcelona y eso lo hicimos y fue bien, pero luego no funcionó. No funcionó por desidia de los norteafricanos. La reunión de Barcelona fue un éxito porque vino el israelí, el libio.

Y antes de que se completara el proceso de Barcelona en el 1995, cómo se convenció a Europa de que hacer esto era importante?

No, no se convenció. O sea, si se convenció, pero por ejemplo en el 95 vinieron muy pocos representantes europeos de importancia. Fíjese usted que un par de años después el rey Hassan convocó una gran conferencia mediterránea a parte del proceso de Barcelona en Tánger y fue Felipe González, fue Cavaco Silva, los alemanes mandaron un ministro de exteriores que no dijo nada, los franceses también enviaron un ministro que fue dio su discurso y se marchó, y de los italianos no vino nadie. O sea que Europa no respondió y la Unión Europea, no digo que la culpa fuera suya, pero actuó con mucha lentitud. Tramitar una ayuda de aquellas que se establecieron entonces para que la Unión Europea ayudara al norte de África pues iban pasando los meses, etc. Esto no era mala voluntad, sino operatividad ineficiente burocrática. Pero aquello fue languideciendo y languideciendo.

La segunda conferencia ya fue mal porque curiosamente ya no vinieron muchos de los países del sur, vinieron quizá niveles más bajos, pero vinieron curiosamente más europeos, la jugada estaba ya vigilada. En esta segunda ocasión ya estaba Aznar y se desinteresó totalmente del

proceso de Barcelona. Tenía como ministro de asuntos exteriores a un mediterráneo como Abel Matutes y el otro fue Piqué que sí que entendía de esto, pero al final se desinteresó. Él tenía la vista hacia los Estados Unidos y eso languideció y murió.

Luego vino Sarkozy que hizo una maniobra muy extraña. Muy típicamente de Sarkozy. Hizo una campaña electoral hace cinco años en el que en ningún momento habló del mediterráneo. En teoría seguía existiendo el proceso de Barcelona, pero yo quedé muy sorprendido, porque el día que el salió elegido en la votación, el domingo, por la radio oí el discurso de Sarkozy para celebrar la victoria y dijo, “y crearemos la unión por el Mediterráneo, que además englobará países del Norte de África y de toda Europa y haremos un pacto, etc...” Esto se lo acabada de sacar de la chistera, esto es una cosa típica de Sarkozy. Creo que en esto jugó parte de la improvisación o alguna nota que le paso alguien de su gabinete, Guinoud. Ahí jugaron dos cosas: la grandeur francesa de que esto se hiciera aquí en Barcelona, y la grandeur de Sarkozy. Sarkozy es un hombre que vale mucho pero que le pierde su carácter y su temperamento. Lógicamente ahora debería perder las elecciones, aunque eso nunca se sabe. Entonces se creó esto y la verdad es que esto tampoco ha funcionado.

Zapatero intentó volver a reestablecer relaciones más positivas con Marruecos. Yo creo que Rajoy no va a seguir las huellas de Aznar. La prueba es que ha ido a Marruecos enseguida. A lo mejor vuelve a interesarse por el mundo mediterráneo. Está por ver.

Por qué piensa usted quizá que Francia como uno de los principales vendedores del Mediterráneo desde la década de los setenta principalmente, posteriormente pierde este interés en liderar la política mediterránea?

No sé si pierde interés. Francia siempre ha seguido de forma muy atenta la defensa de sus intereses comerciales. Con Argelia tiene problemas. Tiene una relación de amor-odio que la hace difícil. Argelia es verdad que es difícil para todo el mundo. Para Marruecos es distinto. Pero no entiendo bien esta falta de interés. Porque teóricamente el país que tenía que haber sentido la ambición y además tenía más posibilidades que España de liderar el gran proyecto mediterráneo era Francia, pero no lo ha hecho. En ciertos aspectos lo hizo. Ellos pretendían, lo que me había comentado el ministro de defensa en Francia, que cuando la caída del muro y se requería una cierta reorganización de las estructuras militares en Europa, el mando del mediterráneo, que es naval, que es americano, pasa a ser Francia, con Charles Mignon a la cabeza.

Yo había sostenido la idea, de que España no se tenía que involucrar en todo el Mediterráneo, sino en el Mediterráneo occidental, de Malta hacia aquí. De Malta hacia aquí somos alguien, de Malta hacia el oriente no somos nadie. Tampoco Italia, tampoco Francia, Francia es nadie, allí son los americanos. Allí están los israelíes y los árabes. Así que el Mediterráneo occidental sí. Libia es un país que he tratado de evitar siempre.

Sobre el tema Mediterráneo al final los alemanes se desinteresaron y yo me temo que sigan estando desinteresados. Ahora como ves no han ido ni a Libia.

Una vez que se lanza el proceso de Barcelona, quizá se podría pensar que esa grandeur francesa, que luego cuando España toma el liderazgo eso podría ser un acicate para los franceses, bueno pues ahora queremos retomar la iniciativa, hubo algún cierto roce entre España y Francia en ese sentido o fue cooperación?

Sarkozy empezó mal porque al día siguiente le llamó Merkel y le dijo, mire esto que usted quiere hacer, no lo puede hacer. No puede hacer un tratado con el norte de África que no tenga en cuenta a Bruselas. Luego quedó en nada.

En qué consistió exactamente su mediación entre el gobierno de Aznar y Alemania a través de Helmut Kohl?

Lo de Kohl, fui a ver a Kohl una vez como defensor por así decirlo de la posición española en un tema y eso fue en el 1996 y fue por el tema del Euro. Y cuando España dice que quiere entrar en el Euro en enero del 2001, pero claro tenía que cumplir los compromisos y los criterios de convergencia de Maastricht. Algunos países europeos como Alemania, Holanda, Francia incluso daba a entender de que España no podía entrar porque tenía un déficit, y que España no podía cumplir estas condiciones. Y Aznar decía que sí. Y convence a Cabal y luego medio convence mientras fuerza la mano a Prodi, que dice estos ya veremos que harán. En Valencia Prodi decía que España podía hacer una especie de pequeña trampa y Aznar de la forma que es, muy ensoberbecido dijo que no había ni pequeñas trampas ni maniobras y vamos a cumplir y España cumplirá y usted señor Prodi, mi consejo es que usted cumpla. Y entonces en Alemania y en Holanda, Francia menos, comenzaron a decir, que bien, que ya estamos de acuerdo que el señor Aznar es un hombre serio, pero, el señor Aznar no tiene mayoría y por lo tanto como deberá desplegar políticas impopulares no las podrá aplicar.

Entonces nosotros dijimos, bien, el señor Aznar no tiene mayoría pero con nosotros sí tiene mayoría. Y nosotros garantizamos que todo lo que haya que hacer para poder entrar en el Euro en la fecha convenida será hecho. Y entonces yo de acuerdo con Aznar, fui a visitar a Helmut Kohl y a otras autoridades en Francia fui a visitar entre otros a Chirac, etc. Entonces yo a toda esta gente les decía que Aznar es un señor de palabra que va a cumplir y podrán hacerlo porque tenían nuestro consenso.

Obviamente este episodio de entrada en el Euro termina por redondear esta acelerada entrada de España en los mecanismos de la Unión Europea de forma completa y que se había iniciado desde mediados de los ochenta. En otro orden de cosas y continuando con el Mediterráneo, ¿por qué cree usted que el proceso de Barcelona ha fracasado?

Yo creo que ha fracasado por desinterés. En primer lugar por dificultades de funcionamiento, cuestiones administrativas. Costaba mucho hacer arrancar las cosas. Porque además los países del sur no pagaban sus cuotas. Mire usted, en política como en todo hay una cualidad fundamental. Que es la seriedad. Los países del sur del Mediterráneo puede que tengan un concepto de seriedad muy importante, pero es otro concepto. Y los países del sur de Europa, o sea, nosotros, somos un poco más serios, pero tampoco. El problema que hay en entre el norte y el sur de Europa es que en el sur no somos serios. No hemos sido serios. Es decir, cuando yo visitaba a esta gente, algunos como Kohl eran muy simpáticos, otros menos, especialmente el inventor de los criterios de convergencia de Maastricht, quien decía que, para hacer lo que usted dice y que dice que harán se requiere mucha “ernsthaftigkeit”, es decir, mucha seriedad. Hay que ser serios, no me dijo, ustedes no lo son.

Seriedad quiere decir coherencia, compromiso, visión de medio y largo plazo, autodisciplina, autoexigencia y exigencia. Y claro por ejemplo los griegos no son serios. No lo han sido nunca. Los italianos, en algunas cosas son serios y en otras no. España, también, según con que cosas. En el tema económico España no lo ha sido. Tiene muchísima gente seria y hacen cosas muy importantes, pero los dos últimos gobiernos socialistas, no han sido serios. Aznar es más serio. Aznar tendrá muchos defectos, y alguna virtud. Y una de sus virtudes es que es serio. Nosotros hemos terminado mal. Es cumplidor. También es cumplidor cuando te

amenaza porque cumple. El gobierno y la gente de Felipe González si eran cumplidores y eran serios e hicieron una gran labor. Y eso le llevó a España a estar donde estuvo. También Aznar en su primera legislatura y parte de la segunda también fue muy considerado. Lo que pasa es que Aznar, en la segunda sobre todo se creó enemigos. Se creó el francés, el enemigo alemán. Los trató mal. Y se dejó llevar por su soberbia y su suficiencia. Rodríguez Zapatero lo ha hecho todo mal desde el primer día. No se porqué, pero ha sido un desastre.

Giscard d'Estaing era un antiespañol total.

ABEL MATUTES

Mi investigación se basa en analizar las claves que permitieron a España después de su entrada en la Comunidad Económica Europea, de identificar una ventana política como la del Mediterráneo para proyectar una cierta imagen hacia Europa.

Eso es lógico. Está claro que España era un país muy joven con plazas de soberanía, por muy españolas que sean en el continente africano, tenemos gran interés en que esa región permanezca estable, lo que implica a su vez, unos niveles de prosperidad, de democracia mínimos y en este sentido, el vecino rico, que en este caso es Europa, también tiene esta prioridad aunque quizá no esté tan sensibilizado como los países del Mediterráneo de la Unión Europea, como España. Por tanto que hubiera esta prioridad era algo lógico. Luego había que renovar una política mediterránea que quizá no se había adaptado a los nuevos tiempos. Era una política que se basaba fundamentalmente en unos protocolos financieros, rígidos, escasos y que quizá no se adaptaban a las necesidades.

Estamos hablando de la Política Global Mediterránea.

Estamos hablando de la política mediterránea de la Unión Europea, y por eso, pues yo me encargué de rediseñar, de diseñar, mejor dicho, una nueva política mediterránea. Que por un lado mejoraba las ayudas y protocolos financieros, y por otro, intentaba ayudar no tanto a los aspectos puramente financieros, sino permitirles de fomentar una mayor creación de riqueza en estos países. Es decir, sacar un poco más de partido de sus potenciales. Para ello, era imprescindible involucrarles en el comercio, darles oportunidades comerciales. Lo cual no es fácil, porque en aquellos aspectos que la Unión Europea puede ser más liberal, como la política industrial, comercio de productos manufacturados o tecnológicos, pues esos países no tenían grandes condiciones para hacer frente a la propia competencia. Por tanto había que ir a lo que ellos producían, se trate del aceite de oliva, de las naranjas, los productos agrícolas tradicionales, que justamente, son delicados y siempre pisabas los callos de alguien, porque claro, si les dabas 2 productos típicos como los del sur de España, Francia o Italia, y si se lo dabas sobre producciones más del norte de Europa como el trigo, la leche, maíz, pues naturalmente chocabas con esas políticas. De ahí que el margen de maniobra fuera estrecho pero realmente esa política mediterránea acabó implantándose y dio resultados.

Y es lo que llamamos Política Renovada del Mediterráneo.

Exactamente, y además de eso, instituir lo que a partir de entonces se podría llamar un diálogo político. Incluso más allá del diálogo una cierta cooperación. Y en ese aspecto, yo creo que el diálogo fructífero que tuve con el Rey Hassan de Marruecos, ayudó a que se redactara esa constitución, la actual, la cual yo creo que se ha adelantado un poco a la de otros vecinos, y que de momento le ha permitido sortear las dificultades que otros países del Sur del Mediterráneo como Túnez y Egipto no han podido. De manera que esa es la cuestión. Yo recuerdo en Túnez donde era muy bien recibido, pude incrementar los contingentes de aceite de oliva, un producto que va a más y que se consume cada vez más tanto en Europa como en el resto del mundo. Digamos que esos países fueron muy receptivos a esto y nos ayudaron a nosotros en el diálogo de Oriente Medio, que no es un diálogo fácil, pero que esos países del lado árabe jugaron un papel positivo.

En esta creación de un diálogo en la que España comienza a tomar un papel de líder en la política euro-mediterránea, obviamente Francia un país que tiene un papel muy fuerte cómo reacciona?

Ha tenido un papel muy fuerte y lo sigue teniendo. Porque el Mediterráneo es una prioridad para Francia y que históricamente ha estado muy vinculado. Tanto en Túnez como en Marruecos, que fue protectorado y no digamos Argelia, que era una provincia francesa.

En este proceso, en el que España comienza a tener un creciente liderazgo, como se entiende como Mitterrand que creo el diálogo 4+5 que luego se retomó entre González y Craxi, hubo algún tipo de tensión?

No. Como presidente de la Comisión en mis tiempos era Jacques Delors, francés, y del partido socialista, muy amigo de Mitterrand, fue ministro de economía, y en todo momento me sentí muy respaldado por esta política. Es más, el rey Hassan envió a su hijo el actual rey a hacer un stage en Bruselas, y nos nombró el Rey a Delors y a mí, tutores. Y como Delors todavía estaba más escaso de tiempo que yo, delegó bastante esa función en mí, y eso demuestra que en ningún momento, ni hubo celos ni interferencias. Y también tengo que decir que mi relación con los distintos ministros de exteriores franceses, Roland Dumas, con el antiguo comisario de política mediterránea, etc., fue muy buena. Luego yo como ministro de asuntos exteriores de España, la colaboración de España y Francia en mi experiencia ha sido extraordinaria, ha sido franca y a su vez, nosotros le ayudamos también a Francia, a tener una mayor presencia y una mayor implicación en Iberoamérica. O sea que esa relación Hispano-Francesa, frente a lo que algunos siempre quieren ver, fue fructífera y agradable. No hubo fricciones ni desacuerdos.

Precisamente esta es una de las cuestiones que se suele leer a veces, de una rivalidad hispano-francesa en el liderazgo de las políticas mediterráneas, así que es interesante ver, analizar y contrastar estos hechos.

Evidentemente, es cierto que también hay que ver las personas. Ciertamente los intereses no están enfrentados. Tanto España como Francia tienen interés en que el Mediterráneo se desarrolle, una región que exporte estabilidad, democracia, los principios que mantenemos en la UE de cooperación inter-nos y con el resto del mundo. En ese aspecto, por lo menos, mi experiencia, después de tres mandatos de comisario y cuatro años de ministro de exteriores ha sido muy positiva, muy fructífera, la relación de Francia en este contexto.

En este contexto se crea la Conferencia de la Seguridad y Cooperación en el Mediterráneo. Se comienzan a identificar los problemas que se quieren solventar.

Eso es. Hubo ese interés. Eso es cuando yo estaba fuera del gobierno. Efectivamente, el que yo nombré director general de relaciones norte-sur que antes fue jefe de gabinete, Juan Prat, luego desarrolló, porque el gobierno español le nombró delegado permanente en esta materia y ya no la seguí tan de cerca. Pero sé que se aplicó a ese trabajo con interés. Después cuando me vine a España de ministro le nombré embajador en la OTAN, y cuando ya me fui acabó de delegado para esa conferencia del Mediterráneo, intentando hacer además de Barcelona uno de los centros de ese diálogo. La relación entre España y esa parte del mundo creo que es buena y sigue mejorando.

A todo el mundo le gusta que su país sea el privilegiado en relaciones y por todo, pero si las cosas se hacen bien, salen bien. Por ejemplo, teníamos un tratado de libre comercio con México y Francia mostraba algunas preocupaciones. Y entonces, ese tratado lo había lanzado

como Comisario, había logrado que se aprobara en la comisión a pesar de las reticencias de algunos. Después cuando me fui de Comisario para ir al Parlamento Europeo, estaba de presidente de la comisión de política exterior y seguridad común y tuve que sacar lo que también estaba atascado en el parlamento europeo y después de dos años de estar de presidente que de ahí lo mandé al consejo de ministros estaba atascado en el consejo de ministros de la Unión y entonces me habían nombrado ministro de exteriores y tenía que sacarlo. Y ahí hubo un poco de reticencias. Al final logré una fórmula de transacción que ellos vieron que les daba una salida y que además quedaban bien y que no quedaban todo el rato contra la pared, al final eso hizo que la confianza mutua, sabiendo que siempre se jugaba con las cartas limpias, incluso para asociarlos y que compartieran mérito hizo que, repito al final las personas son muy importantes. Porque si tú eres capaz de crear un clima de confianza entre tus interlocutores, consigues muchísimo más que no dándotelas de listo y tratando de engañar a la gente.

Si usted tuviera que definir la labor de Felipe González como impulsor de la política euro-mediterránea, cómo definiría esto.

Yo diría que es cierto. González este tema lo tuvo muy claro desde el primer día, yo tuve como es lógico ocasión de compartir en ese aspecto sus ideas, cuando después de mi primer mandato, le pedí que me ayudara a convencer a Delors para que me diera esta cartera, eran las relaciones con el Mediterráneo, con América Latina y con países del Asia y relaciones Norte-Sur, me ayudó con toda nobleza y eficacia, tuvimos ocasión de especificar mucho del contenido de esa política que yo quería darle, por lo tanto, el papel de Felipe, fue un papel importante generoso y de futuro. Y lo mismo Aznar que cuando me nombró ministro de exteriores, le expliqué los grandes ejes que quería y como es lógico era el Mediterráneo y fue un gran impulsor en todo momento de esa política.

Entre la política euro-mediterránea y el gobierno de González y el primer mandato de Aznar, un poco se siguen las líneas maestras.

Sin duda. En política exterior está clarísimo. Eso lo han dicho toda la vida Felipe y Aznar y yo creo que en general la han practicado. Es una política de estado, de intereses permanentes y que por lo tanto necesitan de una permanencia y de una constancia. Si vas bandeando con la política internacional y haciendo una política de partido, no consigues nada, si no que al final te quedas sin política exterior. Eso es lo que decía aquel famoso primer ministro inglés, y le preguntaron cuáles eran sus prioridades, cuáles eran sus amigos y sus enemigos, y respondió, Inglaterra no tiene ni amigos ni enemigos permanentes, tiene intereses permanentes.

En todo este panorama del desarrollo de las políticas mediterráneas, qué papel juega Alemania?

Alemania, dejaba hacer. Obviamente a Alemania, igual que a los ingleses les hubiera gustado tener que poner menos dinero, y más comercio, otros países hubieran querido más dinero y menos comercio, pero al final hay que hacer una combinación de ambas. Alemania dejó hacer, no fue nunca un obstáculo.

Ayudaría obviamente la amistad entre Kohl y González, no?

Sin duda, Kohl, mantuvo una muy buena relación con González y con Aznar, muy buena y yo soy testigo y co-protagonismo. Era un hombre de estado, que con suavidad acababa metiendo los temas y que terminado siendo uno de los grandes de la cohesión interna de la

Unión Europea, con el propio Mitterrand, pero que hay que reconocer que como líder hizo un gran tándem con Kohl, como antes lo habían hecho Schmidt y Giscard d'Estaing.

A mi básicamente en mi investigación me interesan tres variables: la política económica, la migración y la seguridad. Que creo que son tres vectores cruciales, que se complementan, recuerdo una intervención suya en la reunión de Lisboa en 1992, donde usted decía, el Magreb, “atención señores, es una bomba de tiempo”. Cómo se veía todo esto desde España, que necesidad había de hacer llegar este mensaje a Europa, que España tiene un interés en la potencial explosión demográfica o la migración que puede venir desde el sur.

Eso creo que lo has dicho muy bien. Te has informado muy bien. Eso, todo el mundo lo comparte. Y en Lisboa lo dije porque lo que ocurre es que uno comparte las ideas y comparte los principios, pero a la hora de ponerlos en práctica pues siempre salen algunos más perjudicados que otros. Aunque uno no lo pretenda siempre se pisa algún callo. Y el tema de la emigración pues hay que ser conscientes de que no se puede por las buenas levantar todas las barreras y hacer un espacio Schengen porque automáticamente te cargas el experimento. Porque para poder producirse la inmigración en condiciones de integración, de seguridad y un mínimo nivel de vida, tienen que haber puestos de trabajo. Recuerdo que en los años sesenta para emigrar a Alemania, los emigrantes españoles, si no tenían un contrato de trabajo no te ibas a Alemania. Y ahí ni había problemas de religión, ni problemas de razas, ni problemas de nada.

Era un problema de pensar en que la convivencia y la integración si no se dan unas mínimas condiciones, y en vez de fomentar esta convivencia e integración lo que estás haciendo es fomentar el enfrentamiento y la exclusión. Entonces, todos estos son procesos que hay que arrancar y que hay que ir modulando en función de las circunstancias y de las posibilidades. No puedes poner un principio en marcha y caiga quien caiga arrollar porque se vuelve contra ti.

El papel de España yo creo que también era reconocido cuando Francisco Fernández Ordóñez recibe esta llamada de los Estados Unidos pidiéndole que organice la conferencia de paz en Oriente Medio en Madrid en 1991. Algunos autores dicen que es España lo único que fue consistió en organizar este evento, pero que no tuvo un mayor peso.

España fue el anfitrión, pero se hizo el anfitrión por una cosa tan señalada por alguna razón. La verdad es que Felipe González, en particular había cuidado mucho las relaciones con Estados Unidos y además España era un país muy equilibrado, en el conflicto de Oriente Medio. Y obviamente no fue una casualidad que fuera en España. Era un punto intermedio entre los dos, Europa había querido jugar algún papel en ese diálogo que en aquel momento era a dos, con dos grandes supervisores, soviéticos y estadounidenses. Los americanos se dieron cuenta de que el papel de Europa tenía que ser mayor y en esos momentos que ya Rusia se estaba cayendo, con más razón. Entonces quedaba un árbitro que podía parecer que estaba escorado porque buscas la paz, pero ciertamente, tienes grandes intereses estratégicos allá, y en la UE, España tenía una posición muy matizada que estaba muy en esta línea.

Yo creo que el trabajo que se vino haciendo desde 1986 comenzó a dar verdaderos frutos a partir de este momento, con este reconocimiento de organizar este evento por parte de los Estados Unidos por decir, sois interlocutores muy válidos para la resolución del conflicto entre Israel y Palestina y para la estabilidad de la zona.

Eso es así. Yo había tenido muchas conversaciones con el secretario de Estado americano, que siguió siendo amigo mío, y realmente el papel de España fue muy apreciado.

Entonces llegamos al proceso de Barcelona,

Sí, yo ahí no estaba pero se había preparado el terreno. Además Jordi Pujol estaba muy interesado en este tema y en dar un protagonismo a Barcelona y me invitaba numerosas veces a Barcelona a algunas conferencias sobre política mediterránea y al final eso era para él un monotema.

Hasta que punto Jordi Pujol influyó en el ideario de González en desarrollar la política Mediterránea?

Pues francamente no lo sé, pero lo que se, es que en ese tema todos estábamos en sintonía. Había muy buena sintonía. Jordi Pujol tenía una frase que decía con referencia al Mediterráneo; “Siempre hemos estado pegándonos intensamente, pero siempre ha habido una interrelación muy intensa. Unas veces con abrazos y otras con cañonazos, pero nunca hemos dejado de interactuar”. Claro ésta relación con el tiempo y con la civilización de las gentes va mejorando, pero esa relación existe desde los Cartagineses.

La hipótesis de trabajo era la siguiente: vamos a trabajar a través del comercio, para crear una zona de estabilidad que al norte de África le permita mejorar y eso va a mejorar la condición económica de estos países, y como consecuencia se reducirán los incentivos para la emigración.

Exacto, es tan sencillo como eso. Y luego es verdad que los protocolos financieros podría haber sido mayores, que el comercio podría haber sido mayor y además podría haberse buscado una política más integradora con ellos, pues seguramente, pero a pesar de todo se dio un gran avance. Porque esos países tenían un nivel de vida mucho más bajo en el pasado.

En una de las primeras visitas que hice a Túnez todavía estaba Bourguiba, y el primer ministro después de las conversaciones, me dice, vamos a hacer la visita al presidente y Bourguiba me recibió en su palacete al lado del mar, me explicó la lucha de su vida por conseguir la independencia, me explicaba que era un país muy liberal, y de repente me dice, “y usted señor comisario es español, verdad?, Entonces como está mi buen amigo Francisco Franco?” Estamos hablando del 1987. Y poco después tres meses más tarde, más o menos, Ben Ali dio un golpe de estado y le dejó en su palacete, más perdido en sus ensoñaciones, pero tomó el poder.

Más o menos aunque usted estuvo más desviado de la política siguió los desarrollos del proceso de Barcelona?

Sí, claro que sí, seguía en buenas relaciones con ministros de exteriores hasta el propio Moratinos, pero con Moratinos, me llamaba y me pedía algunas gestiones. Aznar y yo le nombramos delegado de la Unión Europea para Oriente Medio y fue donde se hizo un buen nombre, porque de allí pasaban los mandatarios de todo el mundo, y el delegado de la Unión Europeo, era Moratinos que les atendía.

Sobre el proceso de Barcelona hay gente que dice, que fracasó rotundamente, casi desde el inicio...

Un poco sí, en la medida esos países debido a los acontecimientos que todos conocemos lo prioritario ha sido ese diálogo y ha existido. Pero los contextos cambian. Luego la crisis

económica ha favorecido que Europa se concentrara en resolverla y en salir del atasco, porque ahora Europa tiene un gran problema. Antes éramos 15 y ahora 25. Toda ampliación resta profundización. Quien mucho abarca poco aprieta. Entonces todo eso implica que se vaya siguiendo el paso de los más atrasados.

Este dicho de “quien mucho abarca poco aprieta” podría definir de alguna manera la amplitud y las dificultades de este partenariado euro-mediterráneo.

Sí, y por lo vasto que es, es algo que no se arregla en un día solo con dinero.

Porque al final, al norte tenemos una Unión Europea, que es una unión institucional, de voluntades, que también ahora está atascada, y en el sur tenemos dos países como Argelia y Marruecos que prácticamente no se hablan y por otro lado tenemos el conflicto de los árabes y los israelíes.

Efectivamente, son realidades que no son muy homogéneas, el Magreb y el Maschreq, donde cada uno tiene sus conflictos.

Eso ayuda a crear más abstracción y a dificultar cualquier intento de desarrollar políticas coherentes y productivas.

Exactamente. Yo he visto en los últimos meses, una voluntad tanto de Argelia como de Marruecos, de reavivar un poco la UMA (Unión del Magreb Árabe), esperemos que tengan éxito.

Cómo vio usted la salida de Sarkozy cuando anunció por primera vez la Unión del Mediterráneo?

De una forma muy tranquila. Como una manera de querer reactivar ese proceso que estaba un poco dormido. Cuestión distinta es que seamos entre todos de darle velocidad. Es que claro, en este momento con la crisis no es algo de lo que más preocupe.

OGUZ DEMIRALP

I would like to know from the Turkish perspective, a major player in the Mediterranean, how Turkey has been, or even considering your experience as the former Turkey's Ambassador to the EU, how would you assess these process that try to put together a very wide array of complex countries trying to help to increase development.

I am now speaking as an individual as I am not any longer involved in the EU. Of course, creating some kind of union, or unity, of course, in the Mediterranean basin makes a lot of sense. It should be one of the main targets of all countries in the Mediterranean region. Because, everything started here. There are a lot of commonalities, there a shared history and a shared future. But at the same time is very problematic. A lot of divergences, a lot of conflicts. A lot of problems. It's quite a challenge to create this area of cooperation and then of prosperity. Prosperity should be the target of cooperation. But we have to work in this direction. Of course, in real politics you have to be very realistic. Whatever we can do, we should do it.

So in this sense the Barcelona Process, the Union for the Mediterranean and the rest of Mediterranean structures and policies, in order to develop the Euro-Mediterranean flank is important. And I support and Turkey supports that also. But somehow it should not be used as a means to aspire to lead the others, to aspire to be the leaders of the region. It will not work. Neither France nor Spain can be the leaders of the Mediterranean. Because there are also very strong countries in the region like Turkey and Egypt. But of course there are main actors, so it is important to put to cooperate all together, Spain, France, Turkey, Egypt mainly. We should cooperate and we should create spaces of cooperation, trade.

But there are of course a lot of conflicts that prevent to achieve solutions. The most important conflict is the Arab-Israeli one. As long as the Palestinian conflict is not properly addressed it is only to be a dream to establish an area of cooperation in the Mediterranean. It is responsibility of the west, of the EU and the Americans to do something. Because to have cooperation and enhance cooperation in the Mediterranean is in the interest of the West. The United States, is also necessary for Israel. This is the main problem.

I agree with you when you say that there should not be a European country that wants to be the leader.

That should not work.

But on the other hand we see that the EU is a union, is kind of solid, institutionally speaking, but the southern Mediterranean is much fragmented. Internal conflicts, etc.

Establishing Euro-Mediterranean mechanisms and schemes would help to address bilaterally those conflicts. It would be good if they would discuss together in multilateral forums to do collective projects or cooperation or speak to each other. So, mechanisms such as the Barcelona process could have helped to address these issues. Regarding the approach of the EU with regards to the Euro-Mediterranean process, it is very much divided. Northern European countries are not very interested in Mediterranean politics. But this is wrong. They see mainly the European Union as mostly a Germanic union. So it seems that they are not interested in cooperation with Latin countries, but that is wrong. That is a very short-sighted vision, and the EU should have a more united interest toward Mediterranean politics.

This union should not imply competition for leadership. It should be a genuine interest in developing policies for mutual interests in the Mediterranean.

When you worked in Europe, did you see any particular rivalry between France and Spain?

No so much. Because in fact they are close to each other, but of course, during the constitution of the Union for the Mediterranean, that rivalry was visible of course. They wanted to have the Secretariat. Sarkozy wanted to put himself as the leader of the Union for the Mediterranean.

Per the Secretariat, I remember they had a lot of plans and projects. But what they have done or how these projects have been translated into reality I do not know. During the first meeting took place in Paris and my assessment what that it was a good “photo opportunity” that Sarkozy needed to launch their agenda.

Coming back few years, if we remember, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been the main obstacle to develop Euro-Mediterranean politics and diplomatic projects. And there was a lot of optimism.

We had to do whatever it was possible to do. It is not a question of doing a big progress, but at the end, here or there is possible to do a small progress. For instance the creation of the Anna Lindh Foundation or the Euro-Mediterranean Assembly, all that helps. They are important meaningful steps. The creation of the free trade area would be wonderful progress, but with the developments in the Arab world together to the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is very difficult.

From an organizational point of view, for instance, Turkey or other Mediterranean countries, how do you feel about the role of your countries.

Of course, Turkey is an addition, is a bridge to the EU and it could play a very fundamental role in the constitution of the Euro-Mediterranean as an area of cooperation.

When Sarkozy announced the Mediterranean Union, how was the reaction of Turkey?

We clearly opposed to that because it was a trap designed only for Turkey, because they created the Mediterranean Union, a virtual or fictitious entity. They would say to Turkey, you have the Mediterranean Union, so, don't try to come to the European Union. But at the end he had to changed. In 1997, had created a sort of European conference, and Turkey presented its candidacy in Luxembourg to be part of the EU, and they offered us to be part of that European conference. That was the first attempt.

Mr. Sarkozy thought that he was the most clever politician in the world but he had done a lot of harm to Turkey and we will not forget it. And personally I think that is not a man worthy of France, he is not a state-man. He thought only in short term issues.

What about the success or the failure of both the Barcelona Process and the Union for the Mediterranean?

Probably in the future there are going to be more chances to reactivate these processes. Mainly after the Syrian case. Countries like Spain, France, Egypt and Turkey should come together. In order to create a reflection group, not excluding Germany, and not excluding United States.

How would you assess the diplomatic power of the EU in the Middle East?

The EU does not exist in the Middle East. There is only the Americans. Is not an actor. Probably to some extent France or the UK, but nothing else. They are not like the US, that is why is important to have Americans on board as well. Is a part of the Western world.

What do you think, how would you assess the Barcelona process? It was only a question of meeting governments and people? Is not that very expensive?

The rationalization of the resources in these diplomatic processes is very important because they spend a lot of money and waste a lot a time for few political results.

The EU has been funding dictators on one hand, and on the other hand they have been deploying a very liberal discourse defending promotion of democracy, human rights, etc. How do you see this?

This is true. That is why it was created in 2004 the ENP aiming at creating bilateral agreements with certain governments. However this did not work neither as many of these dictators did not accept the implementation of such agreements or parts of them. Only Israel accepted to some extent. However to make this work you of course need the cooperation of those dictators.

If you should summarize these projects, are they a success or a failure?

I would say that it has a limited success. But in terms of aspirations, it is a failure. No realistic person would expect these aspirations to become reality in the very short time. In terms of expectations they have raised, in mediatic terms, has been very big. There were done big steps, but it was not possible to do more. Probably the biggest mistake was raising a lot of expectations.

The Secretariat was defined as an entity to develop technical projects, but the political aspects would remain in the hands of special political delegates and governments. How is possible to split these political aspects and the technical aspects?

It is not possible of course. This language has been only created for political convenience. To find a compromise at the end of the conferences. But we should not raise high sort-term expectations in the Mediterranean. It would be necessary to continue working with these goals in mind but in a very realistic way. Now with the Euro-Mediterranean crisis nothing can be done.

From a Turkish point of view, do you see that the EU has been very patronising, communicating very vertically, or on the contrary, the EU has been trying to find integrative communicational formulas?

They try to be patron. There is a kind of imperial attitude. They want to teach everybody what to say what to do. The Eastern Europe has been always saying, "yes sir" "yes sir". So, people wanting to be integrated in the EU have to be very good students. That's wrong.

If we want to create common basis this kind of communication does not incentive integration processes, right?

Exactly. We have principles, we have policies. Is more vertical. They want to impose, that's it. Germany, Spain, Turkey, US, France, Egypt, have to create a reflection group. Not necessarily the EU. If we are not pragmatic we cannot do anything. They want to apply their

rules and that does not work, and they do not understand that. That is why the EU is nobody in the Middle East.

ROMAIN NADAL

El Mediterráneo es un prioritario para España como para Francia. Yo creo que el proceso de Barcelona fue para los dos países una ocasión de interesar al resto de Europa a la cuestión Mediterránea, pero que el proceso de Barcelona, fue dificultado por el conflicto Israelo-palestino que frenó bastante el proceso. Pero entre España y Francia más convergencia que competencia. Yo diría que el segundo mandato de Aznar ha sido dominado por el enfrentamiento entre Francia y España gracias a Irak y a la política de Bush. El primer mandato de Aznar fue bastante consensual, incluso en términos de política exterior. Se quedó en el marco de la transición. En el compromiso de la política exterior de la transición. A partir del 2000 hasta el 2004 rompió lo que yo creo que es el compromiso en política exterior de la transición y Aznar bascula hacia el neo-conservadurismo norteamericano, el modelo anglosajón de economía, política exterior y rechaza de forma bastante fuerte a Francia, a quien considera un país con un estado demasiado pesado, con una ideología de laicismo que él rechaza también. Rechaza Francia como un país que no está alineado con los Estados Unidos, que no es la línea de Aznar que sigue de una forma bastante ciega a los estadounidenses.

Eso afectó bastante a los gobiernos españoles y franceses y tuvo un impacto sobre la cooperación bilateral y sobre la política mediterránea que podíamos tener. Hubo también tensión fuerte entre España y Marruecos a propósito de los eventos de Perejil. La paradoja es que la mediación se hizo con los Estados Unidos a través de Colin Powell y no Europa. Y Francia podría haber sido un buen intermediario porque Chirac era próximo a la familia real marroquí, y hubiera podido ser un buen mediación. Y esta fórmula no fue usada porque primero Aznar no quería meter a Francia en este lío y estaba fascinado por el modelo norteamericano.

Con Zapatero, España vuelve en el ritmo más clásico de su política exterior. Reanuda con los ejes prioritarios de la política exterior clásica, es decir, Latinoamérica, Unión Europea y Mediterráneo. Y de nuevo, la luna de miel entre España y Francia vuelve normal, hacia una convergencia fuerte sobre estos temas.

La llegada de Sarkozy, creo que con Zapatero se lleva bien, hay el eje franco-español en la lucha con el terrorismo. El ministro de interior en Francia siempre está bien visto en España por la necesaria colaboración contra ETA. Entonces eso lo vi, porque estuve en España hasta el 2005. Después de un año de la llegada de Zapatero, Sarkozy en cuanto llega como ministro de interior, era muy amigo de Acebes, ministro de interior con Aznar, pero con el gobierno de Zapatero no hay ningún problema. Sarkozy no hace ninguna diferencia. Está muy vinculado con Aznar, pero acepta muy bien la alternancia en España. El hecho es que a partir del momento en el que Zapatero lo recibe casi como un jefe de gobierno, porque él ya está en plena campaña presidencial para suceder a Chirac, para él le parece muy bien, y además lo utiliza a Zapatero contra los socialistas franceses, diciendo que él es un socialista moderado y lo usa para criticar a los socialistas franceses.

Entonces el eje hispano-francés funciona de nuevo bien. Sarkozy, electo presidente toma la propuesta y se lanza la propuesta de Unión para el Mediterráneo. Yo creo que lo hace muy “a la Sarkozy”. Con egocentrismo. No se si asocia mucho a España en la elaboración de su proyecto. Sarkozy está en una dinámica muy egocéntrica en aquel momento y lo será todo a lo largo de su mandato. No estoy seguro que se apoya en Zapatero para llevar a cabo su proyecto. Pero de todos modos se trata de modernizar el proceso de Barcelona.

La dificultad es que dentro del mundo del Elíseo de aquella época y el que lleva este proyecto y lo empuja es Henry Guaino. Que lo ha conceptualizado junto a Jean Louis Guigou. Henry Guaino es muy antieuropeo. Él lo ve como un proyecto alternativo al proceso de Barcelona más que como una ocasión de modernizarlo. Y eso va a fracasar contra el muro alemán y Berlín va a decir que eso no se puede hacer así. Va a haber una pugna dentro del Elíseo entre Jean David Levitte, consejero diplomático y Henry Guaino. Y Alemania reacciona muy mal al proyecto inicial de la Unión para el Mediterráneo, porque lo ve demasiado fuera de la Unión Europea. Así que va a ver fuertes tensiones dentro del Elíseo y entre París y Berlín sobre este tema.

Dentro del Eliseo de Sarkozy hay una batalla bastante fuerte entre consejeros. Henry Guaino que es consejero especial de Sarkozy. Tiene la autorización de expresarse en los medios de comunicación. Es un consejero político. Es un consejero muy potente. Jean David Levitte es también influyente como consejero diplomático. Lo había sido de Chirac, lo había sido de Giscard. Era también muy potente, un intelectual de las relaciones internacionales. Es un funcionario, un tecnócrata. Eso va a perjudicar el proyecto desde el principio. Va a haber esa reunión del 14 de Julio del 2008. Lo más importante para Sarkozy es la “Photo opportunity”, con todos esos jefes de estado. Que ahora ha sido un boomerang: Mubarak, Al Asaad, Ben Ali. Ghadaffi no vino para esa ocasión, vino en diciembre para una visita bilateral. Bashar al Asaad estuvo en el desfile el 14 de julio. Y eso lo pagará Sarkozy con las revoluciones en Siria de una forma muy cara. La “Photo opportunity” es un éxito. No hay que negarlo. Vienen casi todo, los israelíes, los palestinos, etc. Bashar Al-Assad estaba desde hacía tiempo un poco apartado de las relaciones internacionales. Sarkozy toma la revancha sobre Chirac que estaba muy en contra de Bashar a causa del asesinato de Rafik Hariri. Fue un tinglado un poco francés.

La foto fue buena y el fracaso son primero, en diciembre de 2008 y en enero del 2009, la nueva ofensiva israelí en Gaza, la operación plomo endurecido, que va a bloquear el proceso de la Unión para el Mediterráneo. Como hay muertos, los árabes se ponen tensos. Y después va a bloquearse con las revoluciones árabes. Eso va a bloquearlo todo o bastante. Túnez, Egipto, Libia, ahora Siria va a bloquear el proceso.

Lo que podemos decir en resumidas cuentas es que el eje Mediterráneo queda prioritario para nosotros. François Holland, electo presidente, en su discurso de política exterior en conferencia de los embajadores a finales de agosto de 2012, que es la hoja de ruta y tiene un párrafo sobre la política Mediterránea, con la idea de utilizar el secretario general de la Unión para el Mediterráneo como la herramienta para hacer proyectos concretos, para adelantar la cooperación. Y como la Unión para el Mediterráneo es algo pesado de mover porque son 44 estados. Utilizar si es posible y si se puede, como núcleo duro el 5+5. Que existía desde los años. Son 10 países. El tamaño más reducido permite quizás más eficacia, menos bloqueos. Hemos tenido una reunión en Malta y ha funcionado bastante bien. A ver si sigue, porque siempre hay que ver que pasa después de las reuniones. Hemos lanzado una idea de reunión en el seno del 5+5 de los ministros de economía y hacienda. A ver si funciona y a ver si lo podemos concretar a principios del 2013.

La idea es no oponer la idea del 5+5 a la UFM pero hacerlo complementarlo. Es decir, crear un núcleo duro. Es como en la Unión Europea se hacen cooperaciones reforzadas. Por ejemplo podemos considerar la zona euro como una zona de núcleo duro que podría ser en un futuro, es nuestra idea ahora, el corazón de Europa, y los países de alrededor que quieren entrar. Y otros países como Inglaterra que no quieren entrar y quizá quieran salir del todo. Cada uno va a lo suyo. Pero hay un núcleo, y a ese núcleo duro nadie le impide de adelantar o de avanzar. Es importante, no en contra de los miembros de la Unión Europea, pero que pueda adelantar, porque cada vez que queremos hacer unión social o unión fiscal, siempre hay uno que levanta la mano y dice que no quiero y eso es un infierno. La Unión Europea a 15 miembros funcionaba bastante bien. A 27, es un éxito, pero hay muchos bloqueos y si queremos avanzar hay que utilizar la cooperación reforzada.

Por ejemplo la tasa sobre las transacciones financieras. Se llevaba años discutiendo. Lo hacemos con una cooperación reforzada. Se necesitaban 9 estados, ahora tenemos 10 o 12 y podemos avanzar. El 5+5 podría ser el núcleo duro de la Unión para el Mediterráneo. Porque el tema es que ahora con las incertidumbres de la zona, no podemos reunir a 44. ¿Quién vamos a invitar de Siria? Hay otros estados que están convalecientes como Túnez. Entonces lo más eficaz es crear cooperaciones reforzadas entre estados que quieren.

La fotografía es muy compleja. Tuve una entrevista hace un tiempo con Jordi Pujol y decía que a Felipe González le decía que había que actuar pero allí donde somos algo, en el oeste del Mediterráneo, porque en el Medio Oriente la influencia es de los americanos. Claro, desde el punto de vista operativo y desde la conceptualización tan complicada de un proceso como estos, te das cuenta que un proceso como el de Israel y Palestina te bloquea todo lo demás. ¿Hasta qué punto no hubiera sido mejor concentrarse en la parte Oeste del Mediterráneo? Y otros de pueden decir con justa razón, sí, pero no puedes hacer una política Euro-Mediterránea sin considerar Israel y Palestina. Pero al final, si un proyecto no está claramente definido, con objetivos reales etc, las abstracciones se pagan caras. Es cierto que España vendió bien a Europa la carta Mediterránea. Y jugó bien esa carta. Pero luego a la hora de definir el objeto principal y concreto, se mezclaron muchas abstracciones que luego se pagaron y se están pagando.

Quien mucho abarca poco aprieta. Creo que la política Mediterránea, surgió también después del proceso de Barcelona, de la expansión de la Unión Europea. Porque oponían el Mediterráneo a otros intereses geográficos, donde Alemania decía que había que dar prioridad a los países excomunistas a quien había que ayudar primero que a la parte Mediterránea. Entonces creo que eso frenó el proceso. Y ahora claro tenemos esas revoluciones árabes y que nos impone una política mediterránea ambiciosa y si no la tenemos lo pagaremos muy caro.

Al hablar de hacer política Euro-mediterránea, es interesante ver los socios con los que había que hacer dicha política: Ben Ali, Gaddafi, Mubarak, etc.

Pero claro, no teníamos otros actores y nadie había predicho el derrumbe en pocos días de estos regímenes. Vivíamos siempre con la idea de que Ben Ali, Mubarak, estarían en el poder y falta un análisis de esas sociedades.

Y claro, por otro lado, el pragmatismo de unos países del norte que ven en la financiación de estos regímenes dictatoriales un elemento y característica de la *Realpolitik*. Una política que teóricamente debería haber contribuido a mantener una cierta seguridad. Que al final tal seguridad no fue tanta, y solo hay que ver el atentado

de Madrid del 11-M. Con relación a la primera parte de la entrevista, estoy de acuerdo con lo que ha dicho. El proceso de era Barcelona era un proceso débil desde el inicio por la conceptualización abstracta y por el conflicto de Israel y Palestina.

Para matizar, la idea creo que era incluir Israel y Palestina para sacar siempre esos dos países del proceso de paz. Ahí sin hablar del proceso de paz se podían adelantar operaciones concretas que permitirían asociar estos dos países sin hablar de la paz. Así que en el concepto inicial no se trataba de solucionar el conflicto de Israel y Palestina dentro del proceso de paz. Tampoco hay que diabolizar a los que concibieron este proyecto. La idea era la de meter estos dos países que eran muy complejos pero diciendo, dentro del proceso de Barcelona no vamos a hablar del proceso de paz, pero vamos a hablar de cooperación económica, etc. Tampoco era tan imbécil. Lo que pasa es que claro, quizás era un poco naif porque al final el proceso de paz es algo muy importante y tan relevante desde el punto de visto de político, que cada conflicto entre los dos, y los hay cada dos años, tensiones, el riesgo era que eso podía bloquear. Yo estoy convencido de que Francia empujó para poner estos dos estados dentro del proceso. Yo conozco a nuestra diplomacia y nuestra diplomacia es así.

Pero quizá haya algún problema adicional a la hora de conceptualizar lo que es y lo que no es conflicto. Así lo expresó Khraisni el embajador de Palestina para las Naciones Unidas, quien dijo que el conflicto no lo tenía Palestina. El conflicto lo tenía Israel que no quiere respetar las resoluciones. Pero dejando esto aparte de momento quisiera preguntarle qué opina usted de esta hipótesis. Si España fue uno de los motores de la política euro-mediterránea, cree que el segundo mandato de Aznar contribuyó a deteriorar y a hacer caer el proceso de Barcelona?

Yo creo que sí. Es una pena que Aznar se haya alejado tanto de Francia y que se haya enfadado con Francia. En una entrevista dijo que había puesto fin a dos siglos de dominación francesa. Esa especie de visión de una cierta corriente de derecha española obviando a Francia, su laicismo. Toda la tradición intelectual francesa vista por gente como país en declive que tiene un complejo de superioridad pero que no lo merece. La visión de Aznar era esa. Con una España en pleno auge, conquistadora. Esa era la visión. Yo soy un partidario de España y de la influencia de España en el mundo, pero su discurso era caricaturesco. Creo que fue contraproducente en su rivalidad con Francia. Yo lo percibía ya en España durante aquella época pero la fragilidad de la economía española se percibía muy bien. El turismo y el ladrillo no es una herencia de Aznar, pero que no se hayan dado cuenta de ello y hayan presumido tanto, ahora lo están pagando muy caro. Y yo creo que ahora no se en qué estado está la derecha española. Rajoy cuando vino aquí en Mayo tenía un discurso muy germano. Vino a visitar a Holland pero no quería emplear todas las ideas de Holland en aquel momento, en Mayo 2012. Estaba recién elegido como nuevo presidente español. Crecimiento, bonos europeos, Rajoy no empleaba ciertas palabras, miraba el problema bancario español pero las palabras que podían enfadar a Merkel no las quería emplear. Y ahora está totalmente con nosotros.

Me hace mucha gracia porque veo que ha evolucionado pero es curioso. Los españoles, una cierta corriente española tiene un prejuicio favorable a los alemanes. Los franceses siempre hay una especie de temor, de rivalidad, y los alemanes siempre son los mejores buena economía etc. Así que Rajoy ha cambiado mucho porque al principio en Mayo fue muy germano pero ahora los alemanes le están machacando. No hay otra palabra. Así que ve que no puede haber una alianza muy fiable con Merkel. Y quien le puede ayudar es Holland.

Yo lo digo como francés pero creo que es una constatación objetiva, Francia y España tienen mucho que hacer juntos. Hay muchísima proximidad. Por la geografía y la historia nuestros intereses son juntos. Creo que podemos llevar un proyecto para Europa, tener una visión más o menos común para la construcción de Europa, porque ahora Europa está muy estancada. Y Francia y España creo tienen una visión común. Cada uno puede tener su propia personalidad y dar su propio toque, pero son muy próximas. Yo creo que en la relación internacional podemos defender el modelo económico y social bastante próximo. Tenemos una idea bastante cercana del papel de la cultura, del humanismo. Lo que me hizo sufrir durante el período de Aznar es que Aznar estaba llevando a España del lado neo-conservadorista con una visión del mundo muy particular. Y me dolía que España si hubiera seguido esta corriente se hubiera acercado más al modelo anglosajón que a un modelo latino-europeo y eso es un poco triste.

Hablando de actividades y proyectos conjuntos, para desarrollar iniciativas hace falta dinero. La Unión por el Mediterráneo ha nacido dentro del contexto de crisis económica. Cómo puede afectar esto al desarrollo de las políticas puestas en marcha?

Nosotros hablamos de todos los recursos europeos que pueden ser utilizados para el proyecto Mediterráneo: la banca europea para las inversiones, etc. Es decir, utilizar todos los recursos y los mecanismos europeos para desarrollar esta política. Las empresas por su dinamismo, las del norte y las del sur pueden contribuir. Hay un crecimiento económico en el sur en el norte de África que nos puede ayudar. El África negra tiene un crecimiento del 5%, el Maghreb es más complejo. Túnez está convaleciente. El país con más recursos es Argelia. Toda la incertidumbre política de Argelia no sabemos qué va a pasar. No sabemos cuánto tiempo estará Bouteflika. Ellos tienen dinero pero no estoy seguro que lo gasten bien. Y para nosotros Argelia es muy importante. Holland va a ir allí el 19 y el 20 de Diciembre de 2012. Argelia es un socio, político muy importante. Es esencial para el mantenimiento de la estabilidad del Sahel. La crisis de AQIM es muy grave y es un socio “indomable”, reacio. No es fácil tratar con Argelia.

Como vivió Francia la “ofensiva” diplomática española por obtener la sede de la Unión por el Mediterráneo? Francia hubiera preferido tener la sede en Túnez y poner un secretario francés. Pero la realidad es que con la crisis económica, las revueltas del Magreb, la incapacidad de reaccionar por parte de la Unión Europea, debido a intereses nacionales e incapacidades institucionales, la UPM está muy paralizada.

Yo no supe bien de esta negociación porque no estuve implicado. Creo que es bueno que España tenga la Secretaría. Si hubiera existido en el Maghreb, Túnez no hubiera sido bueno. Nosotros queremos incentivar e impulsar nuevamente la Unión por el Mediterráneo. Por eso hemos estado en Malta a nivel de jefes de Estado. No había cumbre a nivel de jefes de Estado desde hace 10 años del Mediterráneo occidental. Vino Rajoy, Monti, y creo que tenemos que seguir con esta dinámica. Porque no creo que haya una cumbre Unión para el Mediterráneo después de mucho tiempo.

Activar mecanismos mucho más flexibles y dinámicos es fundamental. Que aparquen las ambiciones de la Leadership y que insistan más en la cooperación entre Partners. Esto me lo comentaba el Embajador de Turquía para las Naciones Unidas. Habría probablemente que horizontalizar la comunicación entre Partners y buscar potencias de negociación similares en lugar de que existan profesores y alumnos. El escenario es tan complejo que buscar las fórmulas de dinamizarlo y de hacerlo eficiente a través del establecimiento de objetivos de corto, mediano y largo plazo, y que se concreten es

fundamental, porque si no nos caemos de ilusiones que al final no se concretan en nada particular. Quizá y esto es una opinión personal, de lo que se cansan mucho los países del sur –y hay que tenerlo muy en cuenta porque ellos son expertos en saber cómo reivindicar y pedir- es que el medio plazo te pueden recriminar, “sí pero es que nos habéis prometido muchas cosas”. En el largo plazo luego parece inevitable que la comunicación se bloquee.

Efectivamente, pero yo creo que el gran desafío del momento es llevar a cabo muchas prioridades en un contexto en el que los Estados están debilitados por la crisis. Tenemos la prioridad del Sahel, tenemos la prioridad de Siria, la Europea, sacar a España, Italia y Grecia de la crisis. Tenemos que reanudar el Mediterráneo. No tenemos que olvidar África. Tenemos que crear lazos con Asia que es la zona emergente. La semana próxima estaremos en Laos en la cumbre Unión Europea-Asia con el presidente. Date cuenta. Una agenda brutal. Y las administraciones no pueden seguir ese ritmo. Para que te voy a mentir. Yo participo en todas estas cumbres. En Malta por ejemplo hemos pactado muchas cosas pero todo esto tiene que seguir, tienen que seguir las administraciones, las empresas, las organizaciones civiles. Yo lo veo complejo, porque es muy complejo. ¿Cuántas prioridades tenemos?

Entonces, el Mediterráneo sí es una petición para nosotros desde el principio. Es un eje, hay que profundizar. Hacemos visitas, en diciembre Argelia, a principios de año iremos a Marruecos, estuvo el presidente de Mauritania.

Con España de momento no veo volver momentos de tensión como lo tuvimos durante la época de Aznar. No veo las condiciones. Con Rajoy yo lo veo más pragmático menos ideológico.

Les questions sont d'abord, une première analyse de l'intérêt politique de la France pendant les années 80 dans la méditerranée.

Je ne suis pas un spécialiste,...euh... je vais vous donner un livre que je viens d'écrire sur le bassin méditerranéen, vous verrez que le seul souvenir très marqué que j'ai c'est que globalement l'Espagne a toujours été très intéressée par l'Amérique du Sud. L'Espagne continue des conflits qu'elle a avec le Maroc depuis 1815(), depuis l'indépendance du Tsar occidentale. L'Espagne n'avait pas d'intérêt, aucun intérêt dans l'Afrique du Nord, les moresses n'ont pas une bonne image et donc les espagnols sont très intéressée par l'Amérique du Sud. Il y eu dans les années Mitterrand, et surtout après la chute de Berlin, Mitterrand a toujours considéré que si l'Allemagne s'élargissait avec des pays de L'est, eh bien,...euh si l'Allemagne est ici, si la France est ici, si l'Allemagne a son échéance à l'EST, il s'est dit que la France a son échéance au Sud. Et donc il avait lancé son fameux 5 pour 5 par un appel de Marrakesh mais je ne suis pas un spécialiste de l'histoire. Mais plutôt ce qui m'intéresse c'est... l'Espagne est une chose, Barcelone est très différent de l'Espagne. Barcelone, la Catalogne, la dépendante poursuit sa stratégie.

Et donc la Catalogne a un intérêt dans la méditerranée mais l'Espagne a un intérêt en Amérique du Sud ce sont deux choses très différentes. Barcelone a toujours fait beaucoup de commerce dans la méditerranée et très les espagnoles ont pu avoir les accords Barcelone, c'est une très longue histoire. Mais ce qui s'est passé par la suite, ça été les accords Barcelone, bon ils sont ce qu'ils sont. Mais les accords de Barcelone n'ont pas abouti à du Moyen-Orient, à de la Palestine. Les accords n'ont pas marché parce que surtout il y a une disparité de la puissance de la commission et la faiblesse des pays Arabes. Et puis Barcelone a toujours mis, pas Barcelone mais la commission Européen a toujours mis des conditionnalités. Donc les Arabes étaient humiliés, il y a des dictateurs. Ce n'est pas..., moi je trouve que la période devient intéressante à partir de la crise crée pas Sarkozy.

Parce que à partir de 2007. Il ya Sarkozy qui monte au créneau et sa campagne. Je suis en relation avec Henri Géraux, qui est un copain et qui était un conseiller de Sarkozy. Et donc il mais beaucoup l'accent sur l'Europe et la méditerranée. Moi, j'ai vu Sarkozy personnellement et je lui ai défendu la thèse que à l'heure actuelle si on mettait en place dans le monde des grands blocs, L'Alena et Mercosur, d'ici Asiane plus cinq. Et si l'europe restait seule, L'europe en 2040 était une vieille europe, une grande Suisse avec des vieux, des minaré et pas d'arabes, c'est le déclin. Un minimum il fallait faire 500 M européens et 500 M Arabs et puis maintenant il faut rajouter l'Afrique. Alors ce qu'il y a de bien c'est la période de maintenant, il faut pas aller trop vite dans votre...euh... 1995, cette période de 2008 ou Sarkozy lance l'Union méditerranée et l'Espagne n'est pas content et l'Allemagne n'est pas contente. L'Espagne et l'Allemagne mettent des bâtons dans les roues parce que Sarkozy voulait faire une union des pays uniquement autour de la méditerranée. Donc sans l'Allemagne, sans L'Angleterre, donc ça été d'une grande violence. Très bien. Mais au moins je trouve que l'initiative de Sarkozy ca été de réveiller, c'était un choc, il était maladroit. Un choc et une stratégie, mais surtout un électro choc. Ça été mais européen regarder la méditerranée c'est pas un club méditerranée, c'est autre chose. Moi j'étais présent en 2008 quand il y a eu le sommet et il y avait Ben Ali, Bashar Al Assad, Mubarak, mais ça été un choc, le 2008 a été un choc, l'opinion française me dit qu'es-ce que c'est?..

Ce choc, Mr. Sarkozy a préparée... ?

Non il n'a rien préparé

Non?

Rien il a rien préparée du tout. Une bombe sous une bombe. Comme un terroriste.

Ce n'était pas une question d'idéologies ?

Non, c'est du terrorisme, politique. Il leur a fait peur il était fort et c'était malin. Et donc les Allemands ont réagi à cette violence et l'espagnol a dit il y a Barcelone qu'est-ce que vous allez faire... Un autre a dit que Barcelone ne marche pas. Ça marche pas très bien. C'est parce que... là les Espagnols sont... le Traité porte le nom de Barcelone mais c'est parce que ça porte le nom de Barcelone que c'est bien. Le traité est dépassé et ne fonctionne pas mais c'est pas à cause de Barcelone mais à cause de la commission européen qui ne l'a pas fait fonctionné...C'est pas à cause des Espagnols.

Alors le problème principal de son fonctionnement... c'est....cette commission européen incapable...

Oui très incapable. Elle n'a pas très bien gérée le processus de Barcelone. Elle n'a pas gérée l'union de méditerranée. Barouzo est un homme incapable, c'est un libéral, qui n'a pas d'idées, qui est néo-opportuniste.

C'est une question d'une communication verticale de l'union européenne vers le Maghreb et une question non-opérative au niveau de mécanismes, des politiques...

Ouais, ouais. C'était.... au niveau des mécanismes, ce n'était pas opérationnel. Au niveau politique, c'était moi je suis européen et vous êtes des arabes.

C'était verticale...

C'était verticale mais surtout symétrique. Moi, européen je connais la solution, vous arabes vous êtes sous-développées, on va vous aider. Donc ce n'a pas marché. L'union pour la méditerranée ça été un choc. Ça été un électrochoc. Les gens se sont dit mais qu'est-ce qui se passe ? Oui, après les choses évoluent très vite. Après 2008, ça bien marché l'union pour la méditerranée pendant 2 ans, puis en 2010-2011, il y a eu la révolution Arabes, il y a eu des morts, Ben Ali est mort, Moubarak est parti, Bashar Al Assad... le Roi du Maroc a été tourmenté, la Jordanie n'est pas stable. Et donc le choc de Sarkozy a donné un nouveau choc le choc du printemps Arabes qui est pour moi une chose importante. Les pays arabes ont été colonisés, puis dans les années 1960, les pays arabes ont été des pays libres, indépendants. Donc ils ont crus qu'ils allaient devenir des grands. Or, de 1960-2010 les pays arabes ont été dirigés par des dictateurs. Des dictateurs mis en place par des européens.

Financé par des européen et des américains.

Financé par des européen et des américains. Et surtout pour avoir le pétrole et le gaz. Les arabes ont eu la colonisation qui a duré un siècle, et après 60 ans de dictature par les européens. Et donc la révolution, 2010 c'est la révolution. Et par l'ancienne période, pour les populations, il y avait qu'une seule façon de s'opposer aux dictateurs : c'est d'être musulman. Et donc la religion est devenue un rassemblement de toutes les oppositions de dictateur. Et donc s'Islam est politique mais pas spirituel. L'Islam est devenue le refuge des humiliés. Et lorsqu'il y a eu des révolutions, bah après il y a études votes et les intégristes musulmans ont

gagné les élections. C'est normale parce qu'ils étaient les seules à avoir travaillé. Et donc on a bien la colonisation, issue de 60 ans d'humiliation, on a les révolutions. Et Maintenant il faut... avec les Arabes, on a le choc de Sarkozy ça c'était en 2010, et on a le choc de Sarkozy c'était en 2008, il y a eu un choc avec les dictatures. Et Maintenant il faut tout recommencer à zéro.

Avec des nuances, il faut tout recommencer à zéro. Eux, ils vont dire qu'est-ce qu'on fait. La deuxième chose c'est qu'il faut peut-être rester dans la méditerranée occidentale, ça veut dire 5 plus 5, peut-être ça va être mieux ; France, Italie, Malte, La Libye, La Mauritanie et le Maghreb. On voit bien sur cette carte que le Maghreb c'est occident, ça n'a rien avoir avec les autres.

Et là, moi ce que je vois à l'heure actuelle c'est qu'il y a un début de grand intérêt pour l'Europe. Parce là les arabes sont marginaux mais même en pays d'Afrique les arabes sont le pivot. Ils sont au centre entre l'Europe et l'Afrique. Et les nouveaux qui arrivent, ceux sont des gens qui regardent un peu au Nord, il regarde à l'Est et il regarde vers le Sud. Alors que ce soit en Tunisie ou au Maroc, il y a des stratégies pour aller en Afrique. Pour nous c'est important parce que, le temps qu'on regarde cette carte, ici tout ça s'est développé, ça s'est développé, il ne reste plus que ça. Ça c'est le dernier continent. Alors les chinois viennent, les américains et les européens viennent.

Mais c'est qui va gagner?

Moi, je pense que ceux sont le européen qui vont gagner. À cause de la proximité, la une proximité géographique, on tourne à la même heure, on a une profondeur historique. Et je pense que les européens vont gagner la bataille de l'Afrique. Les chinois sont corrompus, sont méchants, ils sont opportunistes et ils font que de l'argent. Les Américains sont un peu pareil. Nous, on est plus humanistes, et je pense que les européens ; donc les portugais s'occupe du Mozambique et les espagnols reviennent. Alors les espagnols, les espagnols ont été les premiers exportateurs au Maroc, ils ont même doublé la France. Ça veut dire que les espagnols sont moins en Amérique du Sud et ils viennent sur l'Afrique du Nord. Et les allemands qui ont fait le plein dans les pays de l'est. Maintenant les allemands descendent vers la Tunisie, on a fait des travaux. Les allemands descendent beaucoup en Afrique du Nord, à cause du soleil, des Ils viennent, ils se disent, il faut y aller. On a un retour très fort, il y a tout ce continent à développer. C'est énorme, énorme, énorme.

Le monde de l'Espagne est en la méditerranée. Je suis convaincu que la terre principale est l'Amérique latine. Mais quand le processus de Barcelone a été créé, l'Espagne crée aussi une nature puissante pour créer ça. Mais avant ça, pas convaincu de l'union.

Felipe González a fait beaucoup dans les années 80s, il a créé la Casa à la Sephorade, la Casa Arabe, beaucoup d'institutes. Maintenant les patrons dans l'Andalousie, il traverse le Gibraltar pour faire des affaires de l'autre côté.

Je crois que l'Espagne depuis les années 85s jusqu'au processus de Barcelone, L'Espagne après Franco était rien, était sous-développée. Donc elle cherche un nouvel horizon géopolitique, géostratégique pour avoir une situation politique et diplomatique plus important dans...

Vous pensez que les accords de Barcelone lui ont donné cette position stratégique ?

Oui, exactement. C'est une instrumentalisation des problèmes du Maghreb pour avoir une posture, une situation diplomatique plus importante.

Oui, certainement

Pour avoir une position de management, de leadership, pour ces politiques et ceux de la méditerranée.

Vous avez raison les accords de 95 ont donnée à l'Espagne une autorité. Mais les entrepreneurs espagnols n'étaient pas convaincus. Il n'y avait pas d'envole.

Oui, voilà. La société...

Non, et la bourgeoisie de Franco étaient orientés vers l'Amérique du Sud. Donc il y avait bien un effort diplomatique mais la société naviguait vers l'Amérique. Maintenant la société change et elle s'intéresse au Maghreb. Les algériens, je connais des ministres algériens qui vont faire beaucoup d'exposés en Espagne. Il y a un retour vers l'Espagne. L'Allemagne descend au Maghreb, L'Espagne descend au Maghreb. Il y a un intérêt qui recommence.

Dans le monde méditerranée les pays les plus important sont La France, elle a de l'influence dans les Maghreb, L'Espagne a aussi de certaines intérêts dans la région...

De plus en plus.

L'Espagne et la France, es-ce qu'il y a une rivalité?

Oui, pure rivalité. L'Italie s'intéresse à la Libye, l'Italie commence à faire des coupures-de-presse. Mario Monti était en Algérie la semaine dernière. L'Italie commence à bouger. Angela Merkel va voir Butefica. Non, ça commence, ça commence, ça commence. Il y a des rivalités... oui, peut-être un peu. Oui, mais je ne crois pas en ce moment. Parce que la France a de grands groupes sur les réseaux de vie : l'eau, c'est un réseau de vie, l'électricité. Nous avons sur l'eau et l'électricité les chemins fer, le téléphone. On a des grandes structures AEDF, GDF, Suez. Et ces grands groupes, oui, s'intéresse à la méditerranée mais ce n'est pas majeur. Ces grands groupes sont en Chine, en Amérique. Ce qui fait que les Espagnols eux ils ont beaucoup de, comme les Italiens, beaucoup de PME, PMI, des choses moins grosse. C'est-à-dire ce qu'ils veulent, oui, ce qu'ils veulent c'est Renaud qui est allé identifier des grands groupes. Mais les petits groupes ils n'y vont pas encore. Donc les espagnols, ceux sont des petits entreprises entre Andalousie et le riff, ceux des entreprises de 20 ouvriers, des petites. Puisqu'ils n'ont pas le crédit en Espagne, il traverse de l'autre côté en bateau et le samedi ils reviennent pour passer le weekend avec leurs familles. C'est très proches, c'est une heure de bateau.

Donc il y a un peu de jalousie, il y a tout pour entre l'Espagne et la France, avec un historique. Vous savez pourquoi il y a de la jalousie ? Avec l'Allemagne y avait de la haine, avec l'Espagne y a de la jalousie. Je sais pas, c'est histoire. Vous connaissez la très mauvaise expression de Napoléon?

Non,

Il était très humiliant, Napoléon a dit la chose suivante: « au de-là des Pyrénées, c'est l'Afrique qui commence. C'est très méchants, ça veut dire que les espagnols sont des mores, des africains. Non, c'est très méchant. Quoi qu'il en soit, moi je crois qu'il y a maintenant un intérêt entre la France, l'Espagne, l'Allemagne pour développer. Ce qu'il y a d'intéressant c'est qu'il y a, ce qu'on appelle dans notre jargon ce qu'on appelle la troisième révolution industrielle. et la troisième révolution industrielle c'est la révolution par l'énergie renouvelable. La première révolution c'est la vapeur et elle a donné la machine à vapeur. La

deuxième révolution c'est le moteur à explosion qui donne la voiture et l'avion. La troisième révolution c'est l'énergie renouvelable. L'Afrique du Nord est bien mieux placée alors tout le monde descend en Afrique. Il y a le gars de téléphone qui vient de la Silicone Valley qui sont maghrébins, exilé en Amérique, qui sont très riches et maintenant reviennent très puissants. Ils bouffaient du business au Maroc et reviennent du Silicone Valley donc ils ont de l'argent. Il sont très fort ils sont très intéressants et ils viennent... Donc les nouvelles énergies vont être une source. Les nouvelles technologies font que l'espace pertinent, l'espace optimum, c'est le replus des pays arabes.

Les pays arabes sont absorbés dans le le... et on peut dire que les révolutions c'est la transformation pour entrer dans l'Europe ou pour être proche de l'Europe et ça va progresser. On revient à la Turquie, la Turquie ça marche très fort, l'Afrique du Nord marche très fort (il indique sur la carte). On sent que la pression de l'Europe les absorbe. C'est le retour de la proximité, on croyait que la mondialisation avait tué la proximité. On avait cru que la mondialisation était ; on va n'importe où, ils viennent de n'importe où, on n'importe quoi avec n'importe qui, et on s'est planté. Maintenant c'est la régionalisation, les grands ensembles, la coopération avec les voisins, lui, il appelle ça la continentalisation. Enfaite c'est des grands systèmes qui prennent la formes de quartiers d'Europe (il dessine sur la carte). Ça fait des tranches de melon. Voilà. Ça fait 4 ou 5 et ça tourne à la même heure. Il n'y a pas de stress, il y a des économies de transports. Et donc j'ai fait deux articles là-dessus... (Il demande à Marie de chercher les articles). Ceux sont des quartiers d'Europe, tout le monde a la même heure, tout le monde regarde la même télévision, et on est complémentaire.

C'est états unis européens africaines...

Oui, que ce soit des états unis Europe, méditerranéen ou africaines, au moins c'est un sorte de libre échange en Afrique. De plus en plus les sociétés Ford, Siemens, Telefonika, ils ont des découpages Europe, méditerranéen ou africains. Et voilà maintenant c'est comme ça.

Et maintenant avec la crise économique, la situation de la méditerranée avec la situation politique... c'est maintenant une question de relation bilatérale ou l'union européen a perdu toute possibilité de coopération multilatérale?

Si maintenant qu'aucune des révolutions c'est du bilatérale. Mais il y a beaucoup de laboratoires continuent d'avoir une conception multilatérale et régional. Oui, c'est vrai que ce matin on travaillait avec le Maroc, voilà- et la semaine prochaine je pars en Tunisie. C'est il y a des fragments, chaque pays a des niveaux très différent. Mais l'horizon c'est quand même la convergence. C'est le rapprochement, la complémentarité et surtout la troisième révolution industrielle.

J'ai visité à Barcelone l'Union pour la méditerranée. Et j'ai vu là que l'activité est pratiquement paralysée.

Quand était-ce ?

Je crois une année, en 2011.

2011...

Je crois qu'on a touché toutes les choses que je voulais discuter ce que je voulais discuter. J'ai juste une dernière question, le future au niveau opérative, dans une

plateforme simple c'est plus opérative que une plateforme plus compliqué comme l'union pour la méditerranée...?

Oui, mais je sens que cinq c'est simple, il y en a eu un, c'est rapide. Il va avoir le 5 du 5 pour sécurité alimentaire, le 5 du 5 sur l'énergie, le 5 du 5 sur le transport et la logistique. Ce qu'il y a de bien avec le 5 du 5, c'est qu'il les 5 du sud et les 5 du Nord, mais il y a aussi la commission qui est présente. Bon, le Allemand accepte que... Le 5 du 5 c'est un espace de discussion, ce n'est pas un espace de décision. Ils discutent de la santé, ils discutent de chose et d'autres, et ça remonte au niveau de la commission européen. La commission reste forte, le 5 du 5 n'est pas décisionnaire. Non, le 5 du 5 n'est pas décisionnaire, ça reste un espace de consultations, je vais vous chercher un de mes livre que je vais vous dédicacer.



PRESIDENCIA
DEL GOBIERNO

GABINETE DE LA
PRESIDENCIA DEL GOBIERNO

José Miguel Vidal Zapatero
DIRECTOR ADJUNTO

Dr. D. Ivan Ureta Vaquero
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Madrid, 28 de enero de 2011

Estimado Sr. Ureta,

En nombre del Presidente del Gobierno agradecemos el envío de un cuestionario breve para el libro 'Poder, comunicación política y la cuestión de la migración-seguridad en el Mediterráneo', que está usted elaborando.

A continuación puede encontrar las respuestas relevantes al cuestionario enviado.

Atentamente

COMPLEJO DE LA MONCLOA
28071 - MADRID

1. ¿Cuál es su opinión respecto a la evolución general del rol que ha jugado España y su diplomacia en Europa durante los últimos 20 años con relación a los problemas y retos que presenta la región Mediterránea por lo que respecta a la seguridad en Europa?

España ha tenido un papel protagonista en el acercamiento de Europa a la región Mediterránea en los últimos 20 años. El lanzamiento de propuestas como la Conferencia de Seguridad y Cooperación en el Mediterráneo y el Dialogo 5+5, la puesta en marcha del Diálogo OTAN-Mediterráneo y, sobre todo, el arranque del Proceso de Barcelona son prueba de ello. En todos estos casos, España ha trabajado exitosamente para impulsar en Europa una sensibilidad cada vez más desarrollada hacia el espacio mediterráneo, lo que ha permitido el desarrollo de un acervo muy completo en materia de cooperación regional, seguridad, desarrollo o dimensión humana.

2. ¿Piensa de alguna manera, que España y Francia han mantenido una cierta rivalidad entre sí con el fin de subrayar y realzar la importancia y el impacto de los problemas mediterráneos así como su importancia geo-estratégica -e.g. migración ilegal, terrorismo, recursos naturales y energéticos- y así ganar protagonismo en la política Europea para contrarrestar los efectos de un alargamiento de Europa hacia el este?

El papel de Francia y España en el Mediterráneo han sido complementarios. Y no olvidemos otros actores clave como Italia o Portugal. Juntos hemos conseguido que esta región se convirtiese en una prioridad para la Unión Europea a la altura de la Europa Central y Oriental. Por nuestra ubicación geográfica pero más que nada por nuestra historia, desde Francia y España hemos sabido transmitir a otros Estados miembros de la Unión Europea más alejados de la región la importancia del Mediterráneo como espacio estratégico esencial para nuestra seguridad y prosperidad futuras. Aunque sigue habiendo trabajo por delante, hoy ya se acepta en todas las capitales de la UE la importancia geoestratégica del Mediterráneo en temas tan centrales como la inmigración, el terrorismo y los recursos naturales y energéticos.

3. Cuando Ud. accedió a la Presidencia del Gobierno, después de dos legislaturas del Sr. Aznar, ¿cómo podría definir la situación y la imagen de España y su diplomacia en los círculos europeos? ¿Percibió algún tipo de hostilidad o desconfianza? ¿Entusiasmo y expectativas por el cambio de gobierno?

Cuando accedí a la Presidencia del Gobierno sentí un amplio apoyo en los círculos europeos y, en general, en el ámbito internacional. Conscientes del peso y la influencia de España, percibí confianza en que se podía reforzar el papel de España como actor

global, tarea en la que todos los gobiernos españoles han estado firmemente comprometidos.

4. ¿Cuál es su opinión respecto a cómo se encontró la situación de la acción política exterior española con relación a la región Mediterránea?

La política europea hacia el Mediterráneo reflejan los esfuerzos de España por sentar las bases para lograr un espacio de paz, seguridad y prosperidad entre las dos riberas. Este enfoque se define en 1995 con la firma de la Declaración de Barcelona que alumbró la Asociación Euromediterránea. España fue central en este proceso y continuó desempeñando durante los años que siguieron un papel crucial en el levantamiento de la arquitectura institucional de la Asociación Euromediterránea hasta el nacimiento de la Unión por el Mediterráneo en 2008.

5. ¿Cuáles fueron los frentes más urgentes en los que se tuvo trabajar para reactivar el rol de España en el contexto Euro-Mediterráneo después del gobierno de Aznar?

Mejorar las relaciones con Marruecos fue un importante objetivo que fijé en nuestra política exterior hacia el Mediterráneo. Desde entonces, las relaciones con Rabat han ido adquiriendo mayor peso específico, abarcando todos los campos y permeando todos los sectores que integran una relación estratégica de vecindad. Desde la cooperación estrecha en temas como la lucha contra la inmigración ilegal y el terrorismo a las relaciones económicas o la cooperación euromediterránea, hemos avanzado en un amplio abanico de asuntos de interés mutuo.

6. Durante su mandato, ¿En que forma ha visto evolucionar el papel y la influencia de España y su diplomacia en los círculos europeos con relación a la política Euro-Mediterránea y especialmente con relación a temas como la seguridad y la inmigración?

España es una referencia europea en la política Euro-mediterránea, tanto para los Estados miembros de la UE como para nuestros socios mediterráneos. En los últimos años, existe un creciente reconocimiento de la importancia de esta región para Europa. Es verdad que la relevancia de las cuestiones relativas a la seguridad o la inmigración ha sido crucial para ello, pero también lo ha sido el reconocimiento del potencial económico de la región y de su peso en el mundo. La máxima expresión de este reconocimiento fue el gran apoyo de España al Estatuto Avanzado entre la UE y Marruecos en 2010, el primero con un país del Magreb, o el establecimiento del Secretariado de la Unión por el Mediterráneo en Barcelona. Los últimos acontecimientos

